Colgan Q400 Down near KBUF?

Of course there are pilots who make good cash. Looking at one example and then thinking that all pilots earn that cash is just plain incorrect.

Here is the Colgan pay scale
http://www.willflyforfood.com/airlinepilotpay/Colgan_Air_Pilot_Pay.php

Often time the pilots on some of these planes are earning a base wage less than the guy who is xraying baggage for the TSA
Mainline pilots make a lot more than we do at the "commuters," though still not enough, and drastically less than they used to. I know quite a few pilots for whom flying full-time is their second job, for just that reason.

What is the average number of hours one gets per month? I assume it's more than the minimum. Calling Matt...

from what i remember talking to matt, and what seems pretty much standard in the regionals, I'm sure its much closer to the maximum than the minimum.
I'm lucky in that I'm very senior in the right seat, and because I was hired in the middle of the boom a few years ago, I have been senior for most of my time here (I was hired at seniority #286, we now have 480+ pilots on the list and I'm not far into the 200s).

On the Beech, I averaged 110hrs my first four months (we used pt135 rules) and about 95 hrs after that. Now I'm averaging 80-85hrs, probably. And that's with my pick of schedules (#1 in base, #4 on the airplane). Junior pilots are kept right around 75-80 hrs. Especially the reserve pilots, who are required to be within an hour of the airport, five days a week, with no guarantee that they'll fly. The company will work them right up to 73 hrs of flying for the month, then stop calling unless they really need them. I'd unscientifically guess the average is between 65-80hrs/month, nowadays.

I talk to a number of people who think that all pilots flying people around should have some ridiculous amount of experience. I ask those people where they expect those pilots to get their experience. We all had 0 hours at one point, we all had our private at one point and nothing else, flying around in a 150, 172, whatever. You can't expect every pilot out there to have 20,000 hours, because they have to somehow get there.

Not saying that the pilots on board were qualified for flying that plane in those conditions (I don't have enough info to make that call), but everyone 20,000 hour pilot out there once had 0 hours.

Obviously you don't hire a 0 hour pilot, but the reactions of the public get annoying to me at times.

Thank you, thank you, thank you, Ted! Obviously there are exceptions to this, as Dave and others pointed out, but for the most part, especially these days (and especially at the regional level), that is very very true. As a side note, I suspect most military pilots would prefer (and would have been able, when they were still hiring) to go straight to the majors and skip the regionals, because why would they want to get paid our measly salaries for flying an RJ or a Dash when they could fly the big metal?

Additionally, the media and the public seem to think that the only measure of a good pilot is some combination of the number of hours in their logbook and their age. This, I think, is one of the biggest and most widely held misconceptions about pilots in general (next to pay rates). It's assigning a quantitative figure to a measure of quality...it doesn't work. I'd bet I'm better than a few 5000+ hr pilots, and I'd bet my entire paycheck that there are plenty of sub 500 hr pilots that could fly circles around me. As R&W has said many times in this thread, it's the type of experience that counts more than the numbers in the green book. [/rant]

I thought one of the big things in the Q400 was the ability of the FMC / on board systems to determine if it is a wing stall or a tailplane stall?
Negative. This was discussed a lot on the first morning of the hearing. The ADC calculates (and indicates, through a lot of PFM) a wing stall based on its inputs from the pitot/static system, and the two Alpha vanes. There are no indications or monitoring systems for a tail stall. The Dash isn't that dissimilar from any other plane "prop" plane, it's just bigger and heavier, and has hydraulic controls.

Colgan also apparently does not even have their pilots feel the stick shaker and pusher in the sim. To someone who's never felt it before, and who is reacting to what he thinks is ice, the stick shaker may well have been misinterpreted as a tailplane stall. I can't say I'd have thought any different. And if a tailplane stall occurs, the immediate remedy is - to swiftly pull back on the yoke.

This seems more like a misdiagnosis of the problem rather than an "incorrect" action being taken. And I can't believe Colgan doesn't train their pilots in the sim on the stick shaker and pusher, or that the FAA approved their training plan with that missing. Just seems basic to this non-airline pilot. :dunno:

Wrong, wrong, wrong. I know you're just workign off the (****-poor) media reports, but that's just wrong. Just like every other airline, we're trained on stalls A LOT. We're trained (and tested) to the shaker A LOT. The FAA does not, and has never (to my knowledge), required stick-pusher training of anyone.

