Challenger Jet down in Truckee CA 7/26/21

RussR said:
I've noticed that many people, here and on other sites and in various analysis videos, etc., make a big deal of the Captain only having 230 hours in the 605, and that this is likely to be an important factor in the accident...Yes, the 601 and 605 are slightly different, but they're not that different in terms of speeds, turn radius, bank angle, handling, etc., all of the things that go into flying a circling approach. I just don't see the 605 experience as being as big of a factor as some make it out to be. Meaning, I think this accident would likely have happened regardless of the airplane involved.

This accident is very pertinent to my organization, since we operate both the 601 and the 605, and often have crew pairings similar to the accident flight, where the PIC has less experience in the model than the SIC, and/or the SIC has much more total time than the PIC. It's pretty common in the contract world as well.
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I have read those same comments denigrating the captain's lack of
experience in the 605.

Bombardier made this comment about the 600 series aircraft (which I'm sure you're aware of) in their Technical Memo that was appended to the Flight Performance Study:

The wing design of the Challenger 605 is essentially the same as that of the original Challenger 600, thus all of the Challenger 600 series aircraft have common stall characteristics, and observations of any specific model are applicable to the entire series.
 
Kritchlow said:
This accident is an example of needing to establish, and adhere to strict SOP’s. Generally speaking charter outfits lack that in the first place, and bringing in a contract pilot makes it near impossible.
This is a prime example.

There can only be one captain, but he must be the captain.
In this accident, it seems like the FO was overstepping his bounds, but the captain was not assertive.
Neither was acting in the role they should have been.
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Saying the FO may have overstepped his bounds is the understatement of the century.

Slipping speed brakes out without crew coordination as the PM is grossly unsafe.

This accident is a perfect example of the worst case scenario in the corporate/135 world. I don’t miss that business at all.
 
This is a sentence for the ages. There should be a POA hall of fame :)
hindsight2020 said:
The eye-gougingly boring levels of standardization and pool-noodle-lined terminal/landing operations does have an aggregate net safety effect, even in the presence of non-insignificant levels of handflown instrument cross check atrophy within the ranks by automation overreliance proxy.
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Tarheelpilot said:
Saying the FO may have overstepped his bounds is the understatement of the century.

Slipping speed brakes out without crew coordination as the PM is grossly unsafe.
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The CEO and Director of Operations don't seem to have a clue in the interview record. They threw two contract pilots in the cockpit without ever flying with the one they designated as PIC themselves. The other guy, the PM as you say, appears to be acting as an IOE instructor, which he is qualified to be according to his resume.
(https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Docume...nt 13 - Co-Pilot Information_Redacted-Rel.pdf)

Since the PIC was essentially on a temporary contract pending full time employment after he gets a social security number (he was Mexican), and he did not have experience in a 605, it makes sense to me that the PM was in a CFI capacity. Nevertheless, the CEO and DO both claim their soon-to-be hire was in charge — even believed he had "operational control" of the flight. 'Scuze me!? Clueless management, IMO.
 
3393RP said:
I have read those same comments denigrating the captain's lack of
experience in the 605.

Bombardier made this comment about the 600 series aircraft (which I'm sure you're aware of) in their Technical Memo that was appended to the Flight Performance Study:

The wing design of the Challenger 605 is essentially the same as that of the original Challenger 600, thus all of the Challenger 600 series aircraft have common stall characteristics, and observations of any specific model are applicable to the entire series.
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I don't think the big difference between a 600 and 605 is handling, its updates to the cockpit and avionics. Its the buttonology that will get someone not experienced behind, not the raw flying characteristics.

Still, the biggest issue here is not the stall characteristics of the aircraft, it was a Captain not captaining, and an FO trying to captain the Captain. These two would have crashed a Cherokee together.
 
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midwestpa24 said:
These two would have crashed a Cherokee together.
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Unless CRM and SOPs prohibit speed brake deployment above 30° bank, it could happen again. If DOs and DOMs don't provide contract crews with accurate BOWs it could happen again. IMO.
 
dtuuri said:
Unless CRM and SOPs prohibit speed brake deployment above 30° bank, it could happen again. If DOs and DOMs don't provide contract crews with accurate BOWs it could happen again. IMO.
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The lack of SOPs and a complete absence of CRM from brake release at COE to the burned pine trees at TRK is stunning.
 
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