Bob Miller's Thoughts on Changes to Aeronautical Experience

[gismo]

A sport pilot is a sport pilot, a private pilot is a private pilot, and an instrument pilot is an instrument pilot. The problem is when someone tries to be what they aren't. Personally, I think that the IFR requirement for a private pilot is nothing more than an introduction to IFR flying. I don't see it as being a way of getting yourself out of IFR conditions because you happen to find yourself running into them. A private pilot without an instrument rating should not be anywhere near IFR conditions. If they are, they need an instrument rating, not some more time under the hood. It lets the private pilot see what it takes to fly IFR, and if they are so inclined, they can pursue that course if they think that their flying is going to take them into those conditions.

I pretty much agree with that. Even if 20 hours of instrument training was required for PPL candidates, within six months of VFR only flying virtually all the learned IR skills will have evaporated.

 

[KennyFlys]

First, there's at least a couple good reason why the IR itself, let alone the PPL doesn't require actual IMC experience. One is that in many areas of the country safe "actual" IMC is simply available so seldom that you'd never get done with the training in a reasonable time. Another is that many of the airplanes that are otherwise suitable for PPL training aren't legal in IMC. Third, training in IMC requires that the the airplane never depart from rather tight parameters of flight. This is plausible in the later stages of IR training when the basics are already established, but not for the average PPL trainee. Finally there's the ugly issue of what kind of conditions would be acceptable for the training. Must you have low ceilings? Visibility below 1 mile? Precipitation? All of these parameters would affect the "quality" of the "actual" training to a very large degree.

Continued below with reference to tighter tolerances.

Personally, I think a better idea would be to require some time on a PCATD which despite lousy motion fidelity can provide an experience much closer to "actual" than foggles and could be set up for certain specific scenarios that represent real world PPL issues complete with towers sticking up into the murk, turbulence, whiteouts, low fog layers you can see through until you get close to the ground, and for that added touch of realism, the audio system could add screaming passengers for a distraction.

You've hit on something there at the end... more distraction and learning to tune in what is required and tune out what will kill you is quite important. While time under the hood helps, I still think true IMC is the only way to learn good habits and build skill.

During my instrument training, I had one flight at altitude where I was constantly going into and out of clouds; holes of clear sky in the middle, if you will. I had no ground contact and occasionally clear sky above. It was a major distraction having the next edge of cloud rushing toward me as I'm trying to concentrate in instruments. Sure, you can ignore the outside but you have something that you didn't have under the hood or with foggles... peripheral vision. Not every IMC scenario is hard IMC and having variations during training is important.

Maybe. What I don't see is any correlation between misinterpreting weather forecasts and accidents. WRT VFR into IMC what matters in most cases (excluding the exceedingly stupid launch into low IMC by a non-IR pilot) is the ability and willingness to determine that a new plan is needed and execute it when the weather on the other side of the windshield isn't safe to continue into under VFR. And the FAA could eliminate the need to interpret arcane acronyms and abbreviations in the reports and forecasts if such interpretation is any part of the problem. Yes there are advantages to terse condensed reports, but only to the seasoned weather reader. Why give them an advantage at the expense of the newbies?

You might be amazed at the number of pilots who cannot properly use services. For years, they depended on FSS to tell them everything. Now that FSS has become a bit less than user friendly, I wonder how many of those give up in the process or don't get a brief at all. With computers, cell phones, etc, it's near impossible to not have weather data resources available. So, it's key during training to insure a pilot knows all of them and how to use them to the best of their ability; which should not be lacking or they shouldn't be getting that rating.

Another big MAYBE. If there's truly a correlation between the inability to fly to tighter tolerances under VFR and accident rates then this might make sense, but I seriously doubt that there's such evidence. ADM is a much bigger issue than stick and rudder skills for most new pilots and even the mechanical skills really only affect safety when near the ground such as landing and to a lesser extent, takeoff. Teach students how to recover from small mistakes during the landing rollout instead of requiring them to hold altitude within 50 ft during straight and level flight would likely have much more significant effect on accident rates.

Now, back to your earlier line I made bold along with what is mentioned in your last paragraph. Have you looked at the tolerances for instrument rating lately? They are simply ±100 feet for altitude and ±10° on heading for precision, non-precision and missed.

That's a lot of room to be playing with. If you're allowed to go down to 200 feet on an ILS but also allowed to deviate as much as a 100 feet during the approach, how well are you going to insure stability at DA? The same goes for climbout during missed.

I think this starts best at the primary level. Teach low tolerances from the start with straight and level flight. I've seen pilots practically dive on descent. So, teach constant rate descents.

When I'm flying traffic, I need to gain altitude pretty fast so I stay at Vx to at least above pattern atitude. Sometimes, I need to make fast changes. What I want to make sure of is this doesn't put bad habits into me I end up passing on to students. Stability is important and should be excecised through all phases of flight, particularly in IMC. Ya can't do that if you're allowed to jump up and down by a range of 200 feet.

It's up to the instructor to expect more from themselves and from their student. Expect more than PTS. Unfortunately, many instructors teach strictly to PTS so they can get their students on to passing and have another notch to show the airline recruiters. Of course, what that student does continues on to the time they become an instructor. Ya gotta stop the chain somewhere.

 

[gismo]

Continued below with reference to tighter tolerances.


