Training Crash

[Clip4]

Some observations:

1. “Shaffer-Ray made the comment the right rudder input on the ground was delayed and felt different than when we were at KGAI.” The student tells me the rudder doesn’t seem right, I am checking it out. Yet the CFI doesn’t determine if there was a problem. Then the pilots observe a flap selection issue with the plane and ignore that too. Airplanes will give you warnings if you will listen. Was this a mechanical issue? Maybe. Rule 1, don’t take a sick plane into the sky. Rule 2, discontinue the flight when a mechanical issue occurs.

2. The CFI could have added some risk management and margin of safety to this maneuver by having the student land at the aim point vs the end of the runway - at least for this pilot’s first attempt. Did the CFI first demonstrate this manuver and had this pilot ever did a power off 180?

3. The CFI let a simulated emergency decay and turn into a real one.

4. The 600 hour CFI is extremely shocked this event happened considering his whooping 600 hours total time and now he is willing to get further training. (Please FAA give me a 709 and don’t take certificate action)

While some may argue this was a crap happened flight - in my view the CFI is responsible for this accident.

 

[dmspilot]

Your writing style is confusing. Can't tell what's a quote, what's paraphrased, and what your own words are.

I once found a flight school airplane with a rudder that only went to the right half the amount it was supposed to. It had been flying for months like that.

That said, I doubt there was anything wrong with this airplane. Seeing the aircraft lumbering through the air at high AoA, I knew what was coming next. In the airline business, we call that an "undesired aircraft state" - something that a pilot should never allow happen.

 

[Gary Ward]

When I see stuff like this it makes me think, I am so lucky to fly with my best friend who is a 25000hr standards check airmen. Very lucky. Thank you Greg

 

[flyingron]

Links to the reports:

Accident Cessna 172M Skyhawk N1377U, Wednesday 1 May 2024

The flight instructor and the private pilot were practicing a simulated loss of engine power in the airport traffic pattern as part of the private pilot’s flight review. On base leg, th...

asn.flightsafety.org

CFI waited too long before assuming command. Further his statement seems to indicate failure to understand basic flight principles.
CFI did a classic botched go around and stalled it in.

You've got a huge (for a 172) runway at DMV and they hadn't used much of it. No need to exceed the critical angle. Even without climbing you're over the runway while trying to get speed. Worst outcome, chop it and fly in on to the ground.

 

[StraightnLevel]

.

2. The CFI could have added some risk management and margin of safety to this maneuver by having the student land at the aim point vs the end of the runway - at least for this pilot’s first attempt. Did the CFI first demonstrate this manuver and had this pilot ever did a power off 180?

Question: What is the “standard” for where to land during a power-off 180?

When there’s “plenty” of runway vs. the plane’s needed distance, is it OK to drop the plane into the middle of the runway and completely ignore the normal touchdown targets? Would that get you DQ’d during a checkride, or would it be proper ADM to minimize risk?

 

[flyingron]

If my engine fails in the pattern, I'm going straight for a landable piece of runway.

 

[455 Bravo Uniform]

Question: What is the “standard” for where to land during a power-off 180?

When there’s “plenty” of runway vs. the plane’s needed distance, is it OK to drop the plane into the middle of the runway and completely ignore the normal touchdown targets? Would that get you DQ’d during a checkride, or would it be proper ADM to minimize risk?

You pick the target, like “beginning of 3rd stripe” or “start of 1k ft markers”.

If you’re trying to demonstrate a 180 power off maneuver for a commercial checkride, it’s a fail to miss the target -0 ft/+200 ft. Think of it this way - you’re in a glider, you can’t go around, you got 1 shot.

During training and even during the practical exam, do whatever you need to stay safe, but you botched the maneuver (probably way back before crossing the threshold). Don’t let it turn into a real emergency.

 

[Gary Ward]

When I first watched that video I assumed it was a student pilot solo.
Then I was really surprised to learn a it was a flight review! wow!

