When money was no object in pilot training

[Everskyward]

The March/April 2012 issue of the FAA Safety Briefing has an article by Rich Stowell with this quote, "According to a recent Accident Data Set prepared by the General Aviation Joint Steering Committee (GAJSC), LOC-I was the dominant cause of fatal general aviation accidents over the last decade." The article defines LOC-I as "loss of control inflight" as opposed to LOC-G which is ground LOC.

I haven't paid much attention to this thread and this may have been posted already. Here's another recent article, this one out of AOPA Pilot which I think is relevant.

It happened in the early 1990s. That was the time we saw the diminishing influence of World War II-era flight instructors (and their instructional progeny). Our pilots didn't fly jets, they flew airplanes that demanded exceptional stick-and-rudder skills. As one veteran instructor told me, you could give a P–38 pilot a P–51 manual to read, then send him to the airplane—where he’d easily and safely check himself out in the machine. Pilots of that era could do these things safely because they had good stick-and-rudder skills. Their lives depended on it. Without the mooring provided by stick-and-rudder pilots of an earlier age, general aviation’s flight training curricula came under the influence of the airline and jet community. It was no longer enough to produce a private pilot when it seemed as though you could create an airline pilot lite, the GA version of the professional pilot. But a funny thing happened on the way to the practice area: It disappeared.

License to learn
In defense of stick-and-rudder training
By Rod Machado

 

[Henning]

Some of the interpretations (by FSDO folks) have bordered on ludicrous. King Air SOP per book is (and has been since Noah) flaps 20 for approach, flaps full when runway assured.

Basically how I was taught to fly everything.

 

[Henning]

I haven't paid much attention to this thread and this may have been posted already. Here's another recent article, this one out of AOPA Pilot which I think is relevant.

It happened in the early 1990s. That was the time we saw the diminishing influence of World War II-era flight instructors (and their instructional progeny). Our pilots didn't fly jets, they flew airplanes that demanded exceptional stick-and-rudder skills. As one veteran instructor told me, you could give a P–38 pilot a P–51 manual to read, then send him to the airplane—where he’d easily and safely check himself out in the machine. Pilots of that era could do these things safely because they had good stick-and-rudder skills. Their lives depended on it. Without the mooring provided by stick-and-rudder pilots of an earlier age, general aviation’s flight training curricula came under the influence of the airline and jet community. It was no longer enough to produce a private pilot when it seemed as though you could create an airline pilot lite, the GA version of the professional pilot. But a funny thing happened on the way to the practice area: It disappeared.

License to learn
In defense of stick-and-rudder training
By Rod Machado

I couldn't agree with that assessment more. I fell very fortunate to have had the start in aviation where and when I did. I got to fly with a lot of those guys and had them as my instructors while they were still active QBs. A lot of them are gone now, but some of them are left. It wasn't just the pilots either, it was the flight engineers as well. There was a whole 'nother breed to work with. Guys who could teach you to make a compound curve in a sheet of metal with a leather bag, some mallets, a torch, and an English Wheel.

 

[wabower]

Jets are typically fully configured at FAF, so the Fed assumed that KA's should be as well.

Basically how I was taught to fly everything.

 

[Henning]

Jets are typically fully configured at FAF, so the Fed assumed that KA's should be as well.

I thought Feds had to be trained in type to give an evaluation ride? I know a Fed was sent to Harold Miller while I was there for training in the 503 Air Tractor.

Yeah, jets you got plenty of power in case something goes wrong between the FAF and ''runway made", I prefer to stay on the 'higher lift/drag' side of the flaps until I know I'm landing, then I dump in the rest and put in final trim. They should know this though. I guess maybe they figure a K/A has Jet like performance.

 

[wabower]

Why would beng trained matter in this situation? There are/were many more interpretations and policy decisions that made even less sense.

I thought Feds had to be trained in type to give an evaluation ride? I know a Fed was sent to Harold Miller while I was there for training in the 503 Air Tractor.

Yeah, jets you got plenty of power in case something goes wrong between the FAF and ''runway made", I prefer to stay on the 'higher lift/drag' side of the flaps until I know I'm landing, then I dump in the rest and put in final trim. They should know this though. I guess maybe they figure a K/A has Jet like performance.

 

[rottydaddy]

Basically how I was taught to fly everything.

