Just to set the record straight ...
Since the subject of Project Apollo has been raised, I would point out that it was an electrical fault in an Apollo spacecraft which killed Grissom, White, and Chaffee,
The "fault", if there was one, has never been determined. Indeed, the last sentence indicates that tests showed that nylon space suits rubbing on nylon chairs was a possible ignition source. Certainly we have not yet figured out how to put circuit breakers on nylon.
"The review board determined that the electrical power momentarily failed at 23:30:55 GMT, and found evidence of several electric arcs in the interior equipment. However, they were unable to conclusively identify a single ignition source. They determined that the fire most likely started near the floor in the lower left section of the cabin, close to the Environmental Control Unit.[11] It spread from the left wall of the cabin to the right, with the floor being affected only briefly. The engulfed area on the left contained the manual depressurization valve which would have been used to vent the cabin atmosphere to the outside. Consequently, the astronauts were unable to reach it, however this was in any case insufficient to prevent heat and pressure buildup.[19] They noted a silver-plated copper wire running through an environmental control unit near the center couch had become stripped of its Teflon insulation and abraded by repeated opening and closing of a small access door. This weak point in the wiring also ran near a junction in an ethylene glycol/water cooling line which had been prone to leaks. The electrolysis of ethylene glycol solution with the silver anode was a notable hazard which could cause a violent exothermic reaction, igniting the ethylene glycol mixture in the CM's corrosive test atmosphere of pure, high-pressure oxygen.[20][21]
In 1968, a team of MIT physicists went to Cape Kennedy and performed a static discharge test in the CM-103 Command Module while it was being prepared for the launch of Apollo 8. With an electroscope, they measured the approximate energy of static discharges caused by a test crew dressed in nylon flight pressure suits and reclining on the nylon flight seats. The MIT investigators found sufficient energy for ignition discharged repeatedly when crew-members shifted in their seats and then touched the spacecraft's aluminum panels.
The more serious "fault" if we are finding fault was the engineering decision to run on 100% oxygen in order to reduce the amount of pressure inside the cabin and thus reduce the amount of structure needed to construct the pressure vessel.
and an electrical fault in an Apollo spacecraft which
almost killed Lovell, Haise, and Swigert.
You may, if you wish, call running a 28 volt device from a 65 volt system a "fault", but it was more like a stupid design error. Dropping and damaging the oxygen tank that blew up was compounding that error.
[FONT="]In October 1968, the Number 2 tank eventually used on Apollo 13 was at the North American Aviation plant in Downey, California. There, technicians who were handling the tank accidentally dropped it about two inches. After testing the tank, they concluded the incident hadn't caused any detectable damage.[/FONT]
[FONT="]The dropped tank was eventually cleared for flight and installed in Apollo 13. The tank passed all of its routine prelaunch tests. But at the end of March 1970, after a practice session called the Countdown Demonstration Test, ground crews tried to empty the tank -- and couldn’t. [/FONT]
[FONT="]The small tube used to fill and empty the tank of its super-cold contents had been damaged by the mishandling almost two years earlier. [/FONT]
[FONT="]To get around the problem, workers turned on heaters inside the tank to warm up the remaining liquid oxygen, turning it into gas that could then be vented to the outside. The thermostat inside the tank was supposed to prevent the temperature from exceeding 80 degrees Fahrenheit (25 degrees Centigrade).[/FONT]
[FONT="]But as the temperature inside the tank rose, the thermostat was activated, and the oversight from 1965 came into play. The resulting surge of electricity at 65 volts caused the 28-volt thermostat to weld shut. Technicians failed to notice the situation, and during the procedure to empty the tank, temperatures inside rose to 1,000 degrees Fahrenheit (500 degrees Centigrade). The intense heat damaged some insulation on wiring inside the tank.[/FONT]
[FONT="]No one knew it, but when Apollo 13 lifted off, it carried the makings of a small bomb inside its service module. [/FONT]
[FONT="]The "bomb" was triggered on the evening of April 13 when ground controllers asked Jack Swigert to turn on the fans inside the service module's two liquid-oxygen tanks, as a way of stirring the contents, to allow more accurate quantity readings.[/FONT]
[FONT="]When the fan inside the Number 2 tank was turned on, the damaged wiring caused a spark, starting a fire inside the oxygen tank.[/FONT]
[FONT="]With pure oxygen feeding the fire, the pressure inside quickly grew to the point where the tank burst open, at the same time damaging much of the other plumbing inside the densely packed service module and crippling the spacecraft.[/FONT]
Imagine in each case if a c/b had popped before the fire started or the tank blew. Imagine further if they had reset it.
But there WAS no circuit breaker that popped on either of these accidents, so you are once again setting up a straw man that you might blow it down with a zephyr. Keep to the subject.
So I recommend you read the
SAIB ??? linked above
and do what it says unless you have a really,
really good reason to reset a c/b in flight.