 

[brcase]

Some observations:

1. “Shaffer-Ray made the comment the right rudder input on the ground was delayed and felt different than when we were at KGAI.” The student tells me the rudder doesn’t seem right, I am checking it out. Yet the CFI doesn’t determine if there was a problem. Then the pilots observe a flap selection issue with the plane and ignore that too. Airplanes will give you warnings if you will listen. Was this a mechanical issue? Maybe. Rule 1, don’t take a sick plane into the sky. Rule 2, discontinue the flight when a mechanical issue occurs.

2. The CFI could have added some risk management and margin of safety to this maneuver by having the student land at the aim point vs the end of the runway - at least for this pilot’s first attempt. Did the CFI first demonstrate this manuver and had this pilot ever did a power off 180?

3. The CFI let a simulated emergency decay and turn into a real one.

4. The 600 hour CFI is extremely shocked this event happened considering his whooping 600 hours total time and now he is willing to get further training. (Please FAA give me a 709 and don’t take certificate action)

While some may argue this was a crap happened flight - in my view the CFI is responsible for this accident.

I have 5000+hrs of instruction logged, my thoughts….
1. If a pilot tells me a control doesn’t feel right, the 1st thing I do is take the controls and check it for myself to figure out if there is really an issue, or if it is just the pilots perception. This instructor probably should have done the same. I am not going to terminate the lesson, without evaluating myself, unless the pilot says they think we should.

2. I would have done exactly what this instructor did, I want the pilot to see the results of his set up and make it very clear that he didn’t leave himself enough margin to make it to the runway. I would also like the pilot to realize he isn’t going to make it. But I would have taken over and added power sooner to prevent the touching down short. It is a flight review, the pilot is demonstrating to me, unless he asks for instruction, or demonstrates he needs instruction.

If I know there is no lip on the runway and it is smooth in the area before the pavement I might even let them touch down there. But often the lip on the runway prevents doing this safely.


3. It really never became an emergency, at least not until it was too late to do anything about it. The only real failure was teh failure to maintain airspeed on the go around. This is typically in part caused by use of full flaps during the go around, but that wasn’t the case in this event.

4. Admitting he was responsible and willing to get instruction is exactly the attitude a pilot involved in an event the FAA want to see. It will likely mean he won’t get a 709 ride, especially if he can show the FAA he has already recieved some additional instuction. The primary reason the FAA wants 709 rides is to force the pilot to recieve additional instruction, if the pilot has already don’t so there is little reason for the 709 ride, and is most cases the FAA doesn’t want the liability of flying with a GA pilot.

 

[Clip4]

Question: What is the “standard” for where to land during a power-off 180?

When there’s “plenty” of runway vs. the plane’s needed distance, is it OK to drop the plane into the middle of the runway and completely ignore the normal touchdown targets? Would that get you DQ’d during a checkride, or would it be proper ADM to minimize risk?

The standard for the commercial practical test for a power off 180 accuracy landing is on or within 200 feet beyond the specified point, but why would you set the Commercial PTS standard for a private pilot on Lesson #2 of a flight review?

Generally, if you are doing power off 180 for a flight review, it is not a power off 180 accuracy landing. It’s a power off 180 to landing to the first 1/3 of the runway. At GAI, that’s first 1,000 ft.

 

[455 Bravo Uniform]

Unless the POH called for it, going flaps 20 to 10 didn’t help. It just removed lift thereby compounding the problem. Maybe muscle memory from going flaps 30/40 to 20 on go-arounds…

 

[Zeldman]

If my engine fails in the pattern, I'm going straight for a landable piece of runway.

I would accept a landable piece of airport property.

I have known of a couple pilots that did a 180 and landed on the ramp after an engine failure after takeoff. Both times it was a paved airport with a large enough ramp area to land.

