Richard McSpadden Crash

There's a Charles Barkley quote that sometimes fits. He was a commentator for a game where the favored team lost. The other guys at the desk had a lot of complicated explanations for what happened. They asked Charles for his take, and he said "sometimes you just lose". You do everything right, but you still lose.

They could have been coming in fine in their emergency, but without enough altitude, and hit a tree on the way down with enough force to take them out of control. We're taught to fly it into the crash, but that doesn't always work. Sometimes you lose.
 
They asked Charles for his take, and he said "sometimes you just lose". You do everything right, but you still lose.
This. It takes a high degree of fortitude to simply accept a loss that strikes close to home. It makes us face our own mortality. It forces us to acknowledge that we all have a lack of agency in the face of Lady Luck.

We lost two good ones on Sunday. These two great pilots simply pulled the short straw and ran out of options. Another wise quote: It is possible to commit no mistakes and still lose. That is not a weakness-that is life.

RIP Mr. McSpadden and Mr. Francis. You deserved better than what your aircraft gave you that day.
 
Very true. Sometimes you just get dealt a bad hand.

Kind of like the Kalitta 747 in Afghanistan. Those guys were doomed when the MRAP hit the tail. They just didn’t know it yet.
Slight correction, it was a National Air Cargo 747.
 
Hi everyone.
Very sad. Condolences to the families and friends.
I generated some hi res ortho with the area and I wanted to post for others that may want to view. I used a fixed gear 172 SP that has close to the same performance as the 177.
Not enough information to try and simulate a similar flight, but I have some pics that can show the terrain at the end of Rwy 14, also some views during climb out and at 1000 Ft. above Airport Altitude (AA). the pics names give some more info. and the lower left white text, like AGL...
Moderators please delete if inappropriate.
Edit: Removed irrelevant pics.
 
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From what I’ve seen about it, they departed 32 and came up short landing 32. So the ‘impossible turn’ scenario of turning to land back opposite direction would not be it.
NSTB says impossible turn. The investigator said 1,000 feet, a non-pilot witness said 200 feet. The eyewitness details of the person who reached the plane are a tough read. Both survived the initial impact. And they must have been so darn close to telling the story over a few cold ones. It says they hit the top of the berm and slid down.

https://www.lakeplacidnews.com/news...cid-airplane-crash-followed-engine-failure-2/
Not second guessing this accident, but using this airport as an example, sometimes it's best to head FOR the trees, knowing that controlled flight at a slow airspeed into the tops of trees is often very survivable, more so that a stall spin into almost anything,
The guy who owns the float plane operation at Long Lake, which is probably 30 minutes from the accident site, who has countless hours as a bush pilot in the Adirondacks, told me exactly the same thing. We were flying over the mountains and I observed there were not many places to put down if you had to, he said, “Aim for the pine trees.” Of course everyone else says he’s wrong, but I would listen to him in a pinch.
 
I don’t think the pine trees are as good of an option for a slick Cardinal as they are for a Cub or a floatplane… the floatplane or a Cub has a bunch more stuff hanging off the airframe to “catch” it. A slick Cardinal with the gear up is a lot more likely to have a long and probably deadly drop from the treetops. Better to fly it into the treetops than a stall/spin, sure, but don’t fool yourself about tall trees being great.
 
NSTB says impossible turn. The investigator said 1,000 feet, a non-pilot witness said 200 feet. The eyewitness details of the person who reached the plane are a tough read. Both survived the initial impact. And they must have been so darn close to telling the story over a few cold ones. It says they hit the top of the berm and slid down.

https://www.lakeplacidnews.com/news...cid-airplane-crash-followed-engine-failure-2/

The guy who owns the float plane operation at Long Lake, which is probably 30 minutes from the accident site, who has countless hours as a bush pilot in the Adirondacks, told me exactly the same thing. We were flying over the mountains and I observed there were not many places to put down if you had to, he said, “Aim for the pine trees.” Of course everyone else says he’s wrong, but I would listen to him in a pinch.

