Air France A330 - Missing over Atantic

This letter was posted on AvWeb. I would post the source URL if I had it, but I don't.

Letter of the Week: Airbuses Fly "Like a Video Game"

From AvWeb letters:

I would like to offer my comments and perspective with regard to the Air France Flight 447 accident. I have been a A-330 captain since 2003 and have over 4500 hours in the aircraft. While many A-320 pilots undoubtedly have more series time, I believe this probably makes me one of the most experienced A330 pilots in the world.

When asked how I like the aircraft, I tell people that there is likely no easier airplane to take over an ocean, and that the systems design and presentation is superb. That said, the automation is more complex and less intuitive than necessary, and the pilot-aircraft interface is unlike that of a conventional aircraft. Most important with regard to this accident is the fly-by-wire sidestick control. The sidestick itself has a very limited range of motion, making inadvertent over-control very easy. Of even greater significance, the stick itself provides no "feel" feedback to the pilot. That is, unlike a conventional aircraft, the pilot does not get a sense through pressure of how much input is being sent to the control surfaces. The most important advice I give to pilots new to the Airbus is to treat the aircraft not as an airplane, but as a video game. If you wait for the sidestick to tell you what you are doing, you will never get an answer.

Taking into consideration that Air France 447 was at FL 350 (where the safe speed envelope is relatively narrow), that they were in the weather at night with no visible horizon, and that they were likely experiencing at least moderate turbulence, it does not surprise me in the least that the pilots lost control of the aircraft shortly after the autopilot and autothrust disconnected.

Let's keep in mind that these are not ideal conditions for maintaining controlled flight manually, especially when faced with a sudden onslaught of warning messages, loss of autofllght, confusing airspeed indications, and reversion to "alternate law" flight control, in which certain flight envelope protections are lost.

A very bad Airbus design feature is thrust levers that do not move while in autothrust. They are instead set in a detent which would equal climb trust in manual mode. If the pilots did not reset the thrust levers to equal the last cruise power setting, they likely eventually ended up in climb power, making it difficult to reset the proper cruise power setting and adding to what was likely already a great deal of confusion.

But the real problem probably occurred immediately after the pilot flying grabbed the sidestick and took over manually. Unfortunately, airline pilots rarely practice hand-flying at high altitude, and almost never do so without autothrust engaged. As a result, we forget that the aircraft is very sensitive to control inputs at high altitude, and overcontrol is the usual result. Because the Airbus sidestick provides no feedback "feel" to the pilot, this problem is dramatically compounded in this aircraft.

I believe the Air France pilot grabbed the sidestick, made an immediate input (because as pilots, that's what we tend to do), and quickly became quite confused as to what the aircraft was truly doing. This confusion likely was exacerbated by fixating on airspeed indications that made no sense while trying to find a power setting with no airspeed guidance.

When transitioning from autopilot to manual control at altitude in the Airbus, the most important thing to do at first is nothing. Don't move a thing, and then when you do, gently take hold of the sidestick and make very small inputs, concentrating on the flight director (which, in altitude hold, should still have been providing good guidance). Of course, this is much easier said than done with bells and whistles going off all over the place, moderate turbulence and a bunch of thunderstorms in the area. As I said before, treat it like a video game.

So why did the Air France pilot find himself at the limits of sidestick travel, and then just stay there, maintaining a control input that simply could not logically be correct? When things go really bad and we are under intense pressure, it is human nature to revert to what we know from previous experience. Remember, the Airbus flies like no other aircraft in that the sidestick provides no feedback to the pilot. It is a video game, not an airplane.

I believe the Air France pilot unintentionally fell back on all of his previous flying experience, in which aircraft controls "talkedF" to him when he moved them. Distracted by many confusing inputs, he instinctively expected to be able to control the aircraft by "feel" while dividing his attention to address other matters. I've seen it happen in the simulator, and in an Airbus this is a sure way to lose control of the aircraft and is possibly the most dangerous aspect of Airbus design philosophy.

One last note: Airbus pilots often claim that the aircraft "can not be stalled." When the flight controls are in "normal law" this is a reasonably true statement. However, in "alternate law," as was the case here, stall protection can be lost. If we ever practiced this in the simulator, I don't remember it.