You've hit on something there at the end... more distraction and learning to tune in what is required and tune out what will kill you is quite important. While time under the hood helps, I still think true IMC is the only way to learn good habits and build skill.

It's true that there's nothing like the real thing, but IMO for some scenarios, a good PCATD is actually better than foggles in an airplane on a sunny day. And you hardly ever get a lesson canceled for weather in a sim.

During my instrument training, I had one flight at altitude where I was constantly going into and out of clouds; holes of clear sky in the middle, if you will. I had no ground contact and occasionally clear sky above. It was a major distraction having the next edge of cloud rushing toward me as I'm trying to concentrate in instruments. Sure, you can ignore the outside but you have something that you didn't have under the hood or with foggles... peripheral vision. Not every IMC scenario is hard IMC and having variations during training is important.

No argument there. But remember this thread is/was about practicing flight on instruments by PPL students. No way you're going to teach them how to deal with popping in and out of clouds for an extended period.

You might be amazed at the number of pilots who cannot properly use services. For years, they depended on FSS to tell them everything. Now that FSS has become a bit less than user friendly, I wonder how many of those give up in the process or don't get a brief at all. With computers, cell phones, etc, it's near impossible to not have weather data resources available. So, it's key during training to insure a pilot knows all of them and how to use them to the best of their ability; which should not be lacking or they shouldn't be getting that rating.

Are you talking about PPL candidates or IR trainees? For the IR, weather knowledge is far more important than for the VFR flier IMO because with the IR you'll be flying in the weather (on purpose). The VFR pilot only needs to know how to avoid the bad weather and I really, really doubt that very many non-IR pilots have been killed by misunderstanding a METAR.

Now, back to your earlier line I made bold along with what is mentioned in your last paragraph. Have you looked at the tolerances for instrument rating lately? They are simply ±100 feet for altitude and ±10° on heading for precision, non-precision and missed.

That's a lot of room to be playing with. If you're allowed to go down to 200 feet on an ILS but also allowed to deviate as much as a 100 feet during the approach, how well are you going to insure stability at DA? The same goes for climbout during missed.

First, you're talking about IR checkrides, last time I checked instrument approaches weren't on the PPL ASEL PTS. Besides, that's simply not true today. The IR PTS requires that you fly NP approaches at or above the MDA not +/- 100 ft of the MDA and I'm pretty sure that any IR candidate who dips 100 ft below the DA before initiating a go around, will get a nice pink piece of paper on the spot. It is permissible to descend below the DA while in the process of executing the miss procedure, but you must react by then, not 100 ft lower.

I think this starts best at the primary level. Teach low tolerances from the start with straight and level flight. I've seen pilots practically dive on descent. So, teach constant rate descents.

When I'm flying traffic, I need to gain altitude pretty fast so I stay at Vx to at least above pattern atitude. Sometimes, I need to make fast changes. What I want to make sure of is this doesn't put bad habits into me I end up passing on to students. Stability is important and should be excecised through all phases of flight, particularly in IMC. Ya can't do that if you're allowed to jump up and down by a range of 200 feet.

A PPL who lets the plane "jump up and down" (baring serious turbulence) isn't likely to pass a checkride even if the altitude excursions are within +/- 100 ft. The 100 ft is the tolerance allowed for altitude drifting during level flight and the required maneuvers and I think it's a reasonable threshold for a PPL. After all, you don't want them to "learn" that they need to spend half the time looking inside at the altimeter. Maybe a better test would be to require some maneuvers flown without any instruments while maintaining altitude within a few hundred feet, something I think is a far more realistic requirement for a PPL.

BTW if you want to "gain altitude fast" you ought to be using Vy not Vx. Assuming that was just a typo, IMO Vy is too slow a speed to fly to pattern altitude in most airplanes because it usually involves a serious obstruction of your forward view and it sets you up very poorly for handling an engine failure. Pitched up that high you typically don't have a view of the horizon out the front and it's rather easy to lose airspeed rapidly in that case. Also the required significant change in pitch attitude is very difficult to accomplish accurately. I've done some experiments in a reasonably high fidelity sim about this and found that the loss of an engine was significantly more "survivable" if you kept the pitch attitude low enough to see the horizon above the glareshield at all times. Pitched higher it was far more likely that you'd end up smacking the runway in a high rate of descent with wild pitch excursions.

It's up to the instructor to expect more from themselves and from their student. Expect more than PTS. Unfortunately, many instructors teach strictly to PTS so they can get their students on to passing and have another notch to show the airline recruiters. Of course, what that student does continues on to the time they become an instructor. Ya gotta stop the chain somewhere.

Gotta agree completely with that.

 

[KennyFlys]

No argument there. But remember this thread is/was about practicing flight on instruments by PPL students. No way you're going to teach them how to deal with popping in and out of clouds for an extended period.[/quqote]
It mostly centered around inadequate requirements for a private pilot to cope with "inadvertent VFR flight into IMC," an instrument rating, instrument instructor and a tad bit of currency issue.

Are you talking about PPL candidates or IR trainees? For the IR, weather knowledge is far more important than for the VFR flier IMO because with the IR you'll be flying in the weather (on purpose). The VFR pilot only needs to know how to avoid the bad weather and I really, really doubt that very many non-IR pilots have been killed by misunderstanding a METAR.

