777 cockpit vs Airbus cockpit

Concur. Never flown the 777 but flown the B-52G/H, B-737-300/500, 757-200, 767-200/300 and plummed the 727-200. Currently on the A319/320 but transitioning to the 75/767 again. With out a doubt, the Airbus cockpit is quieter, roomier and better designed ergonomically. It also has the cup holders and grab handles Kimberly liked plus the tray table.
I like the side stick and auto trim. All airliners have some degree of automatic protections that limit what the pilot is allowed to do. The Airbus flys like any other aircraft in the maneuvers required for normal or even emergency operations and even better than most in the low speed regime. Saying the 777 or Boeing is better because you can roll it is pretty pointless.

Gotta love grab handles.
 
I prefer to fly on a boeing any day, the first time I stepped into an Airbus cockpit I realized the pilots are just passengers, they get a very fancy tray table and a better window view.
the 320 that went into the Hudson did so because the birds knocked out the air data probes and since the engine computers didn't know what the airspeed and temp was they rolled the engines back to idle (I've only heard this discussed on maintenance sites) in a 737 you have cables going to the engine controls instead of the throttle just being a electronic signal, a 737 would have been able to keep power on as long as the engines could turn.
Capt. Sullenberger has stated more than once that pilots loose their flight skills flying an airbus due to the lack of feel in the side stick, he attributes his safe landing to flying outside the airbus on the side.
Other than the air france crash that I believe does more to prove the problem with the side stick, we also have the Rockaway crash right after 911 that seems to show a lack of computer oversight where it is needed, and where the pilot would most likely assume there would be a limitation since bank and roll are limited.
There also is the A-320 crash into the trees (easy to find on youtube) that the crew swore they were doing a missed approach but the computer was locked into a landing. A fellow mechanics father flew the 330, but after more than once having the aircraft start sway in a larger and larger pattern until the rudder was pushed, or the autopilot was taken off, he switched to only 767's.
I trust the pilot over the computer any day, as someone who changes and deals with computers quite often.
 
I prefer to fly on a boeing any day, the first time I stepped into an Airbus cockpit I realized the pilots are just passengers, they get a very fancy tray table and a better window view.

Really? Please enlighten us?

the 320 that went into the Hudson did so because the birds knocked out the air data probes and since the engine computers didn't know what the airspeed and temp was they rolled the engines back to idle (I've only heard this discussed on maintenance sites) in a 737 you have cables going to the engine controls instead of the throttle just being a electronic signal, a 737 would have been able to keep power on as long as the engines could turn.

Really? So the birds ingested into the engines had nothing to do with it?

And which 737's are you referring? The older classics (-100,-200,-300,-400) or the NG series (600, 700, 800, 900)?

Got news for you, all of the newer generation Boeing's don't have cables going to the engines, they are FADEC just like Airbus.

Capt. Sullenberger has stated more than once that pilots loose their flight skills flying an airbus due to the lack of feel in the side stick, he attributes his safe landing to flying outside the airbus on the side.

Hmmmm. I fly an Airbus and that statement is pure BS.


I trust the pilot over the computer any day, as someone who changes and deals with computers quite often.

So which modern generation transports are devoid of computers? Using your "logic" ( :lol: ) should we also avoid the 747-400/800, 757, 767, 777 and 787???
 
I prefer to fly on a boeing any day, the first time I stepped into an Airbus cockpit I realized the pilots are just passengers, they get a very fancy tray table and a better window view.
.................................I trust the pilot over the computer any day, as someone who changes and deals with computers quite often.

I'll add to what Rotor Wing says by pointing out the fact that the Toulouse crash into the trees, the tail separation in NY, and AF 447 were ALL PRIMARILY PILOT INDUCED CRASHES. I"ll also say that if you're worried about flying on a design with a history of rudder problems, stay off the 737. Weren't there 3 fatal crashes due to bad design leading to rudder reversal/hardover.

I'm not saying you can't have a negative opinion of the Airbus versus Boeing. You just need to base that opinion on the ACTUAL DIFFERENCES between the two designs and not on "my friends Dad said", or "I once sat next to a guy who said" or even "I saw on the internet and Youtube".
 