This is very true and more and more info seems to be coming out that they were really low when whatever happened.

I could be wrong, but I don't think they were trying to turn back.
Took off 32, tried to get back to 14.
 
“Aim for the pine trees.” Of course everyone else says he’s wrong, but I would listen to him in a pinch.
Unless they are really tall trees with few lower branches, pine trees have tops to slow you down from initial contact then progressively stronger and wider branches as you drop. Deciduous trees are a little different and are less "accommodating" than pines, but even then I think you've got a better chance of survival. (Not that I've actually landed in either . . . )
 
Hi everyone.
Given some additional information from people that observed that take off, it looks like they took off 32.
Here are some additional pictures with the surroundings. If the person is correct that they were only about 200 Ft. AGL they were very close to the end of the rwy. See AGL white text lower left.
At 1000 Ft. they had many other options, and I would think that there may have been something in between. More information / data is needed to make any sense of this unfortunate accident.
I have a couple of more pics with the area around and views at around 200 and 1000 Ft. AGL.


1a-1Kft-behind- around.jpg2a-262Ft-behind-around.jpg
 
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Unless they are really tall trees with few lower branches, pine trees have tops to slow you down from initial contact then progressively stronger and wider branches as you drop. Deciduous trees are a little different and are less "accommodating" than pines, but even then I think you've got a better chance of survival. (Not that I've actually landed in either . . . )
I recommend orange trees with about 12 feet of spacing between. IMG_8740.jpeg
 
One thing to think about is how density altitude can affect a turn back. It was a warm day at an airport that had a noticeably higher than sea level elevation to begin with. My understanding is that is detrimental to performance, but others can confirm.

For example take an individual aircraft and put them at the same point distance and true height-wise from the airport(assume perfectly calm air). Which one does better for the turn back?
 
Unless they are really tall trees with few lower branches, pine trees have tops to slow you down from initial contact then progressively stronger and wider branches as you drop. Deciduous trees are a little different and are less "accommodating" than pines, but even then I think you've got a better chance of survival. (Not that I've actually landed in either . . . )
I suspect that it can be a bit of a crapshoot. The trees might work out fantastic or it may turn out bad.

I knew a student glider pilot that got into a spin at low altitude. There was a single deciduous tree that he happened to spin into which prevented him from hitting the ground and he was not seriously injured.

Another pilot at a competition apparently had a midair collision and lost control in an inverted position. The airflow prevented the canopy from opening to escape with a parachute. Apparenty, the aircraft crashed in an open field but into the only group of trees(3 of them) and it saved her.
 
I suspect that it can be a bit of a crapshoot. The trees might work out fantastic or it may turn out bad.

I knew a student glider pilot that got into a spin at low altitude. There was a single deciduous tree that he happened to spin into which prevented him from hitting the ground and he was not seriously injured.

Another pilot at a competition apparently had a midair collision and lost control in an inverted position. The airflow prevented the canopy from opening to escape with a parachute. Apparenty, the aircraft crashed in an open field but into the only group of trees(3 of them) and it saved her.

Spinning into anything is bad, but flying into a tree slightly above stall speed can often be the best option. Whenever you see a "crash" with a basically intact airframe it's a good sign. ;)

Clipboard01.jpgClipboard02.jpg
 
Much as Tom Hanks in "Sully" insisted his incident be referred to as a forced water landing rather than a crash, I would describe those as tree top landings.
 
One thing about this discussion that strikes me is how much we pilots cede responsibility for mechanical failure.

GA piston engines are simple and reliable. They almost never just stop dead without some kind of external failure, which in many cases can be caught. An engine needs 4 things to run: fuel, air, spark, and oil. So CHECK THOSE THINGS.

Rather than treating engine out as the Hand of God, learn your powerplant. Pull the cowl off monthly and check everything. All hoses intact and secure. All controls connected and functioning properly. No leaks or other signs of issues. All fasteners tight. All safety wires intact and cotters in place.

Stop treating the engine as a black box that requires an A&P to look at. Everything I just described is legal preventative maintenance for the owner.

