Kenny Phillips
Final Approach
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Kenny Phillips
You must be using a phone or tablet, as it's just an MSN link.Maybe screenshot that, I clicked on it and then it wanted me to download an app
Too many Black Hawks down. Farewell to those soldiers.WO1 on each aircraft. Probably was one of their first multi-ship training events. RIP.
https://www.tennessean.com/story/ne...opters-from-101st-crash-kentucky/70062739007/
Certainly there seems to be a lot of accidents whilst using night vision goggles.Too many Black Hawks down. Farewell to those soldiers.
A former Night Stalker friend of mine observed the exact same thing, noting the top rank was W-2 - apparently very unusual in his day.WO1 on each aircraft. Probably was one of their first multi-ship training events. RIP.
https://www.tennessean.com/story/ne...opters-from-101st-crash-kentucky/70062739007/
A former Night Stalker friend of mine observed the exact same thing, noting the top rank was W-2 - apparently very unusual in his day.
If somebody --the unit or higher safety officer (or commander) was on the ball, they could have mitigated that risk ahead of time. Or maybe there just wasn't much aviator experience in the unit to balance crews.The other thing is, formation flight isn’t done as much in MEDEVAC vs other units. It’s in their task list but they just don’t get the proficiency as say an air assault unit. And since they removed multi-ship training from the Black Hawk course years (2007 ish) ago, this was probably their first experience for the WO1s. Combine that with a more demanding mode (night/NVG) of flight and there’s some pretty elevated risk there.
There might be many more without them. That was a problem with the 1st Cav at Hood before googles were fielded. I participated in several boards during that era. It was a witch's brew of lack of visible reference at night over a remote training area, lack of pilot experience, and lack of command awareness of the risk. With current generation night vision devices and better situation awareness you get some improvement, but there is always the human factor. Always.Certainly there seems to be a lot of accidents whilst using night vision goggles.
If somebody --the unit or higher safety officer (or commander) was on the ball, they could have mitigated that risk ahead of time. Or maybe there just wasn't much aviator experience in the unit to balance crews.
The earliest part of my Army flying career the only paperwork we dealt with was a mission sheet and the CEOI before flying, and the logbook after. Not even a PPC. Admin requirements have mushroomed over the decades but that old G. Reaper out there doesn’t care about paperwork. Never has.
I think you're talking about Warlock, but yes, I finally flew full face googles in the latter days of my career. Before that it was Mark I eyeball in the dark with panel lighting turned down low as it would go.Full Face Fives... You sir, are my hero. I'm an ANVIS-6 baby myself, but I have nothing but respect for the guys who lead the way.
Flew with some White Phosphorous goggles the other night, and they are pretty awesome. No more green.
Full Face Fives... You sir, are my hero. I'm an ANVIS-6 baby myself, but I have nothing but respect for the guys who lead the way.
Flew with some White Phosphorous goggles the other night, and they are pretty awesome. No more green.
I’ve been trying to get the company to go to WP but so far no luck. Everything I’ve heard is that the contrast is much better and easier to distinguish clouds (IIMC). Our ANVIS-6 are showing their age and really need to be replaced.
I am reminded of the “brooding introspective anticipators of trouble” from Harry Reasoner‘s immortal description of helicopter pilots.The problem with most RAs that I’ve seen, is two fold. First, it doesn’t accurately reflect risk and they’re designed to be a “go.” That turns them into a check the block process. Unless I was flying formation, NOE, unaided, with a sling load, in the middle of a hurricane, on two hrs of sleep and a 2LT next to me, we were going. At least make RAs accurately represent the risk as moderate and if in combat, make them automatic highs. Even stuff like QRF in combat where I didn't have a clue what I was doing for the day, we’d worse case it and I’m still moderate. LTC looks at the RA brief, “OK got a WO1 with ya, if you get a mission be cautious, use good judgment and stick to the standards.” Gee, pretty much knew that already without his guidance.
Which is the second problem with RAs. The segments on the form that are supposedly making me “aware of things I wouldn’t otherwise know” is just simply incorrect. The planning process, whether it be FARs or military regs, already covers in detail factors that a PIC should be aware of. I don’t need a sheet to tell me that flying in low illum will be slightly more riskier than a full moon. I get that from my 175-1. Don’t need a sheet to tell me that flying with a copilot that has less than 50 hrs NVGs is going to be more of a threat to my health than a copilot with 2,000 hrs NVGs. I know that from common sense.
I was talking about this at work with a pilot at another base one day. Everyone wants to try and checklist out risk and errors. They also over use the “Swiss Cheese” model for everything. In reality, there are plenty of times a pilot just has one lapse in judgment and it ends in disaster. There’s no box on an RA that states “today I’m gonna make a bad decision based on incorrect assumptions that will end with a Class A accident.” It’s just the simple unknown that you have to guard against. I’ve always said, in the Army I looked at everyone (even myself) involved in a mission (ground & air) as being a threat to my existence. That attitude served me well.
The Risk Assessment process is logical and common sense. I have applied it in a variety of contexts, and still use it all the time in business.
1. What can go wrong?
2. How likely is it to happen?
3. How bad would it be if it happened?
4. What can we do to make it less likely, not as bad, or both?
Unfortunately, like many parts of the military bureaucracy, it got turned into a paperwork drill by the staff and command, which then turned into an exercise in finding workarounds by everyone subject to it. I was an S3 in an SF battalion when it became a requirement there. Once one team broke the code and got one approved for a range, everyone else copied it and submitted it for their training, without making any changes. Ok for ranges, maybe not so smart for mountaineering training or a HALO jump.
A former Night Stalker friend of mine observed the exact same thing, noting the top rank was W-2 - apparently very unusual in his day.
We use just those steps above in some IT risk assessments, and I add a 5th - "If this goes sideways, how would we explain this in a press conference". That helps a bit with some of the creative solutions to reduce risks that don't quite make the sniff test. Along the lines of you can't explain handing a prisoner a rifle, even if he doesn't have any ammo.
I don't want to change the subject, because this is interesting. For the military flight risk forms, are the people OK'ing the risk pilots?