 

[hindsight2020]

Late decision to take the aircraft, especially if under the proferred rationalization that 'oh I'm just trying to create a teaching moment', it's a boilerplate instructor error, not student error. The former rationalization is a cope anyways; a greenhorn instructor largely lacks the higher degree situational awareness to lord over a mistake he's purposely allowing to develop. They're just straight up behind the aircraft right along their student. At any rate, we spend an outsized amount of time at PIT (usaf pilot training program where we make instructors) teaching to recognize and build the candidate's eye for that timing. It's an art not a science admitedly.

To wit, the reason we don't do formation landings anymore is because a high time instructor never took it from the student on a botched flare, and balled up two airplanes, killing himself and the student in the process, almost killing the other two in the lead aircraft. I say this in a military-centric forum and it's fighting words, but it's nonetheless true. In fairness, that was an error of complacency, which is what gets people in my demographic (high instructor time) killed. The accident in this thread is not one of those. If the stated experience is as listed, this is a low-experience error, which is why the civilian primary flight instruction sector sucks and doesn't pay squat. Pennywise pounds foolish.

 

[Clip4]

It seems like it would be an art, but actually it isn’t.

All CFI verbalization must precise and early enough in the sequence of events for the listener to comprehend and act. All CFI intervention must be initiated early enough in the sequence of events that the intervention is effective - even if the student does something unexpected or atmospheric conditions change.

There are several human factors that come into play - inexperience, ego, complacency and fatigue topping the list.

 

[hindsight2020]

Sure, I stipulate on the semantics your honor, if it gets the conversation moving.

I merely meant 'art' in that the timing is variable based on all the listed above and more. Not all students have the same reaction time, not all IPs have the same recognition time, and environmentals also play a factor (fatigue, hydration levels). There is no boilerplate distance and time to satisfy the "early enough to allow intervention AND learning to occur".

I will say, civilian CFI upgrade instruction isn't doing such a hot job these days. I think it's a joke they think an endorsement to go take the FOI will change anything on the applied safety front. Bit of a blind leading the blind in that space, and I say that having gone through the civilian training to become a CFI myself; I wasn't a "mil conversion" CFI ticket grabber. Point being, I've personally experienced both flavors of instructor developer. I'm not impressed, and I'm not surprised one bit about case studies like the video accident in question.

 

[dmspilot]

The FAA thinks you should be a CFI for 2 years before you can teach other people to be CFIs. I always thought it would make sense to require a person to be a pilot for 2 years before they could teach people to be pilots. Alas, the FAA wants to get rid of the former requirement. Why they think it's a good idea is beyond me.

The current system encourages rote memorization for both written tests and oral exams. One can pass all checkrides private through CFI without much depth of understanding, or ability to correlate, the material they're expected to master. I've seen CFIs let their students get on the back side of the power curve and not even understand what was going on. The crash that prompted this thread seems to be one of those. Poor plane.

 

[MauleSkinner]

Alas, the FAA wants to get rid of the former requirement. Why they think it's a good idea is beyond me.

Same reason they allow “solo” with a CFI on board…let’s businesses continue doing business.

 

[Dan Thomas]

All CFI intervention must be initiated early enough in the sequence of events that the intervention is effective - even if the student does something unexpected or atmospheric conditions change.

Yes. From the Canadian Flight Instructor Guide, under the discussion of Primacy:

4. While the student is performing an exercise, supervise the actions very closely. Stop the student as soon as any performance error is noticed and teach the correct method. Close supervision means - NEVER allow a student to make an error during the initial stages of training. Think of how you would go about training a student to defuse a live bomb.

 

[TCABM]

… we spend an outsized amount of time at PIT ….

I assume Air Etcetera uses the same criteria as ACC on gradesheet where a ‘2’ is the standard for a student to meet and continue to meet.

Does your command require a line pilot ‘4’ as a pre-req for IPUG? In ACC, I thought that was a high standard but given the responsibility and speed at which things happen, I understood the rationale after going to teach at the FTU.