I disagree. It's the far too common occurrence of VFR into IMC that requires a private pilot to be more capable of reading weather data. That does not ignore those who are capable but take on the attitude they can do it, be it an intended act or a scud run going south. The following story is a good representation of this:

VFR into IMC: 'No go' would have been the better decision

First, you're talking about IR checkrides, last time I checked instrument approaches weren't on the PPL ASEL PTS. Besides, that's simply not true today. The IR PTS requires that you fly NP approaches at or above the MDA not +/- 100 ft of the MDA and I'm pretty sure that any IR candidate who dips 100 ft below the DA before initiating a go around, will get a nice pink piece of paper on the spot. It is permissible to descend below the DA while in the process of executing the miss procedure, but you must react by then, not 100 ft lower.

A PPL who lets the plane "jump up and down" (baring serious turbulence) isn't likely to pass a checkride even if the altitude excursions are within +/- 100 ft. The 100 ft is the tolerance allowed for altitude drifting during level flight and the required maneuvers and I think it's a reasonable threshold for a PPL. After all, you don't want them to "learn" that they need to spend half the time looking inside at the altimeter. Maybe a better test would be to require some maneuvers flown without any instruments while maintaining altitude within a few hundred feet, something I think is a far more realistic requirement for a PPL.

I may be expecting too much from a PPL student. I'll figure that out more as I get further into teaching. My own PPL was twenty years ago and I was required to remain within fifty feet. I didn't think that was an issue then and it's difficult for me to think of it as one now. We'll see. Obviously, I'm getting at tighter tolerances from the start and continuing through advanced certificates and ratings.

BTW if you want to "gain altitude fast" you ought to be using Vy not Vx. Assuming that was just a typo, IMO Vy is too slow a speed to fly to pattern altitude in most airplanes because it usually involves a serious obstruction of your forward view and it sets you up very poorly for handling an engine failure. Pitched up that high you typically don't have a view of the horizon out the front and it's rather easy to lose airspeed rapidly in that case. Also the required significant change in pitch attitude is very difficult to accomplish accurately. I've done some experiments in a reasonably high fidelity sim about this and found that the loss of an engine was significantly more "survivable" if you kept the pitch attitude low enough to see the horizon above the glareshield at all times. Pitched higher it was far more likely that you'd end up smacking the runway in a high rate of descent with wild pitch excursions.

I meant Vx. During the period I'm referring to is after departing 20L and turning out at 300 feet to a reverse course that puts me between 20L and the interstate where I'll continue on north. My goal is to be at or above TPA soon after reaching the approach end of 20. Once I'm at that point, I'll reduce pitch to Vy for the remaining climb up to 2,900 feet.

 

[Everskyward]

A sport pilot is a sport pilot, a private pilot is a private pilot, and an instrument pilot is an instrument pilot. The problem is when someone tries to be what they aren't. Personally, I think that the IFR requirement for a private pilot is nothing more than an introduction to IFR flying. I don't see it as being a way of getting yourself out of IFR conditions because you happen to find yourself running into them. A private pilot without an instrument rating should not be anywhere near IFR conditions. If they are, they need an instrument rating, not some more time under the hood. It lets the private pilot see what it takes to fly IFR, and if they are so inclined, they can pursue that course if they think that their flying is going to take them into those conditions.

I agree with this. You need to know your own limitations as well as the limitations of the airplane. There are many interesting ideas in this thread but I'm not sure how much adding requirements to different ratings is going to help. Lots of things are a "good idea". However, do we want to make all these things requirements? Pilots sometimes lose control of the airplane during crosswind landings. Do we want to make a requirement that all pilots need to do a certain amount of landings at the max demonstrated crosswind component? How about a crosswind landing currency requirement? Pilots slide off runways in the snow. Do we want to mandate snow-covered runway practice? I can see this going down the road to micromanagement. It's interesting how some people who advocate less regulation and government interference in other areas of their lives want more regulation in this instance.

Like others have said, I think the main issue is judgment, but that's a hard thing to learn and even a harder thing to teach. I agree that there are some people who shouldn't be near an airplane, but I also believe that everyone is prone to making a bad decision from time to time. Sometimes I think when we read about an accident we think to ourselves, "I would never do anything so stupid." However, I think if you ask the person who was actually involved (if they are still alive), they probably never thought they would do anything so stupid either.

 

[Henning]

Third: I think fifty feet should be plenty.

Fifty feet? I'm good with it, but that goes counter to getting more people into aviation (again. I'm good with that). Considering all the people saying they are taking 70+hrs to get a PP right now, we'll probably bump that to 200 if they have to perform to those standards.

As for CFI, 500 hrs as a working pilot, be it utility or airline.

 

[stingray]

I may be expecting too much from a PPL student. I'll figure that out more as I get further into teaching. My own PPL was twenty years ago and I was required to remain within fifty feet. I didn't think that was an issue then and it's difficult for me to think of it as one now. We'll see. Obviously, I'm getting at tighter tolerances from the start and continuing through advanced certificates and ratings.