Apparently that was a factor in the Air France A330 accident. The co-pilot was pulling back on the stick, despite being in a stall, while the captain pushed forward not realizing what the co-pilot was doing. The brilliant engineers at Airbus programmed the software to average out control inputs from either side when they conflict.

This is 100% true. A big warning light indicating conflicting control movements, could very well have saved them.

Although, it was the two co-pilots, a senior and a junior co-pilot doing the flying. The senior pilot was pushing the nose down, junior pilot pulling the nose up. The computer averaged the inputs. The training the pilots received did not emphasize that the computer would do this. They should have clearly exchanged the controls.

However, with a side by side interconnected yoke system IMO they would have a much greater chance at figuring out they were both trying to fly the plane at the same time.
 
This is 100% true. A big warning light indicating conflicting control movements, could very well have saved them.

Although, it was the two co-pilots, a senior and a junior co-pilot doing the flying. The senior pilot was pushing the nose down, junior pilot pulling the nose up. The computer averaged the inputs. The training the pilots received did not emphasize that the computer would do this. They should have clearly exchanged the controls.

However, with a side by side interconnected yoke system IMO they would have a much greater chance at figuring out they were both trying to fly the plane at the same time.

Guess what. There is a warning light in front of each pilot as well as a big loud voice that says "DUAL INPUT" every time this situation happens.
 
Guess what. There is a warning light in front of each pilot as well as a big loud voice that says "DUAL INPUT" every time this situation happens.

Does it do that in alternate law, or whatever mode it is that the airplane goes into when it loses its airspeed sensors?

Don't have time to read the whole thing but the BEA final report - which mentions the GPWS saying 'pull up' and etc.. makes no mention of that warning.

http://www.bea.aero/en/enquetes/flight.af.447/rapport.final.en.php


The aeroplane’s altitude reached its maximum of about 38,000 ft; its pitch attitude
and angle of attack were 16 degrees.
At 2 h 11 min 37, the PNF said “controls to the left”, took over priority without any
callout and continued to handle the aeroplane. The PF almost immediately took back
priority without any callout and continued piloting.
 
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I prefer to fly on a boeing any day, the first time I stepped into an Airbus cockpit I realized the pilots are just passengers, they get a very fancy tray table and a better window view.

:lol:

the 320 that went into the Hudson did so because the birds knocked out the air data probes and since the engine computers didn't know what the airspeed and temp was they rolled the engines back to idle (I've only heard this discussed on maintenance sites) in a 737 you have cables going to the engine controls instead of the throttle just being a electronic signal, a 737 would have been able to keep power on as long as the engines could turn.
Capt. Sullenberger has stated more than once that pilots loose their flight skills flying an airbus due to the lack of feel in the side stick, he attributes his safe landing to flying outside the airbus on the side.

I'd rather have been in an A320 rather than a 737 in that instance, but that's just my opinion. Pilots lose skill because they don't fly much, not because of the side stick.

Other than the air france crash that I believe does more to prove the problem with the side stick, we also have the Rockaway crash right after 911 that seems to show a lack of computer oversight where it is needed, and where the pilot would most likely assume there would be a limitation since bank and roll are limited.

The A300 is a conventionally (non FBW) controlled airplane. Computers had nothing to do with it.

There also is the A-320 crash into the trees (easy to find on youtube) that the crew swore they were doing a missed approach but the computer was locked into a landing.

The A320 crash into the trees was the result of the pilots not understanding the systems of the plane. The plane did EXACTLY what the pilots told it to do, the entire time. They were trying to demonstrate the stall protections of the plane (Alpha floor), but those are inhibited at low altitude because, well it'd be hard to land if they weren't. They flew the pass a lower than briefed altitude and it was below the altitude where the alpha floor is deactivated, so they just coasted along. As soon as the pilot commanded full thrust, he got it. It was just too late.

A fellow mechanics father flew the 330, but after more than once having the aircraft start sway in a larger and larger pattern until the rudder was pushed, or the autopilot was taken off, he switched to only 767's.
I trust the pilot over the computer any day, as someone who changes and deals with computers quite often.

If you trust pilots over a computer any day, your days of being on airplanes is rapidly coming to a close. Virtually all modern airliners are bristling with computer interfaces. Pilots still do have the final say, yes even in an Airbus, but the two are intertwined and will be forever.
 