I figure that would be good enough with just about any airplane... if I had to land something new to me and had no POH info or instruction, I would do it that way. I think most pilots would do the same.

Only time I was told different was when I started flying C172s and 150s with a club based at Marlboro Airport in NJ (sadly closed now, thanks mostly to a mayor who was bought and paid for by developers)... runway was about 2100', 400-odd-foot displacement when landing to the west (which was most days)... trees all around and two sets of high-tension power lines across the approach from that end; first set higher than the second, fortunately, but both quite close to the threshold. To round out before passing the numbers on 27, the checkout advice was "if you are surprised you didn't hook the wheels on the first set of wires, you have the correct glide slope nailed".

Members had to be able to demonstrate confident no-flap landings there, and landing with more than 20 degrees down was considered a no-no, not only because of the wires but because the other advice was "if all three wheels are not on the runway when you pass the sock (at midfield), go around!" You'd have to be pretty hot, flaps or no, to find yourself in that situation, so stopping before the pavement ran out would be difficult. But trying to go around from that point with full flaps would be a bad idea in a stock 172 or 150, no matter how soon you started retracting them. With 20 or less, it would be a piece of cake. Going around after touching down long on 09... well, it was much easier to avoid that, but the wires east of the runway were a serious concern.
Obviously, at low weight and with a decent headwind, landing with full flaps was not foolhardy, but the 20-degree limit was a smart rule of thumb, as was the go-around rule. Overruns were pretty common there, but not with that club's planes. And I got really good at flaps-20 and no-flap landings when I was based there.

 

[Henning]

I figure that would be good enough with just about any airplane... if I had to land something new to me and had no POH info or instruction, I would do it that way. I think most pilots would do the same.

Only time I was told different was when I started flying C172s and 150s with a club based at Marlboro Airport in NJ (sadly closed now, thanks mostly to a mayor who was bought and paid for by developers)... runway was about 2100', 400-odd-foot displacement when landing to the west (which was most days)... trees all around and two sets of high-tension power lines across the approach from that end; first set higher than the second, fortunately, but both quite close to the threshold. To round out before passing the numbers on 27, the checkout advice was "if you are surprised you didn't hook the wheels on the first set of wires, you have the correct glide slope nailed".

Members had to be able to demonstrate confident no-flap landings there, and landing with more than 20 degrees down was considered a no-no, not only because of the wires but because the other advice was "if all three wheels are not on the runway when you pass the sock (at midfield), go around!" You'd have to be pretty hot, flaps or no, to find yourself in that situation, so stopping before the pavement ran out would be difficult. But trying to go around from that point with full flaps would be a bad idea in a stock 172 or 150, no matter how soon you started retracting them. With 20 or less, it would be a piece of cake. Going around after touching down long on 09... well, it was much easier to avoid that, but the wires east of the runway were a serious concern.
Obviously, at low weight and with a decent headwind, landing with full flaps was not foolhardy, but the 20-degree limit was a smart rule of thumb, as was the go-around rule. Overruns were pretty common there, but not with that club's planes. And I got really good at flaps-20 and no-flap landings when I was based there.

That is the worst logic to back bad procedure I have ever heard of. That is just incredible to hear, FMD, we're doomed.

 

[poadeleted20]

You're talking about the beginning of training in landing with a dead engine, right?

No. Throughout the training.

At some point, the ME student should be able, and experienced, at landing with one engine set to zero thrust - that's a single engine landing in a twin. If you are consistently retarding the zero thrust engine for your student, your student may bust it up on a real engine out landing due to the long float and awkward yaw.

When the engine is really out, it's zero thrust regardless of speed and there is nothing for the pilot to do as speed changes during the approach and landing to keep it zero thrust. The problem only occurs when the engine is simulated out, as the simulated zero thrust power setting changes with speed and the instructor has to adjust the power setting as speed changes to keep it zero thrust. There is no real world gain to be had if the trainees has to do that adjustment during training, and if it happens for real, there is the possibility of distraction if the Laws of Primacy and Exercise take over and the trainee starts grabbing for the dead throttle in the landing flare instead of focusing on the landing.

 

[poadeleted20]

I haven't paid much attention to this thread and this may have been posted already. Here's another recent article, this one out of AOPA Pilot which I think is relevant.