I think Kenny if you look more at the PPL ticket as a ticket to learn you will see better. I was told that the DPE just wants to see if YOU have control of the airplane and not the other way around. 50' 100' it comes down to Can you make the plane do what YOU want it to. Stress the fact to the student that some more practice with or without you in the plane is needed in certain areas. My CFI has an open class policy, once ground school is paid for you can go back as many times as you want. You would be surprised at how many PP attend this class. You can do the same thing for your students in a way. Offer extended practice after they get their ticket for free (Your time not the plane) for the next year (If you are available). Shorter 1/2 hr runs maybe. More than likely you will get a free lunch out of it.

Dan

 

[flyingcheesehead]

No way – Are most of us in agreement that CFI is about teaching more than flying? How about a person that has 250 hours TT, but has been a teacher for 10 years? That person could be the best flight instructor ever, but would have to wait to log an additional 250 hours. Nope – maybe instead of hours, they should require a teaching course similar to what Ron encourages.​

But the best teacher in the world can't teach well on a subject they don't know enough about. Yes, being a good teacher is important, but they also need the experience to back it up. I don't think X number of PIC hours is the answer. I think several extra-long cross countries (500+nm) will do MUCH better, and not necessarily take any extra time.

 

[flyingcheesehead]

Now, back to your earlier line I made bold along with what is mentioned in your last paragraph. Have you looked at the tolerances for instrument rating lately? They are simply ±100 feet for altitude and ±10° on heading for precision, non-precision and missed.

That's a lot of room to be playing with. If you're allowed to go down to 200 feet on an ILS but also allowed to deviate as much as a 100 feet during the approach, how well are you going to insure stability at DA? The same goes for climbout during missed.

Look again. IR tolerances on approaches aren't ±100, they are +100/-0. If you're flying an approach that says the MDA is 1420 and you hit 1419, you're busted.

 

[flyingcheesehead]

I disagree. It's the far too common occurrence of VFR into IMC that requires a private pilot to be more capable of reading weather data.

However, IIRC the majority of VFR-into-IMC accidents involve INSTRUMENT RATED pilots. So "fixing" the PP-ASEL isn't going to have that much of an effect.

Also, I'd be willing to bet that most of the VFR into IMC crowd never looked at any weather data to begin with, rather than misinterpreting data that they did look at.

 

[flyingcheesehead]

I get to train dozens of pilots every year in the area of aviation weather. It really shocks me to discover how little they know and that they had no plan or method on how to correct that deficiency.

Scott,

I think we just don't know what we don't know.

Weather is probably my greatest deficiency as a pilot, and I'd bet that's true of most pilots. Early on, I simply looked at the TAFs and METARs and if they looked OK I'd go fly. I wasn't going much of anywhere far away at that point. I'd look at the text, call FSS, and go.

When I got into longer flights, my CFI pointed me towards a page he'd put together with a bunch of stuff off Duats all on one page: http://www.cs.wisc.edu/~bolo/flying/wx2.html That helped to kind of have an idea of what might be happening a couple of days down the road. I also learned about the Lifted Index and I do pay some attention to that if I'm going to take off on an instrument flight.

While I was working on my IR, I learned some more about the weather, mostly by going up and flying in it. My CFII got me into using more weather products such as area forecasts, airmets, and pireps. Since I completed the IR, I've learned bits and pieces here and there. Your posts in the recent icing threads have been incredibly valuable, and have been different than the weather stuff I've seen before: They're actually interesting to me.

Yeah... I don't know enough about weather, but I generally don't like learning about it either. It's boring to me. Let's go fly! Heck, the guy on the Sporty's videos literally put me to sleep. It's not that he didn't know his stuff, it just wasn't presented in a way that stuck for me (or kept me awake ).

What I know is more observation-based, and how to use the products available. What I don't know is how to put knowledge of the current big picture into a prediction of what's going to happen next. Here's the lows, here's the highs, here's the fronts... But I can't put that into a picture of what's going to be out there without actual observations. I think if someone were to put together some materials that explained weather at a little lower level (ie easier) and related it to real-world flying complete with some in-flight footage, they'd probably reach a lot more pilots. I'd certainly buy it. (Scott: I'm planning on buying your CD's this fall after the second one's out... Please let us know when that is! )

 

[KennyFlys]

Look again. IR tolerances on approaches aren't ±100, they are +100/-0. If you're flying an approach that says the MDA is 1420 and you hit 1419, you're busted.

Instrument PTS for Area VI:

9. Maintains, prior to beginning the final approach segment, altitude within +/-100 feet, heading within +/-10° and allows less than ¾ scale deflection of the CDI or within +/-10° in the case of an RMI, and maintains airspeed within +/-10 knots.

And,

13. Maintains the MDA, when reached, within +100 feet, -0 feet to the MAP.

Different segments considered. My point was, if they cannot maintain good tolerance in level flight en route or prior to descent to MDA, how can they maintain MDA and have a safe looksee for the runway environment?

A precision approach is even more definite without numbers. It's either have "required visual references for the runway are not unmistakably visible and identifiable." or immediately execute missed. Then, missed is only ±100 feet.

Circling is another story yet, maintaining level flight with +100/-0. So, I tend to believe tighter tolerances is a very good thing. I'll learn more as I get into teaching. But, either way I won't send students on to a checkride by just simply meeting PTS. I'll encourage more and I'll ask for more with a challenge.

 

[KennyFlys]

However, IIRC the majority of VFR-into-IMC accidents involve INSTRUMENT RATED pilots. So "fixing" the PP-ASEL isn't going to have that much of an effect.

