Alexb2000
En-Route
Sounds like something any private pilot could benefit from. But it seems that this training should be done in a FIKI airplane.
Agreed. Sadly not many in the training fleet.
Sounds like something any private pilot could benefit from. But it seems that this training should be done in a FIKI airplane.
See this Chief Counsel letter, especially the part about the "prudent pilot".
In many threads one can find evidence that CFIIs will take students into icing conditions in a non-FIKI aircraft, which clearly is not legal with the claim that the training value far exceeds the risk.
I have also read reports of the FAA burning pilots for 'you should have known there would be ice'.
Few questions:
What is the real training value?
Can an exemption or waiver be obtained?
What is the requirement for staying legal with ice where there exists conflicting data (forecasts, pireps, skew-t, radiosonde, etc)?
I'll go a little further, just to really stir it up on a Monday morning. I would like to see CFI's teach:
Spin entry and recovery
Actual engine out, key off, to landing, no second chances.
Actual in IMC spatial disorientation training even for VFR pilots
Real short field, with trees at the end kind of thing
Real hot and high flying
Night landings with NO aircraft lights
Real weather flying, no more VFR perfect morning flights
Real crosswind landings to at least 20 knots
There is NO substitute for the real thing. Giving pilots the real world confidence and at least some experience WOULD save lives.
Some requirements that should be added before a private checkride can be taken:
- A flight to the edge of the training aircraft's range(with 45 mins of fuel left!)
- Transition thorough or around class B
- 20-30 NM flight in marginal VFR
- 5 takeoffs & landings near gross weight
Second, there is no longer any "definition" of trace ice. The FAA did away with that over TEN years ago.
AIM 7-1-21 said:1. Trace. Ice becomes perceptible. Rate of accumulation slightly greater than sublimation. Deicing/anti-icing equipment is not utilized unless encountered for an extended period of time (over 1 hour).
2. Light. The rate of accumulation may create a problem if flight is prolonged in this environment (over 1 hour). Occasional use of deicing/anti-icing equipment removes/prevents accumulation. It does not present a problem if the deicing/anti-icing equipment is used.
3. Moderate. The rate of accumulation is such that even short encounters become potentially hazardous and use of deicing/anti-icing equipment or flight diversion is necessary.
4. Severe. The rate of accumulation is such that deicing/anti-icing equipment fails to reduce or control the hazard. Immediate flight diversion is necessary.
There's some value there, but mostly if you're doing it with a CFI who does upset training for a living. You won't get much value out of spinning a 172 with a 300-hour jet-jockey-wannabe-wonder CFI.
There are CFI's who do it. They say that if you push the mixture back in the engine just starts right back up. But, I have enough difficulty with hot starts when I'm sitting on the ground that I'm afraid to try it.
The reasons hot starts are difficult on the ground will not exist at altitude with a windmilling prop.
I don't think that's what the Chief Counsel said at all. What it says is that if you take reasonable precautions to avoid ice, they won't bust you if you stumble into it and get out quickly. They are most certainly not saying that it's OK to go flying into conditions that you expect will cause ice just to see what it's like but be excused because you thought you had an out.This thread has not reached a consensus that seems consistent with that interpretation as it would seem to me that if the CFII takes his student into conditions that have been thoroughly pored over where sufficient OUTs exists (the CCs letter mentioned this several times), that it could be considered a managed risk.
Heck, I'm neither wise nor a CFI but some of that seems to be all risk and no benefit. For instance killing the mags and removing the ignition key in the air generates less of a performance delta from a closed throttle landing than the variations due to aircraft loading and wind. One could argue that this generates realistic stress but the comforting presence of the CFI is likely to mitigate that and there are less risky ways to generate a stressful scenario to see how the pilot reacts. And in a real emergency landing situation the focus is about making it survivable, not protecting the airplane so this kind of simulated emergency is far from realistic.If we did all of that, we couldn't stand the training accident rate that would result. Some of that is good, some of that is a "pointless risk". The wise and experienced instructor can tell the difference.
Agreed. Any problems with the restart will likely be more about the cold temp of the engine.The reasons hot starts are difficult on the ground will not exist at altitude with a windmilling prop.
I expect that we'd see a significant drop in the new pilot population if PPL training was extended to the point where every pilot had experienced every possible adverse condition and had been fully qualified to deal with it at a professional level.Kent-
I won't quote you to keep it short.
In summary much of your list wouldn't be effective because the CFI's are not skilled enough or don't take the time to train to a high enough level of proficiency. There is a sermon in there for sure.
