Jeju Air, South Korea

I am kind of wondering if this was similar to Transair flight 810, where the crew inadvertently shut down the good engine. Or possibly killed both engines on the go-around, leaving them dead stick or nearly that for the eventual landing.

Another possibility, just throwing it out there, that the cockpit also took a bird strike causing damage to the overhead panel which could have killed power to all kinds of stuff that wouldn't normally have been affected.
My tag line came from a quote about that incident.
 
Dan Gryder, POA's favorite, thinks the pilots pulled a fire handle. That apparently severs all fuel and electric connections to the engine, including the generator. I don't know how that extrapolates to both engines, unless both fire handles were pulled.
 
Dan Gryder, POA's favorite, thinks the pilots pulled a fire handle. That apparently severs all fuel and electric connections to the engine, including the generator. I don't know how that extrapolates to both engines, unless both fire handles were pulled.
Trips the generator field relay, closes pylon firewall valves for the fuel, hydraulics, and pneumatics. Arms the fire extinguisher bottles to fire to that engine.

The fire handles are normally latched. The latch is removed if a fire is being detected for the associated engine/apu. The latch can be overridden with a release that is difficult to operate with a single hand. Pulling a fire handle is NOT a memory item on the engine fire, severe damage, separation checklist. It is a couple of steps into the checklist after the memory items. Confirmation from both pilots is required prior to pulling the handle.
 
Trips the generator field relay, closes pylon firewall valves for the fuel, hydraulics, and pneumatics. Arms the fire extinguisher bottles to fire to that engine.

The fire handles are normally latched. The latch is removed if a fire is being detected for the associated engine/apu. The latch can be overridden with a release that is difficult to operate with a single hand. Pulling a fire handle is NOT a memory item on the engine fire, severe damage, separation checklist. It is a couple of steps into the checklist after the memory items. Confirmation from both pilots is required prior to pulling the handle.
"Turn your key Sir"
I'm on the edge of my seat on this one. Can't wait for a definitive answer.
 
Trips the generator field relay, closes pylon firewall valves for the fuel, hydraulics, and pneumatics. Arms the fire extinguisher bottles to fire to that engine.

The fire handles are normally latched. The latch is removed if a fire is being detected for the associated engine/apu. The latch can be overridden with a release that is difficult to operate with a single hand. Pulling a fire handle is NOT a memory item on the engine fire, severe damage, separation checklist. It is a couple of steps into the checklist after the memory items. Confirmation from both pilots is required prior to pulling the handle.
Uh, Dan, if both fire handles were pulled at the instant of ADS-B, CVR, and DFDR failure, how did the aircraft manage four more minutes of flight and a teardrop reversal return to the runway?
 
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Probably not four minutes unless a plane drops like a rock down a well. Something a little less. Hard to say what switches were pulled or not pulled at this point, but dual fire bottles could explain some but not all. Pilot panic/loss of situational awareness looks like it could explain a bit too. We’ll see…
 
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Pulling a fire handle is NOT a memory item on the engine fire, severe damage, separation checklist.
Really? Sure is for us. Requires confirmation from the other pilot, but still a memory item. Was the same on the 777 when I flew it.
 
In a very few years I’ve seen that change three times… in the same company.

I’ve also flown the same jet for two different companies where it was and wasn’t.

That sort of inconsistency makes mistakes related to their use even more suspect.
 
Dan Gryder, POA's favorite, thinks the pilots pulled a fire handle. That apparently severs all fuel and electric connections to the engine, including the generator. I don't know how that extrapolates to both engines, unless both fire handles were pulled.
Was this based on anything he stole from the crash site?
 
Really? Sure is for us. Requires confirmation from the other pilot, but still a memory item. Was the same on the 777 when I flew it.
On the Boeing FM, just the autothrottle and thrust lever are memory items. Pulling the engine fire switch is step 4.
 
The checklist and memory items have changed over time. The law of primacy takes over a lot. And the checklist and memory items for the same aircraft may be different on carrier A vs carrier B.

My law of primacy example. I was first required at carrier A on aborted take off due to engine failure to reduce thrust, deploy reversers then pull speed brake handle, which was really just confirmation that ground spoilers had deployed. They were automatic on ground with reversers deployed. At carrier B it was reduce thrust to idle, deploy spoilers the reverse thrust. I spent the rest of my career at carrier B repeating the aborts, even though I briefed ahead of times the steps, because I I did what was taught at carrier A.
 