Lest anyone think I am blaming the Air France pilots for this accident, let me be clear. Despite all of my experience in the aircraft, I am not the least bit certain that I would have been able to maintain control under the same circumstances. I do feel certain that were you to spring this scenario on pilots in a simulator without warning less than half of them would have a successful outcome. Safely flying the 320, 330 and 340-series Airbus requires something of a non-pilot mindset.
Click to expand...
 
Good find.

I'm still thinking the data at hand doesn't tell the whole story. If the AI was many degrees nose up, and the stick (with good feedback or not) is almost all the way back, wouldn't that should be a big clue that something's not right?

The power thing he mentions, wouldn't most jet pilots (even those used to auto-throttles) have some inkling of where level flight cruise power at their normal altitudes should be?

Didn't anyone see the tapes climbing up the graph if the airplane chose to give them climb power from that detent?

Are there ANY mechanical gyros in an Airbus cockpit to cross-reference against? (I don't know.)

Either there was contradictory information available to the pilot to rule something out...

- ASI showing too fast maybe?
- AI showing nose up.
- Thrust increasing or higher than normal for that altitude.

That's a generic "two-out-of-three" odd-man-out scenario, we all practice doing the IR, right? One instrument is jacked up, ignore it and fly the other two...

Or... the real software story hasn't been seen yet, because the FDR doesn't record what the displays were actually showing...

The rediculous number of alerts thrown by the software that most Airbus pilots report after a severe incident also has to be a factor -- the aircraft doesn't know how to prioritize the alerts for pilots, because the software devs built it to fly itself, not give information to the meat-bags sitting in the chairs.

That's my "belief" from everything I've ever read about the overall design methodology, anyway. Meat-bags second, fly myself, first.

It kinda shows through in this "law" thing... anyone who thinks they can create their own "laws" that override the real laws of physics that an aircraft operates in, is kinda whacked in their thinking from the get-go. "Normal law", "Alternate law"... blah blah... just seems like a bit of developer/design "attitude" showing through. (Not aircraft attitude, but a tiny insight into the minds of the architects of the system.)

We may never truly know what those displays were telling the pilots. I'm sure since no one wants to die, they attempted to interpret what the displays were showing and do the right thing, but it's hard to think of a scenario where increasing thrust and continually pitching nose up at FL 350 is ever a good thing in the "common sense" view of aircraft control.

I think there's a bit of a cop-out here in saying it's a video game, though... if the AI and the thrust tapes were working. Problem is, it sounds like the ASI was being fixated upon. Whether the aircraft's software "assisted" that fixation on bad data and a bad instrument, is the big question now.
 
The plane handled so well in the stall, was completely controllable and even recoverable from upset that when combined with the fact the stall warning turned off when the stall got so deep the machine didn't accept the AoA info (though it had no reason not to) that none of the three pilots realized the plane was stalled regardless that their instruments were telling them it was. "A stalled airplane just doesn't drive like this." They did not believe the instruments were giving them useful info, "they couldn't be right, there is no tall warning and the plane is handling ok".

First sentence in instrument training: Always Trust Your Instruments.

They never did anything to sort the indications out and test and verify what was good and bad, just hold the stick in one spot and the FBW system flew a smooth falling leaf at AoAs exceeding 40*.

Captain never took control or a control seat or even issued instructions. Captain failed.
 
Maybe this is just symptomatic of the degradation of the professional flying corps. Used to be a career, and the guys were like rock stars. You got the best and the brightest. I don't know who's in the chair now, but it ain't the best and brightest. Kentucky, Buffalo, and now this.

On the other hand, if Airbus made an airplane that is utterly uncontrollable sans autopilot, our problems are bigger still, and I'm staying way the hell off jetliners.
 
steingar said:
Maybe this is just symptomatic of the degradation of the professional flying corps. Used to be a career, and the guys were like rock stars. You got the best and the brightest. I don't know who's in the chair now, but it ain't the best and brightest. Kentucky, Buffalo, and now this.

On the other hand, if Airbus made an airplane that is utterly uncontrollable sans autopilot, our problems are bigger still, and I'm staying way the hell off jetliners.
Click to expand...


I've been saying this same thing for years. I said it in a Lexington thread on the RB and it started a 6 page flaming session...by people who were attracted to the job.:rolleyes: The degrading pay and working conditions since deregulation have brought this on. Most of that was brought about by "fare wars" and poor business practices competing for consumers who only consider the bottom line of "who has the cheapest ticket".

