flyingcheesehead
Taxi to Parking
Makes sense. So when I see something of that size along my route..regardless of altitude..how far should I stay away?
http://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/publications/atpubs/aim/aim0703.html
Makes sense. So when I see something of that size along my route..regardless of altitude..how far should I stay away?
Makes sense. So when I see something of that size along my route..regardless of altitude..how far should I stay away?
Not long after i started flying i got rolled in a B200 crossing behind a 757 about 5 miles in trail
Yep and then it seemed best to go with it and just keep rolling to get the dirty side back down. Evidently i'm no bob hoover because the boxes in the back made a heck of a mess and I spilled my coffee everywhere.Like actually upside down?
Yep and then it seemed best to go with it and just keep rolling to get the dirty side back down. Evidently i'm no bob hoover because the boxes in the back made a heck of a mess and I spilled my coffee everywhere.
Best to remain above or displaced upwind. If you're downwind and/or below I'd give it at least 5 miles.Makes sense. So when I see something of that size along my route..regardless of altitude..how far should I stay away?
So, I got some new info on this crash.
Apparently, he DID call up Milwaukee Approach, and he wanted to go up the lakeshore at 1500 MSL (~900 AGL). They were landing on the 25's at the time, and the airport is fairly close to the lake (the Class C surface area extends out into/over the lake).
There was an MD80 inbound that was going to cause a conflict. There were some exchanges between the Cherokee and the controller to attempt to resolve it, but in the end the controller had to issue a turn to 090 to the Cherokee.
When the Cherokee reported the MD80 in sight, the controller told him to maintain visual separation and resume own navigation, but he cut in really close behind the MD80.
As soon as the Cherokee crossed the path the MD80 had flown, the radar showed a nearly vertical plunge to the water.
So, the suspected cause is that the Cherokee went right into the MD80's wake, and when it hit the left wingtip vortex it pitched down sharply - pointed straight down or even past it - and that attitude was simply unrecoverable at that low altitude.
Sad, but entirely preventable.
How high were they again? It seems hard to believe that a guy with his experience could not recover from an unusual attitude in a thousand feet.
What was their cruising altitude above the water?
How high were they again? It seems hard to believe that a guy with his experience could not recover from an unusual attitude in a thousand feet.
What was their cruising altitude above the water?
(BTW: Mary and I are from Racine. The pilot in this accident was my F-I-L's flight instructor, and well known as an excellent pilot.)
121.5 will have you communicating with EVERYBODY instantly.
So, I got some new info on this crash.
Apparently, he DID call up Milwaukee Approach, and he wanted to go up the lakeshore at 1500 MSL (~900 AGL). They were landing on the 25's at the time, and the airport is fairly close to the lake (the Class C surface area extends out into/over the lake).
There was an MD80 inbound that was going to cause a conflict. There were some exchanges between the Cherokee and the controller to attempt to resolve it, but in the end the controller had to issue a turn to 090 to the Cherokee.
When the Cherokee reported the MD80 in sight, the controller told him to maintain visual separation and resume own navigation, but he cut in really close behind the MD80.
As soon as the Cherokee crossed the path the MD80 had flown, the radar showed a nearly vertical plunge to the water.
So, the suspected cause is that the Cherokee went right into the MD80's wake, and when it hit the left wingtip vortex it pitched down sharply - pointed straight down or even past it - and that attitude was simply unrecoverable at that low altitude.
Sad, but entirely preventable.
Wow! Not placing judgement, but it's really eye opening that a pilot of his experience became the victim of a wake turbulence encounter.
IMO, the FAA needs to update their documentation on this subject...
Yes, but did you ever consider what happens when flying behind another plane but across its path before? I sure hadn't until this happened. Every single thing the FAA says about wake turbulence is about two aircraft flying on the same path and the rolling moment it would induce, not anything about crossing paths and the pitching moment that would overstress your plane as in this case.
IMO, the FAA needs to update their documentation on this subject...