Apparently that was a factor in the Air France A330 accident. The co-pilot was pulling back on the stick, despite being in a stall, while the captain pushed forward not realizing what the co-pilot was doing. The brilliant engineers at Airbus programmed the software to average out control inputs from either side when they conflict.


You know what happens if two pilots in a Boeing try to fly the plane independently?


The plane will average out the control inputs. It's done mechanically rather than electronically, however.


It would be very obvious, however. Much more so than the side sticks, though there is a (very) loud "DUAL INPUT" warning on the 'bus.
 
You know what happens if two pilots in a Boeing try to fly the plane independently?


The plane will average out the control inputs. It's done mechanically rather than electronically, however.


It would be very obvious, however. Much more so than the side sticks, though there is a (very) loud "DUAL INPUT" warning on the 'bus.

I'm not sure I'd like that. We're about to fly in to a mountain. I yank the yoke left. Copilot yanks the yoke right. We fly in to the mountain.
 
I'm not sure I'd like that. We're about to fly in to a mountain. I yank the yoke left. Copilot yanks the yoke right. We fly in to the mountain.

Then you and your copilot should contemplate the quality of your training and experience in the last moments of life, because you're doing it wrong. Only one person is supposed to be flying the plane.

Btw, the airbus has a far better escape procedure for GPWS encounters than Boeing.
 
This is 100% true. A big warning light indicating conflicting control movements, could very well have saved them.

Although, it was the two co-pilots, a senior and a junior co-pilot doing the flying. The senior pilot was pushing the nose down, junior pilot pulling the nose up. The computer averaged the inputs. The training the pilots received did not emphasize that the computer would do this. They should have clearly exchanged the controls.

However, with a side by side interconnected yoke system IMO they would have a much greater chance at figuring out they were both trying to fly the plane at the same time.

100% not true. First off, the Captain was standing in the cockpit like an idiot and never took the controls, both control seats were occupied by FOs. Secondly, when the the PNF in the left seat grabbed the control it functioned and he recovered the bank angle. The PF in the right seat noticed and said "yeah, you take it" from what I recall reading from the transcript.
 
Then you and your copilot should contemplate the quality of your training and experience in the last moments of life, because you're doing it wrong. Only one person is supposed to be flying the plane.

+1 ... sigh.
 
100% not true. First off, the Captain was standing in the cockpit like an idiot and never took the controls, both control seats were occupied by FOs. Secondly, when the the PNF in the left seat grabbed the control it functioned and he recovered the bank angle. The PF in the right seat noticed and said "yeah, you take it" from what I recall reading from the transcript.
While I don't have the transcript handy at the moment, I do recall reading that the capt was taking a nap elsewhere
and had to be called to the flight-deck where the two FO's were flying the plane with opposite inputs.
And yes the pilot in the left seat had taken control from the pilot in the right seat, but the pilot in the right seat had for
some unknown reason continued to administer opposite control inputs than the pilot in the left seat.
The Captain was in the cockpit during the final moments and did realize the problem when it already too late to pitch
the nose down to bring the a/c out of the stall.

Now let me go find that transcript....:dunno:
 
While I don't have the transcript handy at the moment, I do recall reading that the capt was taking a nap elsewhere
and had to be called to the flight-deck where the two FO's were flying the plane with opposite inputs.
And yes the pilot in the left seat had taken control from the pilot in the right seat, but the pilot in the right seat had for
some unknown reason continued to administer opposite control inputs than the pilot in the left seat.
The Captain was in the cockpit during the final moments and did realize the problem when it already too late to pitch
the nose down to bring the a/c out of the stall.

Now let me go find that transcript....:dunno:

My recollection of the transcript is that the left seater never touched the controls until around 12,000' where the PF had his realization that this was really happening and moved his hand to the side a bit, the left seater grabbed it and saved it with the right seater happily transferring the control.
 
Don't have time to watch that, but if it's any of the ones that were done before the FDR and CVR were found, the information is incomplete.
You are correct Sir!
That video was made before the recovery of the CVR, but this other one is from afterwards with Sully as a consultant.

