B17 crash at Dallas.

[RyanShort1]

Oh, this is fun!

Yours is an emotional argument that, while I agree with the sentiment, has little basis in reality because public perception of the risk to themselves, when compared to the perception of reward, whether real or imaginary, is everything. Anything else is simply your opinion.

So, to summarize what you just said:
1. I'm emotional, but living in fantasy (even though I've tried to back up everything I've said on this thread with actual references and base it on the knowledge I have of the situation) despite the fact that I'm saying that government needs to be morally objective.
2. The public is emotional, and because there are more of them, their emotions are primary, whether or not the facts agree with them.

How is that not a double standard, and completely upside down? Beyond that, I think I'm being objective to say that I'm more passionate about the outcome being just and appropriate than I am emotional. I would characterize the outside-looking-in comments that I've argued against about the briefing, the plan, the airboss, the perception of safety as being more emotional, since they are based on feelings, perceptions, and sometimes outright lies rather than actual knowledge.

The reality is standards and laws are written, often in blood, and the public, in a convoluted way, decide whether our hobbies and activities continue by supporting (or not), funding (or not), or voting for (or against) the activities (or indirectly by the people who make the rules). If they perceive it is a high enough risk to the public, for little reward to the public, then the activity may simply cease to be, at least in its current form.

Sure, but that is often unjust, and those of us who care about aviation should be excessively cautious to not engage in that line of thinking, and to not feed it. The dead guys will not pay for this if an erroneous response unjustly restricts things based on emotion rather than accurate investigation, rather those who are not the guilty are more likely to pay for it.

I'm all for justice, that is appropriate. If someone did something wrong, then it needs to be dealt with appropriately, with consideration for whether or not it was done with malice, or if it was legitimately a mistake, and the one(s) who did it need to take personal responsibility and ownership as I've advocated in this thread before.

You can’t handwave politics, no matter how much you want to. If you want to move the needle on public perception, you have to educate, you have to provide data, not just call “double-standard,” and incriminate the risk/reward perceptions of others by making an apples and orange comparison.

Ok, nice handwave reference... and looking at the definition, I'm amused that you used it. If you look at this thread, I've tried numerous times to educate, back up what I say with links. I believe I have the right to call double standards what they are when I see them, and you've certainly engaged in them.

GA needs to not validate arguments that can be used against us by giving them legitimacy that they don't deserve. Forums, and threads like this certainly can inform public opinion, and it's not great that we eat our own. I'm not advocating circling the wagons - again, there are possibly rule changes and personal consequences that I would absolutely accept as just.

 

[Flying Keys]

Fun, indeed. I have held no such double standard, and I reject your accusation. You are confusing my personal beliefs with my knowledge of how the world does operate.

I’m simply stating the way things work, for better or worse: You’re not using any data or evidence to support your claims. It’s emotion-based theory that traffic standards are held to a different standard than those for airshows. Not even an argument, really, because you’re failing to provide evidence of the differences and the outcomes based on a quantifiable metric. You’re just claiming there’s a double standard, which is so nebulous that it barely warrants a response other than “make a better argument.” Yes, there are different standards for highway safety and air safety. Is that what you mean? Or are you saying the two should be treated and/or applied equally? If so, show your work.

Perception is reality in the public domain, under which we operate. If we manage perception well, we’ll get to enjoy our hobbies that involve some level of risk to others. Part of that management is risk mitigation. Another part is accountability, versus the emotionally-connotated term “witch hunt.”

We have to manage our risk using data, standards, and regs. When we fail, then there’s accountability. That’s our job on the professional side. Yep, the public is emotional and can be dumb and wrong. That’s the unfortunate reality, whether we like it or not - we can’t do anything about that except educate, and because we’re niche, we don’t get a lot of opportunity for that, so accidents become that much worse.

So if that’s the double standard of which you speak, so be it, but we are held to it whether we like it or not, so we have to continue to do whatever we can to ensure it doesn’t have a bad outcome beyond the accident. That may not fit your or anybody’s description of just, but your or my opinion of just doesn’t matter 99% of the time. And when it does, when it’s our turn to do the carpet dance, it’s on us to prove we did everything we could. If it’s the court of public opinion, then it’s managing risk/reward perception. If it’s in a court of law, then it becomes an expensive and time-consuming endeavor, with the potential for a lot more personal consequence.

edited for a typo or two

 

[Flying Keys]

If I may summarize my thoughts:

This accident should have folks who participate in these events, and all supporters of aviation in general saying "this was a preventable accident, we will hold accountable any parties who have been found to have not followed the guidelines/regs, and take steps to ensure future activities will be safer." That's it.