Yes, but did you ever consider what happens when flying behind another plane but across its path before? I sure hadn't until this happened. Every single thing the FAA says about wake turbulence is about two aircraft flying on the same path and the rolling moment it would induce, not anything about crossing paths and the pitching moment that would overstress your plane as in this case.
IMO, the FAA needs to update their documentation on this subject...
And this accident illustrates the trap pilots sometimes fall into when being marshaled around by controllers. We obey to their authority, we fear getting the "phone number" to call, we trust their experience and the fact that they have the "big picture" in front of them, but ultimately, when things go wrong like here, it's entirely the pilot's responsibility. It's always the pilot's fault.
Even if there was a mid air collision of aircraft under ATC control, if it's in VMC, then it's the pilot's fault. We as a community get so used to just throwing the pilot under the bus and chalking everything up to "pilot error", that accidents that are preventable, like this one, go without much more than, "That sucks, that guy shoulda turned." Of course we can all pat ourselves on the back and tell ourselves that "I would have never done that."
Bull crap. Most of us would be just as dead as these guys.
IMO, the real blame here lies with the FAA. Basically, what happened here was a mid air collision. True, the radar pings never intersected and no paint was swapped, but there was a collision. In reality, and MD-80 in flight isn't just 150' long, it's more like 2 miles long. It's not just 100' wide, it actually fans out for thousands of feet. Clearly, controllers don't fully understand this fully and the FAA gives them a catch all way to avoid responsibility by simply saying, "Caution, wake turbulence." This is not the fault of the controllers, but rather the FAA and the way controllers are trained, the fact that their equipment provides no help in this situation and ultimately, that there aren't hard rules to keep planes out of the huge red cone of danger.
In addition, pilots are also under trained. We all get the following an airliner on descent, or on take off lecture and how we could get flipped, but crossing perpendicular to the path is always treated as a survivable event. "You'll get tossed around real good.", or something like that. Clearly it is far more like flying into a thunderstorm. Clearly we need instruction more like, "Fly behind an airliner closer than 2 miles and you could easily die. Your airplane will break." If this sort of instruction was drilled into our heads like it is with thunderstorms and lenticular clouds, then the pilot on this flight might well have said, "Screw this heading, I don't want to die!" and turned away from danger against the controller's instruction, but as it was, he plowed on, probably tightened his seat belt thinking it might just be bumpy.
So, what can we do about this?
In the short term, education. The "Cone of Death" needs to be taught. It's not turbulence, it's death. Controllers need to become aware of the true size of a heavy jet with new rules to steer aircraft well around the cone of death. Pilot's need to also be aware that being directly behind the Cone of Death isn't the only way to die, but also crossing it too. Pilot's also need to be given the understanding that they have complete authority, even under IFR, to say, "Screw that heading, that takes us inside the Cone of Death." and deviate as they see fit. They have the authority now, but how many actually exercise it? How many controllers would actually accept a pilot override and not be annoyed?
In the long term, I believe that technology can really help. I know that pilots on pilot forums nearly always hate it when I suggest that technology can actually make flying safer because Grandpappy's stick and rudder skills should be all you need, but hear me out.
Today's ATC is becoming more and more digital and using computer monitor displays. Pilots more and more are using computer monitor displays in the cockpit. In the age of ADS-B, the type, speed, altitude and location of an airliner is well known. With this information, a software program could easily be coded to create a visual representation of the "Cone of Death" behind every heavy airplane on ATC's "scope". Similarly, the same could be done in the cockpit on the aircraft's collision avoidance display to aid pilot decision making. I bet the boys over at Fore Flight would have no problem coding this and sticking it right on your iPad given you have the ADS-B information.
I hope this particular accident, built on top of all the past deaths related to wake turbulence becomes a rallying cry for change, because if we just chalk it up to the usual "pilot error", dumb controllers and "S**t happens", this will happen again and again and it doesn't have to.
And this accident illustrates the trap pilots sometimes fall into when being marshaled around by controllers. We obey to their authority, we fear getting the "phone number" to call, we trust their experience and the fact that they have the "big picture" in front of them, but ultimately, when things go wrong like here, it's entirely the pilot's responsibility. It's always the pilot's fault.
