I wonder if an ASRS report would be appropriate?
OK, I'll play along.
1) they had to be not be utilizing or paying attention to the GPS
Unknown at this point.
2) they had a visual approach, but they still could have had the localizer frequency set, but did not
Unknown at this point.
3) The tower at Branson either did not have radar surveillance, or if they did, the controller was not paying attention
Unknown at this point.
4) the pilot not flying did not pick up on the error
Unknown at this point.
5) someone in the last 15 minutes during the approach just happened to activate the pilot controlled lighting at Clark field on 122.7.
Unknown at this point.
The "Swiss Cheese Model" also known as "cumulative act effect" was developed by James Reason and Dante Orlandella (University of Manchester).
There is a lot written on it and I spent a great deal of time using it and doing analysis as part of Aviation Safety at the MMAC in OKC (FAA Academy)
In order to do an analysis you have to start with facts, not speculation. Speculation will only skew the results.
We need to know the following:
Aircraft make and model? I realize it was a B-737 but which variant? How was the aircraft equipped?
Any MEL/CDL items in effect at the time of the flight?
SWA procedures for approach at night (visual)?
Duties of PF/PNF during approach (SWA procedures)?
Briefing. Was there an approach briefing detailing the arrival and approach? Where fixes identified, verified on the chart as well as the FMS? Was the NAV accuracy verified on the FMS? What is the maximum drift allowed? Where the Navaids hard tuned or where they auto tuned? Was the airport diagram referenced in the briefing pertaining to approach lighting, landing aids and exiting the runway? How were the respective ND's and PFD's configured for the approach?
ATC. What altitude does radar coverage go down to? Does the tower at Branson have a scope? Did any controllers notice the aircraft was off course? Was the crew asked to verify position?
Human Factors? How long had the crew been on duty? Was this their first?second?third?forth? sector of the day and what day was the trip sequence in (first, second, third, forth?) How much sleep did the crew have in the previous 24 hours? 36 hours? 48 hours? Was there a change in their schedules? Recency of flight (day or night) into this airport for either crewmember?
What do the Captain and FO's training records look like? Any problem areas?
Any other carriers or SWA had previous problems with this airport in the past? Ongoing issues?
This is just a small sampling of questions just to begin the process. I don't think anyone here (unless someone from the FAA or NTSB working the investigation) has these answers yet.
Reason's "swiss cheese" model was a big component of early Safety Management System theory as developed by ICAO and in the early efforts by FAA. It has largely fallen by the wheyside as more sophisticated models have emerged.Here is a paste in of my metaphor: "...if you had several pieces of dissimilar Swiss cheese slices...".
I qualified it by saying "dissimilar"
Gene
OK so if PhD writing a paper it usually "peer" reviewed by high school students?
The metaphor has a fatal flaw.
If you take successive slices off a block of Swiss cheese, the holes will almost certainly line up...that's where "Groupthink" enters the equation
Reason's "swiss cheese" model was a big component of early Safety Management System theory as developed by ICAO and in the early efforts by FAA. It has largely fallen by the wheyside as more sophisticated models have emerged.
It's a matter of trying to get existing controls to defeat anticipated hazards. The problem with that approach is that some hazards can't be anticipated.
"The difference between genius and stupidity is that genius has its limits." -- Unknown, but often erroneously attributed to Albert Einstein.
Reason's "swiss cheese" model ...... wheyside
I appreciate and respect that you're knowledgeable in the field Aviation Safety.There is a lot written on it and I spent a great deal of time using it and doing analysis as part of Aviation Safety at the MMAC in OKC (FAA Academy)
I think speculation is really only harmful if it's the actual investigators doing the speculating. But I think that the OP just wanted to discuss the incident, and any "results" would just be topics for debate.In order to do an analysis you have to start with facts, not speculation. Speculation will only skew the results.
Until we know the facts, I'm fine with speculation. It's just a discussion board.We need to know the following:
...
'Merica!When did this group start attacking each other?!
Good one, Ken!
-Skip
...one thing is for certain...a couple probably otherwise pretty good pilots made a pretty big mistake and they'll likely be lucky to come back flying boxes on Caravan's in North Dakota in a year or two.
Wild speculation.
6 months on the ground and then back into the bidding rotation?
I don't know. Neither does anyone else here.
The investigation is not yet over and we're already concluding punishment??
