Shoot, chute didn't deploy.

Ugh. That sux. Though it sounds like the chute did deploy, but the front attachment point(s) failed and didn’t allow the canopy to fully open.

One thing my CFI drilled into me was (and as Shephard stated above), “Altitude is your friend.” Not sure of the circumstances, but if it was true this pilot was doing stall practice, I would have hoped he/she started with sufficient altitude for spin recovery.
 
...

"Galaxy Rescue Systems told them the accident was the first time one of the chutes had been deployed in flight. During certification, one test deployment was performed on the ground."

Sounds legit.
 
...

"Galaxy Rescue Systems told them the accident was the first time one of the chutes had been deployed in flight. During certification, one test deployment was performed on the ground."

Sounds legit.

We don't actually test our chutes.
But we did stay at a Holiday Inn last night.
 
Nice to know,the company is marketing,what some consider to be the last word in safety. And that didn’t do actual in flight deployments.
 
Ugh. That sux. Though it sounds like the chute did deploy, but the front attachment point(s) failed and didn’t allow the canopy to fully open.

One thing my CFI drilled into me was (and as Shephard stated above), “Altitude is your friend.” Not sure of the circumstances, but if it was true this pilot was doing stall practice, I would have hoped he/she started with sufficient altitude for spin recovery.

If you read the accident report, it sounds like this particular airframe had dangerous stall/spin characteristics, and that's probably why they pulled the 'chute. Unfortunately for them, the parachute installation was underengineered and it failed under a load that was most likely were within its expected design limits, sending them to their deaths.

From the NTSB report:
Metallurgical examination of the separated front anchor revealed that it had been bolted into
aluminum bulkhead skin that was about 0.022-inch thick. Although the anchor and seven of its
eight bolts remained intact, the surrounding aluminum skin of the airplane had separated from
the airplane in overstress. Without any additional supporting structure such as longerons,
stringers, or bathtub fittings, it is likely the thin aluminum skin could not withstand the force
applied to the front anchor during parachute deployment.

That sounds like gross negligence, if not criminal negligence. This shows a limitation in the LSA certification process. The manufacturer self certifies the airplane, if they cut corners, there's no independent third party to ensure compliance. Whether the harsh stall characteristics are characteristic of the type or specific to that one airframe we don't know, but the substandard parachute installation provided nothing but a false sense of security.
 
From the NTSB report:
Metallurgical examination of the separated front anchor revealed that it had been bolted into
aluminum bulkhead skin that was about 0.022-inch thick. Although the anchor and seven of its
eight bolts remained intact, the surrounding aluminum skin of the airplane had separated from
the airplane in overstress. Without any additional supporting structure such as longerons,
stringers, or bathtub fittings, it is likely the thin aluminum skin could not withstand the force
applied to the front anchor during parachute deployment.

I am feeling just utter disbelief as I read this.

I will agree on negligence.
 
I am feeling just utter disbelief as I read this.

I will agree on negligence.
I dunno, structural aluminum foil could be appropriate. <---- I didn't say what it could be appropriate for...
 
I dunno, structural aluminum foil could be appropriate. <---- I didn't say what it could be appropriate for...
Hey, if it's good enough for the lunar lander, then why not an LSA?
 
Aircraft was 50lbs over gross. I don't know how much more stress that translates to on chute deployment, but apparently more than was built for.
 
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