Crash at Reagan National Airport, DC. Small aircraft down in the Potomac.

The tower staffing and operating conditions during the unfortunate events bother me a whole lot.

There were 5 controllers present, one of whom was a trainee.

3 controllers had duties that did not include in flight planes, and performed satisfactorily.
The planes in flight controller was covering both fixed wing and helicopters, was the trainee to inexperienced to trust with just the helicopter(s)?

There was a supervisor and a supervisor trainee present.

I have been many towers as a guest, including the old DCA, IAD, BWI, ADW, Craig and Panama City, FL, and several others. When there is a shortage for any reason, the supervisor took the position until the shortage was ended, even hours later.

Why was it more important to train the supervisor than to step in to the helicopter slot, and show the training supervisor how that should be done to assure safety issues did not result from a personnel shortage?

Alternately, the supervisor could hands on train the new controller on the helicopter position, while the supervisor trainee learned how that should be done.

As an experienced training and safety supervisor, I am very happy that I am not answering these questions at DCA tower.
 
You mean , it is preferable to risk death and general destruction to the surrounding public rather than suspend whatever fake training mission you are on ?

I took that (as posted by @Hunter Handsfield, I haven't seen the video) to mean drop training when there is a conflict. Take the NVGs off, turn away, look for traffic, etc.

Yeah, looks like I misread it.

If Biancolo was talking about those times when there's a conflict, I gotta agree. I bet there WILL be folks saying we should shut down anything that smells of training into/near DCA, but this probably wasn't one of those times. Sorry for the kerfluffle.
 
I wasn't proposing IFR only, just raising it for consideration. And of course not to abandon all training in that environment; those flying the corridors have to learn how to do it. As I said, I'm a private pilot and not a professional (although highly experienced, including loads of IFR in IMC and many hours in complex airspace). But yes, stop the training and look out the window when things are busy. And if IFR only (no VFR) would not improve safety at reasonable cost, of course don't do it.

All these discussions have risks of generating more heat than light -- all I'm hoping is to stimulate rational, non emotional, apolitical discussion.

Regards to all-- HHH

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Yes. This is something we seem to see frequently in military aviation accident investigations, and the conclusions are usually not good. I think in many areas, safety is viewed as weakness. In the military, where toughness is a virtue, this can be exacerbated. Attitudes of leaders can make or break the safety of entire units and entire careers.

Unless you are an active military aviator, of the same community that an accident involves, you have never actually seen the real military accident investigation. You may have seen a JAGMAN because they become public documents. Do not confuse that investigation with the actual privileged mishap investigation. They are very much two different things. They can and have come to different conclusions. I can't think of an example of a real mishap investigation becoming public knowledge, other than maybe a few leaked snippets of the Kara Hultgreen mishap, which of note, were illegally released. I've found the *real* SIRs that have been released during my career, to be every much as good as what the NTSB provides us for civil accidents. A lot of good learning has occurred over the years due to their detail and candor. It would be very unheard of for "toughness" to become involved in the findings. Safety, to the extent that we can honor it operationally, is an enormous concern even in the military. What are you on about?
 
If they went ifr only, traffic would crawl. They let pilots do visual so they can decrease spacing and move more aircraft.
 
I was thinking today, just push that route 4 over 295 but watching this vid, the airliners swing it out wide sometimes. Still gonna be in conflict. It would also put them in a bad area for the RNAV 33 VGF at 490 ft.

I think the computer generated UH-60 cockpit simulation in this vid is probably fairly accurate. Just replace the green imagery with white and move the fixed wing slightly higher. Still shows how difficult to make out an aircraft with a city background.

Apparently media reports of a “proficiency flight” or APART (eval) wasn’t accurate either. It was a “continuity of government training drill.”

 
The other benefit, and it’s most applicable in the DCA area, is it’s better at low altitude vs VHF. VHF commonly gets blocked due to terrain / obstructions. UHF has excellent reception at the lower altitudes.
UHF is even more line of sight than VHF, and subject to blockages by obstacles and terrain.
What disadvantages VHF on a helicopter is poor antenna installations, with less than ideal ground planes. Especially on military birds where VHF is an afterthought.

If they can just hover, why would they need approach plates?
It's a lot easier to fly a helicopter when you have some forward airspeed. Over 50kts or so it behaves pretty much like a fixed wing.
Takes less power, allowing you to continue flying if an engine goes on strike. Also easier to deal with a tail rotor failure. Plus, a heavy helicopter can end up in a situation where it can hover in ground effect, but not out of it.

Helicopters have a Height/Velocity diagram - you can be slow or you can be low, but low and slow can be deadly.
At 200ft you can't hover safely, in case something goes wrong you're dead.