Our response should not be "this was just a freak accident," or "highways are just as unsafe," or "you all hate airshows," because those arguments will not hold water or gain purchase where it matters.

 

[RyanShort1]

Fun, indeed. I have held no such double standard, and I reject your accusation. You are confusing my personal beliefs with my knowledge of how the world does operate.

I’m simply stating the way things work, for better or worse: You’re not using any data or evidence to support your claims. It’s emotion-based theory that traffic standards are held to a different standard than those for airshows. Not even an argument, really, because you’re failing to provide evidence of the differences and the outcomes based on a quantifiable metric.

Wait, what? I wasn't saying anything of the like. Data? I mean, we have, what, ONE data point that it is possible for a mistake to be made at an airshow that causes a mid-air on a dogbone pattern? I don't need data to say that humans can make mistakes. OTOH, it would be worthy to provide data to say that there is an obvious cultural issue... and that this briefing was worse than other briefings. or causal to the crash.
I get that you are talking risk management, but I still don't get why you are trying to turn this thing into statistics. I don't think we need ANY statistics to say that it would be reasonable for the FAA requirements for an airshow to include a formalized / on paper altitude and vertical separation plan, no matter how safe or unsafe it's been done in the past.

You’re just claiming there’s a double standard, which is so nebulous that it barely warrants a response other than “make a better argument.” Yes, there are different standards for highway safety and air safety. Is that what you mean? Or are you saying the two should be treated and/or applied equally? If so, show your work.

You really couldn't tell what I meant?

Perception is reality in the public domain, under which we operate. If we manage perception well, we’ll get to enjoy our hobbies that involve some level of risk to others.

I get that you're saying that's "how things are" but that's also objectively a bad thing when perception is flat out wrong, in particular. Your safe engagement in the aviation hobby shouldn't be curtailed because some Karen gets enough people to sign a petition.

Part of that management is risk mitigation. Another part is accountability, versus the emotionally-connotated term “witch hunt.”

Huh? I'm the one arguing for personal accountability, but also believe that it's easy to see that some of the posters here and on YouTube actually ARE happily on a CAF "witch hunt."

We have to manage our risk using data, standards, and regs. When we fail, then there’s accountability. That’s our job on the professional side. Yep, the public is emotional and can be dumb and wrong. That’s the unfortunate reality, whether we like it or not - we can’t do anything about that except educate, and because we’re niche, we don’t get a lot of opportunity for that, so accidents become that much worse.

Ah, but you've got that backwards. Yes, we need risk mitigation, but data, standards, and regs are all useless without personal responsibility and accountability. No sign in the world keeps bad guys from walking into a place with a sign and killing people, and we all know someone that's done some pencil whipping. You can look 100% on regs, data, etc... and still fail to hold yourself to a high standard and fudge this or that. Same for pilots, same for maintenance.

So if that’s the double standard of which you speak, so be it, but we are held to it whether we like it or not, so we have to continue to do whatever we can to ensure it doesn’t have a bad outcome beyond the accident.

No, that wasn't the double standard I mentioned. Try reading it again.

That may not fit your or anybody’s description of just, but your or my opinion of just doesn’t matter 99% of the time. And when it does, when it’s our turn to do the carpet dance, it’s on us to prove we did everything we could. If it’s the corrupt of public opinion, then it’s managing risk/reward perception. If it’s in a court of law, then it becomes an expensive and time-consuming endeavor, with the potential for a lot more personal consequence.

Justice, by it's definition, is objective, and ought to be primarily directed towards the specific failures and parties.

If I may summarize my thoughts:

This accident should have folks who participate in these events, and all supporters of aviation in general saying "this was a preventable accident, we will hold accountable any parties who have been found to have not followed the guidelines/regs, and take steps to ensure future activities will be safer." That's it.

I mean, I've said almost exactly that...