License to learn
In defense of stick-and-rudder training
By Rod Machado

Machado is wrong. During WWII, we lost more pilots in training accidents than we did in combat. They wrecked during those self-checkouts at an ungodly rate. Any effect of that Machado noticed was due to the Darwinian selection process killing those who couldn't do it, not any particular skills they were taught. If he is aware of any studies of the accident rates or skills of pilots trained by WWII-trained instructors vs those trained by instructors without military experience or with post WWII- military training (i.e., the era where UPT started in jets), I'd like to see it. Otherwise, his statements are unsupportable.

 

[poadeleted20]

Members had to be able to demonstrate confident no-flap landings there, and landing with more than 20 degrees down was considered a no-no, not only because of the wires but because the other advice was "if all three wheels are not on the runway when you pass the sock (at midfield), go around!" You'd have to be pretty hot, flaps or no, to find yourself in that situation, so stopping before the pavement ran out would be difficult. But trying to go around from that point with full flaps would be a bad idea in a stock 172 or 150, no matter how soon you started retracting them. With 20 or less, it would be a piece of cake. Going around after touching down long on 09... well, it was much easier to avoid that, but the wires east of the runway were a serious concern.
Obviously, at low weight and with a decent headwind, landing with full flaps was not foolhardy, but the 20-degree limit was a smart rule of thumb, as was the go-around rule. Overruns were pretty common there, but not with that club's planes. And I got really good at flaps-20 and no-flap landings when I was based there.

Why didn't they just teach people how to rotate the aircraft while the flaps were coming up so it didn't sink? That's been part of my training routine for decades. Giving up the extra drag of the last notch of flaps on a very short, obstructed runway on every single landing to make as slightly possible go-around easier to control seems ridiculous to me.

 

[Henning]

Machado is wrong. During WWII, we lost more pilots in training accidents than we did in combat. They wrecked during those self-checkouts at an ungodly rate. Any effect of that Machado noticed was due to the Darwinian selection process killing those who couldn't do it, not any particular skills they were taught. If he is aware of any studies of the accident rates or skills of pilots trained by WWII-trained instructors vs those trained by instructors without military experience or with post WWII- military training (i.e., the era where UPT started in jets), I'd like to see it. Otherwise, his statements are unsupportable.

EXACTLY!!!! And that is what is missing from flight training today, there is nothing to get the incompetents out of the pilot seat. You want them to kill themselves before they kill a load of passengers, not with them.

 

[poadeleted20]

EXACTLY!!!! And that is what is missing from flight training today, there is nothing to get the incompetents out of the pilot seat. You want them to kill themselves before they kill a load of passengers, not with them.

Actually, what I want is for them to learn to fly so they don't kill anyone, including themselves.

 

[Henning]

Actually, what I want is for them to learn to fly so they don't kill anyone, including themselves.

But you can't assure learning nor can you test for reaction without a full on test of some sorts. The test as nature provides will be a survive/fail test. You could do it with drugs and a sim and get nearly as good a result.

 

[poadeleted20]

But you can't assure learning nor can you test for reaction without a full on test of some sorts. The test as nature provides will be a survive/fail test. You could do it with drugs and a sim and get nearly as good a result.

There are some things we just don't test. Letting someone go fly a new-to-them airplane solo just to see if they live or die isn't one of them. The accident rate for single-seat E-AB aircraft first flights is scary, and that is why the FAA and the kit companies encourage training in similar 2-seaters before trying the single-seater.

Instructors are taught how to evaluate pilot performance, and that is what we do -- first-hand, with access to the other set of controls in case it doesn't work out. It may not be as manly as going out there yourself alone to teach yourself, but it's less destructive and keeps the insurance rates lower.

 

[Henning]

LOL, in the end you still have to check yourself out in that single seat if you're gonna fly it and it will be different. The greatest difference is not one of physically flying, it's one of confidence and stress reaction. All planes fly the same. If you can safely land one plane, you can safely land any of them if you know how to handle the systems. The question is how will you do under the stress? You can't know that until the stress exists. While all planes react the same, the same cannot be said for pilots. I agree this is something we do not test for, that's why we have airline captains that ride a stall all the way to the ocean with the power levers in flight idle, why we have captains that pull their way out of a stall, why we have crews that can't focus on their jobs long enough to know if they are on the correct runway or not.

 

[bbchien]

"Training" and "getting it" are two completely different things. Witness the "Barefoot Bandit".