Even if there was a mid air collision of aircraft under ATC control, if it's in VMC, then it's the pilot's fault. We as a community get so used to just throwing the pilot under the bus and chalking everything up to "pilot error", that accidents that are preventable, like this one, go without much more than, "That sucks, that guy shoulda turned." Of course we can all pat ourselves on the back and tell ourselves that "I would have never done that."
Bull crap. Most of us would be just as dead as these guys.
IMO, the real blame here lies with the FAA. Basically, what happened here was a mid air collision. True, the radar pings never intersected and no paint was swapped, but there was a collision. In reality, and MD-80 in flight isn't just 150' long, it's more like 2 miles long. It's not just 100' wide, it actually fans out for thousands of feet. Clearly, controllers don't fully understand this fully and the FAA gives them a catch all way to avoid responsibility by simply saying, "Caution, wake turbulence." This is not the fault of the controllers, but rather the FAA and the way controllers are trained, the fact that their equipment provides no help in this situation and ultimately, that there aren't hard rules to keep planes out of the huge red cone of danger.
In addition, pilots are also under trained. We all get the following an airliner on descent, or on take off lecture and how we could get flipped, but crossing perpendicular to the path is always treated as a survivable event. "You'll get tossed around real good.", or something like that. Clearly it is far more like flying into a thunderstorm. Clearly we need instruction more like, "Fly behind an airliner closer than 2 miles and you could easily die. Your airplane will break." If this sort of instruction was drilled into our heads like it is with thunderstorms and lenticular clouds, then the pilot on this flight might well have said, "Screw this heading, I don't want to die!" and turned away from danger against the controller's instruction, but as it was, he plowed on, probably tightened his seat belt thinking it might just be bumpy.
So, what can we do about this?
In the short term, education. The "Cone of Death" needs to be taught. It's not turbulence, it's death. Controllers need to become aware of the true size of a heavy jet with new rules to steer aircraft well around the cone of death. Pilot's need to also be aware that being directly behind the Cone of Death isn't the only way to die, but also crossing it too. Pilot's also need to be given the understanding that they have complete authority, even under IFR, to say, "Screw that heading, that takes us inside the Cone of Death." and deviate as they see fit. They have the authority now, but how many actually exercise it? How many controllers would actually accept a pilot override and not be annoyed?
In the long term, I believe that technology can really help. I know that pilots on pilot forums nearly always hate it when I suggest that technology can actually make flying safer because Grandpappy's stick and rudder skills should be all you need, but hear me out.
Today's ATC is becoming more and more digital and using computer monitor displays. Pilots more and more are using computer monitor displays in the cockpit. In the age of ADS-B, the type, speed, altitude and location of an airliner is well known. With this information, a software program could easily be coded to create a visual representation of the "Cone of Death" behind every heavy airplane on ATC's "scope". Similarly, the same could be done in the cockpit on the aircraft's collision avoidance display to aid pilot decision making. I bet the boys over at Fore Flight would have no problem coding this and sticking it right on your iPad given you have the ADS-B information.
I hope this particular accident, built on top of all the past deaths related to wake turbulence becomes a rallying cry for change, because if we just chalk it up to the usual "pilot error", dumb controllers and "S**t happens", this will happen again and again and it doesn't have to.
And this accident illustrates the trap pilots sometimes fall into when being marshaled around by controllers. We obey to their authority, we fear getting the "phone number" to call,.........
And this accident illustrates the trap pilots sometimes fall into when being marshaled around by controllers. We obey to their authority, we fear getting the "phone number" to call, we trust their experience and the fact that they have the "big picture" in front of them, but ultimately, when things go wrong like here, it's entirely the pilot's responsibility. It's always the pilot's fault.
Even if there was a mid air collision of aircraft under ATC control, if it's in VMC, then it's the pilot's fault. We as a community get so used to just throwing the pilot under the bus and chalking everything up to "pilot error", that accidents that are preventable, like this one, go without much more than, "That sucks, that guy shoulda turned." Of course we can all pat ourselves on the back and tell ourselves that "I would have never done that."
