ScottM
Taxi to Parking
- Joined
- Jul 19, 2005
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Display name:
iBazinga!
Tagic
Note the date of his PPL certificate at the end of the overview.
The ink was barely dring on his temporary certificate and he is launching off into IMC. Wow!! I have a suspisicion that some DE and CFIs will also have explaining to do as to why this pilot's decision making ability was so wrong. Not that I am saying they are responsible but I wonder if they observed any behavior that would have given a hint that the pilot was not the best decision maker.
Note the date of his PPL certificate at the end of the overview.
NTSB Identification: NYC06FA215
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Monday, September 04, 2006 in Penhook, VA
Aircraft: Cessna 150G, registration: N2932J
Injuries: 2 Fatal.
This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.
On September 4, 2006, at 1132 eastern daylight time, a Cessna 150G, N2932J, was destroyed when it impacted trees and terrain following an inflight breakup near Penhook, Virginia. The certificated private pilot and passenger were fatally injured. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan was filed for the flight, which departed Smith Mountain Lake Airport (W91), Monetna, Virginia, about 1120, destined for Florence Regional Airport (FLO), Florence, South Carolina. The personal flight was conducted under 14 CFR Part 91.
According to preliminary air traffic control (ATC) communication and radar data obtained from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the pilot contacted Roanoke approach control about 1120, and requested visual flight rules (VFR) flight following services. Shortly thereafter, the airplane was radar identified about 2 nautical miles south of Smith Mountain Lake Airport.
The airplane tracked generally southbound, until about 1130, when the pilot asked the controller for a radar vector. When queried about the request, the pilot responded, "we're kinda lost in some fog here." The controller then asked the pilot to state his present heading, to which the pilot replied, "I can't tell, I think we're upside-down." The controller instructed the pilot to turn right, and 18 seconds later advised the pilot to stop his turn. During this time the airplane had completed a left turn to a northeasterly track, and its altitude varied between 4,500 and 4,700 feet. About 10 seconds later, at 1132, the pilot stated, "we can't see, we can't see, we can't see," and ten seconds later transmitted something unintelligible. The controller advised the pilot to stay calm, that he was at an altitude of 4,500 feet, and that he should not climb or descend the airplane. No further transmissions were received from the pilot, and radar contact was lost shortly thereafter.
A witness, located near the accident site, reported that he heard "a loud pop." When he looked up, he saw the airplane descend into the woods, and then saw the wings of the airplane "floating" down to the ground.
Another witness described that she heard the airplane, and that it sounded like "it was landing in the back yard." She stepped outside and saw the wings of the airplane "twirling in the air," before they impacted the ground, but did not see the rest of the airplane.
The accident occurred during the hours of daylight at 36 degrees 56 minutes north latitude, 74 degrees 36 minutes west longitude.
All major components of the airplane were accounted for at the scene, except for a portion of the right side doorpost, which was not recovered. The wreckage path was oriented on a heading about 080 degrees magnetic, and was about 3,500 feet long. The wings had separated from the fuselage, and were found along the wreckage path, along with numerous other small pieces from the airplane. The left and right wings separated near the wing root, and a portion of the cabin roof and both the fore and aft carry-through spars remained attached to the left wing. Examination of both wings revealed signatures consistent with an in-flight separation in the positive, or upward, direction. All of the fracture surfaces examined on both wings, and their respective wing struts, were consistent with overload.
Flight control continuity was confirmed to all control surfaces. The horizontal stabilizer, elevator, and trim tab were bent upward about 45 degrees near their mid-span. Measurement of the flap actuator revealed an indication consistent with the flaps being in the up position, and the elevator trim tab was in the 10-degree tab up position.
Fuel similar in color to automotive fuel was found in both wing fuel tanks, and in the carburetor. The fuel selector handle was found in the on position. The engine crankshaft was rotated by hand at the propeller, which remained attached, and valvetrain continuity was confirmed. Compression was obtained on all cylinders, except for cylinder number 3, which was dislodged from the crankcase. The impact damaged magneto leads were cut from the magnetos, and rotation of both magnetos produced spark on all towers. The spark plugs exhibited normal wear, and their electrodes were black in color.
The weather conditions reported at Roanoke Regional Airport (ROA), about 26 nautical miles northwest of the accident site, at 1154, included winds from 150 degrees at 6 knots, 3 statute miles visibility in light rain and mist, scattered clouds at 500 feet, an overcast ceiling at 700 feet, temperature 63 degrees Fahrenheit, dewpoint 59 degrees Fahrenheit, and an altimeter setting of 30.20 inches of mercury.
The weather conditions reported at Lynchburg Regional Airport (LYH), about 30 nautical miles northeast of the accident site, at 1126, included variable winds at 3 knots, 2 statute miles visibility in heavy rain and mist, few clouds at 1,100 feet, an overcast ceiling at 2,600 feet, temperature 63 degrees Fahrenheit, dewpoint 59 degrees Fahrenheit, and an altimeter setting of 30.19 inches of mercury.
An AIRMET for IFR conditions was issued about 1 1/2 hours before the accident airplane departed. It warned of occasional ceilings below 1,000 feet, and visibilities below 3 statute miles due to clouds, precipitation, mist, and fog, with the conditions ending between 1100 and 1400. An AIRMET for mountain obscuration was also issued at the same time that warned of similar conditions continuing beyond 1600 through 2200.
A preliminary review of flight service station data revealed that the pilot did not contact any flight service stations or the Direct User Access Terminal System (DUATS) to obtain a weather briefing, or file a flight plan, prior to the accident flight.
The pilot held a private pilot certificate with a rating for airplane single engine land, which was issued on June 17, 2006. His most recent FAA third class medical certificate was issued on February 16, 2006. He did not hold an instrument rating
The ink was barely dring on his temporary certificate and he is launching off into IMC. Wow!! I have a suspisicion that some DE and CFIs will also have explaining to do as to why this pilot's decision making ability was so wrong. Not that I am saying they are responsible but I wonder if they observed any behavior that would have given a hint that the pilot was not the best decision maker.