 

[j1b3h0]

Machado is wrong. During WWII, we lost more pilots in training accidents than we did in combat. They wrecked during those self-checkouts at an ungodly rate. Any effect of that Machado noticed was due to the Darwinian selection process killing those who couldn't do it, not any particular skills they were taught. If he is aware of any studies of the accident rates or skills of pilots trained by WWII-trained instructors vs those trained by instructors without military experience or with post WWII- military training (i.e., the era where UPT started in jets), I'd like to see it. Otherwise, his statements are unsupportable.

I agree with Machado. Most of the WWII types started their training in a Stearman...an airplane that I respectfully submit would eat the current cadre of student pilots (and, for that matter, intructors) for lunch. While it's true they started flying from a giant square slab of concrete - unlike the runways we have now, the reason for the attrocious safety record was the overriding urgency to train as many people as quickly as possible.

@ Henning - I think the evidence is clear that you and I are both somewhat dismissive of nosewheel pilots, but I disagree with your total condemnation of the AF447 guys. I've been flying airliners for 25 years. In that time...50 or so checkrides, 5 different aircraft, guess how many times I've stalled one? Never. Started in the SA227, which has a 60lb stick pusher when one gets within 5kts. of aerodynamic stall. We do approach to stalls, but not the full monte. We certainly don't practice them from high altitude, night IMC, in moderate turbulence, with erroneous EFIS indications, icing, thrust levers that don't move, and an autopilot you can't fully disengage, like on the POS scarebus. Yeah, the pilot(s) was pulling back on the stick, but he was also looking (listening) at indications the aircraft was well over MMO. I wasn't there. I'm less likely to monday morning quarterback.

 

[Henning]

In your 25 years experience as an airline pilot, have you once witnessed a plane fly in cruise with the throttles at flight idle? Have you ever seen one fly at all with the nose up 10* and the power at idle? Anything? Once? They were all three confused by the stall warning announcement turning off when the stall was too steep for the computer to believe the input, although at that time it already had all three inputs all agreeing to this 'unbelievable' AoA. This was a huge fault on the chief test pilot's shoulders. He owns part of that crash as he is responsible for human integration. Canceling an erroneous stall warning should be a human intervention (push to silence), especially when there is no evidence that the reading is erroneous, just a designers supposition "no one could get it this far into a stall". Well guess what? Fumble klutz in the right seat did it within seconds of touch the stick when the #2 AP kicked off on losing its pitot (only for about 20 some seconds, and it was the only of three lost and then came back as they dropped). That is the second engineering design error in the loop, why didn't it just switch to #1 A/P when it lost #2? Brings us to the training/ADM error, fumble klutz who has never hand flown this plane at altitude now grabs the stick when it is operating at its very service ceiling. He instantly stalls it, goes full throttle and pitches up to recovery attitude, not realizing he has no reserve performance since he's at service ceiling and cranks it way back into a stall to the point the stall warning turns off. Now here he is full power with the nose in recovery attitude, the stall warning has turned off, he thinks he's recovering and starts lowering the nose and sure enough, the plane starts recovering, enough so that the AoA now becomes believable to the stall warning system again and it triggers "stall"...

Now right here is where the PF in the right seat had his mind snap, this is where he quit functioning and gave up. He pulled the nose back up to turn the stall warning off and pulled the throttles to flight idle. He proceeded for the next 2+ minutes to hold the stick in precisely that position while the plane performed an admirable falling leaf stall at ~10,000fpm descent. Around 12,000' he finally said "This is really happening" and his hand trembled losing control and the guy in the left seat caught it and recovered the falling leaf stall! That is one well behaved airframe, I'd be glad to fly it. Thing is, neither the guy in the left seat who took it, nor the captain ever advanced the throttles off flight idle. Either of them could have saved it. None of them knew to. None of them realized they were stalled even at the very end. They were all 'deer in headlights', the CVR and FDR made it all very clear. They were all freeze reactors. That is what the civilian/GA training system does nothing to discriminate for, the ability to think clearly and act rapidly under sever stress; some people do, some people freeze.

 

[poadeleted20]

I agree with Machado. Most of the WWII types started their training in a Stearman...an airplane that I respectfully submit would eat the current cadre of student pilots (and, for that matter, intructors) for lunch.