Our response should not be "this was just a freak accident," or "highways are just as unsafe," or "you all hate airshows," because those arguments will not hold water or gain purchase where it matters.

Well, I did engage in some hyperbole there, that should be taken in the context of everything else I've said, not cherry-picked. That said, it IS a pretty freak accident, with the perfect combination of failures that possibly could have been prevented at the briefing, at the airboss' stand, maybe by the FAA, in two cockpits, perhaps if the B-17 hadn't been wearing camouflage paint? Prove me with data that it wasn't.

 

[Flying Keys]

I still don't get why you are trying to turn this thing into statistics

Data-driven statistics are from where meaningful improvement can be driven. If we're going down the road of using them to compare risk, I didn't bring up highways, you did, thus I don't have to provide the data to support my argument.

You really couldn't tell what I meant?

No, your point is not well-taken because it's non-sensical.

that's also objectively a bad thing

It may be a bad thing, but it's a thing. It doesn't matter how we view it - insurers, patrons, and administrators (via the voting public) are fickle. We have to come at it from an angle that improves our position.

some of the posters here and on YouTube actually ARE happily on a CAF "witch hunt."

Whether or not CAF needs to be held accountable (and to what proportion) remains to be seen. I haven't weighed in on that other than to advocate for that accountability if they are so held responsible. I have no personal dog in the CAF issue at all - I haven't heard any of this history until this accident. On another note, think of YouTubers as a cross-section of the public opinion (not fully representative). Their opinion may or may not have any validity and may be steered by nonsense, but in the end, if enough people hold the same opinion, it's a problem for us, and social media spreads nonsense like wildfire. Not sure what you can do about that except go back to "mea culpa, we'll make it better next time" (once the findings are set and the dust settles).

Ah, but you've got that backwards. Yes, we need risk mitigation, but data, standards, and regs are all useless without personal responsibility and accountability. No sign in the world keeps bad guys from walking into a place with a sign and killing people, and we all know someone that's done some pencil whipping. You can look 100% on regs, data, etc... and still fail to hold yourself to a high standard and fudge this or that. Same for pilots, same for maintenance.

This is not backwards in the slightest, it's part of a continuous loop of planning, doing, surveying, and acting, which is part-and-parcel of any technical schema that involves high-risk, life and death decisions. This isn't basic, common-sense human interaction we're talking about here, this is complex, technical, professional work. It's literally the basis of quality improvement.

No, that wasn't the double standard I mentioned. Try reading it again.

As I said, your example of the double standard was not a good one. It was too nebulous from which to derive meaningful conclusions.

 

[RyanShort1]

I'm going to quit arguing with you because I don't want to get into personal attacks. I'll just say I think your line of thinking and mine are on quite different tracks and you definitely fail to understand what I'm trying to say...

 

[Flying Keys]

Prove me with data that it wasn't.

Oh you added this with an edit.

I’m not party to the evidence and findings and I don’t have data to support the proposition to the positive or negative. You posited it, you prove it.

 

[Flying Keys]

This started with me taking umbrage with you conflating risks (vis-a-vis car accidents and airshow accidents), calling it a double-standard, and not backing it up with meaningful comparisons of the risk that show a double standard exists. At that point you're just saying things. That kind of reasoning hurts our collective argument as pilots and airshow enthusiasts.

I asked you to prove the double-standard. You did not. You can blame me for that all you want, but it doesn't make any less wrong.

Then you started with the hyperbole.

Look, I'm sorry this has affected you so personally. I cannot imagine what you and others are going through, especially being a witness and being so close to the people in the accident and the org. I don't think you should be shouldering the mantle of defending this right now, not in this way.

 

[Lindberg]

The broader consequence is that we can take any particular activity that we don't like, and try to shut it down.

What I don't like is people dying and airplanes being destroyed, especially while putting the public at risk. If you equate that with having airshows, then I'll go back to my previous comment: you're making the case for shutting down airshows. Some of the rest of us, however, can see a distinction.

 

[RyanShort1]

This started with me taking umbrage with you conflating risks (vis-a-vis car accidents and airshow accidents), calling it a double-standard, and not backing it up with meaningful comparisons of the risk that show a double standard exists. At that point you're just saying things. That kind of reasoning hurts our collective argument as pilots and airshow enthusiasts.

