Korean 777 Down in SFO

I don't think I've seen it mentioned here yet, but maybe I missed it buried in the side conversations...

But it's being reported today that, according to the NTSB, the plane was doing about 105 kts when the target approach speed should have been about 135 kts.


Wooooooaaaaaah...if accurate.
 
If you had trained these crews you wouldn't be asking these questions. They defer to authority in ways we can't imagine possible and do it every time. As an IP you can set up a scenario in that any pilot older than 12 would recognize as dead man walking, and the FO's wouldn't say shlt if they had a mouthful.

What's the date on the the materials your quoted regarding CRM in the U. S.?

I have never trained flight crews from the Asian culture, but I have participated in joint exercises with the Japanese Maritime Safety Agency, (which has since changed their name to Japanese Coast Guard). The hierarchy of rank I observed was very rigid, and nearly feudal. At the time I was a Lt. Cmdr., and when I addressed a pilot who was their equivalent of an Ensign he seemed very uncomfortable and would not meet my eyes. His English was very good, so I know it wasn't a language issue. In our culture if I had asked a similar question of a similar ranked pilot the response would have been direct and professional.
In the air the system they used was more directive than supportive, by that I mean in our system the crew supports each other in all phases of flight. For instance in a hover over a target the PF gets heading, altitude and sea state clues from the PNF regardless of rank. I observed that in the crews I interacted with the PF was always the senior rank and he got zero input unless he asked for it. Now I recognize that's just anecdotal evidence of one data point, but in our debrief others made similar comments about cockpit structure and workload. My hunch is that culture played a huge role in the breakdown that apparently occurred in that cockpit.
 
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I don't think I've seen it mentioned here yet, but maybe I missed it buried in the side conversations...

But it's being reported today that, according to the NTSB, the plane was doing about 105 kts when the target approach speed should have been about 135 kts.


Wooooooaaaaaah...if accurate.

As I recall the NTSB just stated target speed was 137 kts, and they were flying 40 kts below that, or 97 kts...which is three knots slower than we fly the Duke on final! :yikes:
 
With the emoticons used in the post I was referring to, it's a little hard to tell if the poster is serious or not.

Well... Let's see..

Suppose it was your daughter who was thrown out of the plane and killed instantly... Or your daughter was run over by a first reponders vehicle and crushed to death.... Both of those fatalities were caused by a complete idiot pilot flying 300+ humans in a perfectly safe plane and surrounded by three other pilots who just sat there and watched the fiasco unfold until 4 seconds before impact......

What is your take on what happened?:dunno::dunno::confused:
 
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As I recall the NTSB just stated target speed was 137 kts, and they were flying 40 kts below that, or 97 kts...which is three knots slower than we fly the Duke on final! :yikes:

Exactly. I have never sat in a 777, but I'm guessing they have a speed bug that glues to the speed tape on the MFD when they set Vref. No excuse for being that slow. If they had autothrottle off as has been reported why weren't there hands on the throttles and at least one set of eyes monitoring speed?? :dunno:

Our SOP in the dinky little planes I flew was for the PNF to monitor all flight parameters and call critical speeds, altitudes and configurations. I would hope the guys in the front row of a heavy civil transport would be doing something similar.
 
Well... Let's see..

Suppose it was your daughter who was thrown out of the plane and killed instantly... Or your daughter was run over by a first reponders vehicle and crushed to death.... Both of those fatalities were caused by a complete idiot pilot flying 300+ humans in a perfectly safe plane and surrounded by three other pilots who just sat there and watched the fiasco unfold until 4 seconds before impact......

What is your take on what happened?:dunno::dunno::confused:

My take on what happened is beside the point. I was just rather confused by your statement that seemed to rejoice in the idea that the pilots at fault would be culturally forced to kill themselves (which is inaccurate anyway as you now understand).
 
Okay ultra-PC granola heads let me just impart this minuscule pearl of wisdom to you - consider that the concept of CRM ( as it is TRULY intended) does not extend itself well into all cultures. Furthermore, in the interest of aviation safety should we let any specific cultural norm impact negatively the true spirit of CRM ? Or, do you just think the other three pilots were unconscious for the approach ?

