Q? Cirrus SR20 deploys parachute

If no instrument flying ability, and no VFR within range, possibly.

Half mile vis for a non-IR pilot is not likely to allow a successful approach. A coupled autopilot ILS approach to a loooooong runway would make sense to try, unless the pilot was unsure of his ability to pull it off. Better a broken plane than a broken wife any day of the week.

In the end, it was his PIC decision, and to second-guess him based on this newsbrief is something of a fool's errand.
 
I had to look a few times. This was a pretty short article. So, where's the part about losing the engine?!?!?

If my eyes did not fail me, am I to understand he pulled the chute on a perfectly operating aircraft?!?!?

Maybe I can understand if the guy froze up and found himself suddenly incompetent to fly the aircraft. But, where was the effort to fly to a large field and perhaps even get an ASR approach? There just seems like enough other options to go for. The kicker I see to this is he could have drifted off over water, reducing chances of survival.

I'll go along with Ken, it may not be fair to second guess the PIC. But, I do have to wonder how recent his flight review was conducted and how much was covered; especially if there is frequent flight over water with limited visibility.
 
Me, no. Him, yes. He's alive, and so is his wife.
 
im with Dave, since im instrument rated i suppose that i wouldve tried to land the plane, but for most VFR only pilots, attempting an approach without training is nearly certain death. and the further along they get on the approach the closer they are to the ground plus more likely to lose control, and eventually without the option to pull the chute. the real question here is why did he take off without knowing that the weather would take a turn for the worse. coulda been forecast, coulda not been forecast. either way, in my opinion, with the conditions as they presented themselves, i will not second guess his decision.
 
It doesn't say if he's Instrument Rated, but one would obviously suspect not. Think Kennedy. I think he did the right thing, presuming he realized that he was over his head and knowing that inadvertent flight into IMC is frequently fatal. Whether he made the proper decision in taking off in the first place is another discussion. But, as others have said, he was the PIC, and he had a survivable outcome.
 
gprellwitz said:
It doesn't say if he's Instrument Rated, but one would obviously suspect not. Think Kennedy. I think he did the right thing, presuming he realized that he was over his head and knowing that inadvertent flight into IMC is frequently fatal. Whether he made the proper decision in taking off in the first place is another discussion. But, as others have said, he was the PIC, and he had a survivable outcome.
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Remember the one thing that JFK Jr. didn't do that would have saved their lives was reengage the auto-pilot. Why not do that before pulling the chute?
 
The moon set shortly after the sun did that evening. Weather was bad. Nantucket is a small island. He was definitely in IMC. Obviously, the pilot decided he was over his head. Deploying the chute was a good thing. He and his wife lived to tell about it.
 
ah i thought that it said he was VFR only pilot, read wrong. either way though
 
I'm not going to second guess the PIC either, but I have to disagree with some of the things said here.

First, pulling the chute is supposed to be a last resort. Something to do when you lose your engine at night over the mountains or you lose the rudder. Personally, I have to say that our standards are way too low if flying into poor visibility VFR only is cause to crash the airplane.

I don't know what the weather on the coast at the time was, but I would assume that there was VFR somewhere within 45 minutes. It's probably also a reasonable expectation that every pilot check on weather conditions en-route and divert as necessary before getting into a situation where there isn't VFR within fuel range. It's really hard to argue that something unexpected happened here. If you fly at night, into anything but perfect weather, it's foolish to launch without being proficient enough to handle poor visibility and other weather hazards.

If, as a VFR pilot, you want to fly over water at night, I'd expect - as a passenger - that you would be comfortable flying straight and level in IMC (flying at night over water without a visible horizon qualifies as that). Flying with others without that level of proficiency - a level of proficiency a VFR only pilot can achieve - is, in my book, incredibly irresponsible.

I won't second guess the pilot's decision to pull the chute at that point since he clearly was in over his head. But I would blame him for getting himself into a situation where the only way out was to crash a perfectly fine plane. That's way below the standards we as a community should be comfortable with. Just imagine if he had been flying something without a chute instead. We'd all be reading about yet another, completely avoidable, tragedy.

