The article was written in 2001 and retracted for political reasons. The link is a retrospective. I'd ask if you read beyond the third sentence, but it's literally in the third sentence.
I saw that. And the question I still ask: Why did they publish an article that condemned Lycoming long after they had updated their operator's manuals? That is NOT honest journalism. They didn't even reference the 2005 manual, or
any Lycoming updated manual or Service Letter.
And they're still using the old 75% cruise power figure for leaning. That was updated a long time ago, too. From the old Lycoming Key Reprints Flyer:
65%, not 75%. So that article is not fair to Lycoming or Continental or anyone else. The writer did not do his homework.
Lycoming has hundreds of documents, and every one of them has to pass a team of lawyers before its update is published. That's not Lycoming's fault; it's the fault of every greedy plaintiff that seeks to put the blame for their mistakes elsewhere, or wants a bunch of money, or both. That litigious attitude has driven up the costs of everything for everybody. The money that funds the vast legal industry comes from somewhere, and that's your wallet.
And every time they update a manual, they have to test the advice, of course. That takes time. The old advice has been working well, and the stats prove it. Pilot error is responsible for between 75 and 80% of failures, maintenance for a few more. Catastrophic structural engine failure is rare, and often due to poor maintenance practices. A few will blow up because the pilot has been mismanaging them. Some quit because the owner is just plain cheap.
https://www.aviationsafetymagazine.com/features/why-engines-fail/
https://www.avweb.com/flight-safety/accidents-ntsb/why-engines-quit-failures-are-avoidable/
There are plenty of articles like this. "Unknown cause of failure" is a common factor, and the investigators will often admit that they suspect carb Ice, since the engine was carbureted, the atmospheric conditions were conducive to carb ice, the carb heat control was found in the closed position, and there was absolutely nothing else wrong with the engine or the fuel system or anything else. In the flight school I found that getting the students to learn about carb ice and understand it was difficult. They often thought it was a wintertime thing, and we see that mistaken idea on POA all the time. One of our graduates got a job as a pipeline patrol pilot, and he heard a distress call from a commercial student in a 172 from another flight school when he was flying in the foothills of the Rockies. The guy's engine had quit and he was going down and gave a rough location. Our grad went looking for him and found him and orbited until a rescue helicopter got there. Spring time. He landed in a snowmelt-fed creek, got wet. In the mountains. And he was wearing shorts and sneakers and a t-shirt, didn't even have a jacket. We never let our students fly like that. He's lucky our grad found him, or hypothermia would have killed him by the time he was missed and someone went looking.
At any rate: the guy had pulled carb heat when the engine got rough, and it got rougher so he turned it off. A common mistake due to ignorance. The investigators helicoptered the airplane out, replaced the bent prop, and started it. It ran fine. Carb ice, but of course the ice was long gone by the time the investigators got to it. No evidence, no crime.
Poor training is a big factor, and poor study habits is another. It seems that few people are curious anymore, and they learn only as much as they need to to pass the exams.