KAVX - Catalina Island, twin-engine Beechcraft crash 5 dead

Peter Ha

Pre-takeoff checklist
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Twin-engine Beechcraft 95 went down in steep terrain around 8 p.m. about one mile west of the island's airport
Several people are dead after a small plane crashed on Catalina Island Tuesday night
Details are extremely limited, but crews with the L.A. County Fire and the Avalon Sheriff’s departments began their search just before 8:30 p.m. at El Rancho Escondido Reservoir Road on Catalina, according to an L.A. County FD alert.

 
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So sad to hear....
Privately owned airport with No Operations Permitted at Night. 8pm Departure, sunset was about 6:30pm.
 
Very sad RIP
 
The accident aircraft was N73WA. It arrived at AVX from SMO at about 0119Z (6:19pm local) and departed at 0303Z (8:03pm local). The ADS-B track shows they used runway 22 for arrival and departure.

On the departure, there was a very brief climb to about 75’ AGL, then a descent off the plateau that the airport sits on, followed by a brief, shallow turn toward higher terrain to the right before the signal ends about 10 seconds and 0.25nm after crossing the airport boundary. Groundspeed at the fence was 92 knots and the last ping showed 117 knots. Keep in mind the signal down in the valley to the west of the airport might be blocked by terrain.

Not that AVX already isn’t a black hole, but the runway lights have been NOTAMed out for several years (and as pointed out earlier, it’s closed after sunset).

No METAR available, but weather cameras show that the marine layer was in, with tops between 1400’ and 1500’ MSL (just below the airport altitude of 1600’). Note that the departure end of runway 22 is 50’ higher than the approach end. It’s a fairly consistent 2.7% upslope from the numbers to the last 900’, where it mostly flattens out.
 
As a SoCal pilot I cannot even fathom why someone would takeoff Catalina at night, uphill, in a marine layer.
To be fair, I suspect the tops of the marine layer were below the airport. KNSI and KNUC were reporting bases of 002 and 007, respectively, which equates to bases of 700’ and 900’ MSL. Of course tops aren’t reported and AVX is a long way from each, anyway. No PIREPs for tops at that time (the layer hadn’t yet reached the mainland), but currently seeing PIREPS for tops at about 1500-1600’ (keeping in mind we’re 12 hours post-accident now).

But using weather cams situated above the layer, and judging where the tops met the terrain poking through (though an indirect view of the airport itself), I estimated them to be 1400-1500 MSL at that time. The layer does ebb and flow, but at that time it was peaking higher. But due to the geography of the island and given the general direction of the wind (west to southwest), and it being the early part of the evening when the layer is still moving in, there was likely a fairly fogless shadow on the leeward (east to northeast) side of the island, beginning around the crest, which is at the departure end of the runway. Some patches might have made it over, but they’d likely quickly dissipate as they descend on the east side of the crest.

So my best guess is the fog was thick below and beyond the departure end of runway 22, with possible patches anywhere around the airport itself, not for sure, but more likely around the departure end if there were any.
 
Damn. Experienced folks making mistakes is always a gut punch.
 
His voice sounded familiar...had a bit a rant at a controller that made VAS aviation on YouTube a handful of years ago
 
The other issue with Catalina is the runway is modestly crowned. The end of the runway can't be seen from the takeoff roll, going southwest(the general take off direction). I've taken off from there, and worried about the length which made ME pull it off green, which led to poor roll control, and I had to mentally force myself to push the stick forward and gain speed. After dark, I can imagine that the inability to see the far end of the runway could be confusing. Of course, it could have been something entirely different with engine problems, or nav issue or a dozen other things. But the crown presents an optical illusion of limited take off length.
 
He was 73, I’m sure his night vision wasn’t the best. To try and takeoff in blackness……
Even if the marine layer was below the airport, it would still be an instrument takeoff. Once the nose wheel is off the ground, transition to instruments. Night vision shouldn’t be an issue.
 
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…the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department said its Avalon station received a 911 emergency notification from a cellphone indicating that its user had been involved in a collision with possible injuries and providing GPS coordinates.

