How much longer to fix the 737 Max

Greg Bockelman said:
I think he was talking about the MAX, but yeah, fix the problem and it is still a good airplane.
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All I'm saying.

Boeing's inept implementation of this one system (and really, guys - no annunciation, no cross-check, on a device that is applying a substantial trim change?) is unfortunate; worse, the inadequate training and familiarization (although I know a couple of guys who fly it, claim the computer-only indoc they received was more than adequate; opinions vary).

I hate how the Swiss cheese holes have lined-up on this one; had the pilots and MX on the earlier LionAir flight done anything remotely close to their jobs, the first LionAir crash never happens; even then, they had it in-hand until (again, inexplicably) the pilot-flying apparently transitions control to the other guy without saying, "hey, you gotta keep trimming up, 'K?"

It's not as if there is a perfect airplane out there, and automation, working perfectly, can still kill you just as dead. AF447, in a 777 or 787, even with the unfortunate combination of confused pilots, probably ends clean, because Mr. Non-Flying Pilot sees the yoke in his belly and says, "Mon dieu!"

And I don't think any of us believe, with a straight face, that QF32 ends well with a cockpit of new-age systems operators; that situation required pilots.
 
SCCutler said:
And I don't think any of us believe, with a straight face, that QF32 ends well with a cockpit of new-age systems operators; that situation required pilots.
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...and lots of them and maybe more than a little Divine Intervention:

"The pilot in command of the aircraft, Captain Richard Champion de Crespigny, has been credited in the media as "having guided a heavily damaged double-decker jet to the safety of Singapore Changi Airport and averting what could have been a catastrophe".[25] At the time of the accident he had 35 years of flying experience[26] and was the first Qantas "line" pilot to fly the Airbus A380 as the captain.[not in citation given] He was commended for debriefing the passengers in the passenger terminal after the flight, disclosing details of the flight and offering care for his passengers.[27] In 2016, Champion de Crespigny was appointed a Member of the Order of Australia for significant service to the aviation industry both nationally and internationally, particularly to flight safety, and to the community.[28]

In 2010, Richard Woodward, a vice president of the Australian and International Pilots Association, reported that there were five pilots in the cockpit of this flight. In addition to the normal crew of captain, first and second officer, there were two additional check captains: the captain who was being trained as a check captain (CC) and the supervising check captain, who was training the CC.[15] Captain de Crespigny concentrated on flying and managing the aircraft and monitoring the (100 ECAM) checklists being sifted through by the first officer. The supernumerary pilots monitored all actions and assisted where necessary."

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qantas_Flight_32​
 
NJP_MAN said:
Every country in the world besides the us uses low time pilots in Boeings and airbus. They can fly the NG just fine. Boeing built a death machine and they know it. Sully is a joke when It comes to commentary. He needs to apologize for slandering that flight crew and never speak again. I hope Boeing gets many suits against them and they think twice about hiding software from crews and then not having an answer on how to actually fly the plane without killing hundreds.
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If you are going to write an Onion piece, you have to try to make it funny.
 
PPC1052 said:
If you are going to write an Onion piece, you have to try to make it funny.
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1 crash of and airframe is terrible news. 2 crashes in less than 6 months is a design failure. You cant tell anybody otherwise
 
Greg Bockelman said:
Really?!? A little knowledge is a dangerous thing. No knowledge even more so.
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And what knowledge do you have? Two virtually brand new aircraft fly straight into the ground and the answer seems to be it was a bug in the software? I'm pretty sure this has never happened before. We are in new territory here.
 
NJP_MAN said:
1 crash of and airframe is terrible news. 2 crashes in less than 6 months is a design failure. You cant tell anybody otherwise
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There is no valid logic in that statement. Now, we do know more than those two data points. And if you want to argue based on those facts, have at it. But the mere fact that two crashes in the same type occurred within six months gives rise to nothing more than a hypothesis.
 
SCCutler said:
This is, without a shadow of doubt, one of the most ridiculous things I have ever read on the Internet.
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I understand there are people who are unable to recognize irony or satire. Generally they are unobservant, oblivious, unaware, incognizant, self-absorbed, literal-minded or tunnel-visioned.

