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Velocity173
War is hell. The fog of war is even worse.
But this was hardly war. The F-15s were not being shot at. The only Iraqi helicopters that had been in that area in some time where helicopters that were defecting. The pilots screwed up big time.
I was actually at an Air Force school (AGOS), when this took place.
To me it seems clear from the GAO investigation and the statements from the AWACS guys, that these pilots were just itching for action.
Seems true for a lot of friendly fire engagements. The cockpit tapes of the A-10s that engaged Coalition troops in Iraq showed a couple of cowboys who were eager to kill, kill, kill...until they were told they had just shot friendlies.
To me it seems clear from the GAO investigation and the statements from the AWACS guys, that these pilots were just itching for action. Still, I can't help but think that this would have been avoided by just integrating the Army on the ATO like they do today. Of course all it had to take was an AWACS controller opening his mouth and letting the F-15s know that there are possible friendlies in the area. We both know the importance of clear lines of communication. Just a wrong fill or in this case, bad Mode IV can have deadly results. Just mistakes made all around.
If they had ASE like we have now the outcome would have been different as well. It think the second aircraft would have had a very good chance of survival.
I don't think the available ASE would have done much against this "threat" but good point. One of the Army Aviation lessons learned from the first Gulf War was inadequacy of the ASE. Over a decade later nothing had been done to address the problem- the money was "needed" for the Comanche program. After the loss of a number of airframes and crews in Iraq Cody finally killed the RAH-66, something long overdue, and much of the money saved was used for ASE.
While in OPC we all had an IR jammer ALQ-144 and four radar warning sensors. We did not load our ONE chaff/flare dispenser. We did not have HIRSS(mixed/cooled exhaust) on most hawks. If we had ESSS (stub wings) installed, loaded with 230 gal of JP-8, and 13 on board, we would have had very little maneuverability. We were not expecting any hostiles. If we saw an F-15 off to our left, we would have just thought they were there to protect us. I cannot remember whether our pilots monitored 121.5/243.0 and whether that would have done any good.
RV10flyer, did you know a guy named Tony Taylor? He was a 'Hawk crew chief in Turkey at the time of the shootdown. Actually I think he was in that unit.
I left Ft. Hood in August 1991 when our unit (part of 2AD) was deactivated and reflagged 2-101st at Campbell. Anyway I just bring up Tony because he was a friend of mine in 2-101st and oddly enough is a coworker of mine now. He mentions the OPC shootdown on occasion, I think a good friend of his was on one of the birds. Army Aviation tends to be a small world.
That is good to hear. Our crews did also have kevlar vests.
I remember the day and the distress it caused throughout Army Aviation...I was at Finthen from 85-89....rare anyone else knows of the place...the UH-60 crash with the glider avoidance was on the way back from Graf..I was the duty officer at the Airfield that day. Early October of 86...