It takes a lot of experiences to truly understand how far you can let the student dork it up without bending metal or killing people. When I left the FTU, I walked away with a newfound respect for the FAIPs. I questioned that more and more the longer my career stretched.

 

[hindsight2020]

I assume Air Etcetera uses the same criteria as ACC on gradesheet where a ‘2’ is the standard for a student to meet and continue to meet.

Does your command require a line pilot ‘4’ as a pre-req for IPUG? In ACC, I thought that was a high standard but given the responsibility and speed at which things happen, I understood the rationale after going to teach at the FTU.

It takes a lot of experiences to truly understand how far you can let the student dork it up without bending metal or killing people. When I left the FTU, I walked away with a newfound respect for the FAIPs. I questioned that more and more the longer my career stretched.

Apologies in advance for those who don't speak usaf jive. Click here to file a grievance. PMs kept throwing an error.

Anyhoo, undergraduate pilot training course training standards are graded on a different scale than the ops units/FTUs, but the stated intent is the same. It's a '4', where 4 is the standard, 2 is fail, and 5 is commendables. 3 is only a failure if they reach the end of the block and haven't made 4 on all required items. On the IP upgrade side, Formal evaluations for final aircraft follow standard big USAF 11-2MDS-Vol2 criteria: Q, Q-, U criteria for individual item, and Q1,2,3 for overall (FAA recognizable) checkride grade.

yes, the responsibility bestowed on these O-2 FAIP instructors at the undergraduate pilot training level is incredible. They're good kids, they tend to be upper third of their undergraduate class by defualt, and it's a fine line the service runs doing the bulk of this job with very young aviators; we've lost many of them too soon. It weighs heavy on us old heads, they didn't make it to old salty silverback like yours truly, and they should have.

Quality Standards of the PIT progam inbound candidates? Not near as high as they could be, but then again the service is not really in a position to be chooser when they treat their chattel the way they do, then get pikachu face when everybody runs to the major airlines. Meanwhile the end customers cry bloody murder because "quality is down", but refuse to put their money where their mouth is and pay some of the training command bill with tributes of their own. You know, those big bad MWS guys that could presumably do a better job, if we are to take their inflated sense of worth at face value. Aaaaand crickets. Thought so. Not a long line of people willing to go break rock in district 12, if you catch my drift.

As I said, I live in the world of what things are, not the one of what things should be. We do the best with what we got. It's not the best of what we could get, but that's due to congressional pork barrel, and the widespread corruption of civilian defense contractors and their subcontracting remoras. But I'm not telling ya anything new, with 2 decades in this grind of your own.

 

[TCABM]

…
Quality Standards of the PIT progam inbound candidates? Not near as high as they could be, ….

Let’s talk about your ALFA tour. The bain of the first Ops tour.

 

[hindsight2020]

Let’s talk about your ALFA tour. The bain of the first Ops tour.

In the interest in not derailing this thread any more, let me PM you my rant on that topic. Now back to this evening's origional scheduled programming.

 

[TCABM]

In the interest in not derailing this thread any more, let me PM you my rant on that topic. Now back to this evening's origional scheduled programming.

Got your PM, going to COTA tomorrow, but our careers were not that divergent and we share a lot of similar base sentiment on fixes.

 

[geezer]

My view of the video of the landing was that the plane did in fact touch down on the runway, very hard, not on the grass short of the runway.

The stall warning should have been blaring well before the CFI took control of the plane, and should have been immediately responded to with enough power to save the airspeed, if not the power off landing attempt.

The CFI clearly was not monitoring air speed or angle of attack, or he would have intervened much earlier. At those conditions, rudder and ailerons were already compromised in their effectiveness, and near full forward of the controls yoke was needed to prevent a full stall, which produced the bank to the left and ground impact.

Dumping the flaps before achieving safe no flap airspeed was a contributing factor in the stall and roll. The CFI was way behind the airplane.