Korean 777 Down in SFO

Okay ultra-PC granola heads let me just impart this minuscule pearl of wisdom to you

Even "miniscule wisdom" is a bit of a stretch for your claims. But I really like the "ultra-PC granola heads" argument - between that and the attempt to impart "wisdom" sets the proper tone of condescension, eh?

- consider that the concept of CRM ( as it is TRULY intended) does not extend itself well into all cultures. Furthermore, in the interest of aviation safety should we let any specific cultural norm impact negatively the true spirit of CRM ? Or, do you just think the other three pilots were unconscious for the approach ?

I can't argue with the mounds of statistical evidence or reams of studies you've presented showing proof of these assertions. We'll just have to take it as a given that the cause was due to a culture. I think we now need to move on to recommendations, now, right?

So - should Asian airlines "stand down" until they can be re-staffed with American or European pilots? Maybe some pilots from Air France where cultural norms would never cause three pilots to crash an airplane into water?
 
Hard to imagine that a lowly spam can could have a more capable avionics suite than a 777 though.

You would be surprised.

Heh... I wouldn't. All depends on what the boss decided to pay for... :)

You guys have me beat by a country mile, but there's some incredible GA panels out there these days...
 
So - should Asian airlines "stand down" until they can be re-staffed with American or European pilots? Maybe some pilots from Air France where cultural norms would never cause three pilots to crash an airplane into water?

Great suggestion! Keep them coming!!! :mad2:


No one suggested that, except you. In the 90's after a string of accidents, automation dependence was identified as a problem with american airline crews. The remedy? (this might shock you) TRAINING! :yikes:
 
Even "miniscule wisdom" is a bit of a stretch for your claims. But I really like the "ultra-PC granola heads" argument - between that and the attempt to impart "wisdom" sets the proper tone of condescension, eh?



I can't argue with the mounds of statistical evidence or reams of studies you've presented showing proof of these assertions. We'll just have to take it as a given that the cause was due to a culture. I think we now need to move on to recommendations, now, right?

So - should Asian airlines "stand down" until they can be re-staffed with American or European pilots? Maybe some pilots from Air France where cultural norms would never cause three pilots to crash an airplane into water?

Don't be an ass. He's speaking of patterns and they do exist. Anyone who's sat through a mandated multi-cultural studies course knows what he's talking about in generalities.

One would HOPE that in job roles where lives are on the line, some of the cultural detriments to operating as a crew would have been beat out of people, but where one type of crew may work hard not to say anything to the guy flying the aircraft wrong (saving "face", a common Asian cultural trait), we have our own problems with bravado and invulnerability personality types that we beat out of our crews as they work their way up the ladder.

Jumping his butt for making an observation that's got plenty of evidence, just not necessarily IN THE COCKPIT as you desire, is a bit much. Cultures are cultures, and generalities about cultures take decades to change, if they ever do. You don't need a damned $10M study to see them.
 
I mentioned the culture aspect of the issue, and it has nothing to do with the color of skin, but more with the way the people of various nations react to each other.

I lived in Japan for 16 months, and Korea for 6 months. I lived on the economy in both, and found them to be very capable, and dedicated in most respects. One thing I've learned from my experience, such as it was, is the way the US does things within a formal organization is rather unique in the world. Even in GB, they have a more defined pecking order. Those who go to Eaton or St Albans didn't mix well with the 'public school' kids. Here, the lowest janitor can stand and talk face to face with a CEO and neither would think much of it.

Japan and Korea, and China, Burma, India all have a much more rigid structure involved in hierarchy, personal relationships, and a pro-forma approach to seniority and class distinctions. This is a challenge to CRM in the aviation setting and may have played a part in the crash. If that's considered racist these days, then call me a racist I guess. If I can see and avoid problems that crash an airliner full of people by overcoming the stigma of seniority, or peer intimidation, then I will work toward that.
 
At the risk of jumping into this polite discourse, is a Japanese airline crashing 50 years ago a pattern?
 
At the risk of jumping into this polite discourse, is a Japanese airline crashing 50 years ago a pattern?

Given the very low accident rate of the airlines and (potential) common factors, maybe.
 
