F16 vs Cessna 150 collision

After 26 seconds, and he descended 100' below his altitude restriction from 6000' in that time. He's toast.

He wasn't assigned 6,000. He was assigned 1,600. He was only 100 ft low on radar. Could've been right on 1,600 and still show up as 1,500 on radar. Well within the +- 300 ft difference for mode C accuracy.

Looks like the controller tried to separate aircraft, they just made the wrong choice in vectors. Only thing that I would've done was added "traffic alert, advise you turn left immediately heading 180." Just a bad situation all around.
 
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'Traffic 12 o'clock, two miles'(co-altitude), yes I'll take a turn, do my own if need be(climb too).
 
MKS is 17 miles from CHS... Why would anyone have cleared an aircraft down to 1600 feet for an approach at that distance? Particularly when you're outside the CHS class c airspace and passing by two small airports in the process (both of which are also outside the class c airspace)...

This is a tragedy of errors... But it begins there.

A traffic alert at 2 miles and same altitude?? What happened during the preceding 2 minutes as these aircraft were closing?

From the description of damage to he cessna, it climbed into the F-16's flight path. With the F-16 coming from the left and high, the Cessna's wing probably blocked the view. Never flown an F16 but seems likely the nose blocked any view of a cessna a few hundred feet below and within 2 miles...

This is our home airspace. Very few ga pilots departing any of the four nearby ga airports contact CHS on VFR unless you're entering their class c... its not VFR user-friendly.

CHS is not alone in this regard... We departed Manning 2 days after the accident, headed down to LRO on edge of CHS class c. Called Shaw on the radio and requested flight following. The response was to call CHS in 10 miles...

We can all second guess what the F16 pilot could have or should have done... But it's wrong to overlook an environment that systematically ignores ga in the same airspace as military and heavy commercial traffic.
 
I remember hearing (back in the 80s, I think, in APPROACH magazine) of a collision between a Navy jet trainer (Pinto, I think) and a 150. Both planes landed safely. The 150 had a tire skid mark on its upper fuselage, and the jet had a scuffed nosewheel.

Nauga, any recollection?

Ron Wanttaja
There was a T-38 (I think) and Cessna 150 collision in San Antonio some years back. Took the engine off of the 150 but the instructor and student actually glided to a safe landing. I think the T-38 pilot(s) ejected.
 
He wasn't assigned 6,000. He was assigned 1,600. He was only 100 ft low on radar. Could've been right on 1,600 and still show up as 1,500 on radar. Well within the +- 300 ft difference for mode C accuracy.

Looks like the controller tried to separate aircraft, they just made the wrong choice in vectors. Only thing that I would've done was added "traffic alert, advise you turn left immediately heading 180." Just a bad situation all around.

Sometimes inexperienced controllers get fixated in two dimensions. Since you don't know which way the 1200 code may turn, with an airplane like an F16, climb it, you will have vertical separation immediately.
 
MKS is 17 miles from CHS... Why would anyone have cleared an aircraft down to 1600 feet for an approach at that distance? Particularly when you're outside the CHS class c airspace and passing by two small airports in the process (both of which are also outside the class c airspace)...

This is a tragedy of errors... But it begins there.

A traffic alert at 2 miles and same altitude?? What happened during the preceding 2 minutes as these aircraft were closing?

From the description of damage to he cessna, it climbed into the F-16's flight path. With the F-16 coming from the left and high, the Cessna's wing probably blocked the view. Never flown an F16 but seems likely the nose blocked any view of a cessna a few hundred feet below and within 2 miles...

This is our home airspace. Very few ga pilots departing any of the four nearby ga airports contact CHS on VFR unless you're entering their class c... its not VFR user-friendly.

CHS is not alone in this regard... We departed Manning 2 days after the accident, headed down to LRO on edge of CHS class c. Called Shaw on the radio and requested flight following. The response was to call CHS in 10 miles...

We can all second guess what the F16 pilot could have or should have done... But it's wrong to overlook an environment that systematically ignores ga in the same airspace as military and heavy commercial traffic.

Because 1,600 ft complies with the altitude on the TACAN for runway 15 and meets the controller's MVA. Could've had crossing IFR traffic the controller was trying to get under. Plus, the VFR hadn't even popped up on radar when the 1,600 was assigned. We can sharp shoot the controller's actions all day long but there's no way of knowing where some 1200 code will be at any given time.

