Dick’s numbers are’t in error but his conclusion is. Analyzing aircraft safety is very difficult due to poor data. The FAA has some estimates for fleet hours but not by type. They key words in the post above are “similar aircraft.” For example, training flights are, on average, safer. If you remove training flights from the data the accident rate for GA aircraft would go up. The result is that there is no category for fast single engine piston aircraft. The closest the Nall report gets is single-engine piston. For example, relatively new aircraft are flown significantly more per year than older aircraft. Not all types are flown the same per year. I tried to use Flightaware to look at relative flight hours. This is clearly invalid comparing a Cub to an SR22. I do think it gives relative rates for similar mission aircraft. The result was that if chute saves are moved to fatals an SR22 looked like a Bonanza in accident profile. That data was taken several years ago. I satisfied myself and haven’t redone the data recently. Why do you hear about more Cirrus accidents? A recent Flightaware snapshot points out why.
SR22 51
C172 49
BE36 37
C182 25
BE35 23
BE58 23
PA32 23
M20P 13
BE33 8
SR20 7
DA40 6
An interesting article accessible to all is this one. It dates from 2008 but I think it is still relvant.
Check out insurance costs. You are incorrect. A Bonanza of the same hull value costs the same or more to insure. I checked.
Ron is correct. Dale Klapmeier wanted CAPS to be an option. He finally acquiesced to his brother, Alan, who felt strongly it should be standard. For European certification the aircraft had to go through a spin sequence which it passed. That spin sequence was not the full set required for FAA certification, however.
What surprises me is how big of a deal people make this. Look at the accident record and show me an accident where spin recovery was the issue. Furthermore, are people aware that the 737 wasn’t spin certified? Twins aren’t spin certified. Dick should know this.
Cirrus aircraft are excellent in the stall. I have stalled Cirrus and Columbia planes and done what you shouldn’t do i.e. left and right turns while stalled. However, I would not want to be full power and yank up hard so that both wing structures (not just inner) stalled. BTW, my first full power stall in a Cirrus did freak me out. There is so much power you are almost flat on your back when the plane stalls.
There have been at least two base to final turn events that resulted in a stall and crash. The Lindsay, OK crash is one and there was one at a fly-in community airport.
Cirrus seats fold down. The ones just introduced are easier. Prior to the new seats, the pin was hidden and not nearly as easy to use as the Columbia.
When people ask why pilots are getting into trouble in Cirrus aircraft they often focus on CAPS. Human factors studies done on automobile safety indicate otherwise. CAPS, airbags, cabin integrity etc. fall most closely into the passive safety category. While CAPS isn't completely passive it doesn't affect the way the plane flies and isn't in use during a normal flight. It has been shown that airbags and side impact rails don’t change how people drive. Better, brakes, bigger engines, bigger tires etc. do. Cirrus aircraft are roomy and comfortable as small planes go. They have large GPS screens and great autopilots. All of this encourages long trips. When transitioning to the Cirrus there were two items that hit me in the face. The first was the need for approach planning and speed management. No longer could I enter the pattern WOT. My instructor said “20 inches manifold pressure when 20nm out.” Secondly, weather planning had to become a serious factor for every flight. No longer could I look up and say “weather is fine.” A good example is a recent crash. It was a club plane and the pilot was just recently checked out. He was also low time overall. Low time overall and low time in type are two red flags. He was a VFR only pilot who wound up in the clouds. He didn’t turn around. I suspect he didn’t know how to use the autopilot. He was more worried about getting stuck on the ground than getting out of trouble. He didn't pull the red handle when he became disoriented.
I see a lot of posts about hand flying skills. Certainly they are important. However, as the crash mentioned above shows, it is just as important to really understand and use the systems available in the plane. What is really sad is the number of crashes where CAPS should have been the choice. Systems don’t help if you don’t use them.