 
I can't help but think the accident could have been avoided if there was an obvious way to tell what the control inputs by the other pilot were. Part of the reason for there being two heads up front is so they can cross check each other. So why exclude control inputs from that?
 
I can't help but think the accident could have been avoided if there was an obvious way to tell what the control inputs by the other pilot were. Part of the reason for there being two heads up front is so they can cross check each other. So why exclude control inputs from that?

AF 447? Are you kidding? Three pilots can't figure out the damned plane is stalled and won't fly with the power pulled all the way back and you think that the sticks, which caused ZERO confusion between the pilots were the disastrous components how?
 
I can't help but think the accident could have been avoided if there was an obvious way to tell what the control inputs by the other pilot were. Part of the reason for there being two heads up front is so they can cross check each other. So why exclude control inputs from that?


Would have interconnected sidesticks helped? Probably.


Should have it come to that? No.



If the other pilot was really interested in wondering what the PF was doing, he could have looked over... You can see the stick if you look.
 
Would have interconnected sidesticks helped? Probably.


Should have it come to that? No.



If the other pilot was really interested in wondering what the PF was doing, he could have looked over... You can see the stick if you look.

I still don't see where a stick interconnect would have helped, there was no problem related to it. If they wanted to save the flight one of the three pilots should have shoved the throttles in.
 
AF 447? Are you kidding? Three pilots can't figure out the damned plane is stalled and won't fly with the power pulled all the way back and you think that the sticks, which caused ZERO confusion between the pilots were the disastrous components how?


:hairraise:okay before you burn me at the stake here I'm not saying that it was the main contributing factor, but having independent controls couldn't help.

Let me better explain myself by first asking a question. How can you tell what an Airbus is doing aerodynamically when you're flying if it auto-trims?
 
I still don't see where a stick interconnect would have helped, there was no problem related to it. If they wanted to save the flight one of the three pilots should have shoved the throttles in.

I thought they were at full thrust for most of the descent. It didn't matter because they were so stalled they would have never recovered unless they got the nose down, as opposed to "powering out" of a relatively lightly stalled condition at low altitude. I need to go look again to find out.

The interconnect would have only provided a chance for the PNF to realize the PF had full aft stick. Who knows if it would have worked. It should have never got to the point in the first place, as I no doubt you'll agree. When the tubes froze and they had a invalid reading what they should have done is NOTHING. 2.5 nose up and cruise power. That would have kept them upright and flying, even if not exactly at their altitude. Plenty of time to sort out the problem.


Of course, it's easy for me to dissect it while sitting on my couch. Nonetheless, in the AF447 case doing nothing would have been the best thing possible.
 
:hairraise:okay before you burn me at the stake here I'm not saying that it was the main contributing factor, but having independent controls couldn't help.

Let me better explain myself by first asking a question. How can you tell what an Airbus is doing aerodynamically when you're flying if it auto-trims?

Same as any plane that auto trims, you look at the trim indicator. As for the sticks, if you're pushing right and all of a sudden the plane jinks another direction, you'll notice, and just like on AF447, you'll look over at the other guy and know what's happening. The reality is, that system worked just fine.
 
The interconnect would have only provided a chance for the PNF to realize the PF had full aft stick. Who knows if it would have worked. It should have never got to the point in the first place, as I no doubt you'll agree. When the tubes froze and they had a invalid reading what they should have done is NOTHING. 2.5 nose up and cruise power. That would have kept them upright and flying, even if not exactly at their altitude. Plenty of time to sort out the problem.


Of course, it's easy for me to dissect it while sitting on my couch. Nonetheless, in the AF447 case doing nothing would have been the best thing possible.

^^^ This
 
I still don't see where a stick interconnect would have helped, there was no problem related to it. If they wanted to save the flight one of the three pilots should have shoved the throttles in.
Agree.
You'd think that 75 stall warnings would have given the pilot not flying a clue what was happening. The fact that they were able to ignore this has way more to do with the crash than cockpit design.
 
I still don't see where a stick interconnect would have helped, there was no problem related to it. If they wanted to save the flight one of the three pilots should have shoved the throttles in.

I don't know how the fly-by-wire logic in an Airbus works, but in the planes I fly, it's the primarily the yoke position that stalls the airplane, not the throttle setting.
 