We talk about the pusher in depth in classroom discussion, and get a demonstration of it in the sim, but the FAA's thinking is that if we train to the shaker (first indication of a stall, if that sounds familiar) then we should never see the pusher. It's the same as why PPL candidates don't have to do a spin. Our training, in that regard, is exactly what the FAA requires of us and EVERY other airline out there.

As was mentioned in the hearings either late yesterday or early today, pusher training has been added to our curriculum, but the FAA still doesn't require it, and in fact it's done as a non-jeopardy event because it's not part of the PTS.

Just like any other aircraft checkout in GA, stall series (to the shaker) and steep turns are and have always been part of the initial/recurrent/upgrade/transition training, in addition to the full course of system failures and crap-weather single engine approaches.

So, that means that they'll get between 900 and 1000 hours for the year. A first-year FO would make between $18,900 and $21,000. The captain of the accident flight would have been making between $52,200 and $58,000. The accident FO would have just barely "graduated" to her 2nd-year pay of between $23,400 to $26,000. She also had 772 hours at the time of the accident, so that should indicate what they get in roughly a year for loggable flight time.

Note that it would be possible to get *paid* for more than 1,000 hours if you had less than the minimum in some months and I'm also not sure what they get paid for outside of the logged flight time, so they may make a bit more - But it gives you an idea. I made more driving trucks than the captain of that airplane made, and that's just not right. :no:

You got it right. It's possible to make more, but that's becomming increasingly difficult as flying is reduced and work-rules are slashed. Your calculations for average pay in both seats is pretty close to spot on. My wife, having just started a new job in a bank eight months ago, makes more than me. The manager at the McDonald's in BOS's Airways terminal makes signifigantly more than any regional FO I've ever met, and more than many junior captains at most regionals.
 
I know an ex-USN pilot who now flies for a major. He never got a civilian Single Engine certificate. He's pushing 75's and 76's through the sky but he cannot legally fly a 172....

-Skip

Ditto my wife: ATP + 4 type ratings, dats it.

Family burger run passenger brief, final item: " . . . and remember, I am the only legal PIC in this plane!" :rolleyes:
 
Thank you, thank you, thank you, Ted! Obviously there are exceptions to this, as Dave and others pointed out, but for the most part, especially these days (and especially at the regional level), that is very very true.

It amazes me that non-pilots seem to think that there's this glut of 20,000 hour pilots out there, and they don't want to fly with anyone with fewer hours.

Unless, of course, it's me, in which case they'll happily hop in a plane that I'm piloting with my meager 315 hours and counting. I try to point this out to them, and it sometimes works, sometimes doesn't.

As a side note, I suspect most military pilots would prefer (and would have been able, when they were still hiring) to go straight to the majors and skip the regionals, because why would they want to get paid our measly salaries for flying an RJ or a Dash when they could fly the big metal?

Because there's more romance in props than in jets, and you can't put a price on romance. ;)

Additionally, the media and the public seem to think that the only measure of a good pilot is some combination of the number of hours in their logbook and their age. This, I think, is one of the biggest and most widely held misconceptions about pilots in general (next to pay rates). It's assigning a quantitative figure to a measure of quality...it doesn't work. I'd bet I'm better than a few 5000+ hr pilots, and I'd bet my entire paycheck that there are plenty of sub 500 hr pilots that could fly circles around me. As R&W has said many times in this thread, it's the type of experience that counts more than the numbers in the green book. [/rant]

This is the biggest misconception of the public out there, regardless of the vocation. I've seen people with thousands of hours who I wouldn't fly with, and I've also seen student pilots who I'm exceedingly comfortable with. There are a lot of factors in there.

Ultimately, I'd bet that 99% of the people complaining couldn't fly (or land) a plane to save their lives, and have no clue what they're talking about.
 
Wrong, wrong, wrong. I know you're just workign off the (****-poor) media reports, but that's just wrong. Just like every other airline, we're trained on stalls A LOT. We're trained (and tested) to the shaker A LOT. The FAA does not, and has never (to my knowledge), required stick-pusher training of anyone.

We talk about the pusher in depth in classroom discussion, and get a demonstration of it in the sim, but the FAA's thinking is that if we train to the shaker (first indication of a stall, if that sounds familiar) then we should never see the pusher. It's the same as why PPL candidates don't have to do a spin. Our training, in that regard, is exactly what the FAA requires of us and EVERY other airline out there.

Aha - That's what I was really wondering! If you get a demo in the sim (every time, or just during initial?) then you'd think he'd have known.

Do you have a good old-fashioned stall warning horn to go with the shaker and pusher? Is it easily distinguishable from all the other warning horns?

