woodstock
Final Approach
The cabin probably needed to be wiped down with a damp cloth after that maneuver.
If they turned that plane around in 30 minutes like they do all the others, it probably wasn't even damp.
The cabin probably needed to be wiped down with a damp cloth after that maneuver.
It was the conclusion the board came up with based on several interviews with people who had flown with him and/or mechanics who had worked with him on the fuel selector problem.How do they know what happened to JD? I thought he more or less disappeared, and he was alone...
If they turned that plane around in 30 minutes like they do all the others, it probably wasn't even damp.
It occurs that unless there's a camera outside the door the flying pilot has no way to know if some bad guy is holding a weapon to the guy outside waiting to get back in.
I guess the FAs block the aisle with beverage carts but what kind of barrier is that?
Well, considering that the autopilot does not control the rudder, (that is a function of the yaw damper) the autopilot will feed in aileron input to counteract the roll. When it runs out of aileron, THEN the autopilot will kick off.
Well, rudder trim only feeds in at a given rate and it isn't particularly fast.
I am still betting there is something that happened that we aren't being told about. The Japanese culture seems to be all about "Face" They will do almost anything to keep from "losing face". What was that First Officer doing that caused the incident? It reminds me of the Northwest crew that overshot MSP because of being distracted by the laptops.
So what is the REAL story?
They'll never know for sure but that was a plausible theory.How do they know what happened to JD? I thought he more or less disappeared, and he was alone...
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:
the pilot's diversion of attention from the operation of the airplane and his inadvertent application of right rudder that resulted in the loss of airplane control while attempting to manipulate the fuel selector handle. Also, the Board determined that the pilot's inadequate preflight planning and preparation, specifically his failure to refuel the airplane, was causal. The Board determined that the builder's decision to locate the unmarked fuel selector handle in a hard-to-access position, unmarked fuel quantity sight gauges, inadequate transition training by the pilot, and his lack of total experience in this type of airplane were factors in the accident.