Bob Miller's Thoughts on Changes to Aeronautical Experience

[Everskyward]

I really wasn't trying to split hairs. I was just showing that reference to evaluating one crash vs another using the terms you used would not show too much.

In my mind it would show a lot. If most VFR into IMC accidents are caused by pilots losing control (not knowing which way is up) then the extra training for private pilots which this guy Bob Miller is advocating might help. I have my doubts about that but at least it would be a consideration. On the other hand if most of the accidents are caused by flying into terrain under control (physically), then this extra training wouldn't help at all. In fact I can see it giving some pilots just enough confidence to push themselves further into trouble.

I wasn't trying to accuse you in particular about a hair-splitter. It's just that this format seems to bring out the hair-splitters in us all, including me. In fact, I was the one who was being a hair-splitter in this instance with the definition of "control" as in "controlled flight into terrain" (CFIT). It helps when everyone is on the same page using industry-standard terminology. That way you don't need to keep explaining yourself.

 

[MauleSkinner]

My point was that you can only tell so much from wreckage analysis. Nothing can allow us to read the pilot's mind up to the point of a crash (although there are a couple of backseat videos of crashes, and AOPA uses, or at least used to use, one of them in their CFI recurrent-training courses). I agree that wreckage analysis can teach us a lot, but wouldn't it be great to be able to play back the pilot's thoughts for a student pilot, to show just how easy it is to get into trouble?

Judy

I've heard CVR re-enactments that just about had me curled up in the fetal position under my chair. While they're generally "crew" situations, the thought processes are very similar, and if a person looked hard enough, you could probably find some transcripts that would be very applicable to light GA training.

Fly safe!

David

 

[gismo]

Kent,

As I've said many times before, the devil is in the details. I think many private and instrument rated pilots suffer from the lack of completeness in their analysis. A standard FSS briefing, IMHO, isn't complete. I equate a FSS briefing like trying to save a fish from drowning. I am not suggesting that you skip the FSS briefing, but you need to normally dig deeper and it also may involve a deeper understanding of the weather products you are using to make these important decisions.

Scott, I don't mean to diminish your valuable contributions to pilot's weather knowledge, but IMO understanding weather gives one an edge on predicting the chances a particular flight can be completed within one's capabilities. I assume you will readily admit that even with your level of understanding weather, there's no way to predict anywhere near 100% that a particular flight won't encounter adverse weather, be it MVFR for the pilot with no desire to fly within 50 miles of a cloud or visibilities below 10 miles or severe icing for a competent pilot flying a KingAir under IFR. Thus for the most part flying safety is more about reacting properly to the weather encountered vs flying convenience is what's really affected by unexpected adverse weather. Of course that's assuming that the pilot involved is willing to sacrifice convenience for safety, but the issue there is judgement not meteorolgy.

 

[Dave Krall CFII]

The pilot PTS and REGs and FAA weather minimums are all very reasonable and always have been. Any deficiencies that show up as accidents or otherwise will usually be due to the pilot not taking due diligence in what they have been previously briefed, including judgement training, regardless of total hours or type of experience, or total hours of training.

 

[gismo]

I disagree. It's the far too common occurrence of VFR into IMC that requires a private pilot to be more capable of reading weather data. That does not ignore those who are capable but take on the attitude they can do it, be it an intended act or a scud run going south. The following story is a good representation of this:

VFR into IMC: 'No go' would have been the better decision

http://flighttraining.aopa.org/members/ft_magazine/archives/article.cfm?article=5993

Really? My take on that story is that it's just the opposite. The pilot didn't have any trouble interpreting the forecasts and reports he simply continued on his (not so) merry way as the weather progressively got worse even though he expressed the thought "If I didn't like what I saw, it would be easy enough to turn around and fly home" prior to the flight. Just before encountering a rainshaft he couldn't see because the visibility had diminished considerably from the 10 nm he started with he had decided to make a retreat if he would have to go below 1800 msl to continue. That's 100 AGL at his intended destination 15 miles away!

This story isn't about failing to obtain or misinterpreting the weather information available unless you think a private pilot should be able to forecast with considerably more accuracy than the NWS, it's about bad judgement in the air plain and simple. And while the pilot mentioned that he could have obtained confirmation of the FSS briefer's information via the internet or personal conversations with pilots at his destination, he correctly identified his most serious mistake in not aborting early and being tempted by the lure of the need to "only go a bit further" to reach the planned destination.