-Felix
 
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Found the metar to the time in question:
KACK 180253Z 22003KT 5SM -RA BR FEW008 BKN033 BKN044 19/18 A2979 RMK AO2 SLP088 P0037 60040 T01890178 56010
KACK 180251Z 22004KT 5SM -RA BR FEW008 BKN033 BKN044 19/18 A2980 RMK AO2 P0037
KACK 180153Z 27007KT 3SM -RA BR BKN005 OVC009 21/19 A2982 RMK AO2 CIG 003V008 SLP096 P0002 T02060194
KACK 180100Z 20007KT 3SM BR SCT001 BKN007 BKN015 20/19 A2981 RMK AO2 RAE0054
KACK 180053Z 21006KT 2 1/2SM -RA BR BKN001 OVC015 20/19 A2982 RMK AO2 RAB17 SLP098 P0001 T02000189
KACK 180050Z 21006KT 2 1/2SM -RA BR OVC001 20/19 A2982 RMK AO2 RAB17 P0001
KACK 180045Z 21008KT 1 3/4SM -RA BR OVC001 20/19 A2982 RMK AO2 RAB17 P0000
KACK 180025Z 22008KT 1/2SM -RA FG VV001 20/19 A2982 RMK AO2 RAB17 P0000
KACK 180018Z 22008KT 1SM -RA BR VV001 20/19 A2982 RMK AO2 RAB17 P0000
KACK 180014Z 21008KT 2 1/2SM BR SCT001 20/19 A2982 RMK AO2
KACK 172353Z 22007KT 6SM HZ CLR 20/17 A2982 RMK AO2 SLP097 T02000172 10256 20194 58003
KACK 172253Z 25008KT 10SM CLR 21/13 A2983 RMK AO2 SLP103 T02110133
KACK 172153Z AUTO 26010KT 10SM CLR 22/14 A2984 RMK AO2 SLP104 T02170139 TSNO
KACK 172053Z AUTO 26013KT 10SM CLR 23/13 A2983 RMK AO2 SLP101 T02280128 55008 TSNO
KACK 171953Z AUTO 26016KT 10SM CLR 25/10 A2983 RMK AO2 SLP100 T02500100 TSNO
KACK 171853Z AUTO 26017KT 10SM CLR 26/16 A2984 RMK AO2 SLP105 T02560156 TSNO
KACK 171753Z 26016G22KT 8SM BR CLR 25/18 A2985 RMK AO2 SLP109 T02500178 10256 20206 56011

And as I recall Friday night, there were spotty thunderstorms passing thru the area though nothing shows in the above report. The 6PM forecast mentioned rain and thunder possible. Nantucket is an island some 30 miles southeast of Hyannis. The weather was heading east-southeast. Very little details exist in any news report I've read. In fact, the above report is the longest I've read so far. No idea what the pilot experienced, if the plane was IFR equipped, or if the pilot had any training in IFR conditions.
So, NOW, do you fly the plane or pull the chute? It is possible that flying back to the mainland might have meant flying thru very adverse weather. Seems there have been a lot of occasions lately where the pilot of an BRS equipped plane pulls the chute. Is it the chute that gets the notoriety or the pilot's actions? Are the pilots flying more risky missions because they have a magic carpet? or in spite of the magic carpet? What makes someone launch into this kind of situation?
Not second guessing any pilot, just wondering out loud.
Knowing what I knew about Friday's weather, I wasn't flying but I am ultra conservative.
 
From the FAA :

IDENTIFICATION
Regis#: 869CD Make/Model: SR20 Description: SR-20
Date: 08/18/2007 Time: 0019

Event Type: Accident Highest Injury: Serious Mid Air: N Missing: N
Damage: Substantial

LOCATION
City: SIASCONSETT State: MA Country: US

DESCRIPTION
AIRCRAFT REPORTED PULLING THE CHUTE AND CRASHED NEAR SIASCONSETT, MA

INJURY DATA Total Fatal: 0
# Crew: 1 Fat: 0 Ser: 1 Min: 0 Unk:
# Pass: 1 Fat: 0 Ser: 0 Min: 0 Unk:
# Grnd: Fat: 0 Ser: 0 Min: 0 Unk:

WEATHER: 22008KT 1/2SM FG -RA 001 20/19 A2982

OTHER DATA
Activity: Unknown Phase: Unknown Operation:
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From the data John provides it appears that the visiblity went from 10 miles to less than 1 very quickly.

The incident pilot is with his wife, at night, and all of a sudden has no horizon flying to the airport made famous by JFK jr.

Sitting here in my LZ Boy I can think of lots of things he might have done. But picturing myself up there in that situation, I can't blame him for pulling the handle, not one little bit.
 
It looks like he flew into deteriorating weather, got in over his head and pulled the chute. IMHO the chute saved an idiot that was in over his head and never should have never been where he was in the first place. IOW, the chute saved him from his own poor planning and lack of decision making ability.
 
Good news: This idiot won't be flying his Cirrus for a while.

Bad news? A possibly survivable incident turned into an accident.
 