Possibly best described as an irony deficiency.
 
PPC1052 said:
There is no valid logic in that statement. Now, we do know more than those two data points. And if you want to argue based on those facts, have at it. But the mere fact that two crashes in the same type occurred within six months gives rise to nothing more than a hypothesis.
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Well Boeing admitted fault so theres that. How many 737s fly every single day ? How many NGs have crashed in the last 6 months? How many classics have crashed in the last 6 months? Statistics and an admission seem to be pretty strong evidence to formulate a nice foundation for hypothesis.
 
So from what I gave read the major issue at this point with the 737 is the short landing gear, and low clearance of the airframe. The new high efficiency engines need more clearance. Boeing decided that changing the landing gear length and the associated changes to the airframe and well as the take off and landing characteristics were two extensive and could push the plane to need a new type rating.

So the moved the pylons which changed the aerodynamics necessitated the MCAS.

Ok, with that out of the way. I am not sure why Boeing would continue to bandaid the clearance issue and not finally bite the bullet and lengthen the gear ( short of making a new plane). I know this would necessitate more training for pilots, but it would be an obvious and easily understood change, unlike flight chatacteristic changes which seem harder for some people to comprehend. It may also have been the more expensive fix. But fixing the obvious "problem" with the airframe at this point, seems like the best long term answer short of a clean sheet design.

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kgruber said:
I understand there are people who are unable to recognize irony or satire. Generally they are unobservant, oblivious, unaware, incognizant, self-absorbed, literal-minded or tunnel-visioned.
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It happens!

I get it, and I'm always vigilant. Just not always successfully so.

kgruber said:
Possibly best described as an irony deficiency.
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Gotta remember that one!
 
Larry in TN said:
The 737-10 MAX will have telescoping main gear.

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Interesting video, but looks like this landing gear is only meant to prevent tail strikes and does not do anything to improve engine clearance.
 
dmspilot said:
Interesting video, but looks like this landing gear is only meant to prevent tail strikes and does not do anything to improve engine clearance.
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Also begs the question, if they can do telescoping gear, could they give themselves another 12 or even 18 inches of clearance negating the need to relocate the pylons. The lengthened gear would seem to solve the issues which necessitated the pylon move, resulting in the negative change to flight characteristics.

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Silvaire said:
and the answer seems to be it was a bug in the software? I'm pretty sure this has never happened before. We are in new territory here.
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FYI: As I understand it, the MCAS worked as designed based on the data it received in both events. Why the data was corrupt has been determined in the Lion accident, but nothing has been determined in this accident. Why the Lion captain was able to maintain control and the co-pilot could not will hopefully come out in the final report. And time will tell if the 302 crew will be vindicated in their actions with that final report.

But this is hardly new territory. There have been numerous "bugs" in aircraft systems for years. For example, back in the late 80s an Airbus 320 failed to clear trees during its first demo flight with pax because the flight control FBW computer engaged a "protection mode" which limited pilot commanded elevator movement. In 2014, an Airbus 321 had this same flight computer "protection mode" activate during a climb through FL310 causing a 4000FPM dive because 2 AoA indicators jammed. Being FBW the crew could not correct the dive even with full stick inputs. Instead they had to manually disconnect the ADUs and recover the aircraft. There have been multiple failures/accidents with the 320/321 flight control system over the years...not months, yet the fleet was never grounded.

The irony, this Airbus "protection mode" was designed to prevent the aircraft from entering a stall. Sound familiar? At least with the MCAS there was a way to directly disable it and fly the aircraft.
 
Why can't they just disable MCAS and if need be put all crews through an extra stall recovery training session until they get the fix in? It doesn't seem like it ought to be such a big deal now that it's known.
 
cowman said:
Why can't they just disable MCAS
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Because it was the result of a certification requirement for flight control forces and not stall prevention. If Boeing can figure another way to increase/maintain the controls forces based on AoA per Part 25 without moving the stabilizer then MCAS would not be needed.
 