Never personally had any problems getting FF from either Shaw or Charleston.:dunno:
 
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We can all second guess what the F16 pilot could have or should have done... But it's wrong to overlook an environment that systematically ignores ga in the same airspace as military and heavy commercial traffic.

First post, welcome to POA!

I have to ask about ATC's workload if they routinely deny FF. If they are too busy to provide effective services then they are too busy. I don't fly in the area and you do so you know more from a pilot's perspective. Maybe one of the controllers on the board has info from their perspective of the area.
 
Sometimes inexperienced controllers get fixated in two dimensions. Since you don't know which way the 1200 code may turn, with an airplane like an F16, climb it, you will have vertical separation immediately.

Yeah, I suppose a climb would've been the better choice. I would think with "immediately" it wouldn't take 18 secs to get on that 180 heading either though. He never even made it to 180 also. 260 to 215 in 18 secs.
 
Yeah, I suppose a climb would've been the better choice. I would think with "immediately" it wouldn't take 18 secs to get on that 180 heading either though. He never even made it to 180 also. 260 to 215 in 18 secs.

How fast was the F-16? The controller is several seconds behind the actual aircraft which doesn't matter for us spam can drivers but it makes a big difference for something moving along fairly quickly.
 
How fast was the F-16? The controller is several seconds behind the actual aircraft which doesn't matter for us spam can drivers but it makes a big difference for something moving along fairly quickly.

Don't know but if he was traveling at 250 kts and did a 60 degree bank, it would only take about 12 secs to do a 90 degree turn.

Also, it's hard to tell from the transcript but it appears the F-16 didn't start the turn until the second command???
 
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He wasn't assigned 6,000. He was assigned 1,600. He was only 100 ft low on radar. Could've been right on 1,600 and still show up as 1,500 on radar. Well within the +- 300 ft difference for mode C accuracy.

Looks like the controller tried to separate aircraft, they just made the wrong choice in vectors. Only thing that I would've done was added "traffic alert, advise you turn left immediately heading 180." Just a bad situation all around.

He did tell him "If you don't have traffic in sight turn now" it wasn't until 26 seconds later he began the turn. Count to 26... that's a long time.
 
I'm not trying to sharpshoot, genuinely puzzled. 1600 feet was given 30 miles out. Look at the chart, runway 15 approach is going to take him right between MKS and Summerville. I've flown into that space many a time and have never been cleared anywhere near 1600 feet that far out.
 
Thanks for the welcome.

CHS has a long history with me of being VFR unfriendly. Started with a PPL check ride where they ignored calls for 10 minutes then denied entry. My examiner was used to it and cut me slack by having me climb over the top of their airpspace. That was 2001 btw.

Coming into their space under FF or IFR is fine... As long as you're not landing at CHS. If you are, expect vectors all over the place on most days. There's a pecking order where the AF comes first, commercial traffic second, big ga third and we're an inconvenience most of the time. There's an unwritten understanding that the airport authority does 't want small ga using CHS... They tore down all the T-hangers years ago and won't build any more. Their goal is to have all the GA out in the surrounding airports. This attidue carries over in every way possible. For example, We have the distinction of the highest fuel prices for miles in any direction.

I started flying again six months ago. Have lost track of the number of times we've had to repeat calls to CHS on IFR out of Mt Pleasant. Based on that I've only requested FF for long xc. Most of my flights are less than 80 miles and usually VFR.

Maybe they're simply overworked... Have no clue. Just know the reality of flying in their airspace. Maybe it's better elsewhere. Used to fly into Tampa routinely and never encountered similar disregard.

Fwiw, I will call them from this point forward when leaving the pattern... No desire to be subject of a similar discussion.

As for Shaw, that was first time I've requested ff from them. Manning is inside their moa so I expected a bit more...
 
Thanks for the welcome.

CHS has a long history with me of being VFR unfriendly. Started with a PPL check ride where they ignored calls for 10 minutes then denied entry. My examiner was used to it and cut me slack by having me climb over the top of their airpspace. That was 2001 btw.

Coming into their space under FF or IFR is fine... As long as you're not landing at CHS. If you are, expect vectors all over the place on most days. There's a pecking order where the AF comes first, commercial traffic second, big ga third and we're an inconvenience most of the time. There's an unwritten understanding that the airport authority does 't want small ga using CHS... They tore down all the T-hangers years ago and won't build any more. Their goal is to have all the GA out in the surrounding airports. This attidue carries over in every way possible. For example, We have the distinction of the highest fuel prices for miles in any direction.