Also, I'd be willing to bet that most of the VFR into IMC crowd never looked at any weather data to begin with, rather than misinterpreting data that they did look at.

I'll have to look further for the former statement. The latter makes my point for more training on weather services and interpretation.

 

[poadeleted20]

Look again. IR tolerances on approaches aren't ±100, they are +100/-0. If you're flying an approach that says the MDA is 1420 and you hit 1419, you're busted.

The tolerance on the final approach segment is +100/-0, but elsewhere on the approach it's the same as the rest of the ride -- +/- 100. Also, just going to 1419 is not a bust. The criterion for failing the ride is "consistently exceeds standards." If you dip slightly below 1420 for a few seconds and quickly recover on your own, your performance is not deemed "unsuccessful" by the PTS unless you do it several times or get enough below that obstruction clearance (which can be as little as 250 feel on the final segment) is potentially compromised.

BTW, this reminds me of the Sundance Kid's advice to Butch Cassidy about shooting someone: "Aim for the middle -- that way, if you miss a little, you'll still hit something." Taking that to the IR practical test, aim for 50 above MDA so if you're off a little either way, you're still in the MDA-to-MDA-plus-100 zone. However, since dipping slightly below DH is expected during the start of a precision approach missed, you need not power up until you reach DH on the ILS -- no need to start the missed at DH+50.

 

[poadeleted20]

However, IIRC the majority of VFR-into-IMC accidents involve INSTRUMENT RATED pilots.

Actually, according to John Carson of the AOPA Air Safety Foundation, for 1982-1993, the figure is only 27% for the number of instrument rated pilots involved in “VFR into IMC” accidents, but it's still worrysome.

 

[judypilot]

Folks have kind of nibbled around this, but I'm going to be a lot more direct.

First, we have to keep in mind that accidents are unusual when taken in the context of all the flying that is done. That doesn't mean we don't want to keep decreasing the accident rate, but there aren't airplanes falling out of the sky all the time (though I admit sometimes it seems like they are).

Second, a large proportion of accidents are people who exercise poor judgment. I'm not sure more and better training will help this. We talked about this in a CFI cast a little bit, but only in connection with signing off (or not) certain pilots. If I were to advocate better training, I'd advocate training in the recognition of people who exercise poor judgment--which, of course, is impossible. Particularly scary are those folks who do well in training, but once they get their certificates, they throw all judgment out the window.

I wish there were better statistics on accidents caused by poor judgment vs. those that fell into the "stuff happens" category. But of course, since the relevant people are often dead, or if they survive, are unlikely to say how stupid they were, we'll never have such statistics.

What I DO like is Ron's point that we do more emergency situations and not tell the students what is wrong, but, rather, set scenarios for them. In fact, if we could devise lesson plans to show students how easy it is to keep doing down the accident chain, that would be great. Well, we can, but like Ron, I wonder how many CFIs do that specifically?

Jud

 

[Everskyward]

Actually, according to John Carson of the AOPA Air Safety Foundation, for 1982-1993, the figure is only 27% for the number of instrument rated pilots involved in “VFR into IMC” accidents, but it's still worrysome.

Do you have any statistics which would indicate what proportion of VFR into IMC accidents involved the pilot losing control of the airplane as opposed to running into something while still under control (CFIT)?

 

[stingray]

Do you have any statistics which would indicate what proportion of VFR into IMC accidents involved the pilot losing control of the airplane as opposed to running into something while still under control (CFIT)?

Wouldn't under control be suicide! Unless that mountain moves, enroute

Pilot control vs pilot error due to awareness, vs pilot error due to adverse weather, vs plane malfunction of some sort. (Due to pilot and or Mechanic error). vs a very well maintained aircraft that something catastrophic went wrong totally unrelated to human error.

Dan

 

[MauleSkinner]

Wouldn't under control be suicide! Unless that mountain moves, enroute

Dan

Nope...the airplane being "under control" is one of the things that define a CFIT accident.

 

[MauleSkinner]

Second, a large proportion of accidents are people who exercise poor judgment. I'm not sure more and better training will help this. We talked about this in a CFI cast a little bit, but only in connection with signing off (or not) certain pilots. If I were to advocate better training, I'd advocate training in the recognition of people who exercise poor judgment--which, of course, is impossible. Particularly scary are those folks who do well in training, but once they get their certificates, they throw all judgment out the window.

...

What I DO like is Ron's point that we do more emergency situations and not tell the students what is wrong, but, rather, set scenarios for them. In fact, if we could devise lesson plans to show students how easy it is to keep doing down the accident chain, that would be great. Well, we can, but like Ron, I wonder how many CFIs do that specifically?

Jud

That's what "scenario-based training" is all about...unfortunately, building a full training scenario (as opposed to a short scenario within a training flight--see below for an example) is far more work than an awful lot of CFI's are willing to put into a lesson. But when done properly, it should increase the trainee's ability to recognize when things are starting to go bad, as well as their ability to exercise the judgement necessary to the safe completion of a flight.

I did manage once to put a student into a good VFR-into-IMC scenario purely by accident once...for his dual cross-country to a tower-controlled airport for his three solo T&L's there, we ran into clouds WAY below forecast height...with forecasts of about 3000 OVC, we were down under 1000 AGL to stay out of the clouds, and getting lower. I let him continue until I had to do something to prevent airspace/cloud clearance issues, at which time I asked how low he was planning on going. His response? "You're instrument-rated, aren't you?"