At the risk of jumping into this polite discourse, is a Japanese airline crashing 50 years ago a pattern?

In a sense, I think that yes there can be a pattern involvement. There's another datapoint with the KAL airliner being shot down a while back by the Soviets. I'm not blaming the victims for getting shot down, but the KAL flight was well off the planned route, and as I recall, no one would speak up, no one would tell the captain that they were off course, and going into Soviet airspace. They just continued along, until the Soviets shot them down.

This is part of a pattern of culture if it leads to an uncorrected fault. No human is perfect, and when a senior pilot makes a mistake, in the culture of the Japanese, and/or Koreans, it may have a relationship.

Now, having said that, the crash on Tenerife of the two 747s had a CRM content to it as well, and at least one of those was a western(non-Asian) crew, I think a KLM?
 
And to be honest, I meant cultural patterns overall... again, airlines are a whole different world where you HOPE the folks teaching know their own culture's typical blind spots... and that the procedures folks have beat appropriately on the crews to make those blind spots go away.

I have ZERO opinion on this accident as to whether or not it was cultural.

One of the fatals at KDVT, I agree with the assessment that the female student probably felt a "flight release" from a Dispatcher was more of a mandatory "command" from a superior than a Western female would have seen it, and when the dispatcher handed her an airplane book and keys on a day she shouldn't have been flying... she left her PIC decision-making requirement behind for cultural reasons.

Add in that a female flight student at that school is a relatively rare thing (and meant her family was VERY well connected in China), and there's also different male/female cultural problems there... and she ended up quite dead.

To jump someone and dismiss that there are cultural issues in ALL cultures that can affect aviation safety, because they don't have a "mountain of data", is ludicrous... if you're even slightly observant about people around you. People love to identify with their own cultures, and will... since in our evolutionary history it served us to survive.

In a cockpit, some of those things can become problems. I don't think anyone was trying to say anything other than that.
 
Even "miniscule wisdom" is a bit of a stretch for your claims. But I really like the "ultra-PC granola heads" argument - between that and the attempt to impart "wisdom" sets the proper tone of condescension, eh?

I knew you would like that ! So what's your favorite granola or are you more of a muffin guy ?
:D
 
Don't be an ass. He's speaking of patterns and they do exist.

Insult. Followed by an assertion with no factual cites. I simply can't argue with this kind counter-argument.

Anyone who's sat through a mandated multi-cultural studies course knows what he's talking about in generalities.
Why were you mandated to attend a mtuli-cultural studies course?

Also - I don't need to have sat through any such course to have learned the generalities of which you and Bill speak. I stupidly don't assign them the weight you think they deserve.

One would HOPE that in job roles where lives are on the line, some of the cultural detriments to operating as a crew would have been beat out of people, but where one type of crew may work hard not to say anything to the guy flying the aircraft wrong (saving "face", a common Asian cultural trait), we have our own problems with bravado and invulnerability personality types that we beat out of our crews as they work their way up the ladder.

Jumping his butt for making an observation that's got plenty of evidence, just not necessarily IN THE COCKPIT as you desire, is a bit much. Cultures are cultures, and generalities about cultures take decades to change, if they ever do. You don't need a damned $10M study to see them.
Let's make this simple for me, please? Get an estimate for the number of flight hours of "Asian" airlines and the number of their accidents. Do the same for non-Asian airlines. Determine if there is a statistical significance in any differences. If there are, then determine whether there are any cultural differences that would account for them. Shucks - you can discard that last bit if you like.

I guess I really am the ass because I never got the memo on the patterns or statistics. My fault. Guess I'm the one who will wallow in ignorance while the rest of you pity my desire for evidence.
 
I guess I really am the ass because I never got the memo on the patterns or statistics. My fault. Guess I'm the one who will wallow in ignorance while the rest of you pity my desire for evidence.

Well, there you have it. I for one certainly feel better that we've got that sorted out.
 
Why were you mandated to attend a mtuli-cultural studies course?

The college wanted to make more money and not shut down the department for lack of attendance because no one found it all that relevant to their degree programs, I suppose?