With as much technology as we have on airplanes these days, I would think that it wouldn't be tough to have bitchin' betty give you a warning like "airspeed decay" or somesuch well before it actually gets to the stall - Watching the animation, the airspeed went down in a big hurry. What are the parameters that cause the shaker to go off - Is it simply "airspeed below x" or is there something that warns you that "airspeed is going to be below x 5 seconds from now unless decisive corrective action is taken"?

The manager at the McDonald's in BOS's Airways terminal makes signifigantly more than any regional FO I've ever met, and more than many junior captains at most regionals.

Ugh. :mad3:

I think within 20 years, I am not going to feel safe on airlines any more. It's turning into a job for people who can't get anything else rather than one that's sought after and only the best are hired for in way too many cases (not yours, Matt!). :(
 
From everything that's come out about this, it seems there was a tragic lack of skill in the cockpit that got them into a low, slow, stalled condition. So, are you saying that once the pilot flew the aircraft into a stalled condition, there was no saving it? And why would that be the case?

Could they have saved it? Maybe. They should have never got into such a condition and I don't think you're understanding my point -- the fact that they allowed themselves into such a condition made it extremely unlikely they'd be on the ball enough to get them OUT of the condition.
 
The FAA does not, and has never (to my knowledge), required stick-pusher training of anyone.
I've had sim training in two airplanes which had pushers and it was not part of the curriculum. The only reason I have done a stall to the pusher in the sim was because I asked to do one just for curiosity's sake. That said, the shaker and pusher are tested every day during the preflight so I know what they feel like. I've also never seen anyone get so slow on approach that the shaker was activated, let alone the pusher. Of course I would have said something before that but I've never even see it start to happen.
 
Additionally, the media and the public seem to think that the only measure of a good pilot is some combination of the number of hours in their logbook and their age. This, I think, is one of the biggest and most widely held misconceptions about pilots in general (next to pay rates). It's assigning a quantitative figure to a measure of quality...it doesn't work. I'd bet I'm better than a few 5000+ hr pilots, and I'd bet my entire paycheck that there are plenty of sub 500 hr pilots that could fly circles around me. As R&W has said many times in this thread, it's the type of experience that counts more than the numbers in the green book.

Since the vast majority of the flying public has virtually no clue about the wide range of pilot experience, quality, and capability they tend to accept the notion that flight hours is a true measure of ability even though that's been proven to be a lousy measure of pilot "safety". And it does stand to reason that with two otherwise identical pilots that have significantly different tallys in their logbooks, the one with more time on the average will have experienced more challenging situations that they might have learned something useful from.
Just like any other aircraft checkout in GA, stall series (to the shaker) and steep turns are and have always been part of the initial/recurrent/upgrade/transition training, in addition to the full course of system failures and crap-weather single engine approaches.

Teller, I'm curious about a couple of related issues. One is whether during the recent emphasis on tailplane stalls, sufficient time has been spent on the ways to discriminate between tailplane and wing stall events. Clearly this is critical since the proper response in each case is radically different. I would think that this could easily be demonstrated and practiced in the sim but I haven't heard of any such exercises, from what I've heard most of the "emphasis" on tailplane stalls has been in the form of presentations and discussions.

And that leads to the second issue, that of how the accident pilot(s) might have misinterpreted the airplane's condition at the time of the stall. It sure seems to me that the very abnormally low airspeed alone, not to mention the near stall AoA indication would have dictated that a wing stall recovery was called for. Do you have any comments about that?

I can certainly understand how there might be confusion about which surfaces were losing lift if the stall occurred at an indicated speed well above stall and/or with and AoA noticeably less than the stalling AoA, since ice contamination could then precipitate either type of stall but from what I've read in the reports, the speed (and I assume AoA) were in the range that one would expect to see a wing stall.
 
Judging pilot skill based on hours is not a non-flying and media phenomenon. I remember, not too long ago, right here on this very board, hearing many, many respected people make that exact same claim (and one, unnamed individual even saying "You can believe me and my thousands of hours, or you can believe the FARs" or something like that.

Its a plague, since one of the best pilots I've ever flown with was a young kid with very few logged hours from Minnesota.
 
Aha - That's what I was really wondering! If you get a demo in the sim (every time, or just during initial?) then you'd think he'd have known.
The shaker is every, every, every time. The pusher demo is a new program, but it will be part of every recurrent session, as well.

Do you have a good old-fashioned stall warning horn to go with the shaker and pusher? Is it easily distinguishable from all the other warning horns?