I asked you to prove the double-standard. You did not. You can blame me for that all you want, but it doesn't make any less wrong.

I think that this is where we went off the rails. I think you were asking me to prove something I wasn't even trying to argue for.

I wasn't conflating risk levels, at all. I was saying that the underlying reason *why* it's OK to regulate something is the double standard - posts 501, 502, and 503 - which are basically the same fundament argument our society was dealing with over the last two years. Do we have the right to shut down X because Y might happen? In this case, the risks of a crash because of a miscommunication or bad vector certainly seem higher than they did previously, so certainly risk mitigation for such an occurrence is appropriate, but it's also arbitrary, and in some cases similar decisions have been proven to be quite political. Yes, airshows may only be of entertainment value, but then how many other things do we allow that someone might have safety issues with? And is not entertainment a valid human activity with non-tangible benefits to society?

I don't think you should be shouldering the mantle of defending this right now, not in this way.

See, about that... where did I defend the accident, or what did you mean by "this" if not? I was previously only trying to defend what I believe to be true about particular claims related to the accident, explained in the next paragraph - nothing more. Like, let's be objective about which things we latch onto as potential problems needing solutions.

Go back and read through my previous posts. Most of them have been intentionally trying to point out the falsehoods in other statements being posted here and places like YouTube. Like, for instance, that this was the airboss' first show. If it's the airboss' first show, or he was a rookie, that takes the problem one direction. If he's not, it goes in a different direction... or that the briefing is the obvious smoking gun, or that the pilots were cowboys, and so on.

You're probably correct about your last sentence, but then there IS the problem that the lies out there, if left sitting, get turned into legend, and the perception goes unchecked for a few years until the NTSB report comes out and it's too late. There's already quite a lot of negativity going on in aviation circles, in particular, and far too little reasoned pushback, in my opinion. I have probably more confidence in the NTSB's report than Dan Gryder's version, or Blancolirio's, but there is also the likelihood that they will have some political issues of their own to tap dance around related to the FAA and people with money, and so there is plenty of possibility that there will never be a transparent, just conclusion, and that concerns me.

What I don't like is people dying and airplanes being destroyed, especially while putting the public at risk. If you equate that with having airshows, then I'll go back to my previous comment: you're making the case for shutting down airshows. Some of the rest of us, however, can see a distinction.

Well, I certainly don't like dead people or destroyed airplanes, either, and I think that it ought to be clear that people in the airshow business don't want to die or kill others. I'm not at all trying to help those shut down airshows.
The thing I was trying to say about the double standard is that there are far more safety measures in place for keeping airshow planes away from the public than there are in general GA situations. There are crowd line restrictions, restrictions on other aircraft coming into the space, required emergency services on immediate standby, etc... The GA risk is probably higher if we're honest, but if someone in the public had died, this would have more weight. We DO accept risks in GA and truthfully, we do on the highway as well, and there are good reasons to say that we should accept SOME risks. We need to make sure and present the positives in the balance for all of these things.

 

[Flying Keys]

Where we get away from the cold objectivity of risk management and all the actuarial activity is where it meets the pavement of reward. Some risks are worth the reward, and that often depends on your biases, or whatever perspectives come to light. For instance, many trauma surgeries are very risky but necessary. Often less risky than not doing the surgery, right?

It’s through that lens where we have to deal with selling the risk to the people that can put an end to it, directly or indirectly.

Personally, I’m good with airshows that involve some elements of risk (especially if well-mitigated), I think they’re valuable in several ways. But to some the risk isn’t worth it. That’s who we have to stave off and we will need excellent arguments to do so because in the end, how we feel about it won’t matter.

 

[Flying Keys]

which are basically the same fundament argument our society was dealing with over the last two years. Do we have the right to shut down X because Y might happen. It's arbitrary, and in some cases has been proven to be quite political.

This is a pretty good example of the problem, but I think it proves that the solution isn’t straight-forward. Risk/reward can exist on a continuum and can change depending on the situation. You can have an activity that begins as high risk, which changes after a while (as the receptors build defense, or after new evidence comes to light). That was probably about the best example of risk dynamics in recent history. Not the best outcome, just the best example of the dynamics involved.