Insufficient data to judge. My first questions would be why a non-IR pilot was wandering around at night under VFR with that sort of weather in the area in the first place, i.e., this seems to have been totally preventable by one good pre-takeoff decision. One also wonders whether there were areas of VMC to which he could have flown. Further, the Entegra-equipped SR20 includes a coupled 2-axis autopilot, and Cirrus training focuses on the use of the autopilot from the git-go, even under VFR, so even if there was no good VMC nearby, one wonders whether hooking it up and heading for better weather or even a coupled ILS would have made sense.

Obviously, if everyone walked away, the final decision to pull the chute was not a bad one, but there appear to have been several bad decisions leading up to it. Thus, in this case, the final link in the fatal accident chain was broken by the pilot's one, last, good decision, and I can't argue with that.
 
I would have felt better about the pilot's actions after hearing about the 180 to get back to the good weather. Even a pathetic VFR-only guy like me can manage that (although I admit, I haven't yet tried it at night). If it formed up behind him and left him with no way out, lets hear it for the chute.
 
Did his plane have that startup screen that is supposed to get you to answer a bunch of safety-related questions before proceeding? If so, it didn't work very well...

:dunno:
 
I would have considered the other options discussed i.e. - autopilot, 180, look for alternate airport to land. However, without being in the plane with him, I can't second guess his actions. One thing with the chute, you don't want to wait until you are out of control and at high speed to pull the handle. If he was struggling just to maintain control and felt any attempt to maneuver or attempt to fly the plane out of those conditions would result in a loss of control, he did the right thing. However, I don't understand if he had a functioning AP why he didn't use it to at least get things under control and think through his options carefully. With any accident there will always be a lot of could've, should've, would've when sitting in the comfort of our home or office, but any bad situation that ends without death or serious injury is a good thing.
 
Ron Levy said:
Obviously, if everyone walked away, the final decision to pull the chute was not a bad one, but there appear to have been several bad decisions leading up to it. Thus, in this case, the final link in the fatal accident chain was broken by the pilot's one, last, good decision, and I can't argue with that.
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This is it in a nutshell...Safety is not determined by the lack of an accident. The ONLY difference is that, had he engaged the autopilot and flown to a more suitable destination, we wouldn't be having this discussion.

The outcome probably would have been the same (no injuries), there probably wouldn't have been an accident or NTSB report, but the flight itself wouldn't have been any more (or less, for that matter) safe.

Fly safe!

David
 
I'll have to wait and see what the NTSB report says. Did he contact Flight Watch/Flight Service to find out where better weather was? Did he contact ATC for help? Did he know how to use his autopilot?

I'd bet money this guy will be required to do a 709 ride, which he may or may not do. Either way, he learned an expensive lesson... I hope.
 
I think a posting of what the Cirrus POH has to say about conditions under which chute deployment is recommended might be pertinent. Unfortunately I don't have it, though I have read it in the past. It will surprise many of you.
 
Ah, found it, from the 2005 model. This seems much more conservative than I remember, perhaps it has changed, or perhaps I have a bad memory :confused:

Safety Information SR20

Cirrus Airframe Parachute System (CAPS)

Deployment

The Cirrus Airframe Parachute System (CAPS) is designed to lower
the aircraft and its passengers to the ground in the event of a life threatening
emergency. However, because CAPS deployment is
expected to result in damage to the airframe and, depending upon
adverse external factors such as high deployment speed, low altitude,
rough terrain or high wind conditions, may result in severe injury or
death to the aircraft occupants, its use should not be taken lightly.
Instead, possible CAPS activation scenarios should be well thought
out and mentally practiced by every SR20 pilot.
The following discussion is meant to guide your thinking about CAPS
activation. It is intended to be informative, not directive. It is the
responsibility of you, the pilot, to determine when and how the CAPS
will be used.

Deployment Scenarios

This section describes possible scenarios in which the activation of the
CAPS might be appropriate. This list is not intended to be exclusive,
but merely illustrative of the type of circumstances when CAPS
deployment could be the only means of saving the occupants of the
aircraft.

Mid-air Collision

A mid-air collision may render the airplane infallible by damaging the
control system or primary structure. If a mid-air collision occurs,
immediately determine if the airplane is controllable and structurally
capable of continued safe flight and landing. If it is not, CAPS
activation should be considered.

Structural Failure

Structural failure may result from many situations, such as:
encountering severe gusts at speeds above the airplane’s structural
cruising speed, inadvertent full control movements above the
airplane’s maneuvering speed, or exceeding the design load factor
while maneuvering. If a structural failure occurs, immediately
determine if the airplane is controllable and structurally capable of
continued safe flight and landing. If it is not, CAPS activation should be
considered.