With as much technology as we have on airplanes these days, I would think that it wouldn't be tough to have bitchin' betty give you a warning like "airspeed decay" or somesuch well before it actually gets to the stall - Watching the animation, the airspeed went down in a big hurry. What are the parameters that cause the shaker to go off - Is it simply "airspeed below x" or is there something that warns you that "airspeed is going to be below x 5 seconds from now unless decisive corrective action is taken"?
No. You have the visual indication of the "Low Speed Cue," (aka The Snake) which, for those who have never flown glass before, is a red and white barber pole that appears along the right side of the speed tape starting at the stall speed and going down to the bottom of the tape. If your airspeed "touches" the low speed cue, the airspeed indication itself turns red and the shaker is activated. There is no other stall horn; the shaker is very loud and very noticeable, I don't think another horn would really be distinguishable. Off the top of my head, we already have the 1)altitude alerter, 2) gear horn, 3) over speed horn, 4)takeoff configuration horn, 5)master caution chime, 6)master warning chime, 7)and all the various cabin signals. The noise of the shaker is easily detectable.

There is an airspeed trend indicator (a little arrow on the airspeed tape that shows where your speed will be in 10 seconds), but there are no alerts associated with it. Often times, in the regimes we fly in, we have to slow down quickly, so it would cause more nuisance alarms than anything. Also, the airspeed is very sensitive to bumps and turbulence, so we would probable get an almost constant alarm on an approach in turbulence if they tried to give the computer airspeed prediction logic.

The low speed cue is calculated by the computer, using the ADC and Alpha vane inputs, and the shaker is only triggered when speed=slow speed cue.

Ugh. :mad3:

I think within 20 years, I am not going to feel safe on airlines any more. It's turning into a job for people who can't get anything else rather than one that's sought after and only the best are hired for in way too many cases (not yours, Matt!). :(
Thanks :smile:

I've had sim training in two airplanes which had pushers and it was not part of the curriculum. The only reason I have done a stall to the pusher in the sim was because I asked to do one just for curiosity's sake. That said, the shaker and pusher are tested every day during the preflight so I know what they feel like. I've also never seen anyone get so slow on approach that the shaker was activated, let alone the pusher. Of course I would have said something before that but I've never even see it start to happen.

Same.
 
Lance, I have to go pick my sister-in-law up at the airport. You asked some great questions, and I'll get back to you in a few minutes!
 
With all due respect to the teacher...

The hurdles one must pass to be an ATP are a bit more stringent than passing 6th grade.


Passing a test doesn't mean you know how to think. The problem is still that you can't get the best and brightest when you don't pay best and brightest wages, you lose them to other industries. Airline Pilot used to be a good job, not anymore.
 
Could they have saved it? Maybe. They should have never got into such a condition and I don't think you're understanding my point -- the fact that they allowed themselves into such a condition made it extremely unlikely they'd be on the ball enough to get them OUT of the condition.

Hard to argue with the logic...
 
Passing a test doesn't mean you know how to think. The problem is still that you can't get the best and brightest when you don't pay best and brightest wages, you lose them to other industries. Airline Pilot used to be a good job, not anymore.


There is a lot of truth in this.
 
Passing a test doesn't mean you know how to think. The problem is still that you can't get the best and brightest when you don't pay best and brightest wages, you lose them to other industries. Airline Pilot used to be a good job, not anymore.

Wait, you mean CFIs aren't instant "trustables?"
 
...

Unless, of course, it's me, in which case they'll happily hop in a plane that I'm piloting with my meager 315 hours and counting. I try to point this out to them, and it sometimes works, sometimes doesn't....

.

Uh don't you mostly fly dogs? And aren't they crated and put in the plane? so they really don't have much choice do they?:rolleyes::D
 
Passing a test doesn't mean you know how to think. The problem is still that you can't get the best and brightest when you don't pay best and brightest wages, you lose them to other industries. Airline Pilot used to be a good job, not anymore.

Even if you pay 'em well, the may not know how to think. Witness Wall Street. Oops, did I really say that? :redface:
 
Uh don't you mostly fly dogs? And aren't they crated and put in the plane? so they really don't have much choice do they?:rolleyes::D

Actually, the dogs are frequently the most resistant passengers. Maybe they're onto something that humans aren't... ;)
 
Passing a test doesn't mean you know how to think. The problem is still that you can't get the best and brightest when you don't pay best and brightest wages, you lose them to other industries. Airline Pilot used to be a good job, not anymore.

No kidding.

You missed the context -- the teacher in the interview wondered why everyone wasn't taught as completely as her students.

Sorry -- it ain't the same.
 
