177RG Lake Havasu

Prelim report is out. Engine tear down showed significant pitting, sprawling, and broken piston rings with scored piston skirts. Past engine oil analysis showed elevated metal signatures indicative of excessive ring wear among other things. Blows my mind how someone ignores so many warning signs when their life is on the line.
And on top of it the engine is trying to tell you it’s dying while it’s carrying you down the runway. A powerful reminder of how external pressures can be blinding to the facts.
 
Two sentences from that article:

"The report details that the pilot had done some maintenance work because the plane was experiencing some "vibrations" during takeoff and landing."

"An interview with the pilot's spouse revealed that the pilot had done a majority of his plane's maintenance."


Saving money no matter how much it costs?
Apparently the maintenance work related to the vibrations were on the nose gear and not the engine according to the NTSB prelim:
https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/api/Aviation/ReportMain/GenerateNewestReport/103838/pdf
 
It reminds me of the recent CT jet crash into the building with the brakes partially on. In both cases, apparently the pilot didn't notice the reduced performance until it was too late. Without specifically checking for a specific speed at a specific distance, I can see how that could happen, especially if in the case of the 177 it was gradual.
 
(if that information is correct) I’ve rejected one takeoff roll after a bug got lodged in the pitot tube. Always be prepared for it.
Same here. An hour later after a trip to the mechanic and it was good as new!
 
This is the second person I've known that has been lost trying to turn back. I know it's not a hard rule to land straight ahead, but it should be the first option you consider.
 
This is the second person I've known that has been lost trying to turn back. I know it's not a hard rule to land straight ahead, but it should be the first option you consider.

The first mistake was not rejecting the takeoff. When the plane is telling you it doesn't want to fly, listen.
 
From the report...

The logbooks showed that the camshaft and lifters were replaced with new parts in December 2004, equating to 682 hours prior to the accident. The logbook indicated that the No. 1 cylinder was replaced with an overhauled assembly in March 2020, equating to 75.1 hours prior to the accident. The last recorded oil change was at the last annual inspection recorded as being completed on July 16, 2021, 25.7 hours prior the accident.

Sounds like only 682 hours in 17 years.
 
It's sad. Given the first pictures, I thought maybe he just couldn't climb out at all, and hit an obstruction. From the ntsb report, it looks like stall/spin. He didn't notice the poor performance, I can understand that, and he thought he could make the turn back.
 
KathrynsReport.jpg
 
It's sad. Given the first pictures, I thought maybe he just couldn't climb out at all, and hit an obstruction. From the ntsb report, it looks like stall/spin. He didn't notice the poor performance, I can understand that, and he thought he could make the turn back.
How exactly to you "understand" him not noticing the poor performance? This is an airplane he has owned and flown for almost 2 decades from the same area no less. I would notice if my takeoff roll was 100' longer than normal much less thousands of feet longer.
 
Why such a glaring difference in the wear(or pitting)?

had some been replaced ?
 
It's good to learn when we lose a fellow pilot, especially when it's a friend. So many people think they know what they would do in a similar situation. Gary made mistakes, and it's looking like he made quite a few. Your mind is trying to tell you something is wrong, but it's also telling you it's your imagination. You think your takeoff roll is a little long, but then again, it's hot outside. You think you should land straight ahead, but then your plane will certainly be damaged and you may be as well... can you make it back to the airport?

I've heard so many people say it's the insurance company's plane now. Easy to say when you're sitting in front of your keyboard, not thinking about how bad this is going to hurt when you hit something. When my engine failed in my Luscombe, I did everything I was taught to do. The pilot who was sitting next to me panicked and pulled back on the stick, forcing me to fight him. I might have cleared the trees, but he took the momentum away and I was forced to stall into the trees. Two pilots in the same plane reacting differently.

I hope we can all think about the mistakes made by Gary and learn from them instead of believing we wouldn't make the same mistakes. Hopefully you'll never find out.
 
