True story: In the 1970s I was the copilot (FO for the status conscious) on a Learjet deadheading into Buffalo one morning in dense fog. I was handling the radios because the captain thought he stood the better chance of not missing the approach due to the weather
rolleyes
. It probably saved our lives.
I thought it odd that approach was saying we were two miles from the marker and cleared us for the approach because I could hear the OM beeping as he spoke. I think he was covering verbally for a late turn-on. But it caused me, thankfully, to pay closer attention to resolve the ambiguity.
The next odd thing that happened was the middle marker went off while we were still well above minimums. "What's causing these markers to go off early?" I wondered. Even though I didn't like this captain much, I had to commend his ability to keep the needles perfectly centered.
When we reached minimums, the first thing I saw wasn't the threshold lights, but the aiming point 1000' from the end. So, I started counting the touchdown marks straddling the aiming block. There were more stripes on the far side than the near side. We were about to touch down on the last 1000' of the runway at around 120 kts! "Go around, Bud!", I shouted. He pulled the power off instead. "Go around!", I said again, and placed my left hand behind the throttles ready to push them up if he didn't. This time he did.
As we were vectored back for another try, Bud told me how the Learjet can stop in 1200' with thrust reversers and how he could have made it anyway. No real need to go around. The upshot was, after a second approach was successful with no stuck glide slope needle, only one TR deployed. Had we landed, I'm sure he wouldn't have waited for my callout that both sides were deployed before roaring up on the piggybacks. And if he hadn't, we'd have swapped ends, balled up and burned right there off the departure end of runway 23 as surely as another Learjet crashed and burned in Richmond, Indiana.
From that day forward, I always checked the crossing altitude on an ILS and always set both navs to the ILS for cross-checking. The weather was so bad that morning we had the VOR on the copilot's side set up for the missed approach. Never again.
Japan Airlines lost a DC-8 in San Francisco Bay that could have been prevented by checking GS crossing altitudes, too. We live and learn.
dtuuri