Same as any plane that auto trims, you look at the trim indicator. As for the sticks, if you're pushing right and all of a sudden the plane jinks another direction, you'll notice, and just like on AF447, you'll look over at the other guy and know what's happening. The reality is, that system worked just fine.

I'm just playing devils advocate here but why should you have to look over to see what the other pilot is doing?
I would think seeing the control inputs can be just as important as any instrument. So make it obvious by having them visible at least in your peripheral.
 
I thought they were at full thrust for most of the descent. It didn't matter because they were so stalled they would have never recovered unless they got the nose down, as opposed to "powering out" of a relatively lightly stalled condition at low altitude. I need to go look again to find out.

The interconnect would have only provided a chance for the PNF to realize the PF had full aft stick. Who knows if it would have worked. It should have never got to the point in the first place, as I no doubt you'll agree. When the tubes froze and they had a invalid reading what they should have done is NOTHING. 2.5 nose up and cruise power. That would have kept them upright and flying, even if not exactly at their altitude. Plenty of time to sort out the problem.


Of course, it's easy for me to dissect it while sitting on my couch. Nonetheless, in the AF447 case doing nothing would have been the best thing possible.

The problem was that the PF didn't have the hand flying skills in nor understanding of the functions in Alternate Law. The second the AP kicked off the PF grabbed the stick and lost control, didn't understand that he was already at his service ceiling unable to climb and that any significant increase in AoA would lead them into a stall.

If I had to pick the one factor that would have made the difference is for the stall warning system not to self silence because the stall was unbelievably deep, yet there was no indication that it wasn't stalled, not one.

If it was me, I'd send the Chief Test Pilot for the plane to the Guillotine for passing that off to production.
 
Go get some actually training on the airframe before making such a ludicrous statement. :rolleyes2:

Chief Test Pilot is responsible for pilot ergonomics. That bit of ergonomic stupidity killed all those people. In France, you get prosecuted for those kind of errors.
 
Well, sorry I started this tangent. Anyway, my amateur opinion of 477 is that the control stick intermix operation was a contributing factor. This is my reasoning. The PF in the right seat held the stick back almost all the way to the ocean. Even if the PNF (left seat, I think) jammed his stick all the way forward which would be a ludicrous control movement in an airliner, the plane still may not have recovered from the deep stall they were in. Also, they were flying at night, and I presume the cockpit lights were very low, so looking over at the other control may not have provided the clues present that a control system found in Boeing and all Cessnas.
 
Well, sorry I started this tangent. Anyway, my amateur opinion of 477 is that the control stick intermix operation was a contributing factor. This is my reasoning. The PF in the right seat held the stick back almost all the way to the ocean. Even if the PNF (left seat, I think) jammed his stick all the way forward which would be a ludicrous control movement in an airliner, the plane still may not have recovered from the deep stall they were in. Also, they were flying at night, and I presume the cockpit lights were very low, so looking over at the other control may not have provided the clues present that a control system found in Boeing and all Cessnas.

Only thing was, when the left seater did take the controls, it worked! He put the stick back to where it was and kept the falling leaf stall right side up. The guy in the right lost the wing and the guy on the left got it back, still didn't recover the stall though, just the bank.
 
Only thing was, when the left seater did take the controls, it worked! He put the stick back to where it was and kept the falling leaf stall right side up. The guy in the right lost the wing and the guy on the left got it back, still didn't recover the stall though, just the bank.

This reinforces my opinion. The right seat didn't know what the left was doing and the left didn't know what the right was doing. With unitary controls, it would have been much more clear.

Contributing factor, not exclusive.
 
This reinforces my opinion. The right seat didn't know what the left was doing and the left didn't know what the right was doing. With unitary controls, it would have been much more clear.

Contributing factor, not exclusive.

The right seater knew right away, looked over at the left seater and said "yeah, take it".
 
The right seater knew right away, looked over at the left seater and said "yeah, take it".

I suppose I could post another 64 times, and you would still quote me 65 more times with some talking point to get the last word in. Well - go ahead, do what you gotta do...
 
I suppose I could post another 64 times, and you would still quote me 65 more times with some talking point to get the last word in. Well - go ahead, do what you gotta do...

You've caught on. :yesnod:
 
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