 

[RyanShort1]

Personally, I’m good with airshows that involve some elements of risk (especially if well-mitigated), I think they’re valuable in several ways. But to some the risk isn’t worth it. That’s who we have to stave off and we will need excellent arguments to do so because in the end, how we feel about it won’t matter.

I think we agree.

To the double standard thing, I think we need to help people see that there ARE serious efforts made to keep airshows safe, they are based on the morality of valuing human life, while balancing the art and entertainment that flight can provide, and that those rules are intended to protect the public, and will be updated as necessary. Honestly, a rule or two that would mitigate this collision would likely be very, very simple. As simple as "no merging of separate formations," or something requiring altitude separation until a fixed minimum distance for separation purposes is achieved.

At the same time, when there are negative suggestions, we should ask others about the risks in their favorite forms of entertainment as well, and point out that we don't want to shut them down, and ask for the same respect that we hopefully give them.

 

[Spring Ford]

This seems pertinent to the recent discussion because none of the dead and injured were inside the airfield.

Eleven people died and sixteen were injured when struck by an ex-military jet performing in an airshow in the UK in 2015.

Many were on or beside nearby roads spectating unofficially and some were just driving past, possibly unaware of the nearby airshow. Tickets were required to be inside.

Airshow crashes can have wide ranging effects among direct participants, indirect participants and innocent bystanders.

Caused a lot of reviewing of airshow flying. Can't help with outcomes.

As an aside the badly injured pilot survived and was tried for manslaughter by gross negligence. He was found not guilty.

As I recall pilot flew a loop and struck the ground after completing most of it.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2015_Shoreham_Airshow_crash

AAIB report - 452 pages ! ! !
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/58b9247740f0b67ec80000fc/AAR_1-2017_G-BXFI.pdf

 

[RyanShort1]

This seems pertinent to the recent discussion because none of the dead and injured were inside the airfield.

Eleven people died and sixteen were injured when struck by an ex-military jet performing in an airshow in the UK in 2015.

Many were on or beside nearby roads spectating unofficially and some were just driving past, possibly unaware of the nearby airshow. Tickets were required to be inside.

Yes, that certainly affected perception, especially over in the UK. It's ironic that I think that's why the CAF was only doing the level flight passes by the crowd for the most part - the only loops were done by the Stearman at the Saturday show and even that act was fairly tame and kept on the show center. Tora is also mostly straight passes down the runway with duster turns away from the crowd for the most part.

If anyone is still of the opinion that the CAF is blatantly unsafe culturally, consider that the majority of the flying at Wings Over Dallas is actually pretty tame / boring if you look at some other shows and ask why that is? When I was helping out three years ago with Redbird Squadron it was clear that HQ made deliberate choices not to include what they considered more risky acts, or even jets, at all. That's not an indictment on other airshows, it's actually just saying that they were trying to stack the deck in their favor.

 

[RyanShort1]

Here's an interesting link from the Warbird Information Exchange.

http://hadfield.ca/how-airshows-are-run/

 

[Daleandee]

DG is out with an updated video if anyone cares to hunt it down ...

 

[Fearless Tower]

DG is out with an updated video if anyone cares to hunt it down ...

No thanks

 

[Pinecone]

I agree with the rest of your post. But I don't think I can agree with the quoted portion. I don't see this as a freak accident. I see this as a major failure in the chain. I don't know specifically where the failure occurred, but at least one person made a big mistake, if not many. I do not believe it is ever a good idea to put planes that close to each other when they do not have visual contact and that most certainly happened here.

Maybe the plan allowed for that and many people should have said something. Maybe the pilot put himself in that position due to error. Maybe multiple pilots put themselves in that position. I don't know.

This is the same position I held in my thread a month or so back when an event I flew in resulted in planes getting very close to each other without visual contact. I believe everyone involved in that situation was to blame. We should have had a better plan that did not allow for that.

My opinion.

Agreed.

This was a typical chain of smaller things that lead up to the actual mishap. Changing any one of those things along the path would have changed the outcome.

There are very few "freak accidents" or so-called "Acts of God." Safety statistics show them to be about 1 in 100 mishaps. This was NOT one of them

 

[RyanShort1]

Agreed.