It also ate many of those WWII aviation cadets for lunch. Only difference is we were willing to accept that carnage at that time, and now we're not.

 

[denverpilot]

A side-question for Henning and all. Just 'cause I find this fascinating.

Do you think everyone goes through a stage where they'll freeze with the right external inputs?

Secondarily, can you train away that freeze reaction?

It seems to me that the answer to both questions is "yes".

Third question:

Do you push the student to the freeze point or do you let them find trouble all on their own?

Or is it dependent on the specific type of problem?

(Push to freeze on stalls, but let them find setting a radio to the wrong frequency on their own, for example?)

 

[Henning]

It also ate many of those WWII aviation cadets for lunch. Only difference is we were willing to accept that carnage at that time, and now we're not.

There is the very heart of the issue, although there are other ways to find the same results, we don't employ any method at all.

 

[poadeleted20]

Third question:

Do you push the student to the freeze point or do you let them find trouble all on their own?

Or is it dependent on the specific type of problem?

(Push to freeze on stalls, but let them find setting a radio to the wrong frequency on their own, for example?)

On your third question, you'll have to wait until Henning gets his CFI for an answer. AFAIK, he's never given a single hour of flight training as the FAA defines that term.

 

[denverpilot]

On your third question, you'll have to wait until Henning gets his CFI for an answer. AFAIK, he's never given a single hour of flight training as the FAA defines that term.

He's taught people to drive boats. I'll take that in lieu of CFI time for now. . It's just a question.

And you didn't answer. What technique do you employ?

You've frozen. I've frozen. You've frozen students. Did you intend to?

In terms of teaching, that must be interesting to see it coming... I've taught folks things and frozen them up before, but nothing that's likely to kill them.

(In fact, I credit aviation as one of the reasons I rarely freeze in "IT emergencies". It's not an emergency. No one's bleeding or likely to be. Fear of broken computer systems is silly.)

I think Henning disregards that CFIs freeze people up all the time when he says there's "no" attempt to weed out students who don't understand and might not ever understand. There's a methodology in play here, but it's not documented or consistent by a long shot. And, if the person limps through, they typically don't wash out with a crash. But they might decide on their own not to come back to the airport after 100 hours of dual and no CFI solo endorsement.

Then again, I doubt you'll find any official boat handling instructor's manuals that formally say to push the student 30 hours on watch without sleep and then be available to handle the scenario where they're about to steer out of a channel aground at a particularly tricky port, or anything even remotely "dangerous" in the *official* manuals.

But old-salts probably do it to young folks interested in upgrading to Captain anyway.

Every industry has their rites of passage. Most aren't documented.

 

[Henning]

If you froze a student up and didn't wash them out, then you did nothing to further the selection, instead you sent a known freeze reactor on into the world of aviation, yeah, well done.

 

[poadeleted20]

I just train them. As part of that training, they will go to the limits of the envelope in which they be can reasonably expected to fly, and I'll see what happens. What I do not do is push them until they freeze if that means pushing them beyond that point -- this is not the military, and we test only to standards, not failure. If they freeze up, it's a subject for serious discussion once we get on the ground and then the trainee will have to demonstrate repeatedly the ability to handle the same situation again without freezing.* If it keeps happening, it may be reason for them to find another hobby (no less profession). If they don't freeze anywhere within that envelope, I have nothing to worry about because people rarely freeze up the second time the face a situation they successfully handled before.

BTW, boats are different -- you can almost always call "all engines stop, rudder amidships" and settle things down (Queeg in the typhoon notwithstanding). And yes, I was ship-qualified, too, a very long time ago, but only as an OOD, never an instructor.

*That's much the same as a trainee who throws his/her hands in the air and says "I can't do it" as opposed to continuing to try until I have intervene to help -- even if they crash someday, I want them doing everything they can all the way to impact. I don't want anyone letting go and saying "Jesus, take the yoke," like that guy in Pennsylvania whose Warrior ended up in a barn after it ran out of fuel.

 

[Henning]

BTW, boats are different -- you can almost always call "all engines stop, rudder amidships" and settle things down (Queeg in the typhoon notwithstanding). And yes, I was ship-qualified, too, a very long time ago, but only as an OOD, never an instructor.

Right, that works real well when you have 10,000 tons vectored a wharf and the wind taking you down as well.... With an airplane you can take out the airplane. With big boats and barges you take 'the runway' with you as well.