Uh don't you mostly fly dogs? And aren't they crated and put in the plane? so they really don't have much choice do they?:rolleyes::D


He didn't even say live dogs. Yeah, we saw pictures, but you know photoshop and all.


:D
 
Since the vast majority of the flying public has virtually no clue about the wide range of pilot experience, quality, and capability they tend to accept the notion that flight hours is a true measure of ability even though that's been proven to be a lousy measure of pilot "safety". And it does stand to reason that with two otherwise identical pilots that have significantly different tallys in their logbooks, the one with more time on the average will have experienced more challenging situations that they might have learned something useful from.
I don't disagree for a second that it is a good baseline. I just don't think it should be used as the absolute judge of a pilot's character, as it tends to be.

Teller, I'm curious about a couple of related issues. One is whether during the recent emphasis on tailplane stalls, sufficient time has been spent on the ways to discriminate between tailplane and wing stall events. Clearly this is critical since the proper response in each case is radically different. I would think that this could easily be demonstrated and practiced in the sim but I haven't heard of any such exercises, from what I've heard most of the "emphasis" on tailplane stalls has been in the form of presentations and discussions.
I've been told that most sims don't do the aerodynamic modeling for tail stalls (or fully developed wing stalls) well or accurately. We do something like 2-3 hours of classroom discussion on tail stalls during each training cycle, but I don't think the sims are equipped to demonstrate them. Or so I've been told.

We've been told, recently, too, that Bombardier research shows that the hydraulically operated non-reversable elevators do not flutter or "snatch" like normal control surfaces. Essentially, there will be no cockpit indications and no tactile indications of a tail stall.

And that leads to the second issue, that of how the accident pilot(s) might have misinterpreted the airplane's condition at the time of the stall. It sure seems to me that the very abnormally low airspeed alone, not to mention the near stall AoA indication would have dictated that a wing stall recovery was called for. Do you have any comments about that?

I can certainly understand how there might be confusion about which surfaces were losing lift if the stall occurred at an indicated speed well above stall and/or with and AoA noticeably less than the stalling AoA, since ice contamination could then precipitate either type of stall but from what I've read in the reports, the speed (and I assume AoA) were in the range that one would expect to see a wing stall.

Obviously I can't comment on what they were seeing or how/why they interpreteded the indications. I can clarify the systems on the plane, though, as all this was discussed on the first day of the hearing.

There is no cockpit indication of the AoA. There are two heated Alpha vanes (one on each side of the plane). The left feeds the #1ADC and the right, the #2. If either heater fails, either vane fails, or the difference between them is greater than X degrees, the pusher is deactivated and we get a master caution light. Beyond that, we have no indications about the AoA.

The AoA and the pitot/static inputs to the ADC are all that trigger the stall indication, there are no external mechanical stall vanes of any sort.

Additionally, we have no indications about the condition of the tail surfaces. The digital ice detection probes are on the nose below the pitot tubes and Alpha vanes. We can see the wings around about 1/4 of the prop outward, but it's 20 feet or so behind us and well above us.

The cockpit indications of a stall or impending stall, as I mentioned earlier, are the "snake" coming into view, followed by the shaker, etc.

This is where things get confusing with what we may expect vs what the airplane does. You may have seen some discussion about the "Ref Speed Switch." This is a spring loaded, over-center switch on the overhead panel above the captain. In the norm position, the stall computer does its thing under normal parameters. In the "incr" position, the computer adds 20kts to the stall indication speed.

When we set our speed bugs (set manually, independent of all other systems) for approach, we bug Vref and Vga. For normal weight ranges and flaps 15, this is around 125 and 120 KIAS, respectivly. This will give us a 10-15kt margin above the snake. If we set our bugs for the "non-ice" speeds, but the Ref Speed switch is in Incr (stall speed is now at or above our expected Vref), that 15kt margin now takes us 5kts into a "stall," when we're expecting to still be able to slow more.

So in some ways, it's possible to get a stall indication well above the expected stall speed; even above the expected approach speed.

Makes sense? No?
 
This is where things get confusing with what we may expect vs what the airplane does. You may have seen some discussion about the "Ref Speed Switch." This is a spring loaded, over-center switch on the overhead panel above the captain. In the norm position, the stall computer does its thing under normal parameters. In the "incr" position, the computer adds 20kts to the stall indication speed.