It's all part of the price of being a semi evolved species....

As fot the aircraft controlability, it was stable and responsive to control inputs in pitch and roll while deeply stalled.... I don't see that as what happened. The ergonomics of the human interface leave something to be desired though.
 
Last edited:
steingar said:
Maybe this is just symptomatic of the degradation of the professional flying corps. Used to be a career, and the guys were like rock stars. You got the best and the brightest. I don't know who's in the chair now, but it ain't the best and brightest. Kentucky, Buffalo, and now this.
Click to expand...

Part of it is the airlines give people jobs ensuring others live to see another day and pay 'em $25K a year.

I won't say that's an "excuse" for the lack of professionalism.

I have watched the job get worse and worse as an "interested party", since I bailed out in the early 90's and went to tech jobs that paid better and where -- even when I'm on-call 24/7 and regularly do off-hours work -- I still sleep better than most Regional pilots.

The kids flying airplanes today for a living have it pretty rough, other than the best office window view of any job out there.
 
steingar said:
.On the other hand, if Airbus made an airplane that is utterly uncontrollable sans autopilot,
Click to expand...

Greg Bockelman said:
They didn't.
Click to expand...

Lest anyone think I am blaming the Air France pilots for this accident, let me be clear. Despite all of my experience in the aircraft, I am not the least bit certain that I would have been able to maintain control under the same circumstances. I do feel certain that were you to spring this scenario on pilots in a simulator without warning less than half of them would have a successful outcome. Safely flying the 320, 330 and 340-series Airbus requires something of a non-pilot mindset.
Click to expand...

It sure sounds like he's saying just that.
 
steingar said:
Maybe this is just symptomatic of the degradation of the professional flying corps. Used to be a career, and the guys were like rock stars. You got the best and the brightest. I don't know who's in the chair now, but it ain't the best and brightest. Kentucky, Buffalo, and now this.
Click to expand...
I don't think that's necessarily true. If you read some older accident reports you'll see that pilots years ago were also making mistakes which resulted in accidents. In fact the safety record now is much better than it was then.
 
It sounds to me - especially having read the whole letter, not just that paragraph - that he's saying you can't control the airplane in the same way you control aircraft with more conventional control set-ups. That's quite different from saying it's uncontrollable with an autopilot.
 
steingar said:
It sure sounds like he's saying just that.
Click to expand...
Define controllable... The aircraft was controllable all the way down responding well.

Control on the part of the pilot being able to interpret a course of action from the information being presented by the aircraft, that is tougher. If the stall warning system hadn't of silenced itself in the middle of a stall, it would have been easier, and then it came on again as he finally attempted to lower the nose (the power was still on at this point and the plane started accelerating and the AoA decrease to a number the plane would believe, they were starting to fly out of it with the nose at 5*) then the stall horn kicks on again "WTF! Why did the stall warning come on when I put the nose down? This things all f-ed up, I put the nose down full throttle, that must be the overspeed." and he pulls the throttles the AoA climbs back to unbelievable and the stall turns off again.

The design of the the Stall Warning system deserves a high ranking position in the "causal attributions".

So yeah, human/system interface ergonomics is an issue with the controllability of the aircraft. The actual flight and control systems and aerodynamic design is not at fault here.

He was on the road to recovery when his confusion caused by misunderstanding the stall warning caused him to pull the throttles which is what doomed them. It's most likely why he didn't believe his instruments, stall horn has primacy in training over instruments. Stall horn is first flight.
 
Last edited:
denverpilot said:
Part of it is the airlines give people jobs ensuring others live to see another day and pay 'em $25K a year.
Click to expand...

I don't believe Air France pilots get paid in dollars. Also, some non-authoritative sites on the Internet suggest Air France pilots are among the best paid, anywhere.
 
flyingcheesehead said:
It's here: http://www.avweb.com/news/avmail/AVmail_LettersToTheEditor_204773-1.html

It's also very interesting. I made a comment on the Jetwhine blog about this subject and I think this letter agrees.

I'm not bagging on FBW in general, just the Airbus design philosophy. It's a bad UI, period.
Click to expand...