I may be expecting too much from a PPL student. I'll figure that out more as I get further into teaching. My own PPL was twenty years ago and I was required to remain within fifty feet. I didn't think that was an issue then and it's difficult for me to think of it as one now. We'll see. Obviously, I'm getting at tighter tolerances from the start and continuing through advanced certificates and ratings.

I'd be surprised to learn that you were able to remain within +-50 ft on all maneuvers for the private checkride especially if there was the usual bit of turbulence present but hey, kudos to you if you did. That said, I don't see any reason not to train for +/- 50 ft, one should always strive for more than "just enough to pass", I just don't see any benefit in tightening up the tolerance for the PPL checkride unless someone can show conclusive evidence that pilots held to the standard of +/-50ft are less likely to crash due to bad judgement than pilots held to today's tolerances.

I meant Vx. During the period I'm referring to is after departing 20L and turning out at 300 feet to a reverse course that puts me between 20L and the interstate where I'll continue on north. My goal is to be at or above TPA soon after reaching the approach end of 20.

Ah so by "gain altitude as soon as possible" you really meant "in the shortest possible distance". Obviously Vx is best for that, but in the interest of safety I suggest you reconsider as my personal experience (albeit in one airplane type) says that unless you need Vx to clear obstacles you are generally safer with a much shallower profile if the engine quits. There are certainly exceptions and perhaps your situation is one, but from your description I don't see that yet.

 

[judypilot]

My knowledge of the weather event put us in a position where we could make the flight safely and make all of the right decisions. The Cirrus pilot, on the other hand, evidently was missing something from his knowledge bag which probably forced him to make a number of bad decisions.

Or maybe he had the knowledge and made the decision anyway. I will never forget a discussion I had with a friend who had invited me to stay with his family in Trinidad, CO (in the foothills of the Rockies) after we'd met up for lunch in La Junta, out on the plains. I looked at the weather online and out the window, where I saw huge T-storm buildups along the mountains. He insisted it would be OK, but I didn't like the looks of it. We both had pretty much equal experience with mountainous areas and thunderstorm weather, but he had more experience in that region. I just didn't feel comfortable, and decided to stay put in a motel. He launched, and before he did, I asked him to call me when he got home.

He made it, but though he downplayed it, it sounded to me like he'd had to do more dodging that I would have wanted to do. He took it in stride, but I don't think he was that far from getting into trouble. Those T-storms in the region can move FAST.

So here is an example of someone who had all the knowledge you could have an still made the decision to fly.

Judy

 

[gismo]

Lance,

If I did say I could, would you believe me? Of course we can't predict with absolute certainty that a pilot won't face some kind of adverse weather on any particular flight. My approach is to teach a pilot to minimize his/her exposure to adverse weather.

Like I said, I believe that more weather knowledge has value to a pilot, but I still believe that in most cases, pilots who come to grief where weather is a factor didn't crash because they misread a METAR or FA, nor because they didn't dig deep enough into the underlying raw data, but because they continued on their planned flight when the actual conditions strongly suggested a chance of plans. Now, perhaps some or even most of those pilots wouldn't have even attempted the flight had they been able to acquire and understand all the available weather info, but I'll bet many if not most of them would have just assumed that the actual weather wouldn't be as bad as the data indicated or that they could "handle" it. I think you'll agree that in such cases additional weather knowledge won't improve safety by itself.

Are you able to tell me with absolute 100% certainty that you won't experience an engine failure on a particular flight even if you are an AMT or diligent in all of your maintenance, preflight checks, runups, etc.? We do the best we can to minimize our chances of engine failure.

Of course not, but a better analogy would be a pilot who continues a flight when the engine begins to show signs of distress even though he had performed all the proper preflight checks. It's primarily the pilot's judgment that determines whether he will abort or continue on hoping the rough engine will smooth itself out / that the lowing visibilities will soon begin to improve.

And my point about the fallibility of any analysis of the weather that attempts to predict what the conditions will be at some future time (vs predicting/minimizing the chances of an engine failure) was to some extent an attempt to indicate that weather predictions by folks (like you for example) that have more domain knowledge than I ever hope to gain and spend much of their time making predictions and then validating them over time are still woefully inaccurate when you get to the specifics of adverse wx along a particular route started at a particular time, certainly an order of magnitude or three worse than my ability to predict the lack of an engine failure on the same trip.

My goal is to teach a pilot how to "act" and not "react." Nevertheless, we can't act or react properly without some kind of knowledge, otherwise we're just guessing, correct? How can one judge without some level of understanding? The more you know about a subject, the better off you are to make the right judgement(s) before and during a flight.