When we set our speed bugs (set manually, independent of all other systems) for approach, we bug Vref and Vga. For normal weight ranges and flaps 15, this is around 125 and 120 KIAS, respectivly. This will give us a 10-15kt margin above the snake. If we set our bugs for the "non-ice" speeds, but the Ref Speed switch is in Incr (stall speed is now at or above our expected Vref), that 15kt margin now takes us 5kts into a "stall," when we're expecting to still be able to slow more.

So in some ways, it's possible to get a stall indication well above the expected stall speed; even above the expected approach speed.

Makes sense? No?
That doesn't make any sense at all to me. Are you saying that when you are in icing conditions you set the Ref Speed switch to INCR which gives you the shaker 20 knots faster but you don't adjust the Vref to be 20 knots faster also? So theoretically if you flew at Vref you would be getting the shaker? If that's the case it seems like a design flaw or a procedure flaw.
 
That doesn't make any sense at all to me. Are you saying that when you are in icing conditions you set the Ref Speed switch to INCR which gives you the shaker 20 knots faster but you don't adjust the Vref to be 20 knots faster also? So theoretically if you flew at Vref you would be getting the shaker? If that's the case it seems like a design flaw or a procedure flaw.

No. He is saying if you screw up and set it to INCR in non-icing conditions and then fly a no-ice approach speed it is possible to get the sticker warning even though you're some distance from the stall.

I don't see how the above could have possibly led to this situation. The above would cause a stall-recovery to be done well before the stall and likely just a missed approach. In this case -- somehow -- who knows why -- the airplane went to the stall it seems.
 
That doesn't make any sense at all to me. Are you saying that when you are in icing conditions you set the Ref Speed switch to INCR which gives you the shaker 20 knots faster but you don't adjust the Vref to be 20 knots faster also? So theoretically if you flew at Vref you would be getting the shaker? If that's the case it seems like a design flaw or a procedure flaw.

No. Jesse is right. If non-ice speeds are bugged, but we either forget to turn the switch to norm after leaving icing conditions (the switch is in Incr during all flight regimes when in icing conditions) or it gets stuck in the Incr position and is not caught, the stall indication will occur much earlier than one might expect.
 
No. He is saying if you screw up and set it to INCR in non-icing conditions and then fly a no-ice approach speed it is possible to get the sticker warning even though you're some distance from the stall.
But that wasn't the case in this situation because they really were in icing conditions and correctly set the switch to INCR as I understand it. I guess what I'm curious about then is if the Vref and Vga bugs were set for a higher airspeed too.

I don't see how the above could have possibly led to this situation. The above would cause a stall-recovery to be done well before the stall and likely just a missed approach. In this case -- somehow -- who knows why -- the airplane went to the stall it seems.
You're right that if a stall recovery had been done it wouldn't have been a problem but what was done wasn't even close to a stall recovery, for whatever reason, and I don't think we'll ever know although people will guess.
 
Because there aren't warts with flying other commercial carriers, with any of our planes, or (biggest of all) with driving or riding a motorcycle?

I do not have a tolerance for sensationalist media. "Everybody! Be scared!"
 
Did anyone watch the Frontline episode about Colgan, flight 3407, and flying for the RJ's in general?

It did not paint a good portrait of small airlines at all. Showed the many warts.

You can watch it online here http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/flyingcheap/


I did....

I don't know. I think there were some valid critiques, but at the end I wasn't convinced of any one particular point. He started with the Colgan BUF crash, then did lots of for-against interviews.

:dunno:
 
Did anyone watch the Frontline episode about Colgan, flight 3407, and flying for the RJ's in general?

It did not paint a good portrait of small airlines at all. Showed the many warts.

You can watch it online here http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/flyingcheap/

Because there aren't warts with flying other commercial carriers, with any of our planes, or (biggest of all) with driving or riding a motorcycle?

I do not have a tolerance for sensationalist media. "Everybody! Be scared!"

I did....

I don't know. I think there were some valid critiques, but at the end I wasn't convinced of any one particular point. He started with the Colgan BUF crash, then did lots of for-against interviews.

:dunno:
I was in and out a lot, so didn't see the whole thing. My impression was that while they were pointing out problems, it wasn't the usual sensationalist anti-aviation thing. Seemed rather reasonable to me.

Basically, they seemed to be promoting the idea that major carriers who contract with regionals have some responsibility in encouraging and promoting safety within those regionals just as they have the responsibility for safety in their own lines.

Let's face it, we all know that there is a lot of pressure in the regionals to fly the cheapest way possible. Under-paid, over-tired, under-trained pilots flying all hours and all weather.

The best-paid pilots (I think I remember) fly boxes for UPS.
 