I started flying again six months ago. Have lost track of the number of times we've had to repeat calls to CHS on IFR out of Mt Pleasant. Based on that I've only requested FF for long xc. Most of my flights are less than 80 miles and usually VFR.

Maybe they're simply overworked... Have no clue. Just know the reality of flying in their airspace. Maybe it's better elsewhere. Used to fly into Tampa routinely and never encountered similar disregard.

Fwiw, I will call them from this point forward when leaving the pattern... No desire to be subject of a similar discussion.

As for Shaw, that was first time I've requested ff from them. Manning is inside their moa so I expected a bit more...

Not doubting anything you say, but I flew into JZI about a month ago, VFR thru the Class C with no problems in or out. JZI is a great airport with good service, 15 minute taxi ride to town. Don't know why any GA would want to fly into CHS anyway. And the FBO at JZI has free cookies, Danishes and coffee !
 
I remember hearing (back in the 80s, I think, in APPROACH magazine) of a collision between a Navy jet trainer (Pinto, I think) and a 150. Both planes landed safely. The 150 had a tire skid mark on its upper fuselage, and the jet had a scuffed nosewheel.
Found it, I think. It was a C-150 and a T-2C Buckeye.

MIA85FA247A & MIA85FA247B, September 6, 1985.


"THE COMMERCIAL PLT & CFI DEPARTED FROM GULFPORT, MS ON A NIGHT VFR X-COUNTRY FLT TO GULF SHORES. AL. THE FLT LANDED AT FOLEY, AL AFTER THE PLT MISTOOK FOLEY FOR GULFSHORES 10 MI SOUTH. THE FLT DEPARTED AGAIN & WAS ADVISED BY ATC TO FLY A HEADING OF 170 DEG FOR GULFSHORES. CONTACT BETWEEN THE FLT & ATC WAS THEN TERMINATED DUE TO DISTANCE & ALT CONSIDERATION. THE PLT THEN OBSERVED THE LIGHTS OF OTHER ACFT EAST OF HIM & ASSUMED THEM TO BE IN THE TOUCH & GO PATTERN AT GULFSHORES. THE LIGHTS HE HAD OBSERVED WERE THOSE OF NAVY JET TRAINING A POSITION. THE NAVY ACFT WERE EXECUTING LEFT TRAFFIC BUT THE CIVIL PLT ENTERED INTO RT TRAFFIC & SEQUENCECD HIMSELF BETWEEN THE ACFT ON FINAL APCH. THE FASTER JET ACFT OVERTOOK THE CIVIL & A MIDAIR COLLISION OCCURRED. BOTH ACFT LANDED SAFELY & THERE WERE NO INJURES. THE CIVIL PLT STATED THAT HE DID NOT KNOW HOW TO DISTINGUISH A CIVIL ARPT BEACON FROM A MILTARY ARPT BEACON."

Ron Wanttaja
 
"THE COMMERCIAL PLT & CFI DEPARTED FROM GULFPORT... THE CIVIL PLT STATED THAT HE DID NOT KNOW HOW TO DISTINGUISH A CIVIL ARPT BEACON FROM A MILTARY ARPT BEACON."

So, I wonder if the commercial "student" logged the time as PIC?

dtuuri
 
Here's what it looks like at 1600'. This was over Texas.

"Okay, let's go home."

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Don't know but if he was traveling at 250 kts and did a 60 degree bank, it would only take about 12 secs to do a 90 degree turn.

Also, it's hard to tell from the transcript but it appears the F-16 didn't start the turn until the second command???

I don't know how F-16s operate. Will the pilot be thinking 1/2 standard rate turns and things of that nature on an IFR training flight?
 
I don't know how F-16s operate. Will the pilot be thinking 1/2 standard rate turns and things of that nature on an IFR training flight?

Not sure. I worked a bunch on arrival / approach and I will say, you do have to plan out their turns much earlier than say an F-18. As 35 earlier, those guys are doing like 250 kts when you turn then to final. That's fast for an IAP intercept, especially a GCA handoff.

Only time I recall where they are required to do half standard rate is on a no gyro approach. We were required to inform them to "make half standard rate turns." Outside of that, I would think they're using standard rate the whole time.
 
Not sure. I worked a bunch on arrival / approach and I will say, you do have to plan out their turns much earlier than say an F-18. As 35 earlier, those guys are doing like 250 kts when you turn then to final. That's fast for an IAP intercept, especially a GCA handoff.

