5 Dead In MO SR-22 Crash

[Everskyward]

Airlines don't have that option. They're also bound by the rules to not even shoot an approach if the reported weather is below their minimums, so they'll be headed for a reasonable alternate much earlier than most of us flivvers.

Legally that is true, but just because the Part 91 rules are more lenient doesn't mean that pilots need to take advantage of this to try approaches at airports when it probably would make more sense to head to an alternate much like the commercial operators. The rules are just giving you more rope with which to hang yourself.

 

[dell30rb]

IMO, a pilot who isn't comfortable flying an ILS to 200 feet is probably just as dangerous going missed at 500 feet as he is flying the ILS to 200 feet, breaking out and landing.

Now, if he hears the AWOS and decides to go elsewhere... Great. But IMO, you shouldn't even start shooting an approach unless you're willing to fly to published minimums.

I somewhat agree. The ILS is noticeably more sensitive at the lower altitude but you should be capable of flying one down to 200feet without chasing needles all over the place if you want to shoot an approach to 500'agl.

In my limited experience the ride down the chute from 500' to 200' is usually pretty easy. If wind shear is present it is usually wreaking the most havoc around 900-1200 feet. If you're tracking well at 500' you should be able to take her down to 200' no sweat

 

[Jaybird180]

Our club has an elite sim.. its okay... and by okay I mean it kinda sucks.

$7500 will get you around 3.5 years of currency flying under the hood. Thats based on 2.5 hours per month and a guess that you'll get enough actual to stay current for three months per year.

I forgot about that! Our club has a sim too - though I've never laid eyes on it. It is an ELITE PCATD version 8 of their software, and the Pro Panel, dual throttle quadrant, rudder pedals, and avionics stack.

I still want something at home. Doesn't need to be ambitious (I don't think)

 

[Threefingeredjack]

IMO, a pilot who isn't comfortable flying an ILS to 200 feet is probably just as dangerous going missed at 500 feet as he is flying the ILS to 200 feet, breaking out and landing.

Now, if he hears the AWOS and decides to go elsewhere... Great. But IMO, you shouldn't even start shooting an approach unless you're willing to fly to published minimums.

Excellent point. Once you are stabilized and on the rails you might as well take the whole ride.

 

[timwinters]

IMO, a pilot who isn't comfortable flying an ILS to 200 feet is probably just as dangerous going missed at 500 feet as he is flying the ILS to 200 feet, breaking out and landing.

Now, if he hears the AWOS and decides to go elsewhere... Great. But IMO, you shouldn't even start shooting an approach unless you're willing to fly to published minimums.

Actually, probably more dangerous.

 

[peppy]

IMO, a pilot who isn't comfortable flying an ILS to 200 feet is probably just as dangerous going missed at 500 feet as he is flying the ILS to 200 feet, breaking out and landing.

Now, if he hears the AWOS and decides to go elsewhere... Great. But IMO, you shouldn't even start shooting an approach unless you're willing to fly to published minimums.

If the ceilings are 1000' then I think he is fine. In fact he is safer than the pilot who is good to 200', flies an ILS with the AWOS reporting 200', doesn't get in and decides to try it again because he thinks if he pushes it another 20' lower he will make it. The point of personal minimums is to avoid situations beyond your capabilities and to take a realistic look at your capabilities rather than a macho one and knowing when to say no.

One of the best things that ever happened to me was the first time I decided to land rather than continue on. The stress relief was huge. The sky didn't fall nor did my pilot friends ridicule me. It was a positive experience and made me realize that taking a break to reevaluate is often a great feeling.

 

[flyingcheesehead]

If the ceilings are 1000' then I think he is fine.

No doubt about that... It's when the personal minimum is 1000 feet on an ILS and the ceiling ends up being 500 and the pilot goes missed that I think it becomes a problem.

In fact he is safer than the pilot who is good to 200', flies an ILS with the AWOS reporting 200', doesn't get in and decides to try it again because he thinks if he pushes it another 20' lower he will make it. The point of personal minimums is to avoid situations beyond your capabilities and to take a realistic look at your capabilities rather than a macho one and knowing when to say no.