Certainly, having a better idea about the mechanics behind the weather might help a pilot make a better plan B when things don't turn out like the prediction, but I'll say it one more time: I believe that the concept of a preflight go/nogo decision based on a meterologic level of safety is flawed. The preflight decision should be analyzing the weather from the perspective of whether or not the chances of an inconvenience (like having to return after getting half way or stopping short) are too great. It's the decisions made along the way that greatly affect safety (yes I agree there are exceptions to that but they are just that, exceptions).

I'll give you an example. I was headed from Boulder, CO to Bend, on a flight in a Columbia 400. I realized that in October we were not going to be able to go through the cold front located over Utah. We'd have to fly over at FL200. A Cirrus SR22 went through this same front at 13,000 feet headed in the opposite direction at nearly the same time. The Cirrus was about 100 miles to our south, but got into some weather and the pilot killed himself and three of his family members. Very tragic. We experienced no adverse weather during the flight.

I think that example illustrates my point. You used your weather knowledge to minimize the inconvenience of having to abort or wait to another day. The other pilot's lack of such knowledge or the willingness to apply it should have resulted in him abandoning the trip when the adverse weather was first encountered but he appears to have chosen to continue.

My knowledge of the weather event put us in a position where we could make the flight safely and make all of the right decisions. The Cirrus pilot, on the other hand, evidently was missing something from his knowledge bag which probably forced him to make a number of bad decisions.

And I maintain that the most critical of those bad decisions was to continue when things didn't turn out as well as was hoped for.

Leonardo da Vinci once said that, "All of our knowledge is based in our perceptions." Everything is a trade off isn't it? We want to gain as much utility out of our aircraft while maintaining the highest level of safety.

Yes indeed, and a better understanding of weather will improve both (utility and safety) but sound judgment (if only that could be taught) will have a much greater effect on the latter.

 

[bbchien]

You have to have both knowledge and judgement to be an airman. Anything less is just a pilot.

 

[stingray]

He departs and climbs to cruising altitude and notices that his OAT gauge is showing 34 degrees F. The MEA in this area is 5,000 feet. Well, these meat thermometers always seem to be accurate to a +/- 5 degrees F. He should be okay since the forecast the briefer gave him indicated that he would need to be at 7,000 feet to be in any kind of icing (AIRMET text had the base of the AIRMET as the freezing level and didn't specifically indicate an altitude).

There is his no go. Best chance of Ice is 5 below and 5 above. and anywhere in between.

Dan

 

[stingray]

Dan,


This particular case was from a student of mine (or should I say, became a student of mine) because he was unaware of the limitations on the weather products he was using to make a go/stay decision. He didn't die in the event, but did scare himself big time and now understands how to make better choices. He was missing some very fundamental knowledge.

I can rephrase, Without at least a plane with icing protection for unexpected flight into ice, from -5 to 5 is a no go or should be if you are going to fly within the clouds. If you want to fly on the edge have the protection just incase.

Dan

 

[jwriteclub]

Ditto.

The worst run in I ever had with ice was in a cloud that dropped from +2 C to -1 C in the course of a minute or less. I then built up enough ice to start an un-commanded descent in a T-Arrow in less than 2 minutes.

~ Christopher

 

[gismo]

Lance,

You are emphasizing that the most important factor is how to react to a situation. Even if this were true, you still need some deeper knowledge and training to know the signs of danger.

Let's use another example. A pilot is planning a flight at 7,000 feet. All the weather products indicate that he will be IMC most of the flight. He's instrument rated, instrument current, instrument proficient, etc, etc. He chose 5,000 feet because the forecast freezing level was 7,000 feet according to the FB Winds/Temps (yuk) and loosely stated in AIRMET Zulu. He's gets a thorough preflight briefing and there's no disagreement that the flight can be made safely. He also chose 5,000 feet since this is the highest MEA along most of his route.

He departs and climbs to cruising altitude and notices that his OAT gauge is showing 34 degrees F. The MEA in this area is 5,000 feet. Well, these meat thermometers always seem to be accurate to a +/- 5 degrees F. He should be okay since the forecast the briefer gave him indicated that he would need to be at 7,000 feet to be in any kind of icing (AIRMET text had the base of the AIRMET as the freezing level and didn't specifically indicate an altitude).

