First - I tried hard to keep these quotes in context, I'm not trying to play any games. If I messed up the meaning, I apologize:
I've heard before "the new plants are so much safer than the old ones"
...
Now, as a panacea, we are told the new designs are safer. How are they safer? What's so good about them?
Safety has always been relative - risk vs reward. What is safe enough?
Are the new designs safer? That has to be relative, too. The failures that have occurred, and those which conceivably could occur, can be designed out. Failsafe systems, systems that don't need pumps to circulate cooling water (that's what killed the Fukushima reactors - the generators flooded, then batteries took over, but outside power couldn't be restored before the batteries failed.) The seawall could have been higher, the generators could have been located on higher ground, all human decisions. All this wouldn't have been an issue if there hadn't been a huge tsunami after an equally huge earthquake.
Think about airline travel (not GA) - pretty much a zero failure rate. Are the planes safer than a generation ago? Or are training and procedures better? Is it actually possible that we can learn from mistakes?
Will the new designs have their own problems? Possibly, probably - that's where we get into the knowns, unknowns, the known-unknowns, and the unknown-unknowns.
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But whenever some talking head is telling us about Fukushima or Chernobyl, they helpfully inform us that newer designs are not subject to that failure mode due to features X, Y, and Z. And while I'm no expert on nuclear engineering, the failures at these places weren't the result of some arcane and unknowable subject, it was mundane stuff, water and generators and pumps and management processes and risk management.
-harry
Yeah - I do think the failures, TMI included, were human - either a bad design, or bad procedures, or a failure to follow procedures. Again, I bring it back to airline travel - what about the Air France Airbus? A couple of bad sensor readings, and the humans couldn't figure it out in time. OK - the autopilot threw a curveball into the equation, but even that was a design decision.
Like I said, nuclear fission is complex, and only understood by a handful. Thus when someone says our new plant won't break, I am suspicious. Does that person have the expertise to actually make that statement?
I haven't heard anyone say they won't break - maybe someone has. But the design decisions for later generations of reactors have been to simplify, not to complicate. The KISS approach - makes it easier to understand the relationships between the internal systems and how failures could propogate or be mitigated if they do happen. I suspect the downside to this is going to be that the reactors will be designed to scram at the earliest possible out-of-tolerance condition, and that they'll end up with high downtime ratios. That will add into the $/kW production costs.
The best option I've seen so far is to bury it inside a geologically stable mountain in the middle of the biggest patch of desert we own, and we can't even do that.
I think the last line should be "... we won't even do that." It's not a technological problem, it's political. But yeah, politics are a reality.
All in all - my opinion - newer designs, standardized designs, and simplified designs all come together to lower the chances of an uncontrolled release of radiation. All the way to zero? Nothing has zero risk.
I think the problem still remains political.