It's good to learn when we lose a fellow pilot, especially when it's a friend. So many people think they know what they would do in a similar situation. Gary made mistakes, and it's looking like he made quite a few. Your mind is trying to tell you something is wrong, but it's also telling you it's your imagination. You think your takeoff roll is a little long, but then again, it's hot outside. You think you should land straight ahead, but then your plane will certainly be damaged and you may be as well... can you make it back to the airport?

I've heard so many people say it's the insurance company's plane now. Easy to say when you're sitting in front of your keyboard, not thinking about how bad this is going to hurt when you hit something.

Yep.

I've lost count of the number of times flying over dark areas at night or making the crossing over Lake Michigan and feeling the engine running just a bit rougher. Always turned out to be my imagination.

It's very easy to make the right decision in front of the keyboard after the fact.
 
How exactly to you "understand" him not noticing the poor performance? This is an airplane he has owned and flown for almost 2 decades from the same area no less. I would notice if my takeoff roll was 100' longer than normal much less thousands of feet longer.

It's a good question. First, because even pilots aren't always sensitive to gradual changes. But second, because some pilots don't specifically have a fixed point on the runway where they look for a specific speed. Without that, and especially if the runway doesn't have any distinctive visual cues along the length, I can see how he wouldn't notice a 30 or 40 or whatever percent performance hit until it was too late. Not saying it's not a mistake or excusable, but am saying it seems to be pretty common. He clearly didn't have a point and speed abort reference, and he apparently didn't notice the gradual change.

If you'd notice the change, it's because you have a particular reference of where you should be at a particular speed.
 
This discussion reminds me of a takeoff I made many years ago.
Cessna 172 with the Franklin STC, rated HP 215, limited to 180 with manifold pressure. Nrmal MP on takeoff was about 23.5.

I was also flying a 145 HP Cessna that was essentially the same in its equipment.

Proper and normal runup, all good, with the checklist. Taxi to the runway, advanced the throttle to the 23.50 limit for the temperature and pressure for the day, and accelerated down the runway. The speed did not increase quite as much as normal, and rotation was about 10% past what I had done recently, and climb was just a small bit less than normal.

Then I remembered that I was in the Franklin, looked again at the guages, and found that I had set RPM at2350, not MP at 23.50! Pushed the throttle in just enough to bring RPM to red line, reset angle of climb, and scanned for traffic. Then, I carefully set the correct manifold pressure, avoiding any overtravel.

Even at only 2350 RPM, that engine was giving me nearly normal acceleration, compared to the standard engine. I was in the air and climbing in less than half of the runway length.

In Florida, Craig field, I met a man with a Cessna inline twin, who had on his previous departure there, had a long expected delay after starting his engines, and elected to start the front only, as the rear was well known to overheat on the ground. When the last plane ahead of him took off, he rolled onto the runway and departed. His home field was soft grass, and he was accustomed to poor acceleration, but when he rotated, the climb did not come close to normal, he checked the guages, and found no RPM or oil pressure on the rear engine. A quick start, moderate RPM and manifold pressure until stabilized, and all was good.

Like my experience, there was adequate power available for a safe takeoff in spite of the error. For those that don't remember, Cessna flew one across the higher part of the Rocky Mountains on just one engine for their introductory advertising.

Subtle shortages of performance can easily be ignored for a while, and then if the runway remaining is insufficient, bad choices are made.

Always sad when a very competent pilot misses some small performance warnings.
 
It doesn't take much RPM loss (with a fixed-pitch prop) to take the airplane to its crash location. One of the things we taught was the reduced-performance takeoff, simulating a problem that the student has to deal with. Climb to a safe altitude and return to the airport. In a 172, a 100-RPM reduction means that the thing will barely fly, especially at the airport altitudes we were at. It's pretty stark. You've not only lost RPM, but some torque, too, and multiplying those gives you the HP loss.

With a CS prop it's a bit more difficult. The RPM has to be there, but the MP does, too.
 
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