Let's face it, we all know that there is a lot of pressure in the regionals to fly the cheapest way possible. Under-paid, over-tired, under-trained pilots flying all hours and all weather.

...who on their worst days are probably still better than many of us on our best days. This is the world of commercial transport, be it ground or air based. Not saying there isn't room for improvement (there always is), but jobs are hard work. This is a job. They're getting paid to do it and do it well and safely under less than optimal conditions.

And they succeed! Commercial flying is a very safe mode of transport - far safer than ground-based transport. The problem is that the people who wreck their cars/trucks and kill several people don't make national news, but anytime a plane crashes the media is all over it.

The best-paid pilots (I think I remember) fly boxes for UPS.

Getting paid more only means they have more money in their bank accounts. It doesn't mean they're more rested or better trained, or fly in better weather. If I'm underpaid I'm still going to do my best to do the job safely, seeing as a failure to do so would result in bad results for me personally.
 
I did see the program but missed the first part. What I saw did seem daming of the industry and especailly Colgan. If what the Capt and FO the interviewed said were correct there were some pretty bad safety violations. The problem is that who knows if they were just **** off employees for another reason. I look at any media with a juandiced eye and PBS reporting does not have any great credibility than the other networks just because its public broadcasting.

It would seem there are issues with the industry and probably some pretty nasty incidents but what industry doesen't have that problem?

There are lawyers who let their client's down Doctors etc. Teller flies for Colgan the airline featured in the report. I'd sit in a seat behind him any day of the week.
 
It would seem there are issues with the industry and probably some pretty nasty incidents but what industry doesen't have that problem?

There are lawyers who let their client's down Doctors etc. Teller flies for Colgan the airline featured in the report. I'd sit in a seat behind him any day of the week.
The difference is when nasty incidents lead to the deaths of 50 people.

The PF in the BUF crash pulled back when warned of an impending stall.

What?!?!
 
They're getting paid to do it and do it well and safely under less than optimal conditions.

But they're not getting paid well, and they're not getting paid in proportion to the responsibility they bear.

FWIW, I drive a truck. I carry food, John Deere parts, furniture, plastic wrap, you name it... But never people. It would take me roughly EIGHT YEARS at a regional airline to get back to what I make now. That's not right. :no:

And they succeed! Commercial flying is a very safe mode of transport - far safer than ground-based transport. The problem is that the people who wreck their cars/trucks and kill several people don't make national news, but anytime a plane crashes the media is all over it.

Even so, it's not as good as it should be. The 3407 crash was completely preventable, and even though commercial flying is very safe, tell that to the families of those who were killed. They deserved a better flight crew.

Getting paid more only means they have more money in their bank accounts.

No, it also means that more pilots want to work there, which means they can be more picky in their hiring, and they get the best pilots.

Why do they get the best pilots? Because boxes don't b*tch about how expensive their ticket was. :mad2:

It doesn't mean they're more rested or better trained, or fly in better weather. If I'm underpaid I'm still going to do my best to do the job safely, seeing as a failure to do so would result in bad results for me personally.

But the people who become pilots now aren't necessarily the cream of the crop, since most sane individuals would rather do something with more of a return on their educational investment, like get an English degree and work at McDonald's. Seriously - Tuition, books, etc. for that English degree cost maybe $30,000, and the assistant manager job they'll get at McD's for $10/hr will result in $20,000/yr at 40 hours/week and 2 weeks' vacation. OTOH, the pilot will spend 3 times as much to get to the cockpit of a regional, and make less money.
 
The best-paid pilots (I think I remember) fly boxes for UPS.
UPS is having problems of its own. They just announced that they will furlough 300 pilots unless they get some concessions.

Marketwatch.com said:
UPS today announced plans to furlough at least 300 of its airline pilots, but at the same time continued its effort to find a solution with the pilots' union that would avert or mitigate the layoffs before they take effect. UPS employs about 2,800 pilots.
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/ups-starts-pilot-furlough-process-2010-02-08?reflink=MW_news_stmp
 
The difference is when nasty incidents lead to the deaths of 50 people.

The PF in the BUF crash pulled back when warned of an impending stall.

What?!?!

If it had been a tailplane stall (which may have been what he thought it was from the stick shaker and other indications) then that would have been the proper response.

But they're not getting paid well, and they're not getting paid in proportion to the responsibility they bear.

FWIW, I drive a truck. I carry food, John Deere parts, furniture, plastic wrap, you name it... But never people. It would take me roughly EIGHT YEARS at a regional airline to get back to what I make now. That's not right. :no:

I agree on those two points fully.

