Ok, let me ask you this. Vno for that airplane is 340kts. A quick eyeball of the timeline makes it appear airspeed at the time the cutouts were engaged was 290-300kts. Would it be reasonable for the Captain to assume the trim wheel should still turn manually then?
I truly don’t know, for a variety of reasons. I’ve never flown a 737, so take the following for what it’s worth.
I’m going to guess the CA had no idea the amount of force that would be needed and when, except that it would probably have to be a lot.
As I go back and review the ET prelim, I truly wonder if he didn’t consider, however briefly, that he needed to stay out of a condition in which MCAS inputs would occur....as soon as the shaker started going off.
If that was the line of thinking, combined with a desire to free up some brain bytes to work the abnormal condition, it might have led to the decision to try the AP early, so that means flaps up, which loses some lift. And with sink rate going off, power + pull is a natural response that should result in a higher AoA and MCAS operates in a high AoA regime. Then the AP kicks off and MCAS commanded AND occurs, without interruption, taking out half the nose up trim. *** I think at this point they were dead men flying ***
I wonder if they had hit the stab trim cutout during the 30 or so seconds the AP was engaged, would that have changed the outcome.
That’s conjecture and puts the crew squarely in test pilot mode. But if the known fleet history for stick shaker at rotation in a Max jet is 0-1, I personally would consider hitting the stab trim cutout first thing, just to prevent the jet from entering an unsurvivable condition.
I’m okay with those that disagree with that line of thought. I’m also okay with the biggest lesson learned out of these two crashes is AoAs are delicate and the ground environment in some places isn’t exactly easy on those things.