 
Word is that another aircraft had a mechanical issue at the airport. They had no ‘easy’ way to get out before nightfall. The pilot was planning to take the twin in, fly them out. His intentions seem in the right spot.


In the interest of learning from the tragic event, I’m not familiar with logistics at this airport, name some alternative options? Is a boat possible? Supplies for an overnight? Unexpected camping trip? You get the request, the airport will be closed at nightfall, send over the ‘pros’?
 
Word is that another aircraft had a mechanical issue at the airport. They had no ‘easy’ way to get out before nightfall. The pilot was planning to take the twin in, fly them out. His intentions seem in the right spot.
But why almost 2 hours between landing and takeoff?
In the interest of learning from the tragic event, I’m not familiar with logistics at this airport, name some alternative options? Is a boat possible? Supplies for an overnight? Unexpected camping trip? You get the request, the airport will be closed at nightfall, send over the ‘pros’?
Unexpected camping trip sounds about right.
 
KTLA is reporting that Safai made the flight to “help two stranded pilots” from Proteus Flight School who were trapped due to mechanical issues. That leaves two mystery occupants in the accident aircraft. Perhaps one or more A&P to try to fix the mechanical problem, thus the delay in departing.
 
There was a jitney service that would make the trip from Avalon up to the airport, it runs every hour or so. I think it stops running when the airport closes. It's been a few years since I was out there. Very little other options. It's possible they could have begged a ride, or I think there are one or two cabs on the island but they may not go up to the airport at that time. It would be unexpected camping, or a very long hike to town for a hotel. A long time ago, the hotel would send their little club car back and forth for guests, but that may not be avail anymore.

The stranded plane should have made some kind of arrangements once they found out they weren't getting out that day. Calling in another plane to pick them up after 6pm was not good. And, the pilot picking them up after dark was a reckless operation right from the start.

Edit to add; There were/are wild bison all over those hills, they are not tame or friendly. Walking around after dark and stumbling into a herd of bison would be a real problem.
 
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There was a jitney service that would make the trip from Avalon up to the airport, it runs every hour or so. I think it stops running when the airport closes. It's been a few years since I was out there. Very little other options. It's possible they could have begged a ride, or I think there are one or two cabs on the island but they may not go up to the airport at that time. It would be unexpected camping, or a very long hike to town for a hotel. A long time ago, the hotel would send their little club car back and forth for guests, but that may not be avail anymore.

The stranded plane should have made some kind of arrangements once they found out they weren't getting out that day. Calling in another plane to pick them up after 6pm was not good. And, the pilot picking them up after dark was a reckless operation right from the start.

Edit to add; There were/are wild bison all over those hills, they are not tame or friendly. Walking around after dark and stumbling into a herd of bison would be a real problem.

The only thing we know for sure is it departed after dark, didn’t climb much, descended below the plateau, and crashed into a hillside that defines the valley to the west and below the plateau. There’s a fair amount of evidence the fog was below the plateau, but not certain. It sounds like there was reason to believe there was significant external pressure involved in the ADM.

Regardless of what actually happened in this accident, I just want to revisit the fact that our training usually doesn’t cover the myriad scenarios and external pressures that lead to get-there-itis, especially at unfamiliar airports or regions, and there is a big opportunity to address and perhaps rectify that.

Bottom line, our certificates don’t disallow us from going to these really cool airports that are also unaccommodating or don’t leave room for an out. In this case, there are already a lot of considerations and restrictions being thrown around that most people wouldn’t know (attack bison, for one). Perhaps the rescue PIC made arrangements, perhaps there was an assumption that alternative, impromptu accommodation or transportation would be available on the island. Either way, there’s not a lot of time to verify that when you’re trying to beat the clock (which could be part of the error chain in itself). And as you said, sometimes plans B through D, that we think we might be able to do (based on old or incomplete information like a hike down or relying on transport), fall apart, or never actually existed in the first place. And this applies to the stranded crew as well.