Loss of Control

Loss of control may result from many situations, such as: a control
system failure (disconnected or jammed controls); severe wake
turbulence, severe turbulence causing upset, severe airframe icing, or
sustained pilot disorientation caused by vertigo or panic; or a spiral/
spin. If loss of control occurs, determine if the airplane can be
recovered. If control cannot be regained, the CAPS should be
activated. This decision should be made prior to your pre-determined
decision altitude (2,000’ AGL, as discussed below).

Landing Required in Terrain not Permitting a Safe Landing

If a forced landing is required because of engine failure, fuel
exhaustion, excessive structural icing, or any other condition CAPS
activation is only warranted if a landing cannot be made that ensures
little or no risk to the aircraft occupants. However, if the condition
occurs over terrain thought not to permit such a landing, such as: over
extremely rough or mountainous terrain, over water out of gliding
distance to land, over widespread ground fog or at night, CAPS
activation should be considered.

Pilot Incapacitation

Pilot incapacitation may be the result of anything from a pilot’s medical
condition to a bird strike that injures the pilot. If this occurs and the
passengers cannot reasonably accomplish a safe landing, CAPS
activation by the passengers should be considered. This possibility
should be explained to the passengers prior to the flight and all
appropriate passengers should be briefed on CAPS operation so they
could effectively deploy CAPS if required.
 
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flyingcheesehead said:
I'd bet money this guy will be required to do a 709 ride, which he may or may not do. Either way, he learned an expensive lesson... I hope.
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If I had to do a 709 for flying into IMC and exiting safely then landing (albeit with ZMP assistance), it's a pretty good bet this guy will be required as much.

I have a feeling he may not get insurance on that same type of bird again. While the carriers believe the risk is lower in payout on loss of life, I'd think they would expect a competent pilot who had been checked out accordingly to be capable of flying out of a problem and not simply pull the chute.

While my last statement may seem judgmental, I'm trying to picture this from an insurance carrier's point of view.
 
I have the sneaking purely speculative nagging thought that PIC syndrome was operative here. Pilot was licensed ASEL since 1985. Wife was aboard. No IR, in IMC. Is he going to declare an emergency in front of his wife?

Probalby been a LOOONG time since he had his 3 hours of instrument time refreshed.

Pilots don't train enough. had he been up to PTS standards, he would have arrested the turn, arrested the descent, put the power/climb to it, and returned to the mainland.

Sigh.
 
KennyFlys said:
I have a feeling he may not get insurance on that same type of bird again. While the carriers believe the risk is lower in payout on loss of life, I'd think they would expect a competent pilot who had been checked out accordingly to be capable of flying out of a problem and not simply pull the chute.
Click to expand...

ah but you assume he was insured and competent
 
tonycondon said:
ah but you assume he was insured and competent
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Well, I HOPE he was insured. If so insured, said insurance company surely hopes he is competent. Since most carriers who insure such aircraft require an annual or bi-annual recurrent training in addition (and often more intense) to the FAA-required flight review, they would have reason to expect the pilot to be competent. If that's the case, I wonder if an interview of that CFI would be on the "to do" list for an insurance investigator/adjuster before they pay out.

Aircraft insureds don't have the same protections as auto insurance policy holders. I'm betting carriers try anything possible to escape a substantial payout.
 
KennyFlys said:
Since most carriers who insure such aircraft require an annual or bi-annual recurrent training in addition (and often more intense) to the FAA-required flight review,
Click to expand...

Our insurance does not require anything above and beyond the minimum currency required by the FAA. Haven't flown in 1.9 years? Jump in the plane solo, get your three trips around the patch, load up the family and go...

...And we're a frickin' CLUB fer chrissakes. Insurance companies hate clubs. I can't imagine too many insurance companies requiring extra training for a fixed-gear four-place single. I'm sure it helps to reduce the rates substantially if you do, but I doubt it's a requirement.
 
bbchien said:
Probalby been a LOOONG time since he had his 3 hours of instrument time refreshed.
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In the last year, I've run into two instrument trainees who did not even have in their log the required 3 hours of instrument training for their PPL -- and no idea how that got by the DPE who gave them the practical test. I've also run into two clients who have completed at least two flight reviews with no instrument time on those review or even one tenth of instrument time since PPL five or more years ago. :no: Shame on the instructors involved!
 