I think it is important to keep in mind that a private ticket is supposed to mean the pilot can fly passengers from one end of the country to the other day or night. It seems a dis-service if they can't do that the day they are certificated.
All the hot starts I've heard of have been on the ground, keep a eye on that ITT![]()
So, will you go up with me and shut down the (only) engine?
Some of us don't carry a spare, ya know.![]()
Agreed. Any problems with the restart will likely be more about the cold temp of the engine.
In summary much of your list wouldn't be effective because the CFI's are not skilled enough or don't take the time to train to a high enough level of proficiency. There is a sermon in there for sure.
I think it is important to keep in mind that a private ticket is supposed to mean the pilot can fly passengers from one end of the country to the other day or night. It seems a dis-service if they can't do that the day they are certificated.
To me what's important is that the pilots be trained to handle what they're likely to encounter and educated well enough to be able to recognize when they need more training.
The reasons hot starts are difficult on the ground will not exist at altitude with a windmilling prop.
To get a multi-engine rating one should be required to perform a dead engine vmc demo at 500 feet after takeoff, holding wings level, no rudder blocking allowed, in icing conditions.
Frankly, as long as it's not illegal or unsafe, I've got no problem with it.
Flight in to known icing without an equipped aircraft is illegal and unsafe.
Flight into IMC without operating IFR is illegal and unsafe.
Flight without POSITION lights is stupid and illegal. Now flight without a landing light or runway lights would be a different story (In fact I had neither to turn on doing my private night work).
You left out flying the plane at the gross weight. This is important if you train in a 172 or another four place where the instructor+student doesn't put you at the maximum. The first thing that pilot is going to do after he gets his ticket is load up three buddies and find out how different it flies.
Teaching students to be cavalier about busting the regulations and safe flight isn't teaching them to be better pilots!
Absolutely. And for PPL-ASEL throw in a takeoff with the gust locks in place as well as a completed emergency landing in a swamp or forest.To get a multi-engine rating one should be required to perform a dead engine vmc demo at 500 feet after takeoff, holding wings level, no rudder blocking allowed, in icing conditions.
OK... My only experience with an actual engine shutdown airborne was sitting in the back of a 414 training flight, where the prop was stopped and feathered. There was quite a lot of difficulty getting that engine started again. Even though that's a different situation, it probably adds to my reluctance to do such a thing when I don't have another one to get me to the scene of the perfectly executed emergency landing.![]()
Except for the icing, that's about what used to be required on the ME practical test, although it was 400 AGL, not 500.To get a multi-engine rating one should be required to perform a dead engine vmc demo at 500 feet after takeoff, holding wings level, no rudder blocking allowed, in icing conditions.
So, trying to get some educational value back into this thread...
With hot starts, the real issue is that you have such a low RPM to try to get air/fuel working in. When hot that becomes more difficult since the fuel gets hot and may be boiling in the lines, so you have vapor to contend with.
Even still, Continentals are pretty easy to hot start - on the 310 I get them started first try almost every time, and that included when the starting vibrator failed on my way to Mexico in March.
I'm in favor of teaching students how to save themselves from situations they will likely face vs. teaching the bare legal minimum and hoping for the best. It has nothing to do with legalisms or indifference.
In many threads one can find evidence that CFIIs will take students into icing conditions in a non-FIKI aircraft, which clearly is not legal with the claim that the training value far exceeds the risk.
I have also read reports of the FAA burning pilots for 'you should have known there would be ice'.
Few questions:
What is the real training value? Can an exemption or waiver be obtained?
What is the requirement for staying legal with ice where there exists conflicting data (forecasts, pireps, skew-t, radiosonde, etc)?
Don't you know that's against the rules these days?![]()
To be sure I'm understanding this correctly: At low RPM (IE, hot start on the ground, or even worse, starting from feathered in the air) we're running into problems that we wouldn't run into at high RPM because at high RPM the fuel pump is running faster, helping to push fuel into the lines, keeping them cool and free of vapor? In addition, we're pumping lots of air through the cylinders, keeping things moving and keeping the mixture from becoming overly rich?
Makes sense, if I'm getting it right.
I get it started almost every time now - Full throttle, mixture ICO, low boost for a minute or high boost for 20 seconds to pump cool fuel through the system, pump off, throttle to idle and then three twists in (would result in about 1000 RPM if the engine was running), then crank and twist the throttle in until it fires off.
