B17 crash at Dallas.

So lead put his wingman in a vulnerable position or 3 decided to not fly formation on lead? Goatrope.Why is NTSB calling that a formation yet saying the p-63 didn't see the B-17? If it was a formation 3, the P-63, should have been looking at lead and maintaining his formation position. Total goatrope but how does lead take his gaggle on that flightpath. NTSB doesn't know what a "formation" is. #5 should be Lead.
You seem to have missed some stuff in the thread (or maybe - a LOT). Most of your questions there are answered previously, and most of it all makes sense if you understand how things have worked for literally decades.
 
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You seem to have missed some stuff in the thread (or maybe - a LOT). Most of your questions there are answered previously, and most of it all makes sense if you understand how things have worked for literally decades.
I was an IP on the wing of a T-38 2 ship with a solo lead when an TA-4 blew right by what would have been 3's position. Solo lead and the A-4 didn't see each other and we lived to see our girlfriends that night. Why is the analysis about what the P-63 could see. He should have been looking at lead and been in trail. Where did lead think his wingman were behind him in trail? It was trail, not extended trail. When you are formation lead in whatever alignment you are responsible for where your wingman are. So lead took his threeship into a potential conflict or 3 thought lead was effing up going to the 1000' line and did his own thing. Goatrope.
 
That alludes to what I previously mentioned, the willingness of ALL the pilots involved (fighter element lead) to play this game. It’s really the only poignant point not addressed.

We are the same ilk, I instructed in TA-4s, Meridian. These pilots very well might have not really understood how dangerous what they were doing was. You won’t find many like us in that arena. Whenever I heard a wonky pattern call in the weps pattern, I went into bobble head mode and was spring loaded to make a knock it off call. Having lived and worked in that environment is the ONLY reason I conclude this. My other 11,000 hours didn’t give me that insight. I don’t fault them for not knowing what they didn’t know.

I knew several involved in the mishap, and know the culture (at that very time) well. It was a ticking time bomb. In my opinion…
 
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I was an IP on the wing of a T-38 2 ship with a solo lead when an TA-4 blew right by what would have been 3's position. Solo lead and the A-4 didn't see each other and we lived to see our girlfriends that night. Why is the analysis about what the P-63 could see. He should have been looking at lead and been in trail. Where did lead think his wingman were behind him in trail? It was trail, not extended trail. When you are formation lead in whatever alignment you are responsible for where your wingman are. So lead took his threeship into a potential conflict or 3 thought lead was effing up going to the 1000' line and did his own thing. Goatrope.
It's all in context of what the Airboss was asking them to do. Guaranteed, he was setting them up for in-trail passes for photos and that wasn't rocket science for the pilots to know why you fly past the crowd like that - for photos.

The airboss was the one who called for them to break from formation to trail, and gave them the instruction to be on the 500' line - which is in the transcripts - and the lead seems to have acknowledged some confusion about what the airboss wanted and the ADS-B tracks clearly show the two P-51s on the 1000' line, which is what I saw as a photographer - and they were too far away from the crowd for great photos. In fact, I decided to switch cameras right then, and actually missed (kinda glad) filming the collision because I decided it wasn't a good photo opportunity and took the moment to pick up my son who had been begging for me to get him higher so he could see better. I literally switched my video camera on as the B-17 started to tumble.

There is a non-unfathomable possibility that the #3 guy in the P-63 correctly understood what the airboss requested, and perhaps - just perhaps, #3 actually thought that by going to the 500' line when the bombers were supposed to be going to the 1000' line, he was avoiding a potential conflict. He was the end of the rope however, as switching to trail involves the changes in spacing, and I assume he was looking at lead and #2 trying to get that spacing correct for at least half of that turn. That's why I mentioned lead in posts 547 and 591...

I know my home airport pretty well and that B-17 would've blended in amazingly well with the trees in that neighborhood as a backdrop and unless he looked exactly at that spot out his window, there wouldn't have been any relative motion to alert him to the threat.

This was how the B-24 looked in front of those trees a few weeks before.
 