We had a LONG discussion about that after turning back and getting to the home 'drome

Fly safe!

David

 

[KennyFlys]

Folks have kind of nibbled around this, but I'm going to be a lot more direct.

First, we have to keep in mind that accidents are unusual when taken in the context of all the flying that is done. That doesn't mean we don't want to keep decreasing the accident rate, but there aren't airplanes falling out of the sky all the time (though I admit sometimes it seems like they are).

Flying is still the safest way to travel. Unfortunately, media sensationalism hurts us badly. So, it's incumbent upon everyone of us to represent GA and aviation in general with the brightest light possible.

Second, a large proportion of accidents are people who exercise poor judgment. I'm not sure more and better training will help this. We talked about this in a CFI cast a little bit, but only in connection with signing off (or not) certain pilots. If I were to advocate better training, I'd advocate training in the recognition of people who exercise poor judgment--which, of course, is impossible. Particularly scary are those folks who do well in training, but once they get their certificates, they throw all judgment out the window.

That's unfortunate. We can only hope CFIs are alert to such personalities. While some would say my job is over once they pass the checkride, I'm sure Ron can recall numerous cases before an ALJ that say otherwise. As much as I want to watch students advance on to the ranks of private pilot and beyond, my certificate is not worth risking in the process. Nor are the lives of those pilots, their passengers and others who might become involved in an incident. At some point, you have to make an honest judgment call whether that student should be recommended for a checkride.

I wish there were better statistics on accidents caused by poor judgment vs. those that fell into the "stuff happens" category. But of course, since the relevant people are often dead, or if they survive, are unlikely to say how stupid they were, we'll never have such statistics.

Maneuvering accidents, which accounted for one of four
(25.0 percent) fatal GA accidents, showed an improvement
from the 27.5 percent recorded the previous year.
These accidents often involve questionable pilot judgment,
such as decisions to engage in buzzing, low passes,
or other high-risk activities. The trend in maneuvering
accidents shows a slight increase in the percentage of​

both total and fatal maneuvering accidents since 1999.

It doesn't take a Phd. to know what is safe and unsafe. Clearly, there are far too many among us who have thrown caution to wind.

With regard to accidents in simple terms, Pilot Error accounted for 73.8% of all accidents while 16.95% were mechanical and 9.3% were unknown.

However, in the case of fatal accidents, Pilot Error accounted for 79.1% of all accidents while 9.9% were mechanical and 11.0% were unknown.

I like to put it this way... Eighty percent of all accidents are Pilot Error. That means eighty percent of all accidents are preventable.

So, who's responsible for the eighty percent? I'd have to say somewhere between 99 and 100 percent of all of us. Every one of us make a contribution on some level to the issues in aviation safety. My role becomes ten-fold at a minimum when I begin teaching full-time. The onlookers at the EAA fly-in who just admires those fly-overs and break-offs to enter the pattern... well, not doing something or saying something can also be a contribution.

What I DO like is Ron's point that we do more emergency situations and not tell the students what is wrong, but, rather, set scenarios for them. In fact, if we could devise lesson plans to show students how easy it is to keep doing down the accident chain, that would be great. Well, we can, but like Ron, I wonder how many CFIs do that specifically?

I shall.

 

[Everskyward]

Wouldn't under control be suicide! Unless that mountain moves, enroute

No. Suppose that the mountain was always there but you can't see it. I can think of at least two VFR into IMC accidents, where I knew the people involved. Both of the pilots were instrument rated. One was an airline pilot. In both instances they hit terrain because of low visibility or clouds. Neither of them were on an IFR flight plan.

 

[Henning]

Second, a large proportion of accidents are people who exercise poor judgment. I'm not sure more and better training will help this. We talked about this in a CFI cast a little bit, but only in connection with signing off (or not) certain pilots. If I were to advocate better training, I'd advocate training in the recognition of people who exercise poor judgment--which, of course, is impossible. Particularly scary are those folks who do well in training, but once they get their certificates, they throw all judgment out the window.

But that brings up another issue as well, in order to teach good judgement, one needs to have good judgement, and good judgement is developed with experience which may or may not be equated to time.

IMO, Ones true level of judgement isn't tested until they've had this conversation... "Hey boss, I was just (checking weather, preflighting...whatever) and it looks like I'm gonna have to scrub today." "You don't fly today, don't come back tommorrow!" It's these times that you either push limits, or stand your ground, but it's a hard call you have to make. I know people with a 1000 hrs flying in nothing but beautiful Day/VFR conditions. I know people with 10s of thousands of hours who have never flown anything smaller than a T-37 and have never flown without some form of "Guidance from above" whether it be an AWACS, ATC in the IFR system for United... whatever. Do these people have the rounded experience base to be an effective instructor for a new PP or CP who is going to be flying pipeline patrol or other utility jobs to teach then the ADM that will apply to them?