 

[poadeleted20]

Right, that works real well when you have 10,000 tons vectored a wharf and the wind taking you down as well.... With an airplane you can take out the airplane. With big boats and barges you take 'the runway' with you as well.

Well, I never conned a 10,000 ton ship -- smallest I had the deck on was 77,000 tons. And I specifically said "almost always." With a plane, it's almost never. Big difference.

 

[Henning]

Well, I never conned a 10,000 ton ship -- smallest I had the deck on was 77,000 tons. And I specifically said "almost always." With a plane, it's almost never. Big difference.

Airplane is so much easier to land than a barge. Every landing on a barge is like a single engine landing in a ME plane where you use the TR just at the right time and amount, still in the air, to straighten up so you tag the runway square at exactly stall speed. Get it just a little wrong either side and you have a mess. Best part is you aren't even driving when you're doing it. You're at the back of the barge giving helm and shaft orders to the mate. Now when you're training a guy, you're guiding him to give those commands or worse supervising. Each shift command from the mate has a mechanical delay of 7-12 seconds typically. So, at this point I have approximately 20 seconds before I need an action to happen that I need to be communicating that order, and I have typically a 2 second window in which I need the prop to be making its last 10 RPM, other wise I fall short which causes a situation similar to getting an OEI twin with free castering gear to get going again, and I cannot hit a corner first, or we end up over and cause $1MM worth of damage and probable injuries.

That is EVERY landing, not just the tough ones. The tough ones you add wind and current that have more effect on the barge than the tug.

BTW Ron, how many times did you bring the ship to the dock or conn an UnRep?

 

[j1b3h0]

A side-question for Henning and all. Just 'cause I find this fascinating.

Do you think everyone goes through a stage where they'll freeze with the right external inputs?

Secondarily, can you train away that freeze reaction?

It seems to me that the answer to both questions is "yes".

Third question:

Do you push the student to the freeze point or do you let them find trouble all on their own?

Or is it dependent on the specific type of problem?

(Push to freeze on stalls, but let them find setting a radio to the wrong frequency on their own, for example?)

I tell my students that in many ways learning to fly is learning to see. I help them learn to see what I see that indicates poor directional control, or why a given method is not the best way. I let them experiment with different ways to do things. And, after I've seen them grasp the lesson, I give them enough rope to hang themself...unless or until I have to take over. If that happen - rarely - it usually just reinforces the lesson. Come to think of it, the only times I witness problems requiring immediate reaction is during takeoff or landing (mostly tailwheel). Aerobatic flying is usually fairly predictable, save for the odd kinky spin. Did I answer your question?

 

[Henning]

A side-question for Henning and all. Just 'cause I find this fascinating.

Do you think everyone goes through a stage where they'll freeze with the right external inputs?

Secondarily, can you train away that freeze reaction?

It seems to me that the answer to both questions is "yes".

IMO, first is no, second is "per instance, yes". Freezing or Accelerating in the face of severe stress are autonomic and genetic. Everyone I have encountered who accelerates and experiences time dilation and describes the crash as "it was super calm and peaceful, I saw what was happening like slow motion and figured out what had to be done and just did it" has done so every time they came into such a situation, same for the people who describe the crash as "then it was just a blur, like it wasn't really happening".

Now you can train freeze reactors in certain scenarios so those scenarios do not trigger that basal mode, but you cannot train them out of freezing in high stress moments; at least not without being called a Nazi and a monster or alien overlord.

 

[poadeleted20]

Now you can train freeze reactors in certain scenarios so those scenarios do not trigger that basal mode, but you cannot train them out of freezing in high stress moments; at least not without being called a Nazi and a monster or alien overlord.

I've been called worse. But they do learn.

 

[ebetancourt]

Machado is wrong. During WWII, we lost more pilots in training accidents than we did in combat. SNIP

Back to the future...

I have no statistics to support you or Machado. I am genuinely interested in trying to understand the prevalence of LOC-I, not least because I am in the process of teaching my granddaughter how to fly and I have lots of options and time.