Or maybe the dean of one school was sleeping with the dean of another.

How would I know? It's college. Nothing happens there that matches any decision-making process in the real world, other than "How can we make more money?"

The book says "required" so you go to the class. Doesn't matter if it's useful, relevant, economical, or even scheduled at a time of day that's to your liking.
 
Japan and Korea, and China, Burma, India all have a much more rigid structure involved in hierarchy, personal relationships, and a pro-forma approach to seniority and class distinctions. This is a challenge to CRM in the aviation setting and may have played a part in the crash. If that's considered racist these days, then call me a racist I guess. If I can see and avoid problems that crash an airliner full of people by overcoming the stigma of seniority, or peer intimidation, then I will work toward that.

It will probably surprise the people who think I'm being tiresomely "Politically Correct" that I read - and felt the science sound - in Herrnstein and Murray's infamous book "The Bell Curve". Even after I read the critiques of that book.
 
It would be nice if we could debate about the related aviation topic, instead of racism.

Some wacky troll going to call me racist for mentioning Swiss?

A call for increased speed does not lead me to believe they rapidly applied full power at that moment.
If the pilot added power, they may have not have crashed. I am wondering if 7 seconds is enough time for the engines to spool up to get a significant power increase. The fact they crashed suggests they did not add power, or not enough power, or the engines didn’t have time to respond adequately.

Too slow + too low + too high AOA + sink rate too high = typically is indicative of needing more thrust.

I have never piloted a large aircraft, but it seems to be basic piloting skills that more thrust was needed.

Not that the pilot should get all the blame. It seems there were a lot of holes lined up in the Swiss cheese for this crash to happen. The pilot seems to be the main cause, but he should not be used as a scapegoat.

CRM

ILS system out

777 landing green horn at the control n (not enough mentoring/supervision/help?) (knock it off/go around/add power; wasn’t called out soon enough)

Wouldn’t/shouldn’t other crew member(s) have been keeping and eye on and calling out, glide path, speed info?

Fatigue….
 
It will probably surprise the people who think I'm being tiresomely "Politically Correct" that I read - and felt the science sound - in Herrnstein and Murray's infamous book "The Bell Curve". Even after I read the critiques of that book.

I don't know, I didn't call you PC or anything else. If reading the Bell Curve is your validation of your point, that might be kind of thin. If pointing to others making cultural differences as racism, then I think you're out in left field.

Cultures are different, and that potentially played a part in this crash. Ascribing a detrimental valuation to that POV will actually exacerbate the problem. If we can't talk about cultural differences without screaming 'racist!' every few minutes, the message because lost, and the feelings take over. Not very useful.
 
The fact they crashed suggests they did not add power, or not enough power, or the engines didn’t have time to respond adequately.
Or.. they simply added power too late, when they finally executed GA it was already 2 sec before impact - that's pretty much pointless, -7 sec is when one of them noticed speed discrepancy.
 
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Insult. Followed by an assertion with no factual cites. I simply can't argue with this kind counter-argument.

Why were you mandated to attend a mtuli-cultural studies course?

Also - I don't need to have sat through any such course to have learned the generalities of which you and Bill speak. I stupidly don't assign them the weight you think they deserve.

Let's make this simple for me, please? Get an estimate for the number of flight hours of "Asian" airlines and the number of their accidents. Do the same for non-Asian airlines. Determine if there is a statistical significance in any differences. If there are, then determine whether there are any cultural differences that would account for them. Shucks - you can discard that last bit if you like.

I guess I really am the ass because I never got the memo on the patterns or statistics. My fault. Guess I'm the one who will wallow in ignorance while the rest of you pity my desire for evidence.

Jim -- many of us who work internationally are in fact trained on how different cultures work. The training is done to provide a clear understanding of how different cultures function in the work environment. In fact, my company uses a tool called Globe Smart http://www.globesmart.com/about_globesmart.cfm?content=11 to help us understand how to work internationally. When I went through the training, I was amazed to see how different many cultures worked.

I believe the points people are making here is that this may have played a role in this crash. It is not unusal for certain cultures to obey, yes obey, a certain pecking order.