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You seem to have missed some stuff in the thread (or maybe - a LOT). Most of your questions there are answered previously, and most of it all makes sense if you understand how things have worked for literally decades.

Y i k e s
 
Fair enough. Still @JimLAFB seems to have a good spidey sense about this. This whole thing just doesn’t fit in his world. Just like his world wasn’t applied to that airshow, and it should have been, leastwise much more so.
 
There is a non-unfathomable possibility that the #3 guy in the P-63 correctly understood what the airboss requested, and perhaps - just perhaps, #3 actually thought that by going to the 500' line when the bombers were supposed to be going to the 1000' line, he was avoiding a potential conflict. He was the end of the rope however, as switching to trail involves the changes in spacing, and I assume he was looking at lead and #2 trying to get that spacing correct for at least half of that turn. That's why I mentioned lead in posts 547 and 591...

That is one theory that I can buy, that #3 was going to the 500 foot line because that is where he thought they should be, despite lead going to the 1,000 foot line.

The other theory is that he fell behind the formation, realized it and was trying to catch up. He was quite a distance behind #2. If you increase speed without increasing bank, your turn radius grows, which could have led to the overshoot of the 1,000 foot line.

Either way the result is the same, and we will never know why #3 swung wider than the rest of his formation. Unfortunately by falling behind the formation and entering the 500 foot line, whether planned or not, it put him directly into the B-17. The holes in the swiss cheese aligned this time.

I will add, I was surprised to know that an airshow "gaggle" like this isn't pre-scripted. Having an airboss make show adjustments on the fly over the radio would never even cross my mind. The opportunity for failure is massive.
 
The other theory is that he fell behind the formation, realized it and was trying to catch up. He was quite a distance behind #2. If you increase speed without increasing bank, your turn radius grows, which could have led to the overshoot of the 1,000 foot line.

Either way the result is the same, and we will never know why #3 swung wider than the rest of his formation. Unfortunately by falling behind the formation and entering the 500 foot line, whether planned or not, it put him directly into the B-17. The holes in the swiss cheese aligned this time.
Yeah, it's definitely possible that something caused him to lag and then try to catch up, but I think that the evidence is that he flew the Tora show on that 500' line in the "Hawk" replica T-6 for the Tora show, and at the end of that, flew a brief solo acro routine in the "Hawk" as well, so of the three fighters, he was the one that was already the most familiar with the show lines that day, so I think the other theory is vastly more likely.
 

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Yeah, it's definitely possible that something caused him to lag and then try to catch up, but I think that the evidence is that he flew the Tora show on that 500' line in the "Hawk" replica T-6 for the Tora show, and at the end of that, flew a brief solo acro routine in the "Hawk" as well, so of the three fighters, he was the one that was already the most familiar with the show lines that day, so I think the other theory is vastly more likely.

While I'm not entirely disagreeing with you, I know there have been multiple other accidents where I too thought there is no way so-and-so could have done that. They were so experienced, etc. Yet all it takes is a small lapse in either judgement or situational awareness and poof they are gone in the blink of an eye. Those are usually the accidents that get my attention, if someone so experienced could make such a mistake, why couldn't I? Granted I'm not likely to be flying a warbird in an airshow anytime soon.

One other factor, the pilot was 63 years old and was flying his third routine of the day, could fatigue have played some small part?
 
Airboss should be sued into oblivion and the others who put him there into that position. Looking at you CAF.

So his qualification was being the son of the retiring airboss. Apparently the power went to his head being the Supreme Authority to override a safety culture that was already lacking. Revenue flights during the show? Really.

CAF should just lock the doors at this point.
 
Airboss should be sued into oblivion and the others who put him there into that position. Looking at you CAF.

So his qualification was being the son of the retiring airboss. Apparently the power went to his head being the Supreme Authority to override a safety culture that was already lacking. Revenue flights during the show? Really.

CAF should just lock the doors at this point.
Yep. Burn it down. That fixes things.

<do we have an emoji for sarcasm?>
 
Yep. Burn it down. That fixes things.