Was the loss rate due to the maneuvers taught or the push to turn out pilots in large numbers quickly? (Which may have included flying non-airworthy airplanes.) Were the instructors capable in all cases or "seniored" into position? What was the accident rate in the CPTP prior to the start of the war? In a related topic, I once saw a paper written by an Army flight surgeon who was complaining that loose regulation and inadequate training was causing more helicopters and crews to be lost to accidents than combat (Vietnam). (I don't have those statistics either and my experience (USAF) is that many training incidents would have been enhanced into combat losses.)

I learned to fly (soloed) in a T-28A. Did innumerable spins, formation, aerobatics, etc in ~130 hours. No airplane or crew in the time that I was in the program or in the memory of any of my instructors was lost to an accident. Two were lost about six months after I left due to a prop loss and panic on the part of the student.

So the question really is, "Are we including or excluding training that would reduce the LOC-I incidents?" My personal answer is that we are excluding training that would help pilots master aircraft control and reduce accidents. Specifically: Power off approaches and landings^, slips^, 60* steep turns^, lazy eights and chandelles*, eights on pylons*, spins, and basic aerobatics. Scenario based training to include enough variation to teach the basics of ADM in real-time in flight. Instrument flight.

In my case (and I'll admit I have the luxury of the $, freedom, and time) all of the above is in my granddaughters syllabus. I am very interested in the joint PP IR rating because I had told her that is what I expect on her 17th birthday. We should finish all the PP requirements before solo on her 16th birthday (May) (except solo of course) and then we will start instrument training (how to be determined). She has done all the ^ above and been introduced to the * items. Parachutes are repacked and she will start spins and basic aerobatics in the next few weeks. I never expect to see her in a LOC-I accident, but maybe I am optimistic. Or missing something.

 

[denverpilot]

So I'm getting the impression Henning's of the opinion that if you freeze, ever, you're never going to be able to train that away?

I think the freeze reaction he's thinking of and the type I'm thinking of may be subtly different. I'm thinking overload. Where someone seems to freeze but is really just processing.

Henning's talking about the complete-freeze crowd I think. Like the type that requires a complete removal from the situation to reset.

Not trying to put words in mouths. Is that accurate, Henning?

 

[Henning]

I've been called worse. But they do learn.

A situation they learn by simple repetition. It's the reaction to the unknown, unexpected and untrained situation that you cannot effect.

 

[matthammer]

EXACTLY!!!! And that is what is missing from flight training today, there is nothing to get the incompetents out of the pilot seat. You want them to kill themselves before they kill a load of passengers, not with them.

I haven't really contributed to this conversation, but...

Any instructor who WANTS his student to "kill himself" should be lined up against a wall and shot. If a student is really that inept, you simply don't endorse him for anything. Otherwise you train to proficiency.

 

[Everskyward]

Machado is wrong. During WWII, we lost more pilots in training accidents than we did in combat. They wrecked during those self-checkouts at an ungodly rate. Any effect of that Machado noticed was due to the Darwinian selection process killing those who couldn't do it, not any particular skills they were taught. If he is aware of any studies of the accident rates or skills of pilots trained by WWII-trained instructors vs those trained by instructors without military experience or with post WWII- military training (i.e., the era where UPT started in jets), I'd like to see it. Otherwise, his statements are unsupportable.

I don't think the body of his article had so much to do with WWII pilots as is did with the way that teaching civilian pilots has evolved.

 

[Henning]

I haven't really contributed to this conversation, but...

Any instructor who WANTS his student to "kill himself" should be lined up against a wall and shot. If a student is really that inept, you simply don't endorse him for anything. Otherwise you train to proficiency.

Nothing motivates a student to pay attention and work hard like watching his classmate auger in. Too many pilots live in a fantasy world of 'not me' and just try to idle through to get that airline job.

 

[matthammer]

Nothing motivates a student to pay attention and work hard like watching his classmate auger in. Too many pilots live in a fantasy world of 'not me' and just try to idle through to get that airline job.

The most dangerous types would probably take precisely that "not me" attitude if one of their classmates did auger in. On the other hand, I've seen and heard of perfectly safe pilots quitting simply because someone they know cratered, and they felt the risk was too great as a result. Everyone is different. By no means is allowing pre-private pilot students to kill themselves out of ignorance or undeveloped judgement an intelligent solution to eliminating problem pilots.

 

[bbchien]

"When money was no object...." has been a very long time. Once upon a time I tapped on the INS box and said, "Chief, it is having some odd moments...."
Next day it was replaced OH'd new.