My understanding is that:

  1. This is not the first time the pitots failed on an Airbus and the pilot had to deal with it. This is just the first time it lead to a fatal plunge.
  2. That there is a book procedure to set the throttle and elevator trim to specific settings that, had it been followed, could have got them safely out of the situation.
Are either of the above incorrect enough to indicate that the fault lies more with poor ergonomics than a pilot not resorting to their training?
 
Everskyward said:
I don't think that's necessarily true. If you read some older accident reports you'll see that pilots years ago were also making mistakes which resulted in accidents. In fact the safety record now is much better than it was then.
Click to expand...

A lot of mistakes in the day were stupid, but many were due to new systems, lack of CRM, insufficient forecasting and other stuff that I wouldn't call pilot stupid.
 
Jim Logajan said:
Are either of the above incorrect enough to indicate that the fault lies more with poor ergonomics than a pilot not resorting to their training?
Click to expand...


Here's what bothers me... it was three of them in the cockpit all unable. The captain was not even giving instruction when he should have been on the controls. The captain did not know they were stalled. I would think that by the time you have a command type rating that your systems knowledge should be to the point that you know why the plane is nose up anf falling 10,000fpm and the stall warning horn is off, it's because we've exceeded the limit".

I think what we're gonna see here is an endemic issue with Air France's training program. When one junior flubs it, you have a pilot problem. When three flub it together, you have a technical training program problem. When a captain will stand there and do nothing, you have a command/leadership training problem.
 
Everskyward said:
I don't think that's necessarily true. If you read some older accident reports you'll see that pilots years ago were also making mistakes which resulted in accidents. In fact the safety record now is much better than it was then.
Click to expand...

I think if you were to combine the pay, benefits, and prestige of "then" with the CRM and safety-conscious culture we have now (ie, Thou Shalt Declare An Emergency) that we'd have a better situation than we do now.

chucky said:
It sounds to me - especially having read the whole letter, not just that paragraph - that he's saying you can't control the airplane in the same way you control aircraft with more conventional control set-ups. That's quite different from saying it's uncontrollable with an autopilot.
Click to expand...

Maybe not uncontrollable, but if he is one of the most experienced A330 pilots and doesn't know if he could have saved it even knowing what he knows now, and that he believes that less than half of A330 pilots thrown into that situation in the sim would succeed, it means that the airplane has a problem.

At the very least, some force feedback in the stick would be an improvement.

Jim Logajan said:
My understanding is that:

  1. This is not the first time the pitots failed on an Airbus and the pilot had to deal with it. This is just the first time it lead to a fatal plunge.
  2. That there is a book procedure to set the throttle and elevator trim to specific settings that, had it been followed, could have got them safely out of the situation.
Are either of the above incorrect enough to indicate that the fault lies more with poor ergonomics than a pilot not resorting to their training?
Click to expand...

For the first, you are correct - There have been other incidents, but in those cases the pilots were lucky enough to not be over the ocean in (the vicinity of) a thunderstorm. That applies to the second, as well - Set the throttles and trim and let 'er go works great when you're not in the situation they were in.
 
flyingcheesehead said:
I think if you were to combine the pay, benefits, and prestige of "then" with the CRM and safety-conscious culture we have now (ie, Thou Shalt Declare An Emergency) that we'd have a better situation than we do now.



Maybe not uncontrollable, but if he is one of the most experienced A330 pilots and doesn't know if he could have saved it even knowing what he knows now, and that he believes that less than half of A330 pilots thrown into that situation in the sim would succeed, it means that the airplane has a problem.

At the very least, some force feedback in the stick would be an improvement.



For the first, you are correct - There have been other incidents, but in those cases the pilots were lucky enough to not be over the ocean in (the vicinity of) a thunderstorm. That applies to the second, as well - Set the throttles and trim and let 'er go works great when you're not in the situation they were in.
Click to expand...


The way I read the report, they hadn't even made it up to the weather yet, there is no record of disturbance that wouldn't be covered by stall buffet, and the plane "flew" perfectly while deeply stalled. The only state they were in was a state of confusion. This will prove out to be an inefficient recruiting and training system instituted at Air France (remember the airshow crash, that was another Air France pilot that didn't understand the systems sufficiently) and poor informational ergonomics with the crew. That stall horn should have never turned off. That is "where the airplane killed them". The stall horn was a double whammy that not only didn't tell him he was in a stall when he was in it at its worst, just when he finally made a move to recover it came back on at him and that was game over. He pulled the throttles and quit, he couldn't make a damned bit of sense to him or to any of them. Every indication for the last two minutes is valid. The only "invalid" piece of information in that cockpit was the stall warning and that is only invalid by ommission. There is one more piece of information that invalidates a stall and that is the way the plane is handling. It's under control and responsive, the pilot just doesn't know what input to give. "Stall isn't bitching at us, the controls aren't bitching at us, we can't be stalled so why is our altitude unwinding when we're at full power with the nose 15* up???"