The details of this crash will come in out in time. But I for one would not be surprised that CRM failed because of it.
 
Or.. they simply added power too late, when they finally executed GA it was already 2 sec before impact - that's pretty much pointless, -7 sec is when one of them noticed speed discrepancy.

Go around thrust set at -7 seconds might have been enough to save their bacon, again I have .7 in a 777 sim and that makes me imminently qualified to discuss the accident.:D
In pistons it is normal to add a "bit" of power when you are a slow and or low, in jets I was taught to add plenty of power, it's easy enough to back off if you have too much. Go arounds are full throttle until it spools up, easy enough to back off a hair to keep it in the green. Better to burn up an engine than hit a seawall. :dunno: I think they have some type of automatic engine controls to keep from going over maximum thrust. ;)
 
Jim -- many of us who work internationally are in fact trained on how different cultures work.

And if you apply that training to a specific person without looking at the actual conditions, you've missed its point.

The racist part is not the reference to culture -- leaving aside whether it's actually correct. It's applying a huge generalization as a substitute for actual information. This is wrong, and it does absolutely no good whatsoever. It doesn't help understanding, it doesn't prevent future accidents, and it doesn't assign blame.

The correct thing to do is interview the crew and review the tapes, and draw some conclusions from actual evidence, rather than one's stereotypes.

Even if it were true that an "average" Korean might defer to authority, that does not mean that a specific Korean would do so.

Yep, I've had that training, too. It's use is keeping you from getting bent out of shape over things that are really inconsequential, to prevent faux pas, and to communicate more effectively. It is not useful for assigning blame for anything.
 
..... Furthermore, in the interest of aviation safety should we let any specific cultural norm impact negatively the true spirit of CRM ? Or, do you just think the other three pilots were unconscious for the approach ?


Good news is they all survived...

Better news is their culture dictates they will commit Hari Kari because of the shame they brought on themselves through their poor flying skills...

Best news is the NTSB will save money as the offenders are going to fall on the sword , so no further action will be required....

You see... this "culture thing" can swing both ways...:yes:;)
 
Jim -- many of us who work internationally are in fact trained on how different cultures work. The training is done to provide a clear understanding of how different cultures function in the work environment. In fact, my company uses a tool called Globe Smart http://www.globesmart.com/about_globesmart.cfm?content=11 to help us understand how to work internationally. When I went through the training, I was amazed to see how different many cultures worked.

I believe the points people are making here is that this may have played a role in this crash. It is not unusal for certain cultures to obey, yes obey, a certain pecking order.

The details of this crash will come in out in time. But I for one would not be surprised that CRM failed because of it.

That is interesting, but I'm unclear on why that would say anything one way or another about actions in a cockpit where everyone is from the same culture.

Is there really that much historical support for a claim that co-pilots in western cultures have traditionally been more likely than others to "question command authority"? According to the following editorial, it would seem that even western cultures have traditionally frowned on crew members questioning the actions of the PIC (else why would the NTSB stress this failing):
"...It is extremely difficult for crewmembers to challenge a captain even when the captain offers a threat to the safety of the flight. The concept of command authority and its inviolate nature, except in the case of incapacitation, has become a practice without exception. As a result, second-in-command pilots react indifferently in circumstances where they should be more assertive. Rather than submitting passively to this concept, second-in-command pilots should be encouraged to affirmatively advise the pilot-in-command that a dangerous situation exists. Such affirmative advice could result in the pilot-in-command's reassessing his actions. The Safety Board has previously stated, and continues to believe, that the second-in-command is an integral part of the operational control of a flight, is a fail-safe factor, and has a share of the duty and responsibility to assure that the flight is operated safely. Therefore, the second-in-command should not passively condone any operation of the aircraft which might compromise safety. "
http://www.airlinesafety.com/editorials/editorial3.htm

I think that's an indictment of a universal mindset, not of either western or eastern cultures. One doesn't need to look to cultural differences. CRM and challenging the captain appears to be a rather recent concept.

