You presumably read 120 posts in this thread from people who were not there, but think the person who actually controlled the situation has nothing to offer? He's very likely the only one in the cockpit who really knows what was going on at the time.
So you fly a hand-propped diesel ... cool!
You might notice I said nothing about the possibility of their actions being reasonable. Understanding where, when, and how it became unreasonable is important, and there was apparently only one meat-servo in the cockpit who can say anything about that. I think he should keep his mouth shut for his own self-interest, but I don't think what he has to offer should be discounted outright.
Because he appeared to be as described, perhaps. He admitted fault. I don't think the airplane in front of him even registered in his brain. But we'll never know, even if he makes a statement.
I watched the video that showed the Grumman waaaaay too close behind the Cessna. I saw the still photographs of the predictable result. I don't need to hear from the Grumman pilot.
pretty much how the vote is going
Yeah, there were probably no other
Neither do I. I just though the way you phrased it interesting.
As a white Sox fan...that stings
Maybe I'm just a visual learner. In elementary school we were shown films of idjuts who didn't take precautions, got frostbite, and still pictures of gangrene and amputated digits. I don't recall anything any of them said and it didn't matter.
Yes, the "how" of this accident seems pretty obvious. The "why" is also not hard to deduce on a broad scale: human factors. The human flying might just be able to offer some insight into the specific human factors that led him into the accident chain, even if what he has to say takes some analysis. Maybe there is nothing new to learn about human performance here, but why not at least try?
As a society, or just an aviation interest group, we cannot survive by passively accepting or teaching to the lowest common denominator. Some people, and frankly I just don't care enough about the Grumman "driver" to deduce where he lies on the scale, shouldn't operate aircraft, boats, or wheeled vehicles; shouldn't handle secrets or other people's (maybe even thier own) money; be charged with keeping the peace; and have no business ever advising or teaching others.
Indeed.
If 121 ops bought into this philosophy, airlines would be every bit as safe today as they were in 1955. On far too many occasions, hundreds of lives have been snuffed out in the blink of an eye because not just one but two "idiots" at a time, both of whom somehow managed to get ATP certs despite their "idiocy," have crashed airplanes directly as a result of the lack of "idiot-proofing" in the cockpit. Forgotten flaps settings, accidental throws of the throttles too far back, misinterpreting a storm scope, failing to recognize instrumentation failures (or misdiagnosing an accurate instrument as wrong), messing up a W&B calculation, missing a unit conversion on a fuel order, CFITing due to a total loss of situational awareness, forgetting to fly the plane while playing with a burned out light bulb... the list goes on and on. If you think you are immune to a human factors failure of some sort, you are deluding yourself. I sure don't think I am.
Objection, a statement not supported in this case by any evidence whatsoever. My $0.02, the "driver" was distracted by a non-emergency, lost all perspective, and didn't remember any of the training he received.
At T-15 minutes, the circuit breaker labeled "BRAIN" tripped and could not be reset.
I'm not making any claims one way or another. I am asking questions. WHY was he distracted by the non emergency and lost all perspective? WHY didn't he remember his training? Was there a deficiency in his training? Might he have been under the influence of something? Did he not get any sleep the night before? Was there some other factor going on that we don't know about? The fact that this seems so incredibly obviously avoidable is the very reason why I believe there's probably more to the story.
I agree with you there. And this might even have been one of those cases where it's not "unintentional" to begin with. The airplane was there and, unless there is indeed a mitigating "rest of the story" he intentionally kept flying toward it instead of diverting to avoid it. In that case, it might be certificate action to begin with and the extra twist of maybe knowing he had a failed battery can make the difference in terms of the length of the suspension and revocation is a possibility under the enforcement guidelines in Order 2150.3C. Just pulling one paragraph of the section on revocation out.
Once he got it on the ground, what could be the justification for risking 2 sets of lives and wrecking 2 airplanes instead of 1 and 1?
I don't think anyone here has even remotely suggested that the outcome was justifiable. I am interested in *all* of the links in the chain of events that led to the collision, not just the end stage. We should be able to learn from mistakes that were made along the way, but we won't if we aren't willing to listen to them.
I guess we can start with the takeoff.
Or the engine start.
Hell let’s go all the way back to conception.
Or the flight planning, the maintenance records, the stressors on the pilot, medical history, etc. Lessons learned rarely, if ever, start after the canopy is closed. Nothing excuses the outcome, "We learn from speculation" seems to be a catchphrase here, but I'm baffled that no one seems interested in other factors. Not to excuse the pilot, but to better understand the chain. It's likely we'll have to wait until the NTSB starts releasing material, y'all can just skip the pilot's statement, I suppose.
It's all too easy to look at an accident and say "What an idiot" about the pilot. I know, I've done in myself plenty of times.
This is a very underrated opinion. If you disagree, look up invulnerability.
Where in the ACS does it require a private applicant to know how a magneto works? He has to know how to use it and what to do if it’s not working right, but it’s a stretch too say he has to know the internal operation of it. For an A&P, absolutely. But not for a private pilot.
Don't know if that would be covered under knowledge of aircraft systems or not. I guess that DPE felt it was important. Judging by what happened here, maybe he was right.
I would say it's covered by the systems knowledge Task of the private ACS.
I agree that this is the level of knowledge a PP should have. But I would call that what a magneto does, not how it works.
I think you might have stumbled across the single best way to explain this to a new pilot of *ahem* this era. Then again...I fear my oldest son (12 years old right now) may be one of the few in today's society who has actually USED a gas-powered mower.