Bull crap. Most of us would be just as dead as these guys.
IMO, the real blame here lies with the FAA. Basically, what happened here was a mid air collision. True, the radar pings never intersected and no paint was swapped, but there was a collision. In reality, and MD-80 in flight isn't just 150' long, it's more like 2 miles long. It's not just 100' wide, it actually fans out for thousands of feet. Clearly, controllers don't fully understand this fully and the FAA gives them a catch all way to avoid responsibility by simply saying, "Caution, wake turbulence." This is not the fault of the controllers, but rather the FAA and the way controllers are trained, the fact that their equipment provides no help in this situation and ultimately, that there aren't hard rules to keep planes out of the huge red cone of danger.
In addition, pilots are also under trained. We all get the following an airliner on descent, or on take off lecture and how we could get flipped, but crossing perpendicular to the path is always treated as a survivable event. "You'll get tossed around real good.", or something like that. Clearly it is far more like flying into a thunderstorm. Clearly we need instruction more like, "Fly behind an airliner closer than 2 miles and you could easily die. Your airplane will break." If this sort of instruction was drilled into our heads like it is with thunderstorms and lenticular clouds, then the pilot on this flight might well have said, "Screw this heading, I don't want to die!" and turned away from danger against the controller's instruction, but as it was, he plowed on, probably tightened his seat belt thinking it might just be bumpy.
So, what can we do about this?
In the short term, education. The "Cone of Death" needs to be taught. It's not turbulence, it's death. Controllers need to become aware of the true size of a heavy jet with new rules to steer aircraft well around the cone of death. Pilot's need to also be aware that being directly behind the Cone of Death isn't the only way to die, but also crossing it too. Pilot's also need to be given the understanding that they have complete authority, even under IFR, to say, "Screw that heading, that takes us inside the Cone of Death." and deviate as they see fit. They have the authority now, but how many actually exercise it? How many controllers would actually accept a pilot override and not be annoyed?
In the long term, I believe that technology can really help. I know that pilots on pilot forums nearly always hate it when I suggest that technology can actually make flying safer because Grandpappy's stick and rudder skills should be all you need, but hear me out.
Today's ATC is becoming more and more digital and using computer monitor displays. Pilots more and more are using computer monitor displays in the cockpit. In the age of ADS-B, the type, speed, altitude and location of an airliner is well known. With this information, a software program could easily be coded to create a visual representation of the "Cone of Death" behind every heavy airplane on ATC's "scope". Similarly, the same could be done in the cockpit on the aircraft's collision avoidance display to aid pilot decision making. I bet the boys over at Fore Flight would have no problem coding this and sticking it right on your iPad given you have the ADS-B information.
I hope this particular accident, built on top of all the past deaths related to wake turbulence becomes a rallying cry for change, because if we just chalk it up to the usual "pilot error", dumb controllers and "S**t happens", this will happen again and again and it doesn't have to.
My detector is a small electronic sensor with alarms, exposure tracking, and the ability to output what is going on in PPM. I use it when I think it's appropriate but I most certainly do not carry, position, and activate it in every airplane I'm doing a flight review in during the middle of June.
One word will fix all the problems...... UNABLE......
PIC in calling the shots...
Not exactly true, unless the following statement is new to this AC, 90-23G (dated 2/10/14)
http://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Advisory_Circular/AC_90-23G.pdf
"(3) [FONT=Times New Roman,Times New Roman][FONT=Times New Roman,Times New Roman]When crossing behind a lead aircraft, try to cross above its flightpath or, terrain permitting, at least 1,000 feet below." [/FONT]
[/FONT]
Wow - That's new. 2/10/14. I found a copy of the previous AC (90-23F), and it does not have anything in it about crossing. In fact, the one you posted is 7 pages longer and appears to have a lot more research behind it.
Good reading for all of us... It's significantly different than the previous one, and all of the other FAA material to this point on the subject. Good find!