One of the best things that ever happened to me was the first time I decided to land rather than continue on. The stress relief was huge. The sky didn't fall nor did my pilot friends ridicule me. It was a positive experience and made me realize that taking a break to reevaluate is often a great feeling.

No doubt about any of those situations, though they don't have much bearing on the other one IMO.

BTW, what I like to tell my pax when I have to change plans is: "Flying is always an adventure, it's just not always the adventure you had planned on."

 

[peppy]

No doubt about that... It's when the personal minimum is 1000 feet on an ILS and the ceiling ends up being 500 and the pilot goes missed that I think it becomes a problem.

I'm reacting to the opinion that personal minimums are worthless and you shouldn't fly unless you are comfortable down to 200'. If a person has a real 1000' personal minimum then he will go elsewhere when the ceilings are reporting 500' and will make sure he has an out with at least 1000' ceilings. BTW I am less nervous about the pilot who has 1000' minimums and shoots the approach with weather reported at 500' than I am with the guy who listens to the AWOS say 100' ceilings and shoots the approach just to see. I know flight visibility is sometimes different. There are a few pilots I would trust to try it and not go down to even 199'. However, I see too many cases where pilots push it and wind up with bad results. 200' is very close to the ground. Many of these pilots are high time. A King Air accident south west of Atlanta comes to mind.

 

[wabower]

Your "just to see" point has always created an internal conflict for me. I've flown a bejillion (or thereabouts) approaches and watched at least that many pilots in both sims and airplanes fly several bejillion more. The 135's aren't given below-minimums wx info during their brief, since they are restricted from shooting the approach in such conditions and would never get the required training. The 91's can always shoot the approach to see if they can find the runway, and many do so successfully, or at least say they did. Whether they observed the minimums on these unobserved and untrackable approaches in the same manner as they would have with an examiner in the other seat is unknown. The high number of CFIT accidents leads me to believe that they continued to peek all the way into the trees.

I'm reacting to the opinion that personal minimums are worthless and you shouldn't fly unless you are comfortable down to 200'. If a person has a real 1000' personal minimum then he will go elsewhere when the ceilings are reporting 500' and will make sure he has an out with at least 1000' ceilings. BTW I am less nervous about the pilot who has 1000' minimums and shoots the approach with weather reported at 500' than I am with the guy who listens to the AWOS say 100' ceilings and shoots the approach just to see. I know flight visibility is sometimes different. There are a few pilots I would trust to try it and not go down to even 199'. However, I see too many cases where pilots push it and wind up with bad results. 200' is very close to the ground. Many of these pilots are high time. A King Air accident south west of Atlanta comes to mind.

 

[timwinters]

I'm reacting to the opinion that personal minimums are worthless and you shouldn't fly unless you are comfortable down to 200'. If a person has a real 1000' personal minimum then he will go elsewhere when the ceilings are reporting 500' and will make sure he has an out with at least 1000' ceilings.

Paul,

But, I think the point is that (s)he can't always "make sure he has an out with at least 1000' ceilings."

(S)He can only know that 1000' is what is forecast. But things can change; quite rapidly sometimes. And (s)he better be prepared to encounter lower.

I see the skies over my farm go from 200' to 2000' and back again in less than 15 minutes...regularly. They're often not a smooth, flat bottomed, stratus layer.

 

[flyingcheesehead]

I'm reacting to the opinion that personal minimums are worthless and you shouldn't fly unless you are comfortable down to 200'.

I never said personal minimums are worthless. Heck, one of mine is to not fly IFR unless I'm comfortable shooting an ILS to 200'.

If a person has a real 1000' personal minimum then he will go elsewhere when the ceilings are reporting 500' and will make sure he has an out with at least 1000' ceilings.

Yeah, but what about when the person with the 1000' minimum flies an approach because the AWOS says ceilings are at 1200', but they're actually at 800'? Should that person go missed, or continue the approach to published minimums?

BTW I am less nervous about the pilot who has 1000' minimums and shoots the approach with weather reported at 500' than I am with the guy who listens to the AWOS say 100' ceilings and shoots the approach just to see.