On the other hand, there is this document "Culture in the Cockpit - CRM in a Multicultural World":
http://ntl.bts.gov/data/letter_am/jatww5_1engl.PDF

It seems to say that yes, there appear to be cultural differences but that CRM can be adopted to them without cultural reprogramming of the crew. It doesn't actually say whether or not there are correlations between accident statistics and the cultural background of the crews.
 
There's a good post at pPrune that mentions Malcom Gladwell's ( a certified commie-lib) review of KAL's safety record problems that stem from the large 'power distance' issues that KAL has had and has tried to fix.

Everything Gladwell reported is consistent with my one year at a Korean Air Force Base (not an American base in Korea... a ROKAF base with only a handful of Americans).

The accident investigators would be extremely remiss if they did not consider the nature of Korea culture when examining the human factors of this accident.
 
I worked at a place in the northwest where Korean Air pilot candidates came to sit right seat in a freightdogger. The idea was for them to learn to challenge authority and get a grasp of CRM.
 
I see the CRM challenges as not an 'either - or' or a discrete function. It's a matter of degree, on a sliding scale as much of cultural difference is gauged.

So, if we were to use a scale of 1 - 100 for commitment to CRM, those in the US would maybe rate a 70, and in Europe, maybe a 55, and Korea/Japan possibly a 30. In a deteriorating case where an American co-pilot would speak up, the European would wait a bit longer, and the Asian co-pilot would wait even longer. In fact, someone on the crew did call for power at the very end, when it was too late. More adherence to CRM dictates that the co-pilot(IP) would be actively coaching and discussing the approach as it happened, and not sat there dribbling shyte in is drawers until literally the last second.
 
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Good news is they all survived...

Better news is their culture dictates they will commit Hari Kari because of the shame they brought on themselves through their poor flying skills...

Best news is the NTSB will save money as the offenders are going to fall on the sword , so no further action will be required....

You see... this "culture thing" can swing both ways...:yes:;)

Have you been paying any attention to this?? Not all survived, two dead in the accident and several others are touch and go in the hospital, and Hari Kiri is a Japanese ritual, not Korean. 0 for 2.
 
Have you been paying any attention to this?? Not all survived, two dead in the accident and several others are touch and go in the hospital, and Hari Kiri is a Japanese ritual, not Korean. 0 for 2.


read back......... I have been paying attention... I am the one who posted 2 died.............. I was referring to the fact ALL the pilots /Fo's survived...,, get with the program sir...:yes:;)
 
That is interesting, but I'm unclear on why that would say anything one way or another about actions in a cockpit where everyone is from the same culture.

Is there really that much historical support for a claim that co-pilots in western cultures have traditionally been more likely than others to "question command authority"? According to the following editorial, it would seem that even western cultures have traditionally frowned on crew members questioning the actions of the PIC (else why would the NTSB stress this failing):
"...It is extremely difficult for crewmembers to challenge a captain even when the captain offers a threat to the safety of the flight. The concept of command authority and its inviolate nature, except in the case of incapacitation, has become a practice without exception. As a result, second-in-command pilots react indifferently in circumstances where they should be more assertive. Rather than submitting passively to this concept, second-in-command pilots should be encouraged to affirmatively advise the pilot-in-command that a dangerous situation exists. Such affirmative advice could result in the pilot-in-command's reassessing his actions. The Safety Board has previously stated, and continues to believe, that the second-in-command is an integral part of the operational control of a flight, is a fail-safe factor, and has a share of the duty and responsibility to assure that the flight is operated safely. Therefore, the second-in-command should not passively condone any operation of the aircraft which might compromise safety. "
http://www.airlinesafety.com/editorials/editorial3.htm

I think that's an indictment of a universal mindset, not of either western or eastern cultures. One doesn't need to look to cultural differences. CRM and challenging the captain appears to be a rather recent concept.

On the other hand, there is this document "Culture in the Cockpit - CRM in a Multicultural World":
http://ntl.bts.gov/data/letter_am/jatww5_1engl.PDF

It seems to say that yes, there appear to be cultural differences but that CRM can be adopted to them without cultural reprogramming of the crew. It doesn't actually say whether or not there are correlations between accident statistics and the cultural background of the crews.