THIS.

My last semester's research project was on the cultural issues related to cockpit management. Some cultures have a very difficult time with challenging "superiors" Other cultures have a very difficult time raising bad news in general. Still others have what we would consider a fatalistic/resignation attitude that causes problems.

I'm not going to speculate further, but it would be foolish to eliminate culture (which can be tied to race in SOME cases) just because it's politically incorrect.

These issues pop up in all fields, I've experienced them in IT, medicine, and the military.
 
With all due respect, I think you're dodging.

What I'm asking is: Are you hoping that that these pilots kill themselves?


Hmmm...

Hoping.... NO

Predicting the possibility...... Kinda...

Big difference sir..
 
From UAL waiting to depart SFO

On July 6, 2013 at approximately 1827Z I was the 747-400 relief F/O on flt 885, ID326/06 SFO-KIX. I was a witness to the Asiana Flt 214 accident. We had taxied to hold short of runway 28L at SFO on taxiway F, and were waiting to rectify a HAZMAT cargo issue as well as our final weights before we could run our before takeoff checklist and depart. As we waited on taxiway F heading East, just prior to the perpendicular holding area, all three pilots took notice of the Asiana 777 on short final. I noticed the aircraft looked low on glidepath and had a very high deck angle compared to what seemed “normal”. I then noticed at the apparent descent rate and closure to the runway environment the aircraft looked as though it was going to impact the approach lights mounted on piers in the SF Bay. The aircraft made a fairly drastic looking pull up in the last few feet and it appeared and sounded as if they had applied maximum thrust. However the descent path they were on continued and the thrust applied didn't appear to come soon enough to prevent impact. The tail cone and empennage of the 777 impacted the bulkhead seawall and departed the airplane and the main landing gear sheared off instantly. This created a long debris field along the arrival end of 28L, mostly along the right side of 28L. We saw the fuselage, largely intact, slide down the runway and out of view of our cockpit. We heard much confusion and quick instructions from SFO Tower and a few moments later heard an aircraft go around over the runway 28 complex. We realized within a few moments that we were apparently unharmed so I got on the PA and instructed everyone to remain seated and that we were safe.

We all acknowledged if we had been located between Runways 28R and 28L on taxiway F we would have likely suffered damage to the right side aft section of our aircraft from the 777.

Approximately two minutes later I was looking out the left side cockpit windows and noticed movement on the right side of Runway 28L. Two survivors were stumbling but moving abeam the Runway “28L” marking on the North side of the runway. I saw one survivor stand up, walk a few feet, then appear to squat down. The other appeared to be a woman and was walking, then fell off to her side and remained on the ground until rescue personnel arrived. The Captain was on the radio and I told him to tell tower what I had seen, but I ended up taking the microphone instead of relaying through him. I told SFO tower that there appeared to be survivors on the right side of the runway and they needed to send assistance immediately. It seemed to take a very long time for vehicles and assistance to arrive for these victims. The survivors I saw were approximately 1000-1500' away from the fuselage and had apparently been ejected from the fuselage.

We made numerous PAs to the passengers telling them any information we had, which we acknowledged was going to change rapidly, and I left the cockpit to check on the flight attendants and the overall mood of the passengers, as I was the third pilot and not in a control seat. A couple of our flight attendants were shaken up but ALL were doing an outstanding and extremely professional job of handling the passenger's needs and providing calm comfort to them. One of the flight attendants contacted unaccompanied minors' parents to ensure them their children were safe and would be taken care of by our crew. Their demeanor and professionalism during this horrific event was noteworthy. I went to each cabin and spoke to the passengers asking if everyone was OK and if they needed any assistance, and gave them information personally, to include telling them what I saw from the cockpit. I also provided encouragement that we would be OK, we'd tell them everything we learn and to please relax and be patient and expect this is going to be a long wait. The passenger mood was concerned but generally calm. A few individuals were emotional as nearly every passenger on the left side of the aircraft saw the fuselage and debris field going over 100 knots past our aircraft only 300' away. By this point everyone had looked out the windows and could see the smoke plume from the 777. A number of passengers also noticed what I had seen with the survivors out near the end of 28L expressing concern that the rescue effort appeared slow for those individuals that had been separated from the airplane wreckage.