Perhaps it was always the intention to depart, alternatives be damned. Perhaps the PIC was aware of a medical condition or something else he deemed necessitated an emergency “go” decision. I’m sure we’ll find out eventually. But on paper, without verified accommodations or alternatives (including camping in the plane), prudence would have dictated the conversation ending with “Sorry, it’s going to be too dark, so it’s a no-go. See you first thing in the morning.” If the reported motive for flying out there in this setting turns out to be true, it’s a sad case of well-intended heroism turned tragic, and it didn’t need to be.
 
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The only thing we know for sure is it departed after dark, didn’t climb much, descended below the plateau, and crashed into a hillside that defines the valley to the west and below the plateau. There’s a fair amount of evidence the fog was below the plateau, but not certain. It sounds like there was reason to believe there was significant external pressure involved in the ADM.

Regardless of what actually happened in this accident, I just want to revisit the fact that our training usually doesn’t cover the myriad scenarios and external pressures that lead to get-there-itis, especially at unfamiliar airports or regions, and there is a big opportunity to address and perhaps rectify that.

Bottom line, our certificates don’t disallow us from going to these really cool airports that are also unaccommodating or don’t leave room for an out. In this case, there are already a lot of considerations and restrictions being thrown around that most people wouldn’t know (attack bison, for one). Perhaps the rescue PIC made arrangements, perhaps there was an assumption that alternative, impromptu accommodation or transportation would be available on the island. Either way, there’s not a lot of time to verify that when you’re trying to beat the clock (which could be part of the error chain in itself). And as you said, sometimes plans B through D, that we think we might be able to do (based on old or incomplete information like a hike down or relying on transport), fall apart, or never actually existed in the first place. And this applies to the stranded crew as well.

Perhaps it was always the intention to depart, alternatives be damned. Perhaps the PIC was aware of a medical condition or something else he deemed necessitated an emergency “go” decision. I’m sure we’ll find out eventually. But on paper, without verified accommodations or alternatives (including camping in the plane), prudence would have dictated the conversation ending with “Sorry, it’s going to be too dark, so it’s a no-go. See you first thing in the morning.” If the reported motive for flying out there in this setting turns out to be true, it’s a sad case of well-intended heroism turned tragic, and it didn’t need to be.
That's a nice dissertation. But, why did you quote me? Did I write something you disagreed with? Have I made a glaring error in my info?:confused2:
 
That's a nice dissertation. But, why did you quote me? Did I write something you disagreed with? Have I made a glaring error in my info?:confused2:
Nah, I was agreeing. I left the quote in there because it offered some good insight that added to the complexity of the alternatives. I was expanding on that and lamenting as to how we’re too often left to our own devices once the chocks are in.
 
Sounds like most, if not all, onboard knew better.

Landing 6:15pm to pickup pilots stranded, understandable.

Staying on the ground 2 hours? Tried to fix the problem? What if they got it fixed, were they both going to depart illegally?

A friend of mine got a flat on Catalina, it was towards the end of the day and while maybe we could have got it rushed and fixed in time he took a cab into town and I flew out the next day with tools and tube.
 
55-year-old female passenger listed as a student pilot. Assuming there was also a yet-to-be-identified CFI passenger (instructor for student pilot) in addition to PIC.

Accident evening moonset 2200. At 2000, moon was setting to SW, 17 deg above horizon with 32% illumination.
 
So sad to hear....
Privately owned airport with No Operations Permitted at Night. 8pm Departure, sunset was about 6:30pm.


-
Attendance:​
0800-1700

OPS PROHIBITED AT NIGHT OR WHEN ARPT IS UNATNDD.


Unless they had called out the airport manager to attend, the airport closes at 5 pm, and Catalina can be very fussy about post 5:00 operations.
 
The airport’s operating hours are 8 a.m. to 5 p.m. daily, but pilots can arrive and depart after 5 p.m. before sunset so long as they pre-arrange with airport management, the airport’s general manager, Carl True, said.

“He pre-arranged for his arrival after 5 p.m.,” True said, “but not for the takeoff and he was advised of that.”

Pilot Not Given Clearance To Take Off From Catalina Airport
 
So many people made such a bad decision... The road to Abilene, I guess.

