Another crash in San Diego, ugh. SR22T this time

Really. Why did they make it worse?

Were the earlier models (say 15 years ago) worse?

They made it bigger 65 ft (vs 55ft) to enable a gross weight increase and a slower vertical descent under canopy (resulting in a softer landing). Physics made the deployment sequence a bit longer thus the extra 120 ft. Whether it is worse or not depends on how you value gross weight, slower descent rate and min deployment altitude trade offs.

There were no changes from the first serial number until the G5 so the earlier ones were not 'worse'
 
There were no changes from the first serial number until the G5 so the earlier ones were not 'worse'
Makes sense. Interesting since the guy who checked me out in the 2005 SR22 told me not to pull unless above 1400'. I thought that was a little excessive.
 
I started doing the following after reading about a similar accident a few years ago. It's now become automatic.

As soon as my wheels leave the ground I start a mantra:

"Straight ahead, straight ahead, straight ahead," over and over thru the climb until I reach an altitude that will allow another option (700 to 1000 feet agl, typically).

My hope is that if the engine-failure-on-takeoff happens to me that this reminder/mindset will help ensure I make the right decision. It's a simple thing to incorporate into your takeoff routine.

I used to say this out loud until one day my wife asks me what I'm doing?

"Just repeating the plan if the engine should fail right now," I say.

"I don't want to hear THAT!" she says.

Now I just run the mantra thru my brain silently...
 
Makes sense. Interesting since the guy who checked me out in the 2005 SR22 told me not to pull unless above 1400'. I thought that was a little excessive.

It’s not uncommon (or wrong) for people to add safety margin to the demonstrated performance numbers I quoted since after all, they are cutting it close but 1400 ft is a LOT of buffer for a hard deck type personal limitation.
 
I started doing the following after reading about a similar accident a few years ago. It's now become automatic.

As soon as my wheels leave the ground I start a mantra:

"Straight ahead, straight ahead, straight ahead," over and over thru the climb until I reach an altitude that will allow another option (700 to 1000 feet agl, typically).

My hope is that if the engine-failure-on-takeoff happens to me that this reminder/mindset will help ensure I make the right decision. It's a simple thing to incorporate into your takeoff routine.

I used to say this out loud until one day my wife asks me what I'm doing?

"Just repeating the plan if the engine should fail right now," I say.

"I don't want to hear THAT!" she says.

Now I just run the mantra thru my brain silently...

I do this with stop lights while driving.
 
Interesting since the guy who checked me out in the 2005 SR22 told me not to pull unless above 1400'
My original training was similar. Yes, technically out of MYF by about 1,000 indicated you are "safe" to pull the chute, but let's be honest... if you have a power failure or emergency that seconds and feet are going to tick by fast. If you climb up to 1,400 that, around here, pretty much puts you at pattern altitude and gives you more options to either glide it back to the runway, or pull the chute with plenty of buffer and margin

Having said that, this is where the CFIs will differ. In my more recent SR22T (G5) transition training I'm being taught to pull it once your above the CAPS altitude without even hesitation, no questions asked. With the big composite prop these things don't glide all that well especially if you still have a notch of flaps out from T/O (which incidentally come up at the caps height... coincidence, I think not!), and neither SEE nor MYF give many options. Heck, we were at 2,500 the other day coming back in and he asked "pull the chute, or make that field?" and the answer he was looking for was "pull the chute" (later was demonstrated why by bringing throttle to idle and watching that little banana on the G1000 get very close)

Personally, anyone who's flown with me knows that when I pass the 400 AGL mark (in the older SR20 I fly) I grab the handle quick and announce "CAPS" as an obvious item that if the S hits the fan here I'm pulling it
 
RIP Pilot, and condolences to his family.

That looks pretty awful. It does look like there was an attempt to activate the CAPS, but I don't see a canopy.
 
Interesting he made the same flight yesterday but this time departed on 05 rather than 10L given the metar at the time.

Sent from my SM-G930T using Tapatalk
Wonder why he departed from 5. He would have been in much better shape from 10L.
I'm wondering the same. Longer runway and a 3/4 mile long field at the end.
 
I wonder why the engine quit. Seems like a new aircraft should not have had this issue.

Courtesy of Mike Busch:

1200px-Bathtub_curve_svg-1024x724.png
 
Some of the higher altitudes (such as 1,400 feet) being mentioned RE: CAPS deployment may actually relate to incipient spin or loss of control minimum altitudes (if my Cirrus transition training memory is fairly accurate).

There are straight and level recommended altitudes, "hard"straight and level minimum altitudes, and then there are loss of control / unusual attitude / spin minimums. That might explain why someone has told you in the past a bigger number than the 500 (G1-G3) or 700 ft (G5-G6) numbers most Cirrus pilot's use as their go-to number for low altitude deployment. In other words should you find yourself in a stall/spin/loss of control at pattern altitude or less, you are in a coffin corner of the parachute envelope regardless of which generation you fly. I'm not saying don't pull and pray, but your results may not be optimal...

The chute is fantastic safety feature when used within the recommended operating envelope, I think once (after 2012) the training focus dialed in on low/slow pattern speed control and handling, along with chute operation when in parameters being a "pull first and ask questions later", the safety record of the type has improved a lot.

I noticed when I did the training how obsessive it was about terminal environment (low/slow/approach/speeds/handling) and CAPS briefing/operations/memory items and I'm impressed with how COPA has managed to push such a consistent/standardized training worldwide.
 
I wonder why the engine quit. Seems like a new aircraft should not have had this issue.

Lol, no.

The most dependable planes I've been around are the most smoke ones, which often tend to be the oldest ones.
 
Typical mike. Pretty graphs and no answers. :p
actually there is a graph with axis and numbers, research done by Nathan Ulrich. its there in the video below


zeej... how fast we judge other people on this board sometimes amazes me
 
Thank you for the concern! I’m still here!
I'll admit I had the same thought and almost PM'd you. Though we met only once, it was a memorable ride for me and my trepidation at the top of this thread was real until I scrolled to your post. :)
 
actually there is a graph with axis and numbers, research done by Nathan Ulrich. its there in the video below


zeej... how fast we judge other people on this board sometimes amazes me
Stop responding to my jokes with serious answers. My post was more along the lines of I would like to know specifically what it was that caused the failure.
 
I'll admit I had the same thought and almost PM'd you. Though we met only once, it was a memorable ride for me and my trepidation at the top of this thread was real until I scrolled to your post. :)

There are something like 50 Cirrus based at KMYF so it's not quite as likely as it might first seem. But I have gotten a few check in emails and texts since this happened. Also turns out I did talk to the pilot very briefly once and he by all accounts seems to have been a great guy so that makes it a bit worse. RIP
 
Back
Top