And this accident illustrates the trap pilots sometimes fall into when being marshaled around by controllers. We obey to their authority, we fear getting the "phone number" to call, we trust their experience and the fact that they have the "big picture" in front of them, but ultimately, when things go wrong like here, it's entirely the pilot's responsibility. It's always the pilot's fault.
Even if there was a mid air collision of aircraft under ATC control, if it's in VMC, then it's the pilot's fault. We as a community get so used to just throwing the pilot under the bus and chalking everything up to "pilot error", that accidents that are preventable, like this one, go without much more than, "That sucks, that guy shoulda turned." Of course we can all pat ourselves on the back and tell ourselves that "I would have never done that."
Bull crap. Most of us would be just as dead as these guys.
IMO, the real blame here lies with the FAA. Basically, what happened here was a mid air collision. True, the radar pings never intersected and no paint was swapped, but there was a collision. In reality, and MD-80 in flight isn't just 150' long, it's more like 2 miles long. It's not just 100' wide, it actually fans out for thousands of feet. Clearly, controllers don't fully understand this fully and the FAA gives them a catch all way to avoid responsibility by simply saying, "Caution, wake turbulence." This is not the fault of the controllers, but rather the FAA and the way controllers are trained, the fact that their equipment provides no help in this situation and ultimately, that there aren't hard rules to keep planes out of the huge red cone of danger.
In addition, pilots are also under trained. We all get the following an airliner on descent, or on take off lecture and how we could get flipped, but crossing perpendicular to the path is always treated as a survivable event. "You'll get tossed around real good.", or something like that. Clearly it is far more like flying into a thunderstorm. Clearly we need instruction more like, "Fly behind an airliner closer than 2 miles and you could easily die. Your airplane will break." If this sort of instruction was drilled into our heads like it is with thunderstorms and lenticular clouds, then the pilot on this flight might well have said, "Screw this heading, I don't want to die!" and turned away from danger against the controller's instruction, but as it was, he plowed on, probably tightened his seat belt thinking it might just be bumpy.
So, what can we do about this?
In the short term, education. The "Cone of Death" needs to be taught. It's not turbulence, it's death. Controllers need to become aware of the true size of a heavy jet with new rules to steer aircraft well around the cone of death. Pilot's need to also be aware that being directly behind the Cone of Death isn't the only way to die, but also crossing it too. Pilot's also need to be given the understanding that they have complete authority, even under IFR, to say, "Screw that heading, that takes us inside the Cone of Death." and deviate as they see fit. They have the authority now, but how many actually exercise it? How many controllers would actually accept a pilot override and not be annoyed?
In the long term, I believe that technology can really help. I know that pilots on pilot forums nearly always hate it when I suggest that technology can actually make flying safer because Grandpappy's stick and rudder skills should be all you need, but hear me out.
Today's ATC is becoming more and more digital and using computer monitor displays. Pilots more and more are using computer monitor displays in the cockpit. In the age of ADS-B, the type, speed, altitude and location of an airliner is well known. With this information, a software program could easily be coded to create a visual representation of the "Cone of Death" behind every heavy airplane on ATC's "scope". Similarly, the same could be done in the cockpit on the aircraft's collision avoidance display to aid pilot decision making. I bet the boys over at Fore Flight would have no problem coding this and sticking it right on your iPad given you have the ADS-B information.
I hope this particular accident, built on top of all the past deaths related to wake turbulence becomes a rallying cry for change, because if we just chalk it up to the usual "pilot error", dumb controllers and "S**t happens", this will happen again and again and it doesn't have to.
This is true, however many are loath to contradict the instructions of ATC out of fear and also familiarity. Those that regularly fly IFR just get used to following orders.
In this case though, did the pilot really understand the danger present? I bet he thought that he might get a bump or two, not complete airframe failure. It's easy to say "unable" when there is hill in front of you, or a towering thunderstorm, but something invisible in calm, clear air?
I refuse to blame the pilot, or the controller in this case. I think there is just a serious lack of education on the subject, and perhaps lack of respect for crossing a wake. It really needs to be treated with the same seriousness as a thunderstorm.
I have a confession to make....