Uh, Dan, if both fire handles were pulled at the instant of ADS-B, CVR, and DFDR failure, how did the aircraft manage four more minutes of flight and a teardrop reversal return to the runway?
Perhaps the right handle was pulled when we saw the puff of smoke and the other pulled later.
 
Perhaps the right handle was pulled when we saw the puff of smoke and the other pulled later.
It wouldn't make much sense to pull the fire handle on your only operating engine. Even if it's on fire. As long as it is producing power, you need that power to land.
 
It wouldn't make much sense to pull the fire handle on your only operating engine. Even if it's on fire. As long as it is producing power, you need that power to land.
But if you've misidentified the lame engine ...
And that has happened more times that pilots would like to admit.
 
But if you've misidentified the lame engine ...
And that has happened more times that pilots would like to admit.
Then you didn't follow the procedures.

Pulling the fire switch is not a memory item because it is supposed to be done methodically with confirmation from both crew members.

The memory item has you confirm, and then reduce the thrust lever to idle. If you have misidentified the engine then this step should make that obvious and you can push that thrust lever forward again.

You then go the checklist and review the two memory items (autothrottles off and thrust lever, confirmed, idle) before moving on.

The next step is to confirm the start lever on the affected engine then move it to cutoff. This is a second confirmation that you are dealing with the correct engine.

I'm not sure how you get this far without realizing that you've shutoff your good engine.

Finally, you confirm then pull the fire switch. If the engine wasn't indicating a fire the fire switch won't pull. You have to push the override latch while pulling the fire switch. This is quite difficult to do with one hand so the PM is usually doing it with two hands.
 
Really? Sure is for us. Requires confirmation from the other pilot, but still a memory item. Was the same on the 777 when I flew it.
On the 777 right now. Not a memory item for us.

757 was the same.

Edit: just to expand, ENGINE FIRE isn’t even a memory item for us at all. We don’t do anything without reference to the checklist.
 
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Interesting. I'm with a foreign carrier and they have always been memory items here. Still are.
 
Interesting. I'm with a foreign carrier and they have always been memory items here. Still are.
In the old days they were. (I was young then, it was easy to learn longer memory item checklists) More recently, there was an effort to minimize the memory items to just what needs to be done promptly to reduce the mistakes that are likely to be made while trying to recall a long list of memory items in an emergency.
 
Dovetailing off this, is reducing memory items possibly applicable to single-engine piston aircraft for something such as an engine failure? Would the time consumed by using the checklist instead of doing memory items make a critical difference between a restart and an engine-out landing? Or is the need to memorize the steps to attempt a restart overstated?
 
Dovetailing off this, is reducing memory items possibly applicable to single-engine piston aircraft for something such as an engine failure? Would the time consumed by using the checklist instead of doing memory items make a critical difference between a restart and an engine-out landing? Or is the need to memorize the steps to attempt a restart overstated?
It's a very different environment. On a transport jet, you have a pilot-flying and a pilot-monitoring. The PM can read and do checklists without affecting the PF's ability to maintain aircraft control. The PF is kept in the loop by the PM reading aloud then doing each step of the checklist.
 
It's a very different environment. On a transport jet, you have a pilot-flying and a pilot-monitoring. The PM can read and do checklists without affecting the PF's ability to maintain aircraft control. The PF is kept in the loop by the PM reading aloud then doing each step of the checklist.
There is that. I’m just always wondering about and looking for better ways to do things, plus need to know the why behind everything.
 
A lot of assuming US air carrier practices to a foreign carrier with vastly different cultural and operational practices.

Just look at Asiana 214.
I made this same observation on another forum, using the example of Asiana 214 in a neutral and circumspect manner. Several immediate replies to my comments, made in an accusatory and heated manner, blasted out with the usual labels that make rational discourse impossible.

But the NTSB report on that mishap documented obvious cultural and operational issues, particularly deference to authority and seniority by junior crew members, that were critical components in the sequence of actions that caused the Asiana crash.

There have been inflammatory comments in some discussions regarding the Jeju event when these subjects are mentioned.

That's unfortunate, because I believe those cultural and procedural differences between Asian and Western aviation practices do exist. Repressing honest examination of all factors in this terrible mishap must be avoided, especially since it's clear finding the facts and determining the cause will be most difficult.
 
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