meat servos
meat servos
My tag line came from a quote about that incident.I am kind of wondering if this was similar to Transair flight 810, where the crew inadvertently shut down the good engine. Or possibly killed both engines on the go-around, leaving them dead stick or nearly that for the eventual landing.
Another possibility, just throwing it out there, that the cockpit also took a bird strike causing damage to the overhead panel which could have killed power to all kinds of stuff that wouldn't normally have been affected.
Trips the generator field relay, closes pylon firewall valves for the fuel, hydraulics, and pneumatics. Arms the fire extinguisher bottles to fire to that engine.Dan Gryder, POA's favorite, thinks the pilots pulled a fire handle. That apparently severs all fuel and electric connections to the engine, including the generator. I don't know how that extrapolates to both engines, unless both fire handles were pulled.
"Turn your key Sir"Trips the generator field relay, closes pylon firewall valves for the fuel, hydraulics, and pneumatics. Arms the fire extinguisher bottles to fire to that engine.
The fire handles are normally latched. The latch is removed if a fire is being detected for the associated engine/apu. The latch can be overridden with a release that is difficult to operate with a single hand. Pulling a fire handle is NOT a memory item on the engine fire, severe damage, separation checklist. It is a couple of steps into the checklist after the memory items. Confirmation from both pilots is required prior to pulling the handle.
Uh, Dan, if both fire handles were pulled at the instant of ADS-B, CVR, and DFDR failure, how did the aircraft manage four more minutes of flight and a teardrop reversal return to the runway?Trips the generator field relay, closes pylon firewall valves for the fuel, hydraulics, and pneumatics. Arms the fire extinguisher bottles to fire to that engine.
The fire handles are normally latched. The latch is removed if a fire is being detected for the associated engine/apu. The latch can be overridden with a release that is difficult to operate with a single hand. Pulling a fire handle is NOT a memory item on the engine fire, severe damage, separation checklist. It is a couple of steps into the checklist after the memory items. Confirmation from both pilots is required prior to pulling the handle.
Uh, Dan, if both fire handles were pulled at the instance of ADS-B, CVR, and DFDR failure, how did the aircraft manage four more minutes of flight and a teardrop reversal return to the runway?
Really? Sure is for us. Requires confirmation from the other pilot, but still a memory item. Was the same on the 777 when I flew it.Pulling a fire handle is NOT a memory item on the engine fire, severe damage, separation checklist.
Was this based on anything he stole from the crash site?Dan Gryder, POA's favorite, thinks the pilots pulled a fire handle. That apparently severs all fuel and electric connections to the engine, including the generator. I don't know how that extrapolates to both engines, unless both fire handles were pulled.
On the Boeing FM, just the autothrottle and thrust lever are memory items. Pulling the engine fire switch is step 4.Really? Sure is for us. Requires confirmation from the other pilot, but still a memory item. Was the same on the 777 when I flew it.
Perhaps the right handle was pulled when we saw the puff of smoke and the other pulled later.Uh, Dan, if both fire handles were pulled at the instant of ADS-B, CVR, and DFDR failure, how did the aircraft manage four more minutes of flight and a teardrop reversal return to the runway?
It wouldn't make much sense to pull the fire handle on your only operating engine. Even if it's on fire. As long as it is producing power, you need that power to land.Perhaps the right handle was pulled when we saw the puff of smoke and the other pulled later.
But if you've misidentified the lame engine ...It wouldn't make much sense to pull the fire handle on your only operating engine. Even if it's on fire. As long as it is producing power, you need that power to land.
Then you didn't follow the procedures.But if you've misidentified the lame engine ...
And that has happened more times that pilots would like to admit.
On the 777 right now. Not a memory item for us.Really? Sure is for us. Requires confirmation from the other pilot, but still a memory item. Was the same on the 777 when I flew it.
In the old days they were. (I was young then, it was easy to learn longer memory item checklists) More recently, there was an effort to minimize the memory items to just what needs to be done promptly to reduce the mistakes that are likely to be made while trying to recall a long list of memory items in an emergency.Interesting. I'm with a foreign carrier and they have always been memory items here. Still are.
It's a very different environment. On a transport jet, you have a pilot-flying and a pilot-monitoring. The PM can read and do checklists without affecting the PF's ability to maintain aircraft control. The PF is kept in the loop by the PM reading aloud then doing each step of the checklist.Dovetailing off this, is reducing memory items possibly applicable to single-engine piston aircraft for something such as an engine failure? Would the time consumed by using the checklist instead of doing memory items make a critical difference between a restart and an engine-out landing? Or is the need to memorize the steps to attempt a restart overstated?
There is that. I’m just always wondering about and looking for better ways to do things, plus need to know the why behind everything.It's a very different environment. On a transport jet, you have a pilot-flying and a pilot-monitoring. The PM can read and do checklists without affecting the PF's ability to maintain aircraft control. The PF is kept in the loop by the PM reading aloud then doing each step of the checklist.
I made this same observation on another forum, using the example of Asiana 214 in a neutral and circumspect manner. Several immediate replies to my comments, made in an accusatory and heated manner, blasted out with the usual labels that make rational discourse impossible.A lot of assuming US air carrier practices to a foreign carrier with vastly different cultural and operational practices.
Just look at Asiana 214.