The way they reacted to that though is what shows problems with their fundamental training.
 
Henning said:
This will prove out to be an inefficient recruiting and training system instituted at Air France (remember the airshow crash, that was another Air France pilot that didn't understand the systems sufficiently) and poor informational ergonomics with the crew.
Click to expand...

I agree that it sounds like the plane did a beautiful deep stall all the way to impact, exactly as commanded by the hand flying pilots.

They may find it to be a training problem, but given that they have no lack of pilots going through their ab initio programs, or an abundance of empty seats, I bet their recruiting system is quite efficient.
 
Henning said:
Here's what bothers me... it was three of them in the cockpit all unable. The captain was not even giving instruction when he should have been on the controls. The captain did not know they were stalled. I would think that by the time you have a command type rating that your systems knowledge should be to the point that you know why the plane is nose up anf falling 10,000fpm and the stall warning horn is off, it's because we've exceeded the limit".

I think what we're gonna see here is an endemic issue with Air France's training program. When one junior flubs it, you have a pilot problem. When three flub it together, you have a technical training program problem. When a captain will stand there and do nothing, you have a command/leadership training problem.
Click to expand...

+ 1000........:yes:
 
TangoWhiskey said:
I agree that it sounds like the plane did a beautiful deep stall all the way to impact, exactly as commanded by the hand flying pilots.

They may find it to be a training problem, but given that they have no lack of pilots going through their ab initio programs, or an abundance of empty seats, I bet their recruiting system is quite efficient.
Click to expand...

That there is no shortage of candidates is everywhere. The question is what are the selection criteria for the cadets? Just because you have warm bodies to fill the seats doesn't say anything with regards to their ability or the training they receive.
 
Last edited:
Henning said:
That there is no shortage of candidates is everywhere. The question is what are the selection criteria for the cadets? Just because you have warm bodies to fill the seats doesn't say anything with regards to their ability or the training they receive.
Click to expand...

I get that... point taken! :yes:
 
I had a phone conversation today about this with another pilot and we both reached the same conclusion that's been pointed out here today... The stall warning shouldn't have ever stopped.

If the aircraft was "throwing away" the airspeed indication, it could have still been "smart" enough to show the pilots the AoA vane data that it had, but I bet the pilots did not get to see in the magical world of Airbus where the airplane knows best what to show you according to its various "laws".

The pilot could have a way to manually disarm/silence an inaccurate stall warning, but changing "laws" shouldn't have silenced it.

The design flaw here is that these "laws" completely change the aircraft instrumentation's behavior.

That's called "over-engineering" in most software design circles. At Airbus, it's likely that it has become a cultural thing.

Stall or unknown, stall warning. No stall, all data trusted/good, no stall warning. It's that "unknown" that wasn't handled right by the coders.

Whether they will ever admit it or not, their software killed people.
 
I've been saying that since the first time I read the report. Like I said it's 2 of the links in the accident chain, first it wasn't telling him he was in a stall, second time when it went off as he was starting to recover confusing him to the point of giving up and closing the thrust. That one popped a breaker in his mind.
 
denverpilot said:
If the aircraft was "throwing away" the airspeed indication, it could have still been "smart" enough to show the pilots the AoA vane data that it had, but I bet the pilots did not get to see in the magical world of Airbus where the airplane knows best what to show you according to its various "laws".

The pilot could have a way to manually disarm/silence an inaccurate stall warning, but changing "laws" shouldn't have silenced it.

The design flaw here is that these "laws" completely change the aircraft instrumentation's behavior.


Whether they will ever admit it or not, their software killed people.
Click to expand...

These statements demonstrate a complete lack of understanding of what the "Flight Control Laws" actually are and/or what they do. All they do is decide how the system interprets pilot inputs and provides protections that other dumber airplanes are incapable of. Turn off the autopilot and it flys just like any other EFFING airplane, no mater what LAW you are in. Degradation of the laws simply means fewer protections and a movement toward simpler FBW interpretations.