If they were stuck at the airport all they had to do was call the Sheriff's Department to come get them and take them into town (rescue). Plenty of places to stay in town, assuming there were vacancies. I'm sure they could have found something. Might have cost a pretty penny but it wouldn't cost them their lives.
 
55-year-old female passenger listed as a student pilot. Assuming there was also a yet-to-be-identified CFI passenger (instructor for student pilot) in addition to PIC.

Accident evening moonset 2200. At 2000, moon was setting to SW, 17 deg above horizon with 32% illumination.
The registered owner was a CFI.
 
In the interest of learning from the tragic event, I’m not familiar with logistics at this airport, name some alternative options? Is a boat possible? Supplies for an overnight? Unexpected camping trip? You get the request, the airport will be closed at nightfall, send over the ‘pros’?
There is an expensive cab that takes you down to a genuine town with hotels, restaurants, ferries, supermarkets, etc. It's not desolate. Having flown around CA since 2009 and been to AVX many times I'd quicker sleep in my plane than attempt an unlit potentially IMC night take off there.
 
4th identified occupant, 34-year-old male, listed as a student pilot.
 
The only thing we know for sure is it departed after dark, didn’t climb much, descended below the plateau, and crashed into a hillside that defines the valley to the west and below the plateau. There’s a fair amount of evidence the fog was below the plateau, but not certain. It sounds like there was reason to believe there was significant external pressure involved in the ADM.

Regardless of what actually happened in this accident, I just want to revisit the fact that our training usually doesn’t cover the myriad scenarios and external pressures that lead to get-there-itis, especially at unfamiliar airports or regions, and there is a big opportunity to address and perhaps rectify that.

Bottom line, our certificates don’t disallow us from going to these really cool airports that are also unaccommodating or don’t leave room for an out. In this case, there are already a lot of considerations and restrictions being thrown around that most people wouldn’t know (attack bison, for one). Perhaps the rescue PIC made arrangements, perhaps there was an assumption that alternative, impromptu accommodation or transportation would be available on the island. Either way, there’s not a lot of time to verify that when you’re trying to beat the clock (which could be part of the error chain in itself). And as you said, sometimes plans B through D, that we think we might be able to do (based on old or incomplete information like a hike down or relying on transport), fall apart, or never actually existed in the first place. And this applies to the stranded crew as well.

Perhaps it was always the intention to depart, alternatives be damned. Perhaps the PIC was aware of a medical condition or something else he deemed necessitated an emergency “go” decision. I’m sure we’ll find out eventually. But on paper, without verified accommodations or alternatives (including camping in the plane), prudence would have dictated the conversation ending with “Sorry, it’s going to be too dark, so it’s a no-go. See you first thing in the morning.” If the reported motive for flying out there in this setting turns out to be true, it’s a sad case of well-intended heroism turned tragic, and it didn’t need to be.
"Perhaps it was always the intention to depart, alternatives be damned."

A crusty old A&P told me he never understood the mag check at a distant airport. He said the engine is running and the pilot is going home regardless. Just agreeing with you that we sometimes push to depart even if it's not the best choice.
 
Speculation: Winds, from weather underground

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Why would one take off in a twin maxed out (5 aboard) e.g, carry three, to Avalon, to retrieve two? Five aboard a BE 95 even with much reduced fuel is close to or overgross. Usual useful loads are ~1270 ! If it's a B55 Baron, the useful is higher- but the BURN is higher.

Anybody remember "PAVE"?

I used to shrivel up my nose at that, in the evening due to land cooling you commonly get a tailwind on 04. Might have worked with just 3 aboard but IMO, the ONLY way out at night is "head for the ocean, Nemo", and on 3000 feet, NO margins in a (?over-) -grossed out light twin with just 3,000 feet. I dont have my BE 95 handbook handy but the should have been "just okay" on 04 (if not overgross). But then there's the hump in the middle that tends to toss you into the air B4 ready.....

This is a classic trap. It's the SETUP. Like Sedona AZ (only worse).
 
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The hump in the middle is such a strange thing for a runway. Is that a grandfathered standard?
 
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