 

[gprellwitz]

IMO, Ones true level of judgement isn't tested until they've had this conversation... "Hey boss, I was just (checking weather, preflighting...whatever) and it looks like I'm gonna have to scrub today." "You don't fly today, don't come back tommorrow!" It's these times that you either push limits, or stand your ground, but it's a hard call you have to make. I know people with a 1000 hrs flying in nothing but beautiful Day/VFR conditions. I know people with 10s of thousands of hours who have never flown anything smaller than a T-37 and have never flown without some form of "Guidance from above" whether it be an AWACS, ATC in the IFR system for United... whatever. Do these people have the rounded experience base to be an effective instructor for a new PP or CP who is going to be flying pipeline patrol or other utility jobs to teach then the ADM that will apply to them?

Dr. Bruce tells the story of one of his former students, IIRC, who had that conversation. He opted not to fly and was looking for a job soon thereafter, if not the same day. You just have to ask yourself whether the job's worth potentially losing your life. The hard part is that you probably wouldn't kill yourself but you probably would be unemployed. OTOH, you can't bounce back from killing yourself!

 

[poadeleted20]

Do you have any statistics which would indicate what proportion of VFR into IMC accidents involved the pilot losing control of the airplane as opposed to running into something while still under control (CFIT)?

No, but AOPA ASF might. Of course, the only way to tell would probably be by wreckage analysis, but that is probably achievable from the NTSB accident reports -- just a lot of effort.

 

[stingray]

No. Suppose that the mountain was always there but you can't see it. I can think of at least two VFR into IMC accidents, where I knew the people involved. Both of the pilots were instrument rated. One was an airline pilot. In both instances they hit terrain because of low visibility or clouds. Neither of them were on an IFR flight plan.

My point was if you were in control you should have known it was there. Did you get all the information available before the flight? A simple chart will tell you how high you need to be to avoid obstacles. (The minute the clouds were below MEA they were not in control.) If you are flying around low enough to hit a mountain, Are you in control? Being on an IFR flight plan would have helped maybe, but having control would have for sure.

Dan

 

[KennyFlys]

My point was if you were in control you should have known it was there. Did you get all the information available before the flight? A simple chart will tell you how high you need to be to avoid obstacles. (The minute the clouds were below MEA they were not in control.) If you are flying around low enough to hit a mountain, Are you in control? Being on an IFR flight plan would have helped maybe, but having control would have for sure.

Dan

"Controlled flight" simply means you're not in an unusual attitude. The pilot is maintaining a level attitude or a constant and/or stable descent or climb. They are just continuing on the assumption they will clear an obstacle or find a runway when it won't happen.

Many planes crash into a mountain trying to climb out of a valley with a high DA. Likewise, an aircraft is in control in IMC but not clear of obstacles. Or, they descend for approach and continue straight down to the ground without the runway environment in sight.

 

[tonycondon]

Flying is still the safest way to travel.

airline flying, yes.

 

[Everskyward]

My point was if you were in control you should have known it was there. Did you get all the information available before the flight? A simple chart will tell you how high you need to be to avoid obstacles. (The minute the clouds were below MEA they were not in control.) If you are flying around low enough to hit a mountain, Are you in control? Being on an IFR flight plan would have helped maybe, but having control would have for sure.

I can see you are talking about a different definition of "control". AC61-134 is all about CFIT.

5. DEFINITIONS.
a. Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT). CFIT occurs when an airworthy aircraft is flown, under the control of a qualified pilot, into terrain (water or obstacles) with inadequate awareness on the part of the pilot of the impending collision.

I guess the hair-splitters can make the argument that a non-instrument rated pilot in IMC is not "qualified", however.

 

[KennyFlys]

I guess the hair-splitters can make the argument that a non-instrument rated pilot in IMC is not "qualified", however.

Probably a better way to describe what Dan is saying... The pilot is not in command of the situation. He's not managing his resources and/or properly interpreting information be it from instruments, weather data, approach plates, navigation charts, performance charts, etc.

A pilot could ignore performance data telling them DA places the aircraft beyond its capability. The pilot could ignore proper glideslope and allow full deflection while thinking they are safe on the localizer or they could misinterpret the approach plate data. The pilot could ignore or miss an obstacle clearance on a chart while in IMC.

 

[Everskyward]

Probably a better way to describe what Dan is saying... The pilot is not in command of the situation. He's not managing his resources and/or properly interpreting information be it from instruments, weather data, approach plates, navigation charts, performance charts, etc.

A pilot could ignore performance data telling them DA places the aircraft beyond its capability. The pilot could ignore proper glideslope and allow full deflection while thinking they are safe on the localizer or they could misinterpret the approach plate data. The pilot could ignore or miss an obstacle clearance on a chart while in IMC.

That's usually called poor SA (situational awareness) rather than loss of control. I know, we are all basically saying the same thing, just using different terminology.

 

[MauleSkinner]

Dr. Bruce tells the story of one of his former students, IIRC, who had that conversation. He opted not to fly and was looking for a job soon thereafter, if not the same day. You just have to ask yourself whether the job's worth potentially losing your life. The hard part is that you probably wouldn't kill yourself but you probably would be unemployed. OTOH, you can't bounce back from killing yourself!

I know a guy who made the same choice...the next day, the boss was begging him to come back. Apparently when he found a pilot who WOULD fly the trip, the 20-minute flight in the Baron with severe icing and emergency declared had a bit of an impact on him.

Henning makes a good point, though...trying to regulate "a CFI is a CFI is a CFI" will never work, either. As instructors, we need to teach what we know. As trainees, we need to find an instructor who knows what we need to learn. We can't all know everything about all aspects of flying.