This was a typical chain of smaller things that lead up to the actual mishap. Changing any one of those things along the path would have changed the outcome.

There are very few "freak accidents" or so-called "Acts of God." Safety statistics show them to be about 1 in 100 mishaps. This was NOT one of them

Au contraire... it perfectly fits the definition of "freak" from my perspective and looking at the dictionary.

A certain P-51 crashed in Fredericksburg some years back. That was not a freak accident, there were red flags that warbird people could already see enough to say something. I had had a conversation with someone about why they didn't invite that pilot / plane combination to an event and they told me that pilot was an accident waiting to happen. These kinds of reasonably predictable crashes occur almost every week and are the easy low-hanging fruit that makes it so sad when you see a friend, a mom, a dad, kids died in some stall spin accident.

OTOH, this was a relatively experienced group of people, familiar with CRM, thousands of hours of safe airline flying, as much warbird flying as anyone, including a Tora pilot where melee deconfliction is a safely practiced norm (Has Tora every even had a significant incident? I can't recall a single Tora failure being discussed in maybe three decades) some actually on safety committees with ICAS trying to make airshows safer, willing to deal with problems (I know of a specific example) with cowboys, with so many points - probably the briefing, definitely both cockpits, the FAA on the radio, the airboss, any of whom catch this, it doesn't happen, and if the timing on the stand was even 1 second off, it's a safety concern but not a mid-air.

That so many opportunities were present for a possible chain break, that did not happen, with people that their peers respect and did not view as cowboys, that's where I see it being unusual, or freakish. Nobody thinks it's freakish when a hormonal teenager wrecks a car, but when the most competent Nascar guy who isn't even drunk does, you just scratch your head. Yes, this too was preventable, but it was of a nature that a bunch of good, generally competent people couldn't see it coming.

Define: freak

noun
noun: freak; plural noun: freaks; noun: freak of nature; plural noun: freaks of nature

1. 1.
   a very unusual and unexpected event or situation.
   "the teacher says the accident was a total freak"

 

[Daleandee]

No thanks

I agree. I skimmed it but it's more of the same opinion without fact and why I didn't care to post a link.

 

[wanttaja]

There are very few "freak accidents" or so-called "Acts of God." Safety statistics show them to be about 1 in 100 mishaps.

My homebuilt accident database split accident causes into about 55 categories. One of the categories is "other" for those cases that don't fall into; that's where "Act of God" would fall into. There's about one per year, out of a typical ~170 accidents, but few (if any) truly qualify as Acts of Gods. Most are *still* related to the pilot's actions, just in a way that is unusual.

Here are some exceptions that might fall into the Act of God category:

LAX07CA266: Fire resulting from vegetation contacting hot brakes following an aborted takeoff.
CEN15LA241: The loss of engine power during the descent due to the engine’s ingestion of water and ice (the NTSB report still blamed the pilot for flying in those conditions)
CEN18LA027: Passenger's hat blowing off in the wind and going through the pusher propeller
CEN20CA087: Engine started when turned over manually with the switches off

I have a category called "Runway Condition," for instance. It includes seaplanes hitting logs, or being affected by a tidal rip, or being tripped up by boat wakes. Most of them, though, fault the pilot for selecting soft or unsuitable places to land.

Closest thing to true "Act of God" cases might be the "Creature Strike" category...aircraft hitting animals, in flight or on landing. Got 16 of those...10 are bird strikes, the rest are for deer or elk.

I'd guess ~25 of the 4,715 cases in my (recently updated) database might fall into the Act of God category. That's about one in two hundred. I'm actually surprised it's that high....

Ron Wanttaja

 

[RyanShort1]

I would totally separate "freak" from "act of God."

To me, a freak accident is one where so many things had to go wrong, that's it's almost a miracle one of them didn't go right.

 

[wanttaja]

I would totally separate "freak" from "act of God."

To me, a freak accident is one where so many things had to go wrong, that's it's almost a miracle one of them didn't go right.

Or, a freak accident can have just one very unusual cause. "Acts of God" I would put in the "Even a man who is pure at heart, and says his prayers at night...." category. No mistakes piloting, no mistakes building or maintaining, nothing mechanical, no mistakes navigating, nothing that would raise the risk level. Just the Golden B-B, just the fickle finger of fate, just being at the wrong place at the wrong time. Bird strike, for instance.

