Flight Service
I began working for FAA FSS in 1976, continued through Lockheed-Martin's (LM) takeover and quit about eighteen months later when I saw what a big mistake had been made. A pilot's interaction with a FSS specialist has always been a crapshoot. Some specialists and management are good, others are horrendous. And now with LM, the odds are stacked against the pilots.
Even the good specialists and management are struggling with what use to be routine, simple tasks. When a pilot contacts FSS, he has started a scary game of chance. His call may be routed, rerouted, and rerouted around the U.S. The term LM uses for a call being passed around is it "waterfalls" or “cascades.” What that means is a call, if completed, can end up anywhere in the FSS system. Specialists, who had been doing the job efficiently for 20, 30, or more years, are now scrambling to field request from who knows where.
LM is approaching another anniversary of running FSS. It is still not unusual for FSS nationwide to go down. Hardware and software failures are common. The result is a system that is patched together, propped up, and worked around. LM is having difficulties staffing even the three major hubs, let alone the lesser facilities. Some employees who have had long careers are quitting rather than put up with LM's mess. New hires are getting a fraction of the benefits that specialists had once expected. All of this turmoil is making for a tense, unhappy workforce.
There is no going back. Bridges have been burned. The FAA will not entertain turning back the clock. That will not happen. After working in an FSS system that ran safely and efficiently, I saw it deteriorate to become dangerous. If I were flying, I would try my best to not rely upon FSS for anything. I have seen the confusion on the FSS side of the telephone and microphone. I have worked daily beside some unbelievably bad specialists, supervisors, and management. Why would one risk one's life in LM's game of chance?
Glenn Baker