We ultimately had a tug come out and tow us back to the gate, doing a 3 point turn in the hold short area of 28L. We were towed to gate 101 where the passengers deplaned. Captain Jim Abel met us at the aircraft and gave us information he had and asked if we needed any assistance or hotel rooms for the evening. Captain Herlihy and F/O Ishikawa went to hotels and I went to my home an hour away in the East Bay.

----------------------------------------------------------------------
 
Hmmm...

Hoping.... NO

Predicting the possibility...... Kinda...

Big difference sir..

Okay, I'm glad to see your not hoping for that. You might see how I mistakenly derived from your post when you predicted that they would kill themselves, and particularly the part where you called that "better news" than the flight crew having survived in the first place.
 
If they had autothrottle off as has been reported why weren't there hands on the throttles and at least one set of eyes monitoring speed?? :dunno:

Our SOP in the dinky little planes I flew was for the PNF to monitor all flight parameters and call critical speeds, altitudes and configurations.

This is exactly what happened, according to preliminary CVR record parsing. The F/O called out "airspeed" 7 sec before impact (note that there was no cultural problem involved and all the discussion in this thread was apparently wasted). Stick shaker activated 3 sec before impact. Engines went takeoff thrust 1.5 sec before impact.

At this point I suspect that the captain fumbled something with throttles or tried to salvage landing with low thrust instead of going around immediately.
 
You're thinking that sitting in the right seat while watching this show until only seven seconds remained until game over indicates there was no cultural issue? I'd suggest exactly the opposite.

This is exactly what happened, according to preliminary CVR record parsing. The F/O called out "airspeed" 7 sec before impact (note that there was no cultural problem involved and all the discussion in this thread was apparently wasted). Stick shaker activated 3 sec before impact. Engines went takeoff thrust 1.5 sec before impact.

At this point I suspect that the captain fumbled something with throttles or tried to salvage landing with low thrust instead of going around immediately.
 
You're thinking that sitting in the right seat while watching this show until only seven seconds remained until game over indicates there was no cultural issue? I'd suggest exactly the opposite.

+1 The gyrations had been going on for quite awhile.
 
http://avherald.com/h?article=464ef64f&opt=0

A/P turned off at 1600'. They were hand flying it from there in. From everything else reported so far, it sounds like they got low and got suckered into pitching up to correct. Forgot to add power until it was too late.

If true, it will be interesting to see how this plays out. There will be those who believe in total automation that will use this as an example of the need to let automation do its job while others will cite this case along with others like Colgan and Air France as a need to emphasize basic pilot skills. Wonder who is going to win...
 
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You're thinking that sitting in the right seat while watching this show until only seven seconds remained until game over indicates there was no cultural issue? I'd suggest exactly the opposite.

According to the Aviation Herald article linked by Fearless Tower, "all responsibilities are with the training captain." If he is right-seat and not flying, it is hard to see how he would consider himself subservient or be deferential to the pilot in the left seat.
 
Assumes facts not in evidence. I think we will eventually know more about the hierarchal/seniority issues, but for now all we know is that nobody said nuthin' until their goose was cooked.



According to the Aviation Herald article linked by Fearless Tower, "all responsibilities are with the training captain." If he is right-seat and not flying, it is hard to see how he would consider himself subservient or be deferential to the pilot in the left seat.
 
You're thinking that sitting in the right seat while watching this show until only seven seconds remained until game over indicates there was no cultural issue? I'd suggest exactly the opposite.

:yeahthat:

This crew was behind the curve from the moment they disconnected the AP. Unless the check pilot's duty was to show how to crash into a seawall he failed to perform his duty. Unless the PF's duty was to see how far behind the airplane he could get and still survive he failed to perform his duty. Together they took a perfectly normal situation and did a complete job of screwing the pooch.
 
Not bragging, just stating fact. All, save one, are people who fire off insults as their main debate tactic. Not those who use an insult to accentuate their point mind you...that's a bit more tolerable...but rather the insult is all they can come up with.