A freak accident could involve a mechanical issue or a pilot error, but only those of the very rare variety. The passenger's hat going through the pusher propeller, for example.

Ron Wanttaja

 

[Salty]

I would totally separate "freak" from "act of God."

To me, a freak accident is one where so many things had to go wrong, that's it's almost a miracle one of them didn't go right.

That’s a weird way to look at it. So if everyone screws up in multiple ways, it’s not their fault, it’s a freak accident.

 

[donjohnston]

I think that in order to qualify as freak, you would have to remove human error, wouldn't you?

 

[RyanShort1]

That’s a weird way to look at it. So if everyone screws up in multiple ways, it’s not their fault, it’s a freak accident.

Well, “screws up in multiple ways” might be going too far, in my opinion, doesn't fit this deal, and I would say that's more like the normal accidents - and lines up with something another pilot said to me in a different conversation - "Everyone is looking for a villian."

My use of the term freak, looking at the dictionary definition has to do with a combination of things that normally wouldn’t be all negative all lining up.

For instance, Let's take the fighter flight. Let’s assume that the lead fighter had the B-17 in sight and had reason to believe that the B-17 had him in sight. If he was told to go to the 500’ line he wasn’t “wrong” to follow instructions in the sense the he personally clearly had time to make his line and he was "playing by the rules" as they were given to him. Perhaps if he had added an extra inch of power the flight behind him might’ve accelerated a tiny bit faster in trail and we’d all be talking about a near-miss instead. The same could be said if #2 had chosen to fly a bit tighter or looser "trail" and #3 had tried to match and flown a slightly different line - perhaps going between the B-17 and B-24. All of that could have potentially overcome what appears to be an out-of-character call from the air boss that they didn't think of as a problem. None of us needs to throw stones at #1 or #2, and if anyone accuses them of malice, they are out of line, but each of them could possibly have affected the outcome.

I think that similar scenarios could have broken this accident chain in several different places, yet none of them did. It all lined up, tragically. No one individual thing, except possibly the directives, was a given for this going badly, but it still happened. The last straw was the pilot missing the see and avoid, but by the time he was arcing in to the line, the camo on the B-17 and backdrop was probably a contributing factor as well, and that's not sinister, either, it's just the reality of it.

I think that in order to qualify as freak, you would have to remove human error, wouldn't you?

Not necessarily. If someone has 15 hours, we aren't surprised when they stall and crash. We DO get surprised when someone with 20,000 hours who teaches stalls and spins does. That's enough reason to wonder if there was another contributing factor that we are unaware of.

 

[Salty]

I think that if an accident occurs without a mechanical or medical issue to cause it, then someone screwed up. If the plan was followed properly, then whoever developed the plan and all those that approved of the plan screwed up. It’s not a freak accident, it’s a failure to develop a safe plan. Even if the plan happens to “work” for decades. Even if the plan happens to “work” with more aircraft. Good pilots can certainly make an accident less likely even with a bad plan. That doesn’t change the fact that it’s a bad plan.

Any plan that allows aircraft to be in close proximity without visual contact is a bad plan for the very reason that it allows your “freak” accident to occur.

 

[Capngrog]

... it’s a failure to develop a safe plan.

Or it's a failure to adhere to a safe plan.

 

[donjohnston]

Not necessarily. If someone has 15 hours, we aren't surprised when they stall and crash. We DO get surprised when someone with 20,000 hours who teaches stalls and spins does. That's enough reason to wonder if there was another contributing factor that we are unaware of.

Not in my opinion. We have people driving around who have been doing it for 20,000 hours and they will drive through a red light, run a stop sign, change lanes into another car. That's not a freak accident.

It's not a freak accident when it's caused by human error.

 

[RyanShort1]

Not in my opinion. We have people driving around who have been doing it for 20,000 hours and they will drive through a red light, run a stop sign, change lanes into another car. That's not a freak accident.

It's not a freak accident when it's caused by human error.

Most car drivers aren’t using checklists, CRM, or attending pre-drive briefings, though.

 

[FlightmechH3]

Airshow related.....

