Single Engine down in Nashville - KJWN

In their case, they seemed to be constantly descending from 10.5, and as soon as they leveled off airspeed started dropping.
 
Peter Anderson said:
And the navy being the navy still uses paper charts? Because I certainly don’t lol


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No, not that I am aware of. That does not invalidate their findings nor the applicability to cockpit night lighting.
 
donjohnston said:
Not just Canada's recommendation. Also the US Air Force. Their study showed dimmable white lights are superior to red. Unless you're making a ground attack run or dogfighting on a moonless night.
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Yeap.

Red light needs to be at a higher intensity to see and then it is no better.

A-10 had white cockpit lighting.
 
Jim K said:
yep...
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So my fuel management strategy has always been a 30-min timer set on my 530 that prompts me to switch tanks. However, I've always had the habit of not switching between initial taxi and climbout or if I'm already approaching my destination airport. My sort of vague reasoning was that if something was wrong with that 'side' of the fuel system it was a bad time to find out and there really wasn't any advantage to switching tanks at those times anyway as I'm always carrying excess fuel. This possibility is probably a more solid reason for continuing this practice.
 
Crap. Something so simple to check and verify.

What might explain why the fuel lines to 1,3,5 had fuel but not 2,4,6?
 
Maybe because of the aircraft/engine damage left side vs right?
 
3393RP said:
The frustration with the apparent fuel mismanagement and the sorrow felt because of the loss of a family produce dichotomous feelings that can't be easily digested.

What a sad event.
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If you heard the radio calls, he sounds resigned.

Really sad if the issue is panic or resignation resulting in failure to conduct the engine out flow.
 
SebIp said:
If you heard the radio calls, he sounds resigned.

Really sad if the issue is panic or resignation resulting in failure to conduct the engine out flow.
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Bit of a spate of fatal accidents lately where pilots failed to handle what should have been manageable situations.

A Mooney crashed in St Augustine yesterday, killing both occupants. The door popped open after takeoff and they were returning to land.

I don't want to take the lazy and self-satisfying "kids these days" tack. But I do wonder if increased technology in the cockpit is absorbing training time that used to be spent on stick-and-rudder skills and mechanical systems.
 
SebIp said:
If you heard the radio calls, he sounds resigned.

Really sad if the issue is panic or resignation resulting in failure to conduct the engine out flow.
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Though I've flown the PA32R series, its been awhile. I can't recall how well lit the fuel selector is at night. There is no indication, nor will we probably ever know with certainty, if the lever was not touched during the last portion of the flight or if it was operated prior to landing, operated just prior to landing, while maneuvering over the airport, or after the power began to fail. Nor, if that selector position was directly related to the power loss. I have my suspicions which of those it may be, but that's it.

Maybe some A&P's can chime in and shed some light as to how precise the fuel selector is when the selector is not exactly in the ON (or BOTH, L, or R) position, but just partially away from it. Several witnesses said they heard popping and sputtering sounds as it went overhead, which indicates it may have been operating to some degree, very poorly, but wasn't completely stopped. I know the thoughts about witnesses, but that's all we have from the ground.
 
Here's a similar accident from a PA 32RT a few years ago, thankfully not fatal: https://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/221203

"The on-scene examination noted that the fuel selector lever was found in an intermediate position between the left and right tank detents, about 1 to 2 inches past center, more toward the right tank position."

"When the fuel system was configured to mimic fuel available in the left tank and no fuel in the right tank, engine roughness and a partial loss of engine power was duplicated through placement of the fuel selector lever to the approximate position as found at the accident scene. The engine roughness can likely be attributed to a mixture of fuel and air in the fuel system. "
 
Well the report also says the valve and handle were damaged from both impact and fire. Current position may not be 100% reliable indicator.

If it were indeed in that position it seems to me if it was favoring the left wing more than OFF, some flow should occur. Maybe enough flow to run at a low power setting. Left wing had the juice, per the fire.

Either way, it would have been prudent to keep a tight pattern if that airport was indeed the destination.

IMG_3873.jpeg
 
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