Only time I recall where they are required to do half standard rate is on a no gyro approach. We were required to inform them to "make half standard rate turns." Outside of that, I would think they're using standard rate the whole time.

Wow, yup, we do steep banks under the hood and maybe in IMC if things get weird (ATC forgets you on an ILS intercept and ya really don't want to go missed). but planning on it is a whole 'nuther kettle of fish.
 
I don't know how F-16s operate. Will the pilot be thinking 1/2 standard rate turns and things of that nature on an IFR training flight?

1/2 standard rate is the norm with military fighters......normally around 30 deg angle of bank at the speeds you normally fly an approach, prior to configuring to land. Just like any other pilot, you don't want to be doing a whole lot of big angle of bank, jerking around like a fighter jet on an instrument approach. On the Navy side, most guys will fly 250 until within 30 deg of the final app course, or 10 nm from the field, whichever comes first (and all other things being equal). I do the same thing in the Viper out of habit, though I can't speak for what the norms are in the USAF/CAF. Flying 250 normally saves a bit of gas, being a good compromise between not having the flaps down, and also being fast enough to have good control over the aircraft.
 
He did tell him "If you don't have traffic in sight turn now" it wasn't until 26 seconds later he began the turn. Count to 26... that's a long time.[/QUOTE

Actually , he began the turn 8 seconds later not 26, and was turning for 18 seconds, which equals 26 seconds.
 
He did tell him "If you don't have traffic in sight turn now" it wasn't until 26 seconds later he began the turn. Count to 26... that's a long time.

Actually , he began the turn 8 seconds later not 26, and was turning for 18 seconds, which equals 26 seconds.

That's not the way I read this.

At 1100:26, the controller advised the F-16 pilot, "turn left heading 180 if you
don't have that traffic in sight." The pilot responded by asking, "confirm 2 miles?"
Eight seconds later, the controller stated, "if you don't have that traffic in sight turn left heading 180
immediately." Over the next 18 seconds, the track of the F-16 began turning southerly.
 
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That's not the way I read this.

The F16 was on a 260 heading. 15 seconds after he was told to turn immediately his heading was 215 . Appears to me he did turn immediately when told to do so at an approximate standard rate turn. His heading changed 45 degrees ( my bad, not 55) in 15 seconds.
 
It seems the Maj still thought he would continue the approach after vectors for traffic, he never perceived the urgency from the controller. 2 miles seems awfully close, unless he was a former Thuderbird.
 
It seems the Maj still thought he would continue the approach after vectors for traffic, he never perceived the urgency from the controller. 2 miles seems awfully close, unless he was a former Thuderbird.

Except for the 8 second delay, the Major did exactly what he was told to do. When told to turn immediately , he did. Looks like a standard rate of turn , I have no idea what his angle of bank would have been.

To impart urgency in that situation, the phraseology is "TRAFFIC ALERT". Unfortunately, the controller didn't say that nor suggest an immediate climb.
 
The F16 was on a 260 heading. 15 seconds after he was told to turn immediately his heading was 215 . Appears to me he did turn immediately when told to do so at an approximate standard rate turn. His heading changed 45 degrees ( my bad, not 55) in 15 seconds.

He's got 2 miles traffic at 250kts, he should not be reacting with instrument approach procedures anymore. The F-16 can maneuver at multiple Gs VFR just fine. He was still trying to salvage his approach.
 
He's got 2 miles traffic at 250kts, he should not be reacting with instrument approach procedures anymore. The F-16 can maneuver at multiple Gs VFR just fine. He was still trying to salvage his approach.

BS. When told to turn immediately, he complied, he wasn't issued a traffic alert. Now one knows which way the 1200 code will turn or not turn, you have to get vertical separation going in this situation.
 
He's got 2 miles traffic at 250kts, he should not be reacting with instrument approach procedures anymore. The F-16 can maneuver at multiple Gs VFR just fine. He was still trying to salvage his approach.

That's exactly how I read it.

I wonder if the C150 pilots were listening to the FF frequency. I do that even if I'm not getting FF, and have called in if I hear the controllers talking about me.
 
BS. When told to turn immediately, he complied, he wasn't issued a traffic alert. Now one knows which way the 1200 code will turn or not turn, you have to get vertical separation going in this situation.

Exactly, he should have broke off the approach and climbed out. He proceeded with an approach that was unwise to proceed with. I wonder if he flys for the AF again. If that wasn't a traffic alert, I don't know what one is.
 