OK, I'll play along.
1) they had to be not be utilizing or paying attention to the GPS
Unknown at this point.
2) they had a visual approach, but they still could have had the localizer frequency set, but did not
Unknown at this point.
3) The tower at Branson either did not have radar surveillance, or if they did, the controller was not paying attention
Unknown at this point.
4) the pilot not flying did not pick up on the error
Unknown at this point.
5) someone in the last 15 minutes during the approach just happened to activate the pilot controlled lighting at Clark field on 122.7.
Unknown at this point.
The "Swiss Cheese Model" also known as "cumulative act effect" was developed by James Reason and Dante Orlandella (University of Manchester).
There is a lot written on it and I spent a great deal of time using it and doing analysis as part of Aviation Safety at the MMAC in OKC (FAA Academy)
In order to do an analysis you have to start with facts, not speculation. Speculation will only skew the results.
We need to know the following:
Aircraft make and model? I realize it was a B-737 but which variant? How was the aircraft equipped?
Any MEL/CDL items in effect at the time of the flight?
SWA procedures for approach at night (visual)?
Duties of PF/PNF during approach (SWA procedures)?
Briefing. Was there an approach briefing detailing the arrival and approach? Where fixes identified, verified on the chart as well as the FMS? Was the NAV accuracy verified on the FMS? What is the maximum drift allowed? Where the Navaids hard tuned or where they auto tuned? Was the airport diagram referenced in the briefing pertaining to approach lighting, landing aids and exiting the runway? How were the respective ND's and PFD's configured for the approach?
ATC. What altitude does radar coverage go down to? Does the tower at Branson have a scope? Did any controllers notice the aircraft was off course? Was the crew asked to verify position?
Human Factors? How long had the crew been on duty? Was this their first?second?third?forth? sector of the day and what day was the trip sequence in (first, second, third, forth?) How much sleep did the crew have in the previous 24 hours? 36 hours? 48 hours? Was there a change in their schedules? Recency of flight (day or night) into this airport for either crewmember?
What do the Captain and FO's training records look like? Any problem areas?
Any other carriers or SWA had previous problems with this airport in the past? Ongoing issues?
This is just a small sampling of questions just to begin the process. I don't think anyone here (unless someone from the FAA or NTSB working the investigation) has these answers yet.
So I guess the FAA can call off their investigation and just use your findings?
Thanks for jumping right on this! How soon before you have the FDR and CVR tapes available?
A little refreshing training in verifying the terminal area procedures would be all it would take, depending on the pilots' attitude and history. I would think it would be more expense to train new pilots for the role, rather than retrain an otherwise qualified pilot.
Everyone makes mistakes. I certainly deserve the punishments of the errors I commit. There are certainly differing levels of errors. Even though the outcome of this error was only only considerable discomfort and inconvenience, it was a fairly serious error. Is it worthy of termination? I don't think so.
That being said, these guys did a fantastic job of getting that aircraft down and stopped in the space allotted, considering they likely did not realize it until they were committed to the landing. They, quite obviously, know their aircraft and its capabilities very well. A little refreshing training in verifying the terminal area procedures would be all it would take, depending on the pilots' attitude and history. I would think it would be more expense to train new pilots for the role, rather than retrain an otherwise qualified pilot.
Sure am glad docmirror is not judge, jury and executioner.
No, he is just a troll.
Honeck vs Chien
docmirror vs RotorandWing
Motel owner vs Senior AME on medical issue
IT guy vs FAA trained professional on accident issue
Who are our next contestants in the next round? Step up, don't be shy.
User CP > Edit Ignore list > Add member to ignore list > [docmirror] > Add(button).
Honeck vs Chien
docmirror vs RotorandWing
Motel owner vs Senior AME on medical issue
IT guy vs FAA trained professional on accident issue
Who are our next contestants in the next round? Step up, don't be shy.
Sorry about that. My bad. The fact that I can see this means I screwed up- somehow confused docmirror with climbnsink who is indeed a troll and the only POA member on my ignore list. Not sure how I got them confused.
I could care less if he ignores me or not, but I would appreciate it if someone will quote this so he can at least see my apology.
Boy, oh boy - you really skewered him!! Yessirree, there is no doubt he's shaking in his Nikes now, cause man - that was one snarky tongue lashing about his ideas and theories.