The other one s god's gift to everything. I'll give you three guesses on that one! :)

Tim Winters? ;) ;) ;)
 
Not bragging, just stating fact. All, save one, are people who fire off insults as their main debate tactic. Not those who use an insult to accentuate their point mind you...that's a bit more tolerable...but rather the insult is all they can come up with.

The other one s god's gift to everything. I'll give you three guesses on that one! :)

Well at least now I know I'm not among the 31! ;)
 
Can we agree that a pilot in transition with only a couple landings in type is at risk to screw up? GOOD, WE AGREE!

What's the antidote to this? An experienced instructor in the other seat (in this case 3000+hrs in type), maintaining situational awareness. GOOD, WE AGREE!

How did this get messed up?
1) Loss of situational awareness due to fatigue.
2) Complacency of the instructor
3) Instructor and (maybe) the pilot flying had allowed their hand flying skills to atrophy and neither realized how much trouble they were in until it was too late
4) Instructor was hesitant to correct his (years of experience flying heavies) friend and did not react until it was too late.


IMO situation 1 could definitely be a factor, but there were four pilots on the plane and so we can assume they were taking steps to mitigate acute fatigue. Chronic fatigue could have been a problem. Both of these issues are well known and the NTSB will be looking into them.

Situations 2, 3 and 4 can be called cultural problems. Cultural problems in this case are not race issues but a problem that exists within a community. Namely the pilot community in an airline.
 
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All this talk of cultural factors contributing to 3 apparently trained pilots sitting by watching the pilot flying allow the plane to come in so slow that it landed short of a runway is a bit over analyzing to me. My take- a pilot who had reportedly never landed this type of plane at this airport before allowed his aircraft to become to slow and came up short of the runway. Inexperience with the airplane and the airport are never good factors even for us light airplane pilots. I'll fess up and say my approaches at airports I'm landing at for the first time are never my best especially compared to landings at my home airport. I'm comfortable making the assertion that this lack of familiarity with this airport and this plane contributed to how it was possible to get so slow on approach.

Similarly, one thing I have not heard much about is that this approach appears to be largely over water( a god send as it eliminates the chance of ground fatalities). However, if this captain was training and the glide slope was out, I'd imagine it would be tough for the more experienced pilots to give the training captain much guidance as to where his speed should be at various stages of the approach.(i.e- "make sure you cross the highway above 140 knots). I know they have distance marking guidance on modern airplanes and the lack of visual cues is a sorry excuse for what happened but it could have made communication throughout the approach slower because the experienced pilots had fewer triggers in their own minds about the need to go around sooner.(I.e " oh we just crossed the highway at 105 knots, we are too slow.)

It's all speculation at this point and I'll be curious to see what the cockpit voice recorder reveals about the approach( was anyone calling out airspeeds and distance remaining or where the 3 other pilots just passengers at that point too). I'm just shocked pilots with that level of experience could make such basic airmanship mistakes.
 
All this talk of cultural factors contributing to 3 apparently trained pilots sitting by watching the pilot flying allow the plane to come in so slow that it landed short of a runway is a bit over analyzing to me. My take- a pilot who had reportedly never landed this type of plane at this airport before allowed his aircraft to become to slow and came up short of the runway.

121 crews don't operate that way when things are going right. No one pilot is supposed to be flying alone without the others confirming and operating as a team.

That's the whole point of being a crew operation. You might have a bad brain day but hopefully the guy next to you isn't.

And the aircraft itself is designed to be a huge help (most of the time...) if you let it.

You also don't make it to a 777 cockpit without having demonstrated a bejillion times -- that you know what an airspeed indicator is for.

But then again, the Air France crew proved that multiple pilots can stare at an airspeed indicator and not believe it.

Speculation, yes. Educated a bit compared to the non-pilot speculators.

Seen the non-pilot speculation on Facebook lately? You'll want to gouge your eyes out if you think this is bad.
 
121 crews don't operate that way when things are going right. No one pilot is supposed to be flying alone without the others confirming and operating as a team.

That's the whole point of being a crew operation. You might have a bad brain day but hopefully the guy next to you isn't.