BS. When told to turn immediately, he complied, he wasn't issued a traffic alert. Now one knows which way the 1200 code will turn or not turn, you have to get vertical separation going in this situation.

The report seems a bit inconclusive about the start of the turn, or the time taken to get the turn done, but here's my take about the comms exchange.

This was the third warning to the F16 about traffic and was supplemented with "immediately". Taken as a whole, in the context of pilot - controller exchange this would make me crank and bank, and notwithstanding no instruction, as long as it was VMC above me, I would have been climbing without a instruction to do so. Now, I've never driven a fast mover, but I've spent a lot of time in SoCal airspace back a while, and I've had a FF instruction to 'turn left immediately'. By the time the '--ately' was coming out of his mouth I was hard-over and pulling. Never saw the traffic, but it was enough for me to move my ass when told.
 
Exactly, he should have broke off the approach and climbed out. He proceeded with an approach that was unwise to proceed with. I wonder if he flys for the AF again. If that wasn't a traffic alert, I don't know what one is.

That is not a TRAFFIC ALERT in accordance with the 7110.65. The controller is attempting to separate an IFR from a VFR in Class E airspace. He is only in communication with the IFR and has no idea what the VFR will do.

Going by the 7110.65, the controller should issue a TRAFFIC ALERT, along with a suggested course of action.

Has it occurred to you that if no turn was issued there would not have been a collision?

What do you mean he should have broken off the approach? He was on an assigned turn, not on an approach.
 
That is not a TRAFFIC ALERT in accordance with the 7110.65. The controller is attempting to separate an IFR from a VFR in Class E airspace. He is only in communication with the IFR and has no idea what the VFR will do.

Going by the 7110.65, the controller should issue a TRAFFIC ALERT, along with a suggested course of action.

Has it occurred to you that if no turn was issued there would not have been a collision?

What do you mean he should have broken off the approach? He was on an assigned turn, not on an approach.

What part of PIC responsibility are you having trouble with? This is not the controller's problem. He gave plenty of indication that there was an immediate traffic problem. The man in the plane chose to not respond appropriately and tried to continue the approach. He was in VMC, he could cancel or go missed at any time and climb.
 
What part of PIC responsibility are you having trouble with? This is not the controller's problem. He gave plenty of indication that there was an immediate traffic problem. The man in the plane chose to not respond appropriately and tried to continue the approach. He was in VMC, he could cancel or go missed at any time and climb.

Again BS. The controller assumed responsibility for the separation of an IFR from a VFR in Class E when that vector was issued.

The proper course of action in accordance with the 7110.66 is a TRAFFIC ALERT with a suggested course of action. There is reason for each rule in the 7110 .65, you can either adhere to them or not.

Again you say he "tried to continue the approach". The guy was turning to an assigned heading, don't you get that?
 
What part of PIC responsibility are you having trouble with? This is not the controller's problem. He gave plenty of indication that there was an immediate traffic problem. The man in the plane chose to not respond appropriately and tried to continue the approach. He was in VMC, he could cancel or go missed at any time and climb.

I'd say he's cleaned, battered and fried.
 
Ah! I see!

I think the Maj turned left from 260 THROUGH 180 and came back around (orbit), which explains how the jet was 1/2 mile NE of the Cessna 150 in a 215 heading.

This might be just an accident that he DID try to avoid afterall
 
Ah! I see!

I think the Maj turned left from 260 THROUGH 180 and came back around (orbit), which explains how the jet was 1/2 mile NE of the Cessna 150 in a 215 heading.

This might be just an accident that he DID try to avoid afterall

Shouldn't the fact he made a full orbit be in the prelim report? I would think this would be easy enough to establish from the radar track. Since it's not in the report, and the time required to make a full orbit doesn't fit well, I'm going to discount this, and say he went from 260 > 215 on his way to 180. There's no indication that the pilot made a full orbit and then another ~45 deg turn to the south.
 
First call was traffic 12'oclock 2 miles. I am still unsure of how he hit it IF he actually turned to AVOID.

Perhaps the C150 turned also. It's also possible the C150 pilot saw the F16 and attempted to turn away but the F16 kept turning towards him.

I wasn't going to comment too much about ATC's part in this until some people started to unjustifiably trash the F16 pilot.

In this situation the seperation responsibility would have been in the cockpit, except the controller, contrary to procedures in the 7110.65 decided to assume responsibility for seperation of an IFR from a VFR in Class E.
 
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