Voepass Flight 2283, a large passenger plane, crashes in Vinhedo, Brazil

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Interesting picture on the combination of the crew's experience, and recency. Same overall flight times, but the FO was the experienced guy in the type, by spades. But had crap for recency in the 30 day lookback. Of course, why was he a [de facto] perma FO? Schedules preference, or aptitude problems? We will never know as outsiders to that employment group.

In any event, the CA was the green one in the airplane, though not green for this earth. more importantly , he had much better recency than the more experienced guy. Alas, the combination was not enough to save the flight.

It's not heavily publicized, but crew aircraft communities in the military commonly ensure senior co-pilots are placed against our direct entry captain equivalents (aetc FAIP) or struggle bus *paper-upgrade Aircraft commanders (*yes, the military is not immune to personal corruption/political expedience) to act as seeing eye dogs. Likewise, to the degree leadership can identify left-sigma swimmers, efforts are routinely made to never place them together. This of course is a much harder ask on civilian sEniOriTY driven jobs. Digressing.

The academic answer is that both people are qualified to be there, but that's a naive understanding of crew airplane aviation. I'm too seasoned/lucky-to-be-alive in this occupation to debate that line item anymore, so to each their own/agree-to-disagree.

All that said, it may still be moot after all, if the combined aggregate experience and recency overlap of both crew members didn't amount to a hill of beans on the question of lack of icing experience. That very well could be the case here, again making the CA/FO experience/recency "swiss cheese" hole matching, a moot affair.


and t'is why I still rather fly with my favorite Captain/have the extra gas. I keed I keed (not really). :D
 
View attachment 133236

Interesting picture on the combination of the crew's experience, and recency. Same overall flight times, but the FO was the experienced guy in the type, by spades. But had crap for recency in the 30 day lookback. Of course, why was he a [de facto] perma FO? Schedules preference, or aptitude problems? We will never know as outsiders to that employment group.

In any event, the CA was the green one in the airplane, though not green for this earth. more importantly , he had much better recency than the more experienced guy. Alas, the combination was not enough to save the flight.

It's not heavily publicized, but crew aircraft communities in the military commonly ensure senior co-pilots are placed against our direct entry captain equivalents (aetc FAIP) or struggle bus *paper-upgrade Aircraft commanders (*yes, the military is not immune to personal corruption/political expedience) to act as seeing eye dogs. Likewise, to the degree leadership can identify left-sigma swimmers, efforts are routinely made to never place them together. This of course is a much harder ask on civilian sEniOriTY driven jobs. Digressing.

The academic answer is that both people are qualified to be there, but that's a naive understanding of crew airplane aviation. I'm too seasoned/lucky-to-be-alive in this occupation to debate that line item anymore, so to each their own/agree-to-disagree.

All that said, it may still be moot after all, if the combined aggregate experience and recency overlap of both crew members didn't amount to a hill of beans on the question of lack of icing experience. That very well could be the case here, again making the CA/FO experience/recency "swiss cheese" hole matching, a moot affair.


and t'is why I still rather fly with my favorite Captain/have the extra gas. I keed I keed (not really). :D

Interesting. Just watched a vid from Mentour Pilot on Saudia Flight 163, where over 300 souls burned to death on the tarmac- where likely most would have survived had the crew been competent. The CA, FO, and FE were all low-time on the type as well as overall, with very questionable records. Terrible CRM- I found it difficult to stomach that the CA refused to declare an immediate evacuation after landing, after having wasted nearly ten minutes in the air after being alerted to a fire in the aft cargo compartment. I try not to think about it flying commercial...
 
Transport category aviation is the EASIEST aviation there is… in the “now”.

The problem is that “right now”, while things aren’t very bad, you gotta make the decision that prevents an issue a relatively long time from now. THAT is why it’s hard and dangerous.

This goes for maint, wx, training, selection, EVERY ASPECT.

What scares me the most, is that if I ever do royally screw myself, I’m going to instantly recognize the mistake I made YESTERDAY.
 
Transport category aviation is the EASIEST aviation there is… in the “now”.