Then five minutes later, the pilot gets a clearance, "Direct destination." This takes him a little further north, but he's got GPS, so he jumps on the chance to take that shortcut. Soon he notices his IAS dropped by 5 knots and then looks at the wings and finds some moderate ice building on the wings with some runback (meat thermometer still shows 34 degrees F). He asks ATC for lower due to icing and ATC says, "The MVA in the area is 4,800 feet, unable." The pilot remembered his training and said that he should climb since most icing is limited to a 3,000 ft layer. He has no clue what the tops are, since this wasn't factored into his briefing. He assumed that he could stay below the icing.

He begins to climb with the icing only getting worse in the stratocumulus clouds behind the cold front he was chasing. His airspeed continues to drop and the rest is history.

One could say that he made several judgement errors. Meat thermometer was giving him hints that he might have ignored. Should have done a 180 and not tried to climb. Should have just asked for vectors to the nearest IFR airport to descend out of the icing even if an instrument approach is needed.

IMO this is still a judgment problem. The pilot in your scenario should have realized as soon as he started picking up ice that his only valid plan based on his limited knowledge of the weather around him was to beat a hasty retreat and should that not pan out because the wx behind him had gotten worse, find a safe place to land ASAP. Better yet, having no deice equipment and armed with the simple knowledge that the forecasted freezing level could easily be off a thousand feet or two he might have used his good judgement to conclude that with his limited understanding of the weather coupled with the non-ideal freezing level vs MEA he should either fly an extended but more southerly route or postpone the flight. Now I will agree that a better prepared pilot will have considered more alternatives prior to departure and an in depth look at the available weather sources and the knowledge to properly interpret them would provide a significant advantage in that endeavor. But as wiser men than I have pointed out, "A man's gotta know his limitations". So I say again that IMO the most significant benefit of more weather knowledge is one of convenience (ability to complete more trips as planned) rather than safety.

I guess I don't understand your point here Lance. Then why get an instrument rating? Just always go VFR with flight following. If you can't make the trip VFR, then sit it out. I firmly believe that having an instrument rating makes me a safer pilot and yes, it's more convenient since now I can pop through those little white puffy clouds instead of going around them by the required distances which are a pain to judge.

I believe one could make the same point WRT the instrument rating, that is it's more about convenience than safety and for the most part the safety aspect only comes into play by reducing the need for sound judgment (e.g. aborting or canceling a trip when the wx isn't good VMC). By itself an instrument rating doesn't make a pilot safer, in fact it actually opens more doors to misadventure. To be safe, a VFR pilot need only remain VFR. It's quite possible to do that by only flying in the daytime and only when the visibility is decent and the clouds aren't a factor. The safety issue arises when a VFR pilot attempts to push the limits of VMC either because he chooses to fly in marginal conditions during his preflight weather gathering or he chooses to continue into marginal (or worse) conditions when they are encountered unexpectedly in flight, something that can and will happen no matter how much ability that pilot has in forecasting such conditions, albeit less frequently if his forecasting is above average.

To be safe on an IFR flight, the IR pilot is faced with more choices that affect safety but they are still choices. Perhaps we can agree that increased weather knowledge does increase the percentage of flights that ca be completed safely or alternatively increases the average level of safety if the same percentage of flights are completed. With less weather knowledge the only way to maintain the same level of safety as a pilot with a greater understanding of weather is to complete a smaller percentage of intended or potential flights.

It has nothing to do with convenience. He didn't buy an airplane to watch it sit in the hangar on days that are very safe to fly. If that means I get more utility out of my aircraft, then so be it...it still can be done safely.

But you're stating my very point while disagreeing with it. It is a convenience to be able to fly on days that require additional weather knowledge in order to complete a trip with the same level of safety that the pilot with lesser knowledge would achieve by leaving the plane in the hangar on some of those days. I suspect that we're never going to agree on this and that's OK, I've taken this discussion this far to make certain you understood my meaning and I think we've traveled as far down that road as we can. Now you can go back to something more productive like teaching us pilots useful weather knowledge we can use to get more utility out of our airplanes .

 

[jdwatson]

Great thread, guys. I was surprised at the "pandora's box" I had opened when I got my instrument rating. The rating easily doubled my prep time for a flight. However, I do think it made me a much safer pilot. Flying with precision, learning more about weather, prioritizing workload & etc all make my flights (when I did fly) much safer even if it was severe clear and a million.

Hats off to both of you for your eloquence and civility. It's rare in this media to see two disagree without the whole thing unraveling into 3rd grade name-calling.