I think the point others made is that there are some cultures where certain behaviors are more ingrained and difficult to overcome. Did it play a role in this accident? Who knows other than the pilots that were in the cockpit. Having worked overseas for a number of years, I have seen my fair share of agreement head shaking, only to find out later there was never any intention on their part of doing what we agreed to. It sounds strange, but anyone who has worked these regions knows what I am talking about. The fact the government issued a publication on the topic, suggests there is at least knowledge of the concern (should make for an interesting reading -- thanks for sharing).

But you are absolutely right Jim that it doesn't stop at specific cultures (in this case meaning ethnic origin) but also across cultures - like you pointed out in the pilot community in general. Who hasn't sat next to a more experienced pilot, felt compelled to acquiesce authority to them, only to realize that their experience was dated or not pertinent to the operation you were conducting?

All of what we are speculating about is just that, speculation. With the amount of stored information available about this flight, the fact there were observers and the crew survived, we will have a pretty good idea of what happened.
 
read back......... I have been paying attention... I am the one who posted 2 died.............. I was referring to the fact ALL the pilots /Fo's survived...,, get with the program sir...:yes:;)

You are correct, I misread the flight crew reference. You are still way off base on the lame Hari Kiri reference, but your score just improved to 1 for 2.
 
Good news is they all survived...

Better news is their culture dictates they will commit Hari Kari because of the shame they brought on themselves through their poor flying skills...

Best news is the NTSB will save money as the offenders are going to fall on the sword , so no further action will be required....

You see... this "culture thing" can swing both ways...:yes:;)

Are you posting this in jest?
 
I knew you would like that ! So what's your favorite granola or are you more of a muffin guy ?
:D

I like Galaxy granola, because it seems to have the lowest sugar content.
 
If you had trained these crews you wouldn't be asking these questions. They defer to authority in ways we can't imagine possible and do it every time. As an IP you can set up a scenario in that any pilot older than 12 would recognize as dead man walking, and the FO's wouldn't say shlt if they had a mouthful.

What's the date on the the materials your quoted regarding CRM in the U. S.?
That is interesting, but I'm unclear on why that would say anything one way or another about actions in a cockpit where everyone is from the same culture.

Is there really that much historical support for a claim that co-pilots in western cultures have traditionally been more likely than others to "question command authority"? According to the following editorial, it would seem that even western cultures have traditionally frowned on crew members questioning the actions of the PIC (else why would the NTSB stress this failing):
"...It is extremely difficult for crewmembers to challenge a captain even when the captain offers a threat to the safety of the flight. The concept of command authority and its inviolate nature, except in the case of incapacitation, has become a practice without exception. As a result, second-in-command pilots react indifferently in circumstances where they should be more assertive. Rather than submitting passively to this concept, second-in-command pilots should be encouraged to affirmatively advise the pilot-in-command that a dangerous situation exists. Such affirmative advice could result in the pilot-in-command's reassessing his actions. The Safety Board has previously stated, and continues to believe, that the second-in-command is an integral part of the operational control of a flight, is a fail-safe factor, and has a share of the duty and responsibility to assure that the flight is operated safely. Therefore, the second-in-command should not passively condone any operation of the aircraft which might compromise safety. "
http://www.airlinesafety.com/editorials/editorial3.htm

I think that's an indictment of a universal mindset, not of either western or eastern cultures. One doesn't need to look to cultural differences. CRM and challenging the captain appears to be a rather recent concept.

On the other hand, there is this document "Culture in the Cockpit - CRM in a Multicultural World":
http://ntl.bts.gov/data/letter_am/jatww5_1engl.PDF

It seems to say that yes, there appear to be cultural differences but that CRM can be adopted to them without cultural reprogramming of the crew. It doesn't actually say whether or not there are correlations between accident statistics and the cultural background of the crews.
 
I don't think I'd brag about having an ignore list that long! ;)
Not bragging, just stating fact. All, save one, are people who fire off insults as their main debate tactic. Not those who use an insult to accentuate their point mind you...that's a bit more tolerable...but rather the insult is all they can come up with.

The other one s god's gift to everything. I'll give you three guesses on that one! :)
 
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