And guess what, Boeing aircraft will also interpret pilot inputs and offer protections based on airspeed and configurations. Rudder travel and aileron authority are two examples. And I vaven't seen a Boeing airliner yet that gives the pilots the "Magical" AOA indicator.

Gotta go work. I be back to finish later.
 
maddog52 said:
These statements demonstrate a complete lack of understanding of what the "Flight Control Laws" actually are and/or what they do. All they do is decide how the system interprets pilot inputs and provides protections that other dumber airplanes are incapable of. Turn off the autopilot and it flys just like any other EFFING airplane, no mater what LAW you are in. Degradation of the laws simply means fewer protections and a movement toward simpler FBW interpretations.

And guess what, Boeing aircraft will also interpret pilot inputs and offer protections based on airspeed and configurations. Rudder travel and aileron authority are two examples. And I vaven't seen a Boeing airliner yet that gives the pilots the "Magical" AOA indicator.

Gotta go work. I be back to finish later.
Click to expand...
My next door neighbor is a A330 pilot for Delta (at least he was until today when they announced they were closing the MSP A330 base). He told me that after the AF crash and the reported problems with freezing pitots, their training was amended to include a procedure for losing airspeed which involved pitching to 3° up on the AI and manually setting power at 83% N1. According to him this would likely have saved the AF flight (makes sense to me). He also said he's experienced loss of airspeed in the 330 multiple times but never for more than a few seconds. And according to him Delta replaced all their pitots with ones that don't freeze when that problem first surfaced a few years ago. It's my understanding that AF still hasn't done that.
 
Henning said:
. .....That stall horn should have never turned off. That is "where the airplane killed them". The stall horn was a double whammy that not only didn't tell him he was in a stall when he was in it at its worst, just when he finally made a move to recover it came back on at him and that was game over. He pulled the throttles and quit, he couldn't make a damned bit of sense to him or to any of them. Every indication for the last two minutes is valid. The only "invalid" piece of information in that cockpit was the stall warning and that is only invalid by ommission. There is one more piece of information that invalidates a stall and that is the way the plane is handling. It's under control and responsive, the pilot just doesn't know what input to give. "Stall isn't bitching at us, the controls aren't bitching at us, we can't be stalled so why is our altitude unwinding when we're at full power with the nose 15* up???"

The way they reacted to that though is what shows problems with their fundamental training.
Click to expand...

If I remember correctly, most if not al the Boeings I've flown have a speed below which the stall warning is inactive. I'll confirm this when I get back home and check the manuals in a few days. This prevents inadvertant warnings while on the ground and afterall, who is going to be able to control an airliner 50 or 60 knots below stall speed. Airbus appears to have built a jet that can do this.

Keep in mind that the PF had an indication of the airspeed calculated for stall warning AOA (Vsw) on his airspeed tape. It's a red and black strip adjacent to the airspeed tape when in Alternate Law and should have alerted him to the fact that he was way to slow.

The fact that he got himself into this situation is more of an indictment of his training/proficiency than Airbus design philosophy. (Except for the fact that they apparently had inadequate Pitot heat).
 
denverpilot said:
The pilot could have a way to manually disarm/silence an inaccurate stall warning, but changing "laws" shouldn't have silenced it.

>>
That's called "over-engineering" in most software design circles. At Airbus, it's likely that it has become a cultural thing.

Stall or unknown, stall warning. No stall, all data trusted/good, no stall warning. It's that "unknown" that wasn't handled right by the coders.

Whether they will ever admit it or not, their software killed people.
Click to expand...

Let me get this straight. The the "stall warning should never have stopped" but the pilot should have a way to "disarm/silence it". I beleive turning off both FACs (Flight Augmentation Computers) would remove the stall indications, but i don't know why in the heck you would want to.

'Changing Laws" didn't silenece the stall warning. Falling below an extremely slow airspeed where nobody beleived the aircraft could be controlled is what silenced the stall warning. And when the airpseed rose back into the range, he discounted the valid indications and reverted making the improper inputs that put them in the problem to begin with.