Don't like the odds ... change them.
 
Don't like the odds ... change them.
Agree completely, but always change them in your favor.

Look at the odds of a fatal crash when you turn back to the airport and how to manage those odds. I've seen people experiment with a simulated turn back at a safe altitude and conclude that, "I can make it back to the runway in xxhundred feet", then use that altitude as a decision point for every take-off. Nothing could be sillier, IMHO. Under some conditions there is NO altitude from which you can make it back, and under others a turn back takes you BEYOND the runway in the opposite direction. So everything in between can apply. Keeping that in mind you would need to do a complex calculation for every take off that takes into account runway length, wind direction, wind velocity, aircraft weight, density altitude, startle response delay, angle of bank, pilot proficiency, and likely other factors. I think it's safe to say that few if any pilots actually do that. Meanwhile, if the turn back is a knee-jerk response based on a target altitude you may be missing the best choice straight ahead or with a minimal turn in the runway direction.
 
.....or most important....have a plan and brief the plan before you take off.
 
It also need to remain bolted together. See @hindsight2020 ’s thread about his engine.

Indeed. I'm a bit surprised to read that take, given the recency of my personal anecdote. I don't disagree with the macro point, but the personal investment/responsibility canard argument falls on its @ss quickly in light of my situation. Unless of course the argument is being made I should have eddy current my case studs prior to every flight, even in the visual absence of any leaks/visible damage from the eventual offending fastening bolt and/or mating area.

For the record, further forensics have since become informative, once I had time to get back to the hangar while talking to the mechanic. We are confident now that it was prob one of the inner (non-thru) studs that failed in fatigue (see original picture in my thread), as evidenced by the failure point being inside the flange. The rest of the stud failures were clean shear at the face of the nut/flange, outside the barrel, consistent with simple and cascading "domino" overload failure. To wit, only two nuts remained torqued (though elongated): the two corner aft ones. Intimating a forward-to-aft, "ripping" mode of failures. I was probably less than a minute from full separation (and lord knows what amount of internal spun bearing) if I had continued to demand level flight or go-around power from the engine, so I got extra lucky by pulling power at altitude when I did. It was close, per usual I had no concept of how close. USERNAME.CHECKS. :cornut:

In fairness to his stated argument, my failure mode could be construed as a legitimate outlier within the mechanical parent category, though engine shops and folks who dabble on it for a living here don't consider things like case cracks or fatigue stud failures particularly "uncommon" among the 50hp/jug variety of lyco 4-bangers. At any rate, further to his point, my powerplant did not seize, providing me just enough minutes of diminishing partial power to make a key. It was eventually gonna, and probably would have, once the barrel separated and puked all the lubricant. But it didn't. And that is partially due to its relative moving parts simplicity (and cartoonish tolerances compared to turbines), as his argument correctly highlights.

It's all good. I only come to POA to be told [insert 'dumb/dangerous/different' here] is always my fault.. in truth if my wife didn't work I wouldn't have a reason to hang around for it here. *checks siiiiiiiix at 7Gs in black and white* :biggrin:
 
Agree completely, but always change them in your favor.

Look at the odds of a fatal crash when you turn back to the airport and how to manage those odds. I've seen people experiment with a simulated turn back at a safe altitude and conclude that, "I can make it back to the runway in xxhundred feet", then use that altitude as a decision point for every take-off. Nothing could be sillier, IMHO. Under some conditions there is NO altitude from which you can make it back, and under others a turn back takes you BEYOND the runway in the opposite direction. So everything in between can apply. Keeping that in mind you would need to do a complex calculation for every take off that takes into account runway length, wind direction, wind velocity, aircraft weight, density altitude, startle response delay, angle of bank, pilot proficiency, and likely other factors. I think it's safe to say that few if any pilots actually do that. Meanwhile, if the turn back is a knee-jerk response based on a target altitude you may be missing the best choice straight ahead or with a minimal turn in the runway direction.
One of the things I always brief before a takeoff is wind direction at 1000 feet. Some people will say you can make the turn back at X AGL. Okay, which way would you turn? I always have that firmly in mind before leaving earth.
 
