>To say that the gist of this thread is "extremely dangerous" would be an understatement.
I don't know what was going on in this discussion, but more info is generally better than less.
>1. Remember the number "8" -- This is the increase in the risk factor for death or serious injury when attempting a turnback following an engine failure during takeoff vs. landing straight ahead (or nearly so).
>Source: Transport Canada, "An Evaluation of Stall/Spin Accidents in Canada," TP 13748E, 1999.
TC doesn't mention the Rogers/Jett work. Their conclusion is based on the performance of pilots who did not know the optimal technique nor when it could be performed successfully. Thus for the general case, their conclusion is correct.
>2. Remember the number "62" -- This is the overall success rate (percent) for turnbacks in a turnback-specific study using a simulator and techniques ranging from "pilot's choice" to "optimum turnaround bank/speed/g-load."
Sounds right. The success rate is going to be pretty low when anything other than the optimum technique is used AND one doesn't have metrics as to whether the maneuver can be done under a particular set of circumstances. All this means is that the maneuver has a high failure rate when you don't know what you're doing.
>3. Remember the number "68" -- This is the success rate (percent) for turnbacks in the turnback-specific study AFTER subjects were given specific instructions on how to execute the aerodynamic optimum bank/speed/g-load.
Seems reasonable, but I don't recall whether there was any actual flight training for that maneuver. In any case, it really doesn't matter -- my position is that you shouldn't attempt the maneuver if you have a viable alternative, i.e. a good landing site ahead. If the landing alternatives are poor (solid trees, buildings, cold water) then a 68% chance of success is superior to a straight ahead landing attempt.
>4. Remember the number "Zero" -- This is the margin for error when attempting a turnback at the aerodynamic optimum combination of bank, speed, and g-load specified in the paper referenced earlier in this thread.
That's factually incorrect. There are margins in stall speed, altitude and runway length for the maneuver, and if you use pre-takeoff performance metrics you know whether any or how much margin exists.
>If the turnback happens to work, the pilot will be the "Ace of the Base" for a day; if the turnback fails, there will be a burning hole in the ground that consumes both the occupants and the airplane. It's one of the two extremes, with no middle ground.
Not true. There are at least two other types of outcomes. One can attempt to land straight ahead under unfavorable conditions and also be injured or killed. Also, there are cases (including one at RHV a few years back) where the aircraft reached the field after a turnback and tore off a wing, but the pilots were not injured. Even if they were, that might be a considered a preferred outcome to hitting a house and injuring/killing people on the ground.
>5. Remember the numbers "5, 8, 2" -- In a one year period alone (October 2005-2006), there were a total of 5 accidents in the NTSB database wherein the flight profiles included the intentional practice of simulated engine failures with attempted turnbacks to the runway close to the ground. In each of the five cases, the cockpit contained two pilots: one of the two on board was either a CFI or an FAA Inspector.
No doubt low altitude practice of this maneuver is stupid. The maneuver should be practiced at an altitude appropriate for aerobatic training. I've talked to at least two pilots who had accidents while practicing from takeoff to touchdown. Neither had a clue as to the optimal technique and both made serious errors that caused the maneuver to be unsuccessful. Both thought they were knowledgeable in the maneuver, but neither knew of the Rogers/Jett work or had seem my presentation on this subject. Another point though is that there are no statistics on the numbers/percentages of successful attempts of this maneuver. I've used it successfully twice during partial engine failures, and have read numerous anecdotes of similar successes. Those events don't make the news or statistics.
>The results: 5 destroyed airplanes; 8 dead pilots; 2 injured pilots. Interestingly, during that same one-year period, there was only one accident in the database where an instructor and a student were killed during intentional spin training. Yet some in this Forum persist in perpetuating the myth that "spin training" is dangerous (and in general, it is dangerous if conducted by the average flight instructor; not so if conducted by those who specialize). What then does that make the practice of turnbacks close to the ground?