As mentioned before about the swiss cheese therory, that lessons were not learned when it comes to pilot overconfidence and aggressiveness.

Holland had a history and he stated himself that he wanted to barrel roll a Buff. The Yakima incident still scares the hell out of me. Compounding failures for many in the system resulted in the deaths of innocent people.

Then the C17 AK crash in 2010. Zero lessons were learned. More death.

The pressure to put on a "show" for the public by a pilot/pilots, start encroaching into an unsafe realm. It is not worth it.

 

[Brad Smith]

Usually it's the "Freak" holding onto the stick that causes the accident.

 

[hindsight2020]

I don't see much from what has been made available, that the fighter element was hot doggin' it. I find that (video-documented) execution to be typical and unremarkable; it's the decision to execute in said conditions what's imprudent from where I sit. In safety circles, (i)decision and (ii)perception and (iii)execution errors are not distinctions without difference, just because they lead to carnage just the same. I recognize that may seem like immaterial hair-splitting, and counter-intuitive for laypeople.

So to me at least, bringing up Bud Holland and similarly styled case studies in the context of this collision, is a non-sequitur. What is clear from the NTSB prelim narrative is that the brief did not include organic altitude decon between show tracks, and the audible to shackle elements while both in element-internal in-trail position, was not made by either of the flight leads, but by the airboss. At any rate, a line item which is germane to the safety angle in that the airboss is still alive, but the impact participants are not. I am not privy to any player objecting in real time to the command, but it would be a safe assumption there was not a significant pushback, given the elements indeed attempted to execute the directed reposition.

Will the NTSB stop with Hutain, and call it a single actor causal? Probably. That'd be getting it wrong in my book, but I'm not the NTSB. I'm hopeful to stand corrected on that front and see the NTSB expand the safety focal point to the aforementioned additional players/entities. The FAA angle I'm much more curious about, since that proverbial hurricane cone model is a lot more wide and unpredictable.

 

[skyking3286]

"The Yakima incident still scares the hell out of me"

I think you might be thinking of the cowboy flying culture that created the Airway Heights/ Spokane Fairchild USAF base crash with the B-52? It's been written about, if you want to see a chain of events that created the crash. The tragic thing was the pilot that was riding with him to prevent that couldn't and pulled the eject lever but too late. But that culture of "it hasn't happened yet so it probably will not happen ever" is a echo of this event. People overlooked the obvious issues in the culture there.

 

[hindsight2020]

Looks like an FOIA came through for us plebes not part of the big effing club, which I always welcome. blanco channel has a transcribed version.

Not really anything particularly revealing for me, though it reaffirms what the NTSB had already highlighted in the prelim. The only thing that sticks out for me is the lack of pushback from fighter lead. Can't speak for the man but I wonder if he had any hesitation in consenting to push his formation to trail and shackle co-altitude. Hutain is ultimately the one that pays for the gamble as #3. Doesn't personally absolve the latter of course, as someone in loose formation, capable of maneuvering out of plane. But the tape helps provide the context of what all players were facing with that rather...exigent audible.... if I may be charitable/euphemistic.

I only embed the blancolirio content because he offers a transcription, which I find useful for folks to follow the sequence. I'm not making an endorsement of his commentary in either direction, so don't @ me about his editorial. I have my own position, some of which diverges from his.

 

[FlightmechH3]

No pre-briefed altitude blocks between the fighters and the B-17.

Air boss........needs to own this.

 

[Fearless Tower]

Air Boss sounded like he was trying to be a Forward Air Controller calling in strikes....

 

[hindsight2020]

Air Boss sounded like he was trying to be a Forward Air Controller calling in strikes....

Jest aside, no way. FAC/JTAC procedures are way more sanitized than that, even under fire. They have to be, or friendlies die all over the place. This guy was straight up out of his element, lobbing blivets off the range, to keep with the CAS theme.

 

[Fearless Tower]

Jest aside, no way. FAC/JTAC procedures are way more sanitized than that, even under fire. They have to be, or friendlies die all over the place. This guy was straight up out of his element, lobbing blivets off the range, to keep with the CAS theme.

I know.....I was being kind. He actually sounded like he was trying to pretend to be a FAC...like a Hollywood vision of what a FAC would do.