KennyFlys said:
Since most carriers who insure such aircraft require an annual or bi-annual recurrent training in addition (and often more intense) to the FAA-required flight review, they would have reason to expect the pilot to be competent.
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Generally speaking, you can't get insurance in a Cirrus at any reasonable price unless you complete annually the Cirrus Pilot Proficiency Program offered by COPA or an equivalent such as PIC's 3-day refresher course. This attitude may be explained by the statistic given me by COPA that 50% of Cirrus accidents involve the 10% of Cirrus pilots who don't get such training.
 
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Ron Levy said:
Generally speaking, you can't get insurance in a Cirrus at any reasonable price unless you complete annually the Cirrus Pilot Proficiency Program offered by COPA or an equivalent such as PIC's 3-day refresher course. This attitude may be explained by the statistic given me by COPA that 50% of Cirrus accidents involve the 10% of Cirrus pilots who don't get such training.
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If carriers are requiring the recurrent training per their specifications and an endorsement or affidavit by a CFI... and, the insured pilot does not obtain recurrent training, I'd think the carrier would have placed a clause making the policy null and void in such an event. Or, one could reasonably assume a carrier would fight payout based on a requirement.
 
My insurance carrier offered me a lower price IF I could prove I had recurrent training. There are more sticks than just one they will use. I wouldn't bet against a clause saying if you weren't current when the accident occurred, they have the right to refuse the claim.
Of course, since they are sometimes issuing the policy based on a loan against the plane, I'm sure there are even more sticks they'll use.
But then, if you have enough money to buy a late model airplane, the cost of insurance might not be an issue.
 
flyingcheesehead said:
...And we're a frickin' CLUB fer chrissakes. Insurance companies hate clubs.
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From the point of view of an underwriter, a club is the pits. You have no control of who you're underwriting; the pilots are in the club becuase they're not going to get the hours to make ownership work (>120 hours/year). That's why the rates are qu ite high.

I thank an AIG underwriter with whom I spent about two hours at OSH this year for some insights.
 
silver-eagle said:
But then, if you have enough money to buy a late model airplane, the cost of insurance might not be an issue.
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True, the cost of coverage is pretty inconsequential to the value or cost of the insured aircraft. Regardless, when it comes to paying out a policy value that may exceed the premium by two or three hundred fold or more, they will seek whatever means available which may allow them to escape the obligation.

There's an extra kicker in all of this. Should the incident leading to the loss of your aircraft also cause the loss of your life, to your passengers or others be they in another aircraft or on the ground... the look-see they take is gonna be a LOT more in depth. Covering your aircraft becomes potentially nothing in comparison given that courts, particularly the juries, love to give away an insurance company's money. :yes:
 
I was in ACk the other day in the X. They had the remains of the cirus wrapped up in a tarp at one end of the airport. It looked like a Long EZ.
All I can say is the guy was lucky he was over land when he pulled the oh crap handle.

John
 
Ron Levy said:
In the last year, I've run into two instrument trainees who did not even have in their log the required 3 hours of instrument training for their PPL -- and no idea how that got by the DPE who gave them the practical test. I've also run into two clients who have completed at least two flight reviews with no instrument time on those review or even one tenth of instrument time since PPL five or more years ago. :no: Shame on the instructors involved!
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:eek: :eek: :eek:!!!

So, can the DPE's get in trouble for that? And doesn't instrument time go on the 8710, so shouldn't someone at the FAA have caught it too?
 
What I don't understand is how CFI's and DPE's can be held acountable for anything provided they followed the reg. Once a pilot is deemed worthy, aren't they accountable for thier own actions?
 
AWACSEng said:
What I don't understand is how CFI's and DPE's can be held acountable for anything provided they followed the reg. Once a pilot is deemed worthy, aren't they accountable for thier own actions?
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Signing someone off for a private check ride and then signing that someone passed the check ride without the required simulated instrument time is not following the regulations.
 
I was just speaking in general, not a direct reference to the above post. Sorry for the confusion.
 
silver-eagle said:
I wouldn't bet against a clause saying if you weren't current when the accident occurred, they have the right to refuse the claim.
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I don't know of an aircraft insurance policy that does not state that coverage is in effect only when the PIC is legally qualified and current when the accident occurs. Further, if you tell them you had the insurer-required recurrent training and it turns out you didn't, your application was fraudulent and the insurance contract is null and void.
 
flyingcheesehead said:
So, can the DPE's get in trouble for [letting someone take the PPL practical test with less than three hours of instrument time]?
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Yes, if the FSDO finds out.
And doesn't instrument time go on the 8710, so shouldn't someone at the FAA have caught it too?
Click to expand...
Yes, it should, although if someone has 2.6 hours in the log and rounds it to "3" on the 8710, nobody not seeing the actual logbook would know.
 
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