It also need to remain bolted together. See @hindsight2020 ’s thread about his engine.
Ok. Let's stipulate that half of engine outs are due to internal failures unlikely to be caught by anyone not named Mike Bush. The other half are due to external issues with fuel, oil, engine controls, etc that might be caught by more frequent and thorough checks with the cowl off.

When I say change the odds, I mean take the 50% that is there for the taking. The rest is what it is.
 
One of the things I always brief before a takeoff is wind direction at 1000 feet. Some people will say you can make the turn back at X AGL. Okay, which way would you turn? I always have that firmly in mind before leaving earth.
I don't even do that. "Thumbs up" points to the up aileron during the preflight, whether using a stick or yoke. On the takeoff roll I just do the same thing and always point my thumb into the crosswind component and focus on rudders to keep aligned. It's a little unusual to have the wind at 1000 feet be from the opposite direction, but certainly it can happen and should be factored in.
 
I don't even do that. "Thumbs up" points to the up aileron during the preflight, whether using a stick or yoke. On the takeoff roll I just do the same thing and always point my thumb into the crosswind component and focus on rudders to keep aligned. It's a little unusual to have the wind at 1000 feet be from the opposite direction, but certainly it can happen and should be factored in.
Good 'rule of thumb'...
 
I don't even do that. "Thumbs up" points to the up aileron during the preflight, whether using a stick or yoke. On the takeoff roll I just do the same thing and always point my thumb into the crosswind component and focus on rudders to keep aligned. It's a little unusual to have the wind at 1000 feet be from the opposite direction, but certainly it can happen and should be factored in.
Yup….the thumb thing to remember. ;)
 
The 177 made a hard left turn after takeoff, presumably under firm control of its owner. Anybody know the surface wind at time of takeoff?
 
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Hi everyone.
The 177 made a hard left turn after takeoff
Where did you get that information from? The only information I can find is "the plane take off toward Cascade Acres..." which is WNW (left) of the Rwy and "..maybe 200 feet, he saw the plane take a sharp right" which would be logical, but not a sharp left.
I hope we can get more information to analyze and learn something from this accident, so far very little useful information.
I cannot see / find any of the "..berm at the end of the runway and fell around 30 feet into a ravine..." around the end of the Rwy?
 
Hi everyone.

Where did you get that information from? The only information I can find is "the plane take off toward Cascade Acres..." which is WNW (left) of the Rwy and "..maybe 200 feet, he saw the plane take a sharp right" which would be logical, but not a sharp left.
I hope we can get more information to analyze and learn something from this accident, so far very little useful information.
I cannot see / find any of the "..berm at the end of the runway and fell around 30 feet into a ravine..." around the end of the Rwy?
https://www.lakeplacidnews.com/news...cid-airplane-crash-followed-engine-failure-2/

The crash happened around 4:05 p.m. Sunday at the end of a runway, close to the North Elba Athletic Fields and Recycle Circle Lane, shortly after takeoff after “a hard roll to the left,” according to initial NTSB reporting.

Edit: this article contains conflicting accounts, unless I'm missing something. Just how many eyewitness statements are there? Also, different witnesses can remember things differently.
 
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Here's the aircraft vs. accident data I used for the computation:
View attachment 121106
"All" is the total aircraft on the registry as of the end of the given year. The year itself is calendar year, not fiscal year (the FAA publishes figures based on fiscal year).

It's interesting to note that one can get different numbers of accidents per year depending on what source one uses. For 2021, for example, if you use the online tool, the total comes out to over 1700, vs. the 1635 shown above. I extract my numbers from the NTSB accident database I downloaded on 1 December 2022.

Accidents which receive an NTSB number (e.g., "NYC08CA089") and are included in the NTSB accident database are counted. I presume that these are considered accidents because the criteria in NTSB Part 830 are met.