Bell206 said:
Because it was the result of a certification requirement for flight control forces and not stall prevention. If Boeing can figure another way to increase/maintain the controls forces based on AoA per Part 25 without moving the stabilizer then MCAS would not be needed.
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And the control forces are a result of moving the pylons. Is it time to ditch the 737, which I know Boeing does not want to do because of time and cost, or abandon the Max 8 and look to a solution that increases ground clearance? For instance, trying to get taller landing gear on the plane.

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drotto said:
Is it time to ditch the 737,
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I don't know. The emerging overseas markets are whats driving this size aircraft. Airbus came out with the 320/321 NEO which is what the MAX was upgrade to compete with. I think if they try and add taller gear to the 37 it will require a clean sheet. I also think the MAX 10 is a stop gap until the Boeing NMA/797 is certified which is a clean sheet design but I think it's designed toward the larger market the 57/67 services. But maybe they'll come out with a 797 short version instead and replace the 737. More people are flying and there isn't enough aircraft to handle the future market.
 
Bell206 said:
I don't know. The emerging overseas markets are whats driving this size aircraft. Airbus came out with the 320/321 NEO which is what the MAX was upgrade to compete with. I think if they try and add taller gear to the 37 it will require a clean sheet. I also think the MAX 10 is a stop gap until the Boeing NMA/797 is certified which is a clean sheet design but I think it's designed toward the larger market the 57/67 services. But maybe they'll come out with a 797 short version instead and replace the 737. More people are flying and there isn't enough aircraft to handle the future market.
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Making a short version of the 797 seems like it may be the smartest move at this point. Any clue how far off that plane is?

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NJP_MAN said:
1 crash of and airframe is terrible news. 2 crashes in less than 6 months is a design failure. You cant tell anybody otherwise
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NJP_MAN said:
1 crash of and airframe is terrible news. 2 crashes in less than 6 months is a design failure. You cant tell anybody otherwise
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There were more than 25,000 car crashes in the US in 2017. Obviously almost every auto on the roads is a design failure, right?

Go take an intro course in Logic.
 
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murphey said:
There were more than 25,000 car crashes in the US in 2017. Obviously almost ever auto on the roads are design failures, right?

Go take an intro course in Logic.
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Nice try. Boeing said they botched the deal. You cant defend them when they aren't defending themselves. Too late.
 
It was a joke, obviously MCAS doesn’t “think” anything :rolleyes:
 
drotto said:
Any clue how far off that plane is?
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The last I heard/read was 2025. But while a short version may work, it's a twin -aisle so I doubt Boeing will go that route to replace the 37. But who knows where this will end up. If they can figure a way to maintain Part 25 control forces without the MCAS/stabilizer trim may be a better route.
 
Silvaire said:
It was a joke, obviously MCAS doesn’t “think” anything :rolleyes:
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There are enough people taking extreme positions in various threads to make it difficult to tell who's joking and who isn't.

A ;) would have helped.
 
Bell206 said:
FYI: As I understand it, the MCAS worked as designed based on the data it received in both events. Why the data was corrupt has been determined in the Lion accident, but nothing has been determined in this accident. Why the Lion captain was able to maintain control and the co-pilot could not will hopefully come out in the final report. And time will tell if the 302 crew will be vindicated in their actions with that final report.

But this is hardly new territory. There have been numerous "bugs" in aircraft systems for years. For example, back in the late 80s an Airbus 320 failed to clear trees during its first demo flight with pax because the flight control FBW computer engaged a "protection mode" which limited pilot commanded elevator movement. In 2014, an Airbus 321 had this same flight computer "protection mode" activate during a climb through FL310 causing a 4000FPM dive because 2 AoA indicators jammed. Being FBW the crew could not correct the dive even with full stick inputs. Instead they had to manually disconnect the ADUs and recover the aircraft. There have been multiple failures/accidents with the 320/321 flight control system over the years...not months, yet the fleet was never grounded.

The irony, this Airbus "protection mode" was designed to prevent the aircraft from entering a stall. Sound familiar? At least with the MCAS there was a way to directly disable it and fly the aircraft.
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I can't speak for the dive of the A321 out of FL310, but the 320 into the trees had nothing to do with a fault in the design, but the failure of the pilots do fly the plane as designed.