We fail when we assume teaching our little corner of the world will solve all of aviation's problems.

Fly safe!

David

 

[KennyFlys]

That's usually called poor SA (situational awareness) rather than loss of control. I know, we are all basically saying the same thing, just using different terminology.

Agreed. I was simply addressing what Dan appeared to be calling uncontrolled. Tis why I used the phrase "not in command" or perhaps even better, "loss of command."

 

[poadeleted20]

The PTS says "Maintains the MDA, when reached, within +100 feet, -0 feet to the MAP." So if there's a stepdown fix on the FAC prior to reaching the MDA, you are implying that you don't have the +/- 100 feet criteria at the stepdown fix altitude.

Yes.

For example look at the VOR-A at KFDK. Let's say you performed your PT at 2,300 feet and started your descent to 1360 after you were established inbound on the FAC. But, you ended up at 1300 when you reached NIORT (assuming you can identify NIORT), would that meet the PTS criteria? Or do you believe the threshold is 1360?

Not only is 1300 a bust, but it is also dangerous. The proper tolerance at NIORT is +100/-0 just as it is for the MDA because the TERPS Required Obstacle Clearance (ROC) for a nonprecision approach is the same for the stepdown fix and the MDA (250 for VOR and 300 for NDB -- way less than the 500-foot ROC on the intermediate segment). Allowing -100 would eat into the slop already built in for the various uncontrollable inaccuracies (altimeter error, wind effect on altimeter readings, temperature effects on altimeter readings, etc). That's why it's -0, not -100, from the FAF inbound for NP approaches -- -100 on the altimeter on the final segment could be fatal, which is as good a reason as I can imagine for it being a bust on the checkride.

Thanks to Olle Akerlind's "From takeoff to landing" (Honeywell, 2002) for the TERPS information.

 

[flyingcheesehead]

Yes, but deep down in your gut, you know what you are doing now doesn't exactly give you a lot of confidence.

True. Ironically, I realized after flying into the ice with Tony and Matt the other day that I have managed to successfully avoid any icing encounters when flying on my own. The only other time I remember picking up any ice was with a CFI fairly early in my instrument training. So, I guess I still have a healthy respect for the weather.

However, what made me really step back and think again was that in the original scenario that Tony presented here, looking at the info that was given, I would have made the decision to go, and my ice-free record would be a thing of the past.

But let me ask you a question...if you pulled out the lifted index chart and most of your route had a lifted index of +20, what would be your reaction?

Ummm... +20 would indicate very very small chance of T-storms, wouldn't it? I usually just look at this chart:

If there's a lot of orange and red, my reaction would be to wish I had a Garmin 496.

In reality, I end up having a more in-depth discussion with FSS. They usually tell me to go, and I usually don't run into problems. (Only T-storm problem I've had yet wasn't forecast, and I flew into it just as it was being born.)

I still don't have the understanding I'd like to have of that either.

Happy to see they weren't boring you. You've only seen a small piece of what's possible.

Heh... Didn't mean anything bad by that, but I think that may well be the reason so many pilots aren't that great with weather - It's hard for us to follow, and many of the weather presentations I've seen were just not very good presentations period - Either monotone, or the Sporty's video guy who gets overly excited about things IIRC. Congrats on bucking the trend!

 

[EdFred]

If this is the same Bob Miller that suggested to go pick up ice with students on purpose so they can see the effect, I pretty much discount anything he says because he's a tool.

 

[bbchien]

Ummm... +20 would indicate very very small chance of T-storms, wouldn't it? I usually just look at this chart.....I still don't have the understanding I'd like to have of that either.

LI may not mean too much. Its one temp delta at one altitude. CAPE is what you want....

 

[jesse]

airline flying, yes.

And only certain types of airline flying at that. The numbers aren't looking so good when you get to the small regional planes with entry level captain's/FO. But even they--are still a lot better than GA.

 

[judypilot]

No, but AOPA ASF might. Of course, the only way to tell would probably be by wreckage analysis, but that is probably achievable from the NTSB accident reports -- just a lot of effort.

My point was that you can only tell so much from wreckage analysis. Nothing can allow us to read the pilot's mind up to the point of a crash (although there are a couple of backseat videos of crashes, and AOPA uses, or at least used to use, one of them in their CFI recurrent-training courses). I agree that wreckage analysis can teach us a lot, but wouldn't it be great to be able to play back the pilot's thoughts for a student pilot, to show just how easy it is to get into trouble?

Judy

 

[stingray]

I can see you are talking about a different definition of "control". AC61-134 is all about CFIT.

I guess the hair-splitters can make the argument that a non-instrument rated pilot in IMC is not "qualified", however.

I really wasn't trying to split hairs. I was just showing that reference to evaluating one crash vs another using the terms you used would not show too much. Take ten stupid pilots flying without charts in marginal VFR then into IMC hitting a mountain under control vs 10 pilots with charts and the knowhow to use them into the same situation staying above limits.

This basically goes to the question also about airplanes being the safest way to travel. The airplane IS the safest way to travel if I am the pilot and I do everything I am supposed to do to have a safe flight. In an airline you are relying on one other person. In a car you are relying on each person you pass or are passed by. Run the numbers, of course I'm alive either way so it it just goes to show safe is all a relative.

Dan