Would this be more acceptable?HEy. HEY! That's MY line
*Sigh* © Dr. Bruce
-Skip
Would this be more acceptable?HEy. HEY! That's MY line
If cowboy is being a little too conservative in his approach, yours sounds a bit too cavalier, perhaps unintentionally.
"It's no big deal; it's still visual" Sounds like a classic VFR into IMC scenario to me.
...in weather conditions that are marginal at best, may have been unpredicted (not generally a good sign), and, even if they were known in advance, like a 1.2 NM marine haze, have a excellent chance of degrading into IFR very quickly (do they really go up to 3 SM at the edge of the segmented circle?).
If cowboy is being a little too conservative in his approach, yours sounds a bit too cavalier, perhaps unintentionally.
"It's no big deal; it's still visual" Sounds like a classic VFR into IMC scenario to me.
Sounds like you think that learning ends after the checkride. . .
A student goes up in to the practice area to learn basic maneuver--flight into IMC not being one of them.
A HUGE part of being a student pilot is habit-patterning, and the number one habit a student needs to learn is the "go/no-go" decision.
With all due respect, if you went up within your 50nm radius and got caught in weather bad enough to force you into a SVFR situation, BOTH you AND your instructor have issues.
There is zero excuse for being that close to home base doing practice maneuvers and getting caught in weather bad enough to genuinely need a SVFR to land. None.
If it's that iffy, then the "go/no-go" decision should be for any student, "no-go."
It's whenever I would stupidly let my butt write checks that my face couldn't cash that I had to whip out the proctologist's card upon landing and call him to help me remove the seat cover I sucked up.
Don't repeat it too many times, since it tends to drown out the number two habit a student needs to learn:the number one habit a student needs to learn is the "go/no-go" decision.
the number one habit a student needs to learn is the "go/no-go" decision.
the number one habit a student needs to learn is the "go/no-go" decision.
the number one habit a student needs to learn is the "go/no-go" decision.
Apples to oranges.Do you think we practice forced landings so we can skip the pre-flight?
That's how you sound. If my engine quits, I must have not done a good enough pre-flight, so you don't teach forced landings, cause you teach a good enough pre-flight inspection on the engine to make a valid "go/no-go decision" on the engine.
Students and low time pilots who are not trained in using all available facilities have had accidents because they were not trained in the practical use of them. That's a fact. Deal with it.
I think his point was the alternative to continued flight into IMC, once you are on an XC and see or get reports of weather, is to divert. Different issue that the go/no go which is before you launch. Some people have a hard time changing plans, pehaps again because they see it as admitting a mistake. And then you have the other pressures to get where you were going, expecially if a passenger really wants to get somewhere that they think is important and you have already invested an hour or two into trying to get there.NTSB lists better than 75% of all fatal accidents involving VFR pilots (including students) are the direct result of continued flight into instrument conditions. No mention of failure to divert to other facilities. -JD
Students and low time pilots who are not trained in using all available facilities have had accidents because they were not trained in the practical use of them. That's a fact. Deal with it.
well it certainly isnt the students fault. The CFI failed the student by not teaching her how to actually deal with the situation. Its called realistic training and it works!
In emergency situations we revert to trained behavior without thinking about it. That's why the military is so hardover on boldface training and emergency procedures in the sim. She was trained by repeated exercise to touch, not move, the selector, and when it really happened, that's just what she did (no surprise to me).I'm not so sure about that. If the student knew the flow, but didn't understand why she was touching the fuel selector, she should have asked. That's her responsibility.
Here is one for you. I read about an accident that happened when a pilot (I think it was a student) ran out of fuel and went down. Walked away, but the accident was caused by fuel starvation, not fuel exhaustion. She had fuel in the other tank. In the review of the events, the pilot had gone through the flow check on engine failure, and "touched" the fuel tank selector as she had done in training simulations, but DID NOT actually switch to the other tank. Something for the CFI's on this forum to think about.
Which is why I don't like to teach a GUMPS check in a fixed gear or a fixed prop. FMS in fixed/fixed singles. Fuel Mixture Switches/Seats
Teaching "lower gear" in a fixed can develop bad habits since there's no gear to lower. Then when the transition to complex happens, the gear doesn't get lowered.
Not sure I agree with that.
It seems to me that if you cannot remember to lower the gear as you verbally say "gear down". There is no way you are going to remember to use the correct verbal checklist for each different airplane.
The human mind is funny though--who knows.
How do you "verify" the tank you are on has fuel? The indicator could be wrong. Unless you ran the other tank dry you are pretty sure it still has something in it, and since the engine quit you are not that sure of the one you are on - whatever you think it ought to have in it. Why not just switch?
Oh I get all that. I am just saying that things happen in flight, and you can not be certain the tank that ought to have 5 gallons left actually does. What about a tank drain that started leaking, or a split in the fuel line from one tank, and you lost some over the last 3 hours? Or what if you happended to do a lot of climbing while on one tank and most of the descent on the other? On my plane I had a gasket seal (for the fuel level indicator) that we found leaked only when the tank was filled above tabs, so not something you would necessarilly notice until you were filled for a long XC. And that tank would have a little less than planned toward the end of the flight.
I was not talking about the checklist as a solution to the leak itself. Only that IF the engine quits, you ought to doubt the fuel level in a tank even if the indicator (or your switch schedule) says you have fuel in that tank. And if you doubt the fuel level of the tank you are on, why not just switch to one that had fuel in it an hour ago?