The problem is that “right now”, while things aren’t very bad, you gotta make the decision that prevents an issue a relatively long time from now. THAT is why it’s hard and dangerous.

You're essentially saying OODA loop.

Here's the thing: if these critterS (and I capitalize S because there's two of these dodo birds on board to theoretically cut the loop in half) can't identify progressive problems at the slow-arsed pace of a fully [control and nav] pool-noodle-lined school bus, as a flying public we are right cooked.
 
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View attachment 133236

Interesting picture on the combination of the crew's experience, and recency. Same overall flight times, but the FO was the experienced guy in the type, by spades. But had crap for recency in the 30 day lookback. Of course, why was he a [de facto] perma FO? Schedules preference, or aptitude problems? We will never know as outsiders to that employment group.

In any event, the CA was the green one in the airplane, though not green for this earth. more importantly , he had much better recency than the more experienced guy. Alas, the combination was not enough to save the flight.

It's not heavily publicized, but crew aircraft communities in the military commonly ensure senior co-pilots are placed against our direct entry captain equivalents (aetc FAIP) or struggle bus *paper-upgrade Aircraft commanders (*yes, the military is not immune to personal corruption/political expedience) to act as seeing eye dogs. Likewise, to the degree leadership can identify left-sigma swimmers, efforts are routinely made to never place them together. This of course is a much harder ask on civilian sEniOriTY driven jobs. Digressing.

The academic answer is that both people are qualified to be there, but that's a naive understanding of crew airplane aviation. I'm too seasoned/lucky-to-be-alive in this occupation to debate that line item anymore, so to each their own/agree-to-disagree.

All that said, it may still be moot after all, if the combined aggregate experience and recency overlap of both crew members didn't amount to a hill of beans on the question of lack of icing experience. That very well could be the case here, again making the CA/FO experience/recency "swiss cheese" hole matching, a moot affair.


and t'is why I still rather fly with my favorite Captain/have the extra gas. I keed I keed (not really). :D
left-sigma swimmers ??
 
Seems to me the plane was begging for help from the pilots almost the entire trip. The pilots had so much time and so much warning to save the day, yet sat as passengers while all this unfolded for pretty much the whole trip. Other than the potential icing systems failures and potential nuisance CAS messages, the plane performed as designed. The pilots not so much. Sad.
 
FOM says for those warnings execute Severe Icing immediately. Escape ice first, notify ATC after. If the FOM says that surely it means things are serious and about to get very spicy if you don't take action, no?

I'm just a student pilot so it is hard for me to understand being briefed that we have icing conditions en-route and not leaving anti-ice on the entire time, as well as being primed for an emergency descent if the degraded perf and low speed cruise ice warnings fire. Then keep going off. How do you just ignore that?
 
How do you just ignore that?
@Tools said it well above this response, but also read up on “alarm fatigue.” Having the icing chime/light go on and off pretty much the entire time they were at cruise may have set the stage for them ignoring it when it suddenly got critical. Whether those prior alerts were legit or not doesn’t matter - what matters is there was no consequence for inaction… until there was.
 
Hehe, I just did a maint flight after a major inspection. Never seen so many alerts and alarms in my life!

OBVIOUSLY clear and a million…. At some point you just revert to basics, hopefully your basics are what ya need. THAT is where amazing training is WORTH IT.

At the end of the flight, I couldn’t tell you if the seat belt chime was cycling, or if the wing missing alert was screaming…. You blank out A LOT, to free up capacity.

These guys training did not cement the correct startle response. In the above scenario for me, we lost our yaw damper at 360. I started a descent BEFORE even asking…. THAT was my startle response.

They had the wrong response in the heat of battle. The better discussion is WHAT made pilots with the fundamentally wrong startle response? Not what happened in the heat of battle. It being SO WRONG makes all the detail moot.
 
It's not zero in any aircraft and in the case of the ATR it should be more effective in an upright flat spin than many other aircraft, as practically none of the rudder is blanked by the elevator.
The F-4 was about as close to zero as any plane. I think Rutan was able to recover two (without popping the chute) out of almost 1,000 that he put into flat spins.
 
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