Even so, it's not as good as it should be. The 3407 crash was completely preventable, and even though commercial flying is very safe, tell that to the families of those who were killed. They deserved a better flight crew.

So would you have done better? You wouldn't have been flying most likely, but it's not your job to. The problem with death is that you may have a 1% of dying, but you either 100% die or 0% die. As a truck driver I'm sure you've driven in conditions that most people would consider unsafe (I know I have a number of times), and you made it, as did I. You know as well as I do that when you transport things professionally you may still have days you can't drive or fly, but that your job ends up being to still be out working on those days when the rest of us are at home. The rest of the planes going into Buffalo that night made it.

All crashes are preventable. Don't take off, don't drive, etc. You also won't get the job done that way.

No, it also means that more pilots want to work there, which means they can be more picky in their hiring, and they get the best pilots.

So goes the theory, but I don't buy that. You know as well as I do that the best don't always end up working for the best, and hiring managers don't always hire the best.

Why do they get the best pilots? Because boxes don't b*tch about how expensive their ticket was. :mad2:

Yes they do. I don't use UPS because it costs too much. I use FedEx.

But the people who become pilots now aren't necessarily the cream of the crop, since most sane individuals would rather do something with more of a return on their educational investment, like get an English degree and work at McDonald's. Seriously - Tuition, books, etc. for that English degree cost maybe $30,000, and the assistant manager job they'll get at McD's for $10/hr will result in $20,000/yr at 40 hours/week and 2 weeks' vacation. OTOH, the pilot will spend 3 times as much to get to the cockpit of a regional, and make less money.

And you'd work at McDonalds? That's also an unfair example. The regional pilot has a schedule of raises and options for moving up in the ranks. The McDonalds worker... probably doesn't. I'd also say that, as a rule, most pilots I know are more educated than most truckers (present company excluded).

I'm not saying that the conditions are fair and that there's no room for improvement - that's not at all the case. I just get sick of people not being willing to accept that life has risks and actions have consequences. You get in a car, on a plane, on a motorcycle, you might die. You demand the cheapest price, your quality might go down (generally will). I'm surprised to see you siding with the media on this one.
 
But it wasn't, and there was no indication he thought that was the case. :frown2:

As we weren't there and don't have all the info, I find it difficult for either of us to make a determination that he did or didn't think it was the case.
 
As we weren't there and don't have all the info, I find it difficult for either of us to make a determination that he did or didn't think it was the case.

All we have is a crash site and an NTSB report.

The report states that, when the stick shaker activated to warn the flight crew of an impending aerodynamic stall, the captain should have responded correctly to the situation by pushing forward on the control column. However, the captain inappropriately pulled aft on the control column and placed the airplane into an accelerated aerodynamic stall.
Contributing to the cause of the accident were the Crewmembers’ failure to recognize the position of the low-speed cue on their flight displays, which indicated that the stick shaker was about to activate, and their failure to adhere to sterile cockpit procedures. Other contributing factors were the captain’s failure to effectively manage the flight and Colgan Air’s inadequate procedures for airspeed selection and management during approaches in icing conditions.

These findings indicate otherwise:

  1. The captain’s response to stick shaker activation should have been automatic, but his improper flight control inputs were inconsistent with his training and were instead consistent with startle and confusion.
  2. The captain did not recognize the stick pusher’s action to decrease angle-of-attack as a proper step in a stall recovery, and his improper flight control inputs to override the stick pusher exacerbated the situation.
  3. It is unlikely that the captain was deliberately attempting to perform a tailplane stall recovery.
  4. No evidence indicated that the Q400 was susceptible to a tailplane stall.
 
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As we weren't there and don't have all the info, I find it difficult for either of us to make a determination that he did or didn't think it was the case.
The NTSB has come out with their report now and although it is true that they can't know what was in his mind, they don't think that was the cause.

http://www.ntsb.gov/Publictn/2010/AAR1001.htm

11. The captain’s response to stick shaker activation should have been automatic, but his improper flight control inputs were inconsistent with his training and were instead consistent with startle and confusion.

12. The captain did not recognize the stick pusher’s action to decrease angle-of-attack as a proper step in a stall recovery, and his improper flight control inputs to override the stick pusher exacerbated the situation.

13. It is unlikely that the captain was deliberately attempting to perform a tailplane stall recovery.

14. No evidence indicated that the Q400 was susceptible to a tailplane stall.

15. Although the reasons the first officer retracted the flaps and suggested raising the gear could not be determined from the available information, these actions were inconsistent with company stall recovery procedures and training.
 
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