As I mentioned earlier, this includes some foreign accidents, accidents in the US involving foreign-registered aircraft, and unregistered air vehicles. In addition, separate accidents occurring to a given aircraft will also be counted separately.

Certainly, there are some silly accidents in the database, but I suspect the number of stall-spin cases FAR exceeds the instances where a drunk driver drove through a hangar. In any case, the drunk-driving-into-the-hangar incident would not be considered a reportable accident, per NTSB 830.2:

Aircraft accident means an occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft which takes place between the time any person boards the aircraft with the intention of flight and all such persons have disembarked, and in which any person suffers death or serious injury, or in which the aircraft receives substantial damage.

If the drunk drove into an *occupied* aircraft, then yes, it would be assigned an NTSB number. For example, a case where a guy with a fork lift drove into a 172 (ANC00LA005).

Should also point out that the figures I posted are based on *all registered aircraft being active*. The a recent annual FAA General Aviation Survey says that less than 80% of the single-engine piston-powered aircraft in the registry are active. Include THAT, and the rate drops from one accident per 175 aircraft to one in 140.

Just remember: It ain't random. You can reduce your risks by trying to fly safe.

Ron Wanttaja
Great analysis, Ron
Numbers like this scare me a bit but being a little scared helps to keep me on my toes.
The following observation belongs in a different thread, but I couldn't help but notice the 23.5% reduction in the supply of registered aircraft since the peak in 2008. Surely this is a big factor in the increasing unaffordability of aircraft these days.
 
Great analysis, Ron
Numbers like this scare me a bit but being a little scared helps to keep me on my toes.
The following observation belongs in a different thread, but I couldn't help but notice the 23.5% reduction in the supply of registered aircraft since the peak in 2008. Surely this is a big factor in the increasing unaffordability of aircraft these days.
The reduction was (mostly) administrative. After 9/11, Congress got upset with the FAA because the FAA couldn't contact too many airplane owners...generally airplanes that had been scrapped years earlier. FAA's response was to institute the requirement that all aircraft owners would have to re-register their airplanes every three years (recently changed to seven years).

This caused a MASSIVE drop in aircraft registrations. Implementation was staggered in the 2011-2013 time period. Here's how the homebuilt fleet size changed.
1696792367339.png

Note that the number of *active* aircraft didn't change much over this time period...which meant that the number of accidents remained about the same. The upshot was that the ACCIDENT RATE shot through the ceiling.

The FAA got alarmed, EAA got alarmed, and they decided to have a safety summit to figure out what happened. EAA had me present to illustrate how the rise was completely artificial, and due to the re-registration policy. Don't know whether they believed (or even understood) me. EAA got saddled with a "Do Not Exceed XX Fatal Accidents a Year" policy after this.

The sad thing is, this is still affecting the computed accident rate. Two sections of the FAA have a *different definition* of what constitutes an "inactive" airplane, and some organizations combine products of the two in computing accident rates. This skews the results. I'm going to talk about that during EAA's online "Homebuilt Week" in January; the title of my presentation is "Lies, Damn Lies, and Homebuilt Accident Statistics."

Ron Wanttaja
 
Hi everyone.
Edit: this article contains conflicting accounts...
I think we need to wait for better data before we can analyze.
I posted a couple of more pics just in case someone can pinpoint a closer location.

KLKP-End32-Area3.jpgKLKP-End32-Area4.jpg
 
https://www.lakeplacidnews.com/news...cid-airplane-crash-followed-engine-failure-2/

The crash happened around 4:05 p.m. Sunday at the end of a runway, close to the North Elba Athletic Fields and Recycle Circle Lane, shortly after takeoff after “a hard roll to the left,” according to initial NTSB reporting.

Edit: this article contains conflicting accounts, unless I'm missing something. Just how many eyewitness statements are there? Also, different witnesses can remember things differently.
Possible scenario is hard left, followed by right turn back toward the runway. This would be more consistent with sparse witness information so far.
 
Possible scenario is hard left, followed by right turn back toward the runway. This would be