The accident record on spin training reflects the relatively low rate of that maneuver being performed. When spin training was mandatory there was a much higher incidence of fatal spin training accidents. That was the main reason that the FAA switched from required spin training to stall/spin awareness training. As for safety, specialization is not what counts. There are plenty of specialized instruction programs that teach sub-optimal (or even dangerous) techniques. And while I agree that training/practice of turnback maneuvers close to the ground is reckless, training at altitude is not. Most pilots to whom I've given this training conclude that it's too difficult a maneuver for them to perform reliably. There's considerable value for them in making that realization. For others, it becomes a technique they can use.
>6. Remember the number "43" -- In the five accidents referenced in item 5 above, some of the narratives described repeated attempts at turnbacks prior to the accidents. In those cases, the success rate was calculated: 43 percent of the turnback attempts were successful, with the last attempt of course being a smoking hole in the ground.
I'm actually surprised that the rate of success was that high. Very few pilots are familiar with the Rogers/Jett (and dare I say Philipson) research. This is meaningless though. Yes, this is incredibly dangerous if 1) you don't know what you're doing, and 2) you practice it from/to the ground.
>7. Remember the number "100" -- This is the success rate (percent) for all of the "straight aheads" attempted in the simulator study of turnbacks.
Yeah, that's correct, but consider that the criteria for success was (roughly) that the aircraft remained under control and had a relatively low descent rate upon landing. I know of several cases where a straight ahead landing attempt after engine failure was unsuccessful, some of them very high profile (e.g. the fatal crash of the LA traffic reporter "Yellow Thunder" in the 1980s from Fullerton). This past year there was a fatal accident at Cameron Park during a straight ahead abort. In real life cases, straight ahead landings have considerable risk too.
>Cirrus Design Corporation’s Pilot Training Bulletin PTB 02-06-01 doesn’t mince any words: "The ability to successfully complete and execute a return to the airfield maneuver after takeoff is a dangerous maneuver to practice at low altitudes and is therefore not authorized during training."
Sounds reasonable to me. Key words: "to practice."
>The Beechcraft Pilot Proficiency Program used to teach turnbacks after takeoff during their clinics based on the paper previously referenced in this thread -- that is, until an instructor and trainee were killed in the process. They no longer teach that close to the ground.
They never should have taught it close to the ground. Unfortunately we can't seem to stop people from doing unnecessarily dangerous things. In CAP we had a multiple fatality accident during training of canyon turns at low altitude, despite the fact that our training handbook has a notice in bold, capital letters warning that performing that maneuver at low altitude has a high risk of crash/injury/death (I wrote that warning). One crew did it anyway. They confirmed that the warning was correct.
>Bear in mind, too, that an actual engine failure in a fully-loaded airplane with passengers may very well include screaming passengers, smoke in the cockpit, oil covering the windscreen, and a lot more adrenalin than you might think -- how well will you perform under these conditions where your margin for error is zero? With turnbacks, you are playing Russian Roulette. You have been warned in no uncertain terms.
Sure, actual emergencies are stressful and your performance degrades. People do crash and burn on straight ahead landings too.
>Besides, if it were possible to train pilots to turn back with an equal or greater probability of success and survivability as the time-proven straight ahead, I or someone like me who specializes in emergency training would have developed and marketed such a training methodology. And that person would be able to name his/her price, because insurance companies would demand it as recurrent training. In my case, the fee for one day would be a percentage of the combined value of the airplane plus the pilot's life insurance policy. And I would be making more money in aviation than John and Martha King! But then again, I'd just be dreaming…
Well, maybe I'm a lousy businessman. My experience is that people do NOT flock to emergency maneuvering courses in general as they tend to be very expensive. 'Course, I don't claim that the probability of success is greater than a straight ahead landing for all cases, just that in certain circumstances the risk of the maneuver presents a better risk than a straight ahead landing. That training doesn't seem to make pilot's jump to spend even 1% of a $1.5 million loss on training. Perhaps I just need a marketing department.
