It seems to me that the bigger failure was giving false position reports. That 1.4 mile spread could have saved some lives that day, litigation aside of course.
Let's go by the transcript.
At 2059:50Z, Collins said he was a mile or two offshore and was cleared to land. Hock was instructed to continue downwind and advise when the Zlin was in sight. When Hock said she did not have the traffic and asked for Fowler to call her base, Fowler agreed --
implicitly assuming responsibility for keeping Hock behind Collins. Even when Collins called "just crossing the shoreline" while still 1.4 miles from it, Fowler asked Hock if she had crossed the shoreline, and
she said she had not. At that point, I can see no basis for Fowler to assume that Hock was farther out than Collins. Nevertheless, Fowler instructed Hock to turn base (an instruction which 14 CFR 91.123(b) required Hock to obey), thus betting lives that he fully understood where everyone was.
Now, one might argue that Hock's reply to Fowler's question about whether she had crossed the shoreline that she was "gettin' there" was a basis for assuming that by the time she turned, she'd be behind Collins. Personally, I would not want a controller turning another airplane me in front of me without a more exact position report than that given by Hock, but that is no more than
my opinion. However, it is the apparent finding of the court
as a matter of law and fact that the court agrees with my opinion, and that Fowler erred in a negligent manner when he ordered Hock to turn base.
Once Hock had turned in, she had no reason to believe Collins' plane was behind her (note that the leading edge of Collins' wing hit Hock's rudder, conclusively showing Hock was in front of Collins), leaving her in the position of searching in front of her for a plane that was behind her.
Even when Collins said "negative contact with the Cessna in front of us" (suggesting that perhaps Collins realized Hock was not behind him), Fowler said, "You should be number one, Bob," i.e., that there was nobody between Collins and the runway -- which was not so. In any event, Hock was in Collins' blind spot, creating an untenable situation in which Hock was looking ahead for a plane behind and above her, and Collins was told there was no traffic while Hock was invisible to him.
While it might be argued that Collins' inaccurate position report and failure to see Hock turning in front of him contributed in part to the accident (and clearly the court agreed when it allocated 5% of the liability to Collins), it is clear that the court found that the primary responsibility was Fowler's when he turned Hock in front of Collins despite a lack of positive confirmation that Hock's plane was outside Collins'.
At the end of the day, I can't find any significant fault in the court's conclusions. And as a pilot, I like knowing that controllers are responsible for making sure they aren't turning me in front of someone else when they give me an instruction I am obligated by regulation to obey.
BTW, an 8000-hour ATP/CFI might have felt the hackles rise on the back of his neck had he been in Hock's position when Tower called the base turn, and either lagged the base turn, or queried for a more exact location on Collins to ensure the Zlin was in front of rather than behind the Cessna. However, I can hardly fault a 35-hour Student Pilot for this lack of situational awareness, and it seems by default that the court felt the same way. Had I been in Collins' plane, I probably would have been looking for Hock's plane, also "just to be sure," but the evidence presented suggests it may have been pretty hard to see, and the court has accepted that as fact, and given the thirde plane on the opposite downwind from Hock, Collins had nowhere else to go but straight ahead anyway.