They flew that approach over the grass runway to demonstrate the plane's alpha floor function, which occurs when the speed gets too low (well when the AoA gets too high). Plane goes to full power and the pilot can hold full aft stick and she'll climb out at Max AoA. Only thing is, alpha floor is disabled below a certain RA (100'? 80'? I have to look it up). It's disabled below that RA because it would be hard to land the a/c otherwise. So these pilots do a flyby, power at idle, waiting for the alpha floor to activate. Well because they are too low, lower than planned and briefed, AF doesn't engage and they just cruise on down the runway at idle power bleeding off airspeed until they realize it's not going to work. Shove the thrust levers forward and they get full power, but by then it's too late. Into the trees they go.
 
NJP_MAN said:
1 crash of and airframe is terrible news. 2 crashes in less than 6 months is a design failure. You cant tell anybody otherwise
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How many new versions of [fill in your favorite model of a car] crash within 6 days, not 6 months?
Heavens to murgatroyd, stop productionof that model!!!!
 
murphey said:
How many new versions of [fill in your favorite model of a car] crash within 6 days, not 6 months?
Heavens to murgatroyd, stop productionof that model!!!!
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Name another plane that has augered in 2 times in 6 months as a brand new release. Its not common in planes

Edit: if we saw 2 Neos, 2 A350s 2 787s all crash then you would have a point.
 
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NJP_MAN said:
Name another plane that has augered in 2 times in 6 months as a brand new release. Its not common in planes
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That is a logic fallacy. You are starting from the result and working backward.

Neither accident crew followed the applicable emergency checklist. The previous Lion Air incident crew, faced with exactly the same failure, did follow the applicable procedure and subsequently landed safely.

The reason your statement is a fallacy is that if the two accident crews had done as the incident crew did, followed the checklist and landed safely, you'd have a different conclusion--that there was nothing seriously wrong with the airplane even though the airplane is exactly the same.

Your statement is judging the airplane by the (poor) performance of the two accident crews, not on the state of the airplane itself.
 
I don't know how long it will take to fix the myriad software issues that are the result of the kludge of mounting too-large engines on the basic airframe, but it may take some doing and some time to re-earn the trust of the pilots who must operate it and the passengers who will fly in it. The 737 MAX, regardless of how it turns out as a business success, will enter the annals of seminal case studies for business schools, and maybe not in a good way.
 
Larry in TN said:
That is a logic fallacy. You are starting from the result and working backward.

Neither accident crew followed the applicable emergency checklist. The previous Lion Air incident crew, faced with exactly the same failure, did follow the applicable procedure and subsequently landed safely.

The reason your statement is a fallacy is that if the two accident crews had done as the incident crew did, followed the checklist and landed safely, you'd have a different conclusion--that there was nothing seriously wrong with the airplane even though the airplane is exactly the same.

Your statement is judging the airplane by the (poor) performance of the two accident crews, not on the state of the airplane itself.
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You're right. Perfectly good airplanes all parked and grounded by every aviation authority on the planet. Just because 2 poor performing crews and nothing else. My bad on assuming those weren't absolutely perfectly designed works of modern engineering. Great planes those maxes
 
NJP_MAN said:
You're right. Perfectly good airplanes all parked and grounded by every aviation authority on the planet. Just because 2 poor performing crews and nothing else. My bad on assuming those weren't absolutely perfectly designed works of modern engineering. Great planes those maxes
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I disagree. They were poorly designed, with decades old engineering.........JUST to satisfy the accountants at the airlines that wanted a common type rating. Band Aid on a Band Aid!!!!

They SHOULD have designed the best possible airplane for the job, and required a new type rating. What is a plane full of life worth?

They should all be scrapped.
 
NJP_MAN said:
You're right. Perfectly good airplanes ...
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You misunderstand. I did not make any comments on the validity of your conclusion.

My comments were only on your argument. I pointed out that it is a logical fallacy. Your conclusion may be correct; or maybe not. My point is that your argument is flawed so it can not support your conclusion. To support your conclusion you need an argument that is not a logical fallacy.
 
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