Ah, now we're making this about me. Well, I can tell you that if it was widespread low IFR I wouldn't have shot the approach. But when my nearby alternate, with a human observer, is calling for 9000 scattered, and the weather at my destination isn't anything like the forecast, I have reason to believe that maybe the AWOS is busted. So I shoot the approach.

I know flight visibility is sometimes different. There are a few pilots I would trust to try it and not go down to even 199'. However, I see too many cases where pilots push it and wind up with bad results. 200' is very close to the ground. Many of these pilots are high time. A King Air accident south west of Atlanta comes to mind.

What makes you think that high personal minimums would help pilots who won't even adhere to published minimums? If they won't even obey what's black and white and on paper and required by law and common sense, what makes you think they won't bust their personal minimums?

To be a safe IFR pilot requires discipline - Both the discipline to go missed when you reach the MAP and execute plan B, and the discipline to keep one's skills sharp enough to be able to shoot that approach to 200' in the first place. I'd prefer not to fly IFR with anyone who lacks either.

 

[bbchien]

Re: 5 Dead In MO SR-22 Chrash

I absolutely agree that speculation is worthwhile. But I was unable to see what was to be learned from your speculation because it seemed to me to provide at least two (or three?) possible causes. I also I don't know what you meant by "Improper IFR". Flying VFR into IMC?

I disagree with your assertion that we have all the information that an investigator is likely to have. The one person I personally knew who died in an aviation accident turned out to have THC in his blood, indicating use of marijuana within 3 hours of the accident. The NTSB listed it as a contributing factor.

We also don't have the radar tracks and any ATC communications. If he was IFR then his dealings with ATC might add insight. The video story on this web page includes an interview with witnesses who claimed to have thought the airplane sounded like it might have had problems prior to impact.

If it turned out the pilot knew there was a problem, then why didn't he deploy the parachute? That is the frustrating aspect to me.

Well here you go Jim. Emphasis mine. You may find a definition of "improper IFR in an aviation safety article written by yours truly (~2003 IIRC, copy not on this computer), and at the NTSB site simply by using "improper IFR" in the text search box.


NTSB Identification: CEN12FA633
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Saturday, September 15, 2012 in Willard, MO
Aircraft: CIRRUS DESIGN CORP SR22, registration: N436KS
Injuries: 5 Fatal.
This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed. NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

On September 15, 2012, about 0023 central daylight time, a Cirrus Design SR22, N436KS, was substantially damaged when it impacted terrain near Willard, Missouri. The pilot and four passengers were fatally injured. The aircraft was registered to and operated by JL2, LLC under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as a personal flight. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed for the flight, which was operated on an instrument flight rules flight plan. The flight originated from Lee’s Summit Municipal Airport (LXT) about 2340 on September 14, 2012. The intended destination was the Springfield-Branson National Airport (SGF), Springfield, Missouri.

Springfield Approach was providing air traffic control services to the flight at the time of the accident. The pilot contacted Springfield Approach about 0002 as the flight entered their airspace. About 0017, the pilot was cleared for an Instrument Landing System (ILS) approach to runway 14 at SGF. The pilot was instructed to contact the control tower at that time. At 0020, about 3 minutes after establishing contact with the control tower, the pilot requested radar vectors in order to execute a second ILS approach. About 30 seconds later, radar contact was lost. The controller’s attempts to contact the flight were not successful.

The accident site was located in a pasture about 6 miles northwest of SGF. Ground impact was located in an open area of the lightly wooded pasture field. The airplane was fragmented. The main impact crater contained the propeller, engine, instrument panel, and portions of the fuselage. Linear ground impact marks, consistent with being formed by the wings, emanated from the main impact crater. Based on the ground impact markings, the airplane was oriented on an approximate heading of 340 degrees at the time of impact. The debris field extended to approximately 110 feet east of the main impact crater. Located within the debris field were the airplane flight control surfaces and wing flaps.