What actually killed those people was a combination of inadequate pitot heat and poor pilot training and/or proficiency. IMO
 
And just to be clear, the side sticks do have artificial feel.
From the Airbus 319/320 flight manual.

.......Two sidesticks, located on the Captain's and First Officer's lateral consoles,
provide electrical signals to the flight control computers for pitch and roll control.
The two sidesticks operate independently and do not move with autopilot or
opposite sidestick inputs. They have artificial feel, and are spring-loaded to
neutral.​
........

It takes a definite amount of force to move the stick, is very well balanced and flies pretty much like anyother aircraft. Calling it a "Video Game" is pretty much over the top.
 
I had the chance to fly an Airbus sim a few years ago and other that the fact that it was a sidestick, which took about 60 seconds to get used to, it felt normal.
 
maddog52 said:
And just to be clear, the side sticks do have artificial feel.
From the Airbus 319/320 flight manual.

.......Two sidesticks, located on the Captain's and First Officer's lateral consoles,
provide electrical signals to the flight control computers for pitch and roll control.
The two sidesticks operate independently and do not move with autopilot or
opposite sidestick inputs. They have artificial feel, and are spring-loaded to
neutral.​
........

It takes a definite amount of force to move the stick, is very well balanced and flies pretty much like anyother aircraft. Calling it a "Video Game" is pretty much over the top.
Click to expand...

It's my understanding that the force required to move the stick doesn't change with airspeed, trim, or any other parameter so there would be no "feel" like we experience in our simpler airplanes. But I have no direct knowledge of this so it could be wrong.
 
This reeks of a witch hunt to blame the dead pilots.

If I understand the situation correctly the stall alarm sounded each time the nose was pushed down. That would mess with a pilot's head IMO.
 
ebacon said:
This reeks of a witch hunt to blame the dead pilots.

If I understand the situation correctly the stall alarm sounded each time the nose was pushed down. That would mess with a pilot's head IMO.
Click to expand...

Dunno if I'd call it a witch hunt. I'd call it a pretty logical conclusion given the CVR and electronic flight data.

I find it hard to blame Airbus/Air France for a pilot putting the throttles in TOGA and then pulling back on the stick. I know there's the issue of overspeed for those guys, but they should have gone to a level attitude and a known power setting and they would have ridden it out. Pretty elementary flying technique. I'm not discounting the conflicting info they were getting, but they should have followed the procedures they had been given. The report points out that they didn't run the "Incorrect IAS Indication" checklist. It probably would have saved their lives.
 
Yeah, I don't know about it being a witchhunt either. If it turns out that the control systems weren't responding, then it wasn't the fault of the pilots. I find that to be unlikely, though.

Yes, a stall warning when lowering the nose in confusing, but it's also a clear sign that those signals aren't reliable in the current situation. Are there any instances where lowering the nose would cause the stall warning to go off if the stall warning was working correctly?
 
sba55 said:
Yeah, I don't know about it being a witchhunt either. If it turns out that the control systems weren't responding, then it wasn't the fault of the pilots. I find that to be unlikely, though.

Yes, a stall warning when lowering the nose in confusing, but it's also a clear sign that those signals aren't reliable in the current situation. Are there any instances where lowering the nose would cause the stall warning to go off if the stall warning was working correctly?
Click to expand...

Exceeding critical angle of attack in a nose down might do it, right?
 
When the air speed indicators fail, aren't the pilots supposed to use a specific throttle setting and a specific pitch attitude?

They didn't do that -- and the big thing is that apparently they weren't trained by Air France to do it.

The copilots had received no high altitude training for the "Unreliable IAS" procedure
 
Last edited:
I had the impression the aircraft got it's nose up 40% after another pilot related that. Here is what another pilot with experience sent to explain it better.

Best,

Dave
==================================================


They didn't hold the nose up 40°. The pitch attitude was mostly around 10°, never more than 15° ANU (aircraft nose up). 10°-15° ANU with max power (or whatever Airbus calls it) would normally produce an airplane that's flying and climbing.

The AoA was 40° but the pilot's had no way of knowing the AoA.

To add to the confusion, the stall warning stopped when the indicated airspeed got so low, and AoA so high, that it was classified as invalid by the computer. When the crew did try lowering the pitch attitude the result was the stall warning coming back on which would normally lead a pilot to believe that it wasn't helping.
 
You must log in or register to reply here.
Back
Top