And the aircraft itself is designed to be a huge help (most of the time...) if you let it.

You also don't make it to a 777 cockpit without having demonstrated a bejillion times -- that you know what an airspeed indicator is for.

But then again, the Air France crew proved that multiple pilots can stare at an airspeed indicator and not believe it.

Speculation, yes. Educated a bit compared to the non-pilot speculators.

Seen the non-pilot speculation on Facebook lately? You'll want to gouge your eyes out if you think this is bad.

I can't even imagine what non-pilots are saying- that's why I discussing it here.:). I also recognize what you are saying is true with regards to 121 carriers using multiple pilots and the benefits to crew resource management and the like. My whole thing is that no matter how many pilots are on board, only one is flying at a time. If the other pilots waited until 7 seconds before the crash to excecise their input into the situation than the pilot flying was essentially flying as a single pilot operation until that point. How that pilot flying allowed his airspeed to become so slow is really the only concern I have. You could have had 20 pilots in that cockpit all seasoned with multiple approaches in the plane and into that airport and it may not have made a difference if no one was aware of the basic components of flying....airspeed on approach is important. That's why I'm most curious to see if the crew, (because clearly the pilot at thr controls was not aware)was aware of how slow they were getting before the 7 seconds. If all the pilots on board failed to notice this basic prinicple of flying, than that's more evident of a serious lack of basic airmanship coupled with other mitigating factors,( unfamiliar pilot with airplane and airport flying devoid of the usual aids he's use to) than any crew management issues. No one can communicate what they don't recognize needs to be said. If the crew did recognize the airspeed issues and remained silent well then..... Wow
 
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A friend posted on FB this e-mail from one of the pilots in a different aircraft that was almost a little too close for comfort... leaving her intro intact at the top...

----

I'm going to share an email I received this evening from a friend in aviation. The originator of the email was one of the IRO's on United's 747 which was on the taxiway at SFO and had a birdseye view of the Asiana 777 crash;
Here is an email from a United crew holding short of the runway as the Asiana B-777 approached:

On July 6, 2013 at approximately 1827Z I was the 747-400 relief F/O on flt 885, ID326/06 SFO-KIX. I was a witness to the Asiana Flt 214 accident. We had taxied to hold short of runway 28L at SFO on taxiway F, and were waiting to rectify a HAZMAT cargo issue as well as our final weights before we could run our before takeoff checklist and depart. As we waited on taxiway F heading East, just prior to the perpendicular holding area, all three pilots took notice of the Asiana 777 on short final. I noticed the aircraft looked low on glidepath and had a very high deck angle compared to what seemed “normal”. I then noticed at the apparent descent rate and closure to the runway environment the aircraft looked as though it was going to impact the approach lights mounted on piers in the SF Bay. The aircraft made a fairly drastic looking pull up in the last few feet and it appeared and sounded as if they had applied maximum thrust. However the descent path they were on continued and the thrust applied didn't appear to come soon enough to prevent impact. The tail cone and empennage of the 777 impacted the bulkhead seawall and departed the airplane and the main landing gear sheared off instantly. This created a long debris field along the arrival end of 28L, mostly along the right side of 28L. We saw the fuselage, largely intact, slide down the runway and out of view of our cockpit. We heard much confusion and quick instructions from SFO Tower and a few moments later heard an aircraft go around over the runway 28 complex. We realized within a few moments that we were apparently unharmed so I got on the PA and instructed everyone to remain seated and that we were safe.

We all acknowledged if we had been located between Runways 28R and 28L on taxiway F we would have likely suffered damage to the right side aft section of our aircraft from the 777.

Approximately two minutes later I was looking out the left side cockpit windows and noticed movement on the right side of Runway 28L. Two survivors were stumbling but moving abeam the Runway “28L” marking on the North side of the runway. I saw one survivor stand up, walk a few feet, then appear to squat down. The other appeared to be a woman and was walking, then fell off to her side and remained on the ground until rescue personnel arrived. The Captain was on the radio and I told him to tell tower what I had seen, but I ended up taking the microphone instead of relaying through him. I told SFO tower that there appeared to be survivors on the right side of the runway and they needed to send assistance immediately. It seemed to take a very long time for vehicles and assistance to arrive for these victims. The survivors I saw were approximately 1000-1500' away from the fuselage and had apparently been ejected from the fuselage.