<do we have an emoji for sarcasm?>
Well, what's your solution?

I don't want to see it gone, but in all seriousness, I have zero confidence that the CAF is capable of fixing their problem themselves.

The CAF has a culture problem pure and simple and it has for several decades now.

Many have tried and failed to correct it. I used to be a CAF member, but Dallas was the final straw for me.

There are most definitely good people who mean well and are trying to do good in the organization, but there are still too many that just don't or refuse to get it and as long as they 'pay-to-play', they won't ever change.

To be clear, I'm not advocating for burning the CAF to the ground, I'm saying the organization is burning itself down internally and many of its own members can't smell the smoke.
 
Well, what's your solution?

I don't want to see it gone, but in all seriousness, I have zero confidence that the CAF is capable of fixing their problem themselves.
I'm not suggesting a solution, only noting that destroying the organization won't fix anything. IMO, this was a series of mistakes with terrible consequences and with several responsible parties. The holes in the swiss cheese lined up. There are ways to fill in some, maybe all of those holes without tearing things to the ground. Altitude deconfliction seems like the first one, and I'm sure there are quite a few others.

From a distance, my sense is the CAF's safety culture, maintenance, and pilot qualification processes have improved markedly. I think that has shown up in the accident statistics. This accident is (IMO) an outlier and I'm sure all warbird shows going forward will have much more rigorous separation practices than were used on that weekend.
 
One of my closest friends is a vintage warbird collector and operator. His favorite saying: "just remember, warbirds are always trying to kill you."
 
One of my closest friends is a vintage warbird collector and operator. His favorite saying: "just remember, warbirds are always trying to kill you."
All of our aircraft are. Some (especially warbirds) are just more direct about it. I know this guy with a Decathalon... (I also know a guy with an RV-6 and RV-10, and a Tomahawk once upon a time who hasn't shared all of his stories...).
 
I'm not suggesting a solution, only noting that destroying the organization won't fix anything. IMO, this was a series of mistakes with terrible consequences and with several responsible parties. The holes in the swiss cheese lined up. There are ways to fill in some, maybe all of those holes without tearing things to the ground. Altitude deconfliction seems like the first one, and I'm sure there are quite a few others.

From a distance, my sense is the CAF's safety culture, maintenance, and pilot qualification processes have improved markedly. I think that has shown up in the accident statistics. This accident is (IMO) an outlier and I'm sure all warbird shows going forward will have much more rigorous separation practices than were used on that weekend.
571 pages of interviews in docket will have you shaking your head. Noteworthy are short on scene interviews with all. Also noteworthy is later extensive interviews with excruciating extent with almost all. One telling missing later interview is with fighter lead. I guess he didn't want to talk about it.
 
The holes in the swiss cheese lined up. There are ways to fill in some, maybe all of those holes without tearing things to the ground. Altitude deconfliction seems like the first one, and I'm sure there are quite a few others.
This all seems correct, from a non-interested observer's point of view, but the goal of the airboss was to bring them all down to the same altitude for the photo passes. That was a known element, one that would have been expected, and altitude deconfliction would very deliberately NOT be a thing. Space between the groups WOULD have been a thing. That was not a point that the pilots would have even had a reason to question based on previous years. This isn't as "cowboy" as some people make it out to be, it's a general pattern that all of them expected - and photographers like myself could basically predict with small variations for wind direction and other minor factors. The thing is that the turn and timing was so badly off, as to be completely out of character for the expectations of the pilots and it begs the question as to whether or not the ride Stearman caught him off guard, or if some other factor that we don't know about played a role.
571 pages of interviews in docket will have you shaking your head. Noteworthy are short on scene interviews with all. Also noteworthy is later extensive interviews with excruciating extent with almost all. One telling missing later interview is with fighter lead. I guess he didn't want to talk about it.
Yes, and the fighter lead's radio transmission acknowledged a visual on the Fortress, which begs the question why the NTSB report didn't dig any further into that aspect when combined with the other statments.
 
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