I can't wait for your op-ed, dead eye analysis with it's killer insightful and elegant turn of phrase.
Oops, it was docmirror and fearless tower this time. But, the general point is accurate.
I just like folks that provide lots of criticism but refuse to provide any contributory commentary. Everyone's a critic, but would they give an opinion, or make a stand on anything? Of course not! Just like the 'crats.
OK, I'll play along.
1) they had to be not be utilizing or paying attention to the GPS
Unknown at this point.
2) they had a visual approach, but they still could have had the localizer frequency set, but did not
Unknown at this point.
3) The tower at Branson either did not have radar surveillance, or if they did, the controller was not paying attention
Unknown at this point.
4) the pilot not flying did not pick up on the error
Unknown at this point.
5) someone in the last 15 minutes during the approach just happened to activate the pilot controlled lighting at Clark field on 122.7.
Unknown at this point.
The "Swiss Cheese Model" also known as "cumulative act effect" was developed by James Reason and Dante Orlandella (University of Manchester).
There is a lot written on it and I spent a great deal of time using it and doing analysis as part of Aviation Safety at the MMAC in OKC (FAA Academy)
In order to do an analysis you have to start with facts, not speculation. Speculation will only skew the results.
We need to know the following:
Aircraft make and model? I realize it was a B-737 but which variant? How was the aircraft equipped?
Any MEL/CDL items in effect at the time of the flight?
SWA procedures for approach at night (visual)?
Duties of PF/PNF during approach (SWA procedures)?
Briefing. Was there an approach briefing detailing the arrival and approach? Where fixes identified, verified on the chart as well as the FMS? Was the NAV accuracy verified on the FMS? What is the maximum drift allowed? Where the Navaids hard tuned or where they auto tuned? Was the airport diagram referenced in the briefing pertaining to approach lighting, landing aids and exiting the runway? How were the respective ND's and PFD's configured for the approach?
FMS database? Who is the supplier of the database? What charts (EFB ) are being used in the cockpit?
ATC. What altitude does radar coverage go down to? Does the tower at Branson have a scope? Did any controllers notice the aircraft was off course? Was the crew asked to verify position?
Human Factors? How long had the crew been on duty? Was this their first?second?third?forth? sector of the day and what day was the trip sequence in (first, second, third, forth?) How much sleep did the crew have in the previous 24 hours? 36 hours? 48 hours? Was there a change in their schedules? Recency of flight (day or night) into this airport for either crewmember?
What do the Captain and FO's training records look like? Any problem areas?
Any other carriers or SWA had previous problems with this airport in the past? Ongoing issues?
This is just a small sampling of questions just to begin the process. I don't think anyone here (unless someone from the FAA or NTSB working the investigation) has these answers yet.
I consider this a terminating event. I work in IT, and years ago I worked with a guy who went into a bank building to work on a mainframe and punched the Emer Power Off button on the wall. Sadly, he took down the wrong mainframe and caused hours of outage for the bank. No one was hurt, no one faced imminent danger but the financial results were horrible. He was marched out of the building, stripped of his badge and terminated immediately for cause.
This is the kind of stuff that makes for better decisions, when the consequence of mistakes is the loss of income. You can't tie unacceptable behaviors to outcomes and clearer than taking away someone's income with the exception of a fatal, or injury event.
Also, you don't get any points, or recognition of doing a 'fantastic job' handling an emergency that is of your own making. The plane was not broke, the Branson airport was open and functional, the instrumentation was available(I will assume), and they just screwed the pooch. Do not pass Go, do not collect $200. I guess short of sending them off to jail, they will be in some other industry for the rest of their lives, and for the remaining pilots on the payroll, it will serve as a clear and convincing example; "Is that our field?" "Hmmm, not sure, but let's double and triple check, cause we don't want to wind up like those turkeys down in Branson, who are now pouring concrete for a living."
Five unknowns and about 20 questions.
Contribution value: -20.
Really??
You obviously don't like the messenger (me) and you obviously feel the best solution is to fire these pilots without a proper investigation.
Please don't flatter yourself.
Just read what I wrote.
It has absolutely nothing to do with you personally, but if your contribution is to harass others who've contributed their ideas, but ask only questions, it's pretty clear you don't want to discuss, you want to critique. I get enough of that from She Who Must Be Obeyed.
Have a nice day.