My Engine out procedure:
Switch Tanks
Check Mags
Check Mixture
Turn on the Electric Fuel Pump
It's a nice left to right flow in the Cherokee. If the engine still doesn't start, now I go back and really start looking to see what it might be. Yeah, my first flow is a brainless reaction, but if it comes back to life that's a lot better than looking for my emergency checklist while I lose altitude.
I'm not so sure about that. If the student knew the flow, but didn't understand why she was touching the fuel selector, she should have asked. That's her responsibility.
Ed I did not read all the posts, but since I had a Six yours kinda stuck out for me. What ever works for you, but I would think that Turn on the pump is #1, switch tanks, Mixture, Mags. If it is something you can do something about it will be fuel, get more fuel fast, that's the pump. If there is no fuel to pump, That's switch tanks, Pushing the mixture in may help also. Unless you turned the mags off what can you do there. Now your in the diag mode. look at fuses.
Dan
In emergency situations we revert to trained behavior without thinking about it. That's why the military is so hardover on boldface training and emergency procedures in the sim. She was trained by repeated exercise to touch, not move, the selector, and when it really happened, that's just what she did (no surprise to me).
This is similar to an F-111 accident many years ago. In the beginning, the boldface for engine fire was, "Throttle-OFF, Fire Pushbutton-DEPRESS, Agent Discharge Switch-ACTUATE." However, the fire extinguishing agent discharge switch doubles as the fire warning lights test switch -- up for discharge, down for test. Pilots test the lights during pre-start checks every flight, and often test them periodically during flight (usually with a warning to the WSO so the right seater doesn't have a heart attack seeing all three lights come on at once). Thus, they get a lot of practice pushing the switch down, and virtually none pushing it up.
One day, an F-111 had an engine fire, and the pilot pulled the throttle off, depressed the fire pushbutton, and actuated the agent discharge switch -- down, the way his arm was used to doing it every single time. Needless to say, this did not put the fire out, but rather lit up the other two fire lights, convincing the crew that the fire was spreading and aircraft disintigration was imminent, resulting in prompt ejection. On the ground, the mishap board figured it out. After that, the boldface was changed to "Agent Discharge Switch - UP." The situation never recurred.
Left to right, right to left. Takes about 1.75 seconds either way.
Back almost 40 years ago in C-150's, I was taught to grab the fuel selector valve and ensure it was fully selected to the "ON" position by trying to move it in that direction, not just touching it. That paid off in 1972 when, on my Commercial practical test, a really stupid FAA Inspector turned the valve off to "simulate" an engine failure (not exactly "simulation" in my book). Within half a second, the engine was running again, because without even thinking, the first thing I did was reach down and grab the fuel valve handle and move it where it belonged. The inspector then retarded the throttle and we completed the task.Hmmm interesting. I was always taught, and therefore taught, to actually use the valve as well in training (train em like you fly em), hadn't really considered that aspect.
"You fight like you train." BGen (then-Maj) Steve Richie, USAF's only pilot ace in Viet Nam.
"...so train the way you want to fight." Capt (then-LCDR) "Duke" Cunningham, USN's only pilot ace in Viet Nam.
Me neither. Pretty much the same reason. It teaches that it doesn't matter.Which is why I don't like to teach a GUMPS check in a fixed gear or a fixed prop.
Diamond Aircraft is working with the FAA to obtain approval for use as a complex trainer a modified version of the CS-prop version of the DA40. It still has fixed gear, but it adds little speed brakes selected by a gear handle to simulate the effects/sensations of gear extension/retraction. The package includes "gear" up/down indications, a "gear up warning" system, and a very big indication of landing with "gear" up. The big difference from a flight school perspective is that it is still insured as a fixed gear airplane because the real gear can't be retracted. The FAA is chewing on the idea of permitting folks to use this for initial commercial and initial CFI-A training as well as the complex airplane endorsement.I don't know if they still sell it, but a couple of years ago I saw a retractable gear "trainer" that was being sold in the Sprotys catalog. You could stick it on your 172 panel and "practice" raising and lowering the gear. It taught you that when you put the "gear" down, nothing happened. No sound of the mechanism working. No increased drag. No lowering airspeed. And best of all, if you forgot to put it down there were no consequences. Yep, a great training aid - for gear-up landings that is
Diamond Aircraft is working with the FAA to obtain approval for use as a complex trainer a modified version of the CS-prop version of the DA40. It still has fixed gear, but it adds little speed brakes selected by a gear handle to simulate the effects/sensations of gear extension/retraction. The package includes "gear" up/down indications, a "gear up warning" system, and a very big indication of landing with "gear" up. The big difference from a flight school perspective is that it is still insured as a fixed gear airplane because the real gear can't be retracted. The FAA is chewing on the idea of permitting folks to use this for initial commercial and initial CFI-A training as well as the complex airplane endorsement.
Here is one for you. I read about an accident that happened when a pilot (I think it was a student) ran out of fuel and went down. Walked away, but the accident was caused by fuel starvation, not fuel exhaustion. She had fuel in the other tank. In the review of the events, the pilot had gone through the flow check on engine failure, and "touched" the fuel tank selector as she had done in training simulations, but DID NOT actually switch to the other tank. Something for the CFI's on this forum to think about.
Wow... That's really interesting.
It's also a very smart idea on Diamond's part. I can see the insurance companies not insuring Arrows at flight schools any more once there's another option for commercial training.