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Good article about HV diagrams:

If so, how difficult is it to stop and hover at night a couple hundred feet over a dark river with potential false horizons due to lights on the shore?
Not familiar with the DC lighting environment, but it has enough cultural lighting that false horizons shouldn't really be a problem. The problem is the HV diagram.

Also, same question but with NVGs? I would guess that NVGs make hovering in that situation really difficult?
You train for that, good crew coordination helps a lot. Again, you won't be hovering at 200 or 400ft, and at low altitudes you have other visual cues, mostly looking around the NVGs.
 
UHF is even more line of sight than VHF, and subject to blockages by obstacles and terrain.
What disadvantages VHF on a helicopter is poor antenna installations, with less than ideal ground planes. Especially on military birds where VHF is an afterthought.


It's a lot easier to fly a helicopter when you have some forward airspeed. Over 50kts or so it behaves pretty much like a fixed wing.
Takes less power, allowing you to continue flying if an engine goes on strike. Also easier to deal with a tail rotor failure. Plus, a heavy helicopter can end up in a situation where it can hover in ground effect, but not out of it.

Helicopters have a Height/Velocity diagram - you can be slow or you can be low, but low and slow can be deadly.
At 200ft you can't hover safely, in case something goes wrong you're dead.

View attachment 137761

Good article about HV diagrams:


Not familiar with the DC lighting environment, but it has enough cultural lighting that false horizons shouldn't really be a problem. The problem is the HV diagram.


You train for that, good crew coordination helps a lot. Again, you won't be hovering at 200 or 400ft, and at low altitudes you have other visual cues, mostly looking around the NVGs.
Not sure where you heard that from. UHF is far better in urban areas with buildings / terrain over VHF.



 
The tower staffing and operating conditions during the unfortunate events bother me a whole lot.

There were 5 controllers present, one of whom was a trainee.

3 controllers had duties that did not include in flight planes, and performed satisfactorily.
The planes in flight controller was covering both fixed wing and helicopters, was the trainee to inexperienced to trust with just the helicopter(s)?

There was a supervisor and a supervisor trainee present.

I have been many towers as a guest, including the old DCA, IAD, BWI, ADW, Craig and Panama City, FL, and several others. When there is a shortage for any reason, the supervisor took the position until the shortage was ended, even hours later.

Why was it more important to train the supervisor than to step in to the helicopter slot, and show the training supervisor how that should be done to assure safety issues did not result from a personnel shortage?

Alternately, the supervisor could hands on train the new controller on the helicopter position, while the supervisor trainee learned how that should be done.

As an experienced training and safety supervisor, I am very happy that I am not answering these questions at DCA tower.
The trainee was a supervisor trainee, not a trainee controller. So, there were a supe, a supe trainee, a ground controller, a local controller, and a "local assist" controller - NOT a trainee. I haven't heard of local assist before, but it sounds somewhat like a "D-side" for a radar position - Someone that's there to not talk on the radio at all, but to monitor the situation and take care of various side tasks to take workload off the guy on the radio.
Or he could have got a little low on papi and was adjusting.
Nope... There was a "verbal reaction" in the cockpit that corresponded to the pitch up, and they collided one second later.
Unless you are an active military aviator, of the same community that an accident involves, you have never actually seen the real military accident investigation. You may have seen a JAGMAN because they become public documents. Do not confuse that investigation with the actual privileged mishap investigation. They are very much two different things. They can and have come to different conclusions.
I'm thinking of things I've read, so something that's public. Or presumably, public enough for us nerds who read accident reports all the time. ;)
I've found the *real* SIRs that have been released during my career, to be every much as good as what the NTSB provides us for civil accidents. A lot of good learning has occurred over the years due to their detail and candor. It would be very unheard of for "toughness" to become involved in the findings. Safety, to the extent that we can honor it operationally, is an enormous concern even in the military. What are you on about?
Sorry, it appears there was a misunderstanding. I'll have to go back and check my wording. I didn't mean the toughness thing would ever be in a report, it's just an attitude thing that happens in and out of the military as well as in and out of aviation. It's a challenge for anyone who is in charge of safety to create the right culture, and there are "macho man" attitudes out there that tend to cast safety in a negative light, and the more macho men there are around, the easier that attitude spreads and the more people avoid following procedures that are there for safety and take shortcuts that cause accidents.

I feel like I've read multiple military accident reports where there has been a cultural or training or attitude issue that is found to be base-wide or unit-wide, generally not confined to one crewmember, though sometimes that crewmember is known to be the worst offender. Looking for reports, maybe I just keep remembering the ones that fit this profile - The Fairchild B-52, the Elmendorf C-17, and the Ellsworth B-1.
 
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