What's your hot start procedure? Is there any way I can improve upon what I'm doing? Thanks!
Call me crazy but what seems to "work" seems to vary by engine and airframe installation. Basically the small differences between how things are all plumbed up between airframes seems to influence what works and what doesn't. At least that's my experience.I've heard of that working well on Continentals but never done it. Mine is everything full forward, prime same as cold, and then pull throttle back slowly while cranking. Starts by about 1/3 throttle.
[snip]
I've heard of that working well on Continentals but never done it. Mine is everything full forward, prime same as cold, and then pull throttle back slowly while cranking. Starts by about 1/3 throttle.
There was some interesting research done at the University of Wisconsin a couple of years ago that I participated in, based on the theory that we don't train pilots to deal with weather the right way.
There was a scenario presented that involved a lot of pressure on oneself to fly a particular flight. They gave you actual weather data - A full briefing from a real day was available, and you could choose one of two destinations that would accomplish your mission. You were allowed to make your own go/no-go decision, but you were pressured towards a go. Then, you got in a sim and flew the flight you planned (VFR).
Three groups were tested: Student pilots, non-instrument-rated Private pilots, and instrument-rated pilots. About 30 of each went through the scenario, IIRC.
I chose my destination and went, but ended up diverting about halfway there based on some criteria that I determined prior to takeoff for continuing safe flight. The majority of other instrument-rated pilots landed safely as well, though I don't think any were able to make it to the destination VFR.
As for the non-IR Private pilots? They all killed themselves. Every. Last. One.
Point? We tell people to set personal minimums and avoid weather that's anywhere close to not being VFR, but we never take them up in marginal weather, we never show them what it's like and how bad it really is, we never teach them how to make the proper decisions prior to a marginal flight to keep themselves safe, and we never put them in a situation where they have to do an actual diversion. Result? Pilots get into the real world and are pressured to fly in marginal weather, and the crashes that result are still one of the "big three" killers in aviation.
So, there is some validity to the idea of teaching those "situations they will likely face".
There was some interesting research done at the University of Wisconsin a couple of years ago that I participated in, based on the theory that we don't train pilots to deal with weather the right way.
There was a scenario presented that involved a lot of pressure on oneself to fly a particular flight. They gave you actual weather data - A full briefing from a real day was available, and you could choose one of two destinations that would accomplish your mission. You were allowed to make your own go/no-go decision, but you were pressured towards a go. Then, you got in a sim and flew the flight you planned (VFR).
Three groups were tested: Student pilots, non-instrument-rated Private pilots, and instrument-rated pilots. About 30 of each went through the scenario, IIRC.
I chose my destination and went, but ended up diverting about halfway there based on some criteria that I determined prior to takeoff for continuing safe flight. The majority of other instrument-rated pilots landed safely as well, though I don't think any were able to make it to the destination VFR.
As for the non-IR Private pilots? They all killed themselves. Every. Last. One.
Point? We tell people to set personal minimums and avoid weather that's anywhere close to not being VFR, but we never take them up in marginal weather, we never show them what it's like and how bad it really is, we never teach them how to make the proper decisions prior to a marginal flight to keep themselves safe, and we never put them in a situation where they have to do an actual diversion. Result? Pilots get into the real world and are pressured to fly in marginal weather, and the crashes that result are still one of the "big three" killers in aviation.
So, there is some validity to the idea of teaching those "situations they will likely face".
Call me crazy but what seems to "work" seems to vary by engine and airframe installation. Basically the small differences between how things are all plumbed up between airframes seems to influence what works and what doesn't. At least that's my experience.
I was taught (on a C-172R and a PA-28R-180) to run the boost pump for a specific amount of time wit the mixture rich. Then close the mixture, open the throttle and crank. When the engine catches, close the throttle (down to idle) and push in the mixture. The ice being to take it to a known state (i.e. flooded) and then correct it (open throttle, mixture cut off) until it runs.
Seemed to work both hot & cold OK. But I don't have a ton of experience. Maybe 15-20 starts total.
John
When I attended Scott D's Beyond the Wx Brief 2-day seminar we reviewed several Wx related NTSB reports and the associated Wx reports that would have been available to the pilot. What I learned is that sometimes an "FAA Standard Weather Briefing" is insufficient" and that all-around weather knowledge by most pilots is insufficient and they came to grief for it.
These were all IR pilots with decent TT who did nothing careless or reckless (except maybe 1 or 2 of them).
And sometimes, you're just unlucky. Also, how do you define "decent" TT?