We made numerous PAs to the passengers telling them any information we had, which we acknowledged was going to change rapidly, and I left the cockpit to check on the flight attendants and the overall mood of the passengers, as I was the third pilot and not in a control seat. A couple of our flight attendants were shaken up but ALL were doing an outstanding and extremely professional job of handling the passenger's needs and providing calm comfort to them. One of the flight attendants contacted unaccompanied minors' parents to ensure them their children were safe and would be taken care of by our crew. Their demeanor and professionalism during this horrific event was noteworthy. I went to each cabin and spoke to the passengers asking if everyone was OK and if they needed any assistance, and gave them information personally, to include telling them what I saw from the cockpit. I also provided encouragement that we would be OK, we'd tell them everything we learn and to please relax and be patient and expect this is going to be a long wait. The passenger mood was concerned but generally calm. A few individuals were emotional as nearly every passenger on the left side of the aircraft saw the fuselage and debris field going over 100 knots past our aircraft only 300' away. By this point everyone had looked out the windows and could see the smoke plume from the 777. A number of passengers also noticed what I had seen with the survivors out near the end of 28L expressing concern that the rescue effort appeared slow for those individuals that had been separated from the airplane wreckage.

We ultimately had a tug come out and tow us back to the gate, doing a 3 point turn in the hold short area of 28L. We were towed to gate 101 where the passengers deplaned. Captain Jim Abel met us at the aircraft and gave us information he had and asked if we needed any assistance or hotel rooms for the evening. Captain Herlihy and F/O Ishikawa went to hotels and I went to my home an hour away in the East Bay. — at Washington Hilton.
 
And why post something that had already been posted?? Too hard to see what's on previous page?
 
He was simply pointing out the reality that in some parts of this world, the culture creates some significant obstacles to good CRM. The truth will obviously come out. Right now it just provides one very possible explanation of how a professional flight crew can completely botch a visual approach with a perfectly good airplane.

I fly in South East Asia for an Asian carrier, and I'm one of the few expats here. Yes, you are correct on culture and CRM and the obstacles.
 
I fly in South East Asia for an Asian carrier, and I'm one of the few expats here. Yes, you are correct on culture and CRM and the obstacles.

Racist! :D :rofl:
 
I fly in South East Asia for an Asian carrier, and I'm one of the few expats here. Yes, you are correct on culture and CRM and the obstacles.

Never let facts enter into a discussion like this. ;)

Cheers
 
This may be a silly question to ask, but considering an approximately 15 mile segment of the approach was mad visually over water is it possible for the PF to lose the perception of speed and altitude one would get flying over land? I know I've been over Lake Michigan and experienced that.

Yes, I know he should have been checking the ASI.
 
No. I fly over the Bay on almost every flight. It's not that big. You can see the far shore in MVFR. On the day in question, the visibility was in excess of 30 miles.
 
There's a good post at pPrune that mentions Malcom Gladwell's ( a certified commie-lib) review of KAL's safety record problems that stem from the large 'power distance' issues that KAL has had and has tried to fix.

I mentioned that. The book is "Outliers," though, and you have to put up with him repeatedly calling it "glide scope*."

(*Once again we see the fact gaps when we have actual knowledge. Scary to think about when we don't.)
 
This may be a silly question to ask, but considering an approximately 15 mile segment of the approach was mad visually over water is it possible for the PF to lose the perception of speed and altitude one would get flying over land? I know I've been over Lake Michigan and experienced that.

Yes, I know he should have been checking the ASI.

The guys had a 11,300 foot long runway to land on..:mad2::mad2::mad2:..
How could he miss.:dunno::dunno::(
 

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...Now, having said that, the crash on Tenerife of the two 747s had a CRM content to it as well, and at least one of those was a western(non-Asian) crew, I think a KLM?

Yep. I thought of that as an other case of "Never question Lord Captain."
 
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