 

[flyingcheesehead]

Re: 5 Dead In MO SR-22 Chrash

About 0017, the pilot was cleared for an Instrument Landing System (ILS) approach to runway 14 at SGF. The pilot was instructed to contact the control tower at that time. At 0020, about 3 minutes after establishing contact with the control tower, the pilot requested radar vectors in order to execute a second ILS approach. About 30 seconds later, radar contact was lost. The controller’s attempts to contact the flight were not successful.

The accident site was located in a pasture about 6 miles northwest of SGF.

That's really weird... What was going on in the last 5 minutes of this flight? (It's blocked, so no track available on FlightAware.) The crash was somewhere in the vicinity of the FAF, where it would have been at 0017. 3 minutes later they request vectors for another try, and 30 seconds after that are back in the vicinity of the FAF?

I suppose that if they had slowed to 90 knots for the approach and were cleared for the approach 4 miles from the FAF and then blew through the localizer they may have then been in roughly this position... Why they lost control, who knows.

 

[RV10flyer]

Could he have mistaken Rt 123(just South of crash site and inline with rw 14) and the town of Willard for rwy 14 and the airport?

 

[N801BH]

Still a sad deal no matter what happened..

The thing that amazes me is when the NTSB reports the planes condition as

" On September 15, 2012, about 0023 central daylight time, a Cirrus Design SR22, N436KS, was substantially damaged "

Geez Loius... the thing is virtually destroyed..

 

[LJS1993]

Guys what is starting to annoy me about aviation is the fact that nothing is ever absolute in terms of exactly WHY this incidents' like this occur. If it was an issue with altitude and vision wouldn't synthetic vision be of assistance?

 

[flyingcheesehead]

Guys what is starting to annoy me about aviation is the fact that nothing is ever absolute in terms of exactly WHY this incidents' like this occur. If it was an issue with altitude and vision wouldn't synthetic vision be of assistance?

Maybe - But ya gotta have it installed (not possible with equipment on a Cirrus this old), and if you've got it, you've gotta pay attention to it.

 

[N801BH]

Guys what is starting to annoy me about aviation is the fact that nothing is ever absolute in terms of exactly WHY this incidents' like this occur. If it was an issue with altitude and vision wouldn't synthetic vision be of assistance?

If a pilot is able to fly the video game screen down to a safe landing, then yeah, Synthetic vision would help save lives... The trick is to find pilots who won't lock up at the first sign of distress.

 

[flyingcheesehead]

Could he have mistaken Rt 123(just South of crash site and inline with rw 14) and the town of Willard for rwy 14 and the airport?

Maybe - But if so, how did he wind up 5 miles away without realizing it, how'd he end up so far off glideslope (basically on the ground prior to the FAF, so it'd have been at full deflection for a while)...

Also, while we don't have the full ATC communications picture yet, they don't mention ATC giving an altitude alert at all, and from making contact with the last controller to radar contact lost was only 30 seconds, which indicates that the altitude was probably lost in a big hurry - so likely either stall/spin or a very quick graveyard spiral.

 

[olasek]

If it was an issue with altitude and vision wouldn't synthetic vision be of assistance?

Synthetic vision is supposed to eliminate CFIT type of accidents and I believe I read somewhere recently that there was yet not a single CFIT accident in which aircraft was equipped with synthetic vision. But this accident could have been your typical vanilla 'loss of control' and in such cases synthetic vision is not going to be of any help.

 

[Gary F]

Maybe - But ya gotta have it installed (not possible with equipment on a Cirrus this old), and if you've got it, you've gotta pay attention to it.

Maybe with a Garmin G500. I had it installed with SVT in my steam gauge DA40 and I believe that it is well worth the cost.

 

[Jaybird180]

Guys what is starting to annoy me about aviation is the fact that nothing is ever absolute in terms of exactly WHY this incidents' like this occur. If it was an issue with altitude and vision wouldn't synthetic vision be of assistance?

I recommend you spend some time reading NTSB reports (stick with the factual reports initially). They will give you the probable cause at the end, but as the story unfolds, you will begin to understand what could have been done differently.

For every effect, there is a cause. No mysteries.

Every once in a blue moon there will be an unsolved accident, but RARE.

 

[olasek]

there is a cause. No mysteries.

I am guessing what he could have meant above was the fact that there is a good percentage of GA accidents where NTSB in its report says simply under probable cause loss of control for unknown reason. So it is in fact a mystery why some pilots (and this includes vastly different level of piloting experience) lose control of a perfectly well functioning aircraft.

 

[wabower]

Glass cockpits were supposed to eliminate CFIT, but didn't. TAWS was supposed to eliminate CFIT but didn't. SVT is now being hailed as the next eliminator--anybody willing to bet on it?

Synthetic vision is supposed to eliminate CFIT type of accidents and I believe I read somewhere recently that there was yet not a single CFIT accident in which aircraft was equipped with synthetic vision. But this accident could have been your typical vanilla 'loss of control' and in such cases synthetic vision is not going to be of any help.

 

[N801BH]

....anybody willing to bet on it?

I will bet that gravity will win EVERY time..

 

[L.Adamson]

Glass cockpits were supposed to eliminate CFIT, but didn't. TAWS was supposed to eliminate CFIT but didn't. SVT is now being hailed as the next eliminator--anybody willing to bet on it?

Yes.............I am!

One great thing about "experimental aviation" is the reduced cost of luxury items such as SVT. That's why, so many experimentals have them, these days. From what I've seen & experienced, synthetic vision will "easily" eliminate much of CFIT. It really does work as advertised, and it really is that good. BTW--- it's all rugged mountains around here, which works very well for my evaluations.

L.Adamson

P.S. --- We'd average three CFITs around here, every year. The number has now dropped. Is it better avionics, or less flying?

 

[olasek]

SVT is now being hailed as the next eliminator--anybody willing to bet on it?

The jury is still out, I would simply wait. Some claim that SVT is this last line of defense, that nothing speaks to a pilot as vividly as a big red mountain right in front of you nose but no doubt there will be pilots for whom even this is not enough, we have to wait for meaningful numbers.

 

[peppy]

Could he have mistaken Rt 123(just South of crash site and inline with rw 14) and the town of Willard for rwy 14 and the airport?

You wouldn't think so since he was going around for another try on the ILS.

 

[peppy]

Paul,

But, I think the point is that (s)he can't always "make sure he has an out with at least 1000' ceilings."

(S)He can only know that 1000' is what is forecast. But things can change; quite rapidly sometimes. And (s)he better be prepared to encounter lower.

I see the skies over my farm go from 200' to 2000' and back again in less than 15 minutes...regularly. They're often not a smooth, flat bottomed, stratus layer.

But think where your argument leads. If you can't predict that you will have an out with a 1000' ceiling then you can't predict you will have an out with a 200' ceiling. Heck, VFR pilots should never fly. No matter what the equipment or our skill level, there is some point where we have to say we have built in adequate margin. I continue to be amazed by the argument that a rusty pilot with a 500' personal minimum shouldn't fly if the ceilings are projected to be 1000' at the destination with CAVU everywhere else because weather might be worse than predicted but the ultra current pilot can head to a field with a 200' ceiling being confident that the weather will respect his outs. Maybe you see the weather at your farm respect your 200' minimums and never go lower but I find it just as likely if not more so for 400' to go to 100' than 1000' to go to 200'.

 

[peppy]

Ah, now we're making this about me.

I didn't intend any comments to be personal. Any similarity was completely unintentional.

 

[timwinters]

The final report (probable cause) is out on this one:

The pilot was conducting an instrument landing system approach in night instrument meteorological conditions at the time of the accident.
Radar track data indicated that the airplane crossed the final approach course near the initial approach fix, about 11 miles from the
runway. The airplane drifted through the localizer about 0.25 mile before crossing the localizer again and drifting about 0.25 mile to the
opposite side of the localizer. The airplane flightpath then paralleled the localizer briefly. The track data indicated that the airplane
entered a left turn, which resulted in about a 90-degree course change. About that time, the pilot requested radar vectors to execute a
second approach. The airplane entered a second left turn that continued until the final radar data point, which was located about 420 feet
from the accident site. During the second left turn, about 9 seconds before the final radar data point, the pilot transmitted, "I need some
help." The data indicated that the accident airplane descended at an average rate of 6,000 feet per minute during the final 10 seconds of
data. No further transmissions were received from the pilot. The airplane impacted an open area of a lightly wooded pasture located about 6
miles north-northwest of the destination airport. A witness reported hearing an airplane engine surge to high power about four times,
followed by what sounded like a high speed dive. She heard the initial impact followed by an explosion. The postaccident examination of the
airframe and engine did not reveal any preimpact failures or malfunctions that would have precluded normal operation. The location and
condition of the airframe parachute system were consistent with partial deployment at the time of ground impact.
Based on the performance information depicted by the radar data, the pilot's request for assistance, and examination of the airplane at
the accident scene, it is most likely the pilot became spatially disoriented in night meteorological conditions and subsequently lost
control of the airplane.

 

[tiger]

I haven't flown (ever) with a three-axis autopilot or in an airplane a fast as the SR-22, so these are genuine questions, not judgements...

Aren't all SR-22s equipped with a decent AP / FD etc?

If so, and flying an ILS in actual with moderately low ceilings, in the dark, and with four pax, why not fly that one with the automation? Especially when it is apparent that you're struggling to follow the LOC course all the way from the IAF.

The crash site was 6 miles out, and the IAF is 11 miles out, so even at SR-22 speeds there should have been a reasonable amount of time while still right-side-up but having difficulty to turn on the automation?

 

[flyingcheesehead]

I haven't flown (ever) with a three-axis autopilot or in an airplane a fast as the SR-22, so these are genuine questions, not judgements...

Aren't all SR-22s equipped with a decent AP / FD etc?

If so, and flying an ILS in actual with moderately low ceilings, in the dark, and with four pax, why not fly that one with the automation? Especially when it is apparent that you're struggling to follow the LOC course all the way from the IAF.

The crash site was 6 miles out, and the IAF is 11 miles out, so even at SR-22 speeds there should have been a reasonable amount of time while still right-side-up but having difficulty to turn on the automation?

Maybe the pilot didn't really know how to use the automation (unlikely, given Cirrus' focus on automation during training), or maybe the automation wasn't working quite right. Quite a few things can cause an autopilot to perform at a less-than-perfect level, and if the pilot didn't use it frequently enough to know how it was performing on a localizer, he may have been trying to use it and cut it off after it flew through the localizer twice, tried to hand-fly it, and lost control.

I wonder what his BMI was.

 

[Jaybird180]

Early model Cirri are steam gauge, then they got dual 430s; latest models are Garmin perspective. 3 axis APs are an option (yaw damper is the 3rd).

Automation is not a guarantee of success but does aid situational awareness.

 

[SixPapaCharlie]

ugh. partial deployment bugs me. He knew is was done flying the plane but not soon enough.

6000 FPM. 10 seconds of terror.

sucks.

 

[TangoWhiskey]

I wonder what his BMI was.

Somewhere well south of 40:

http://www.pilotsofamerica.com/forum/showpost.php?p=985606

 

[DavidWhite]

Somewhere well south of 40:

http://www.pilotsofamerica.com/forum/showpost.php?p=985606

Reading that report and then looking at that picture made me very sad.

 

[NoHeat]

Reading that report and then looking at that picture made me very sad.

Indeed.

 

[marcoseddi]

so sad, best wishes to the family.

 

[Henning]

I haven't flown (ever) with a three-axis autopilot or in an airplane a fast as the SR-22, so these are genuine questions, not judgements...

Aren't all SR-22s equipped with a decent AP / FD etc?

If so, and flying an ILS in actual with moderately low ceilings, in the dark, and with four pax, why not fly that one with the automation? Especially when it is apparent that you're struggling to follow the LOC course all the way from the IAF.

The crash site was 6 miles out, and the IAF is 11 miles out, so even at SR-22 speeds there should have been a reasonable amount of time while still right-side-up but having difficulty to turn on the automation?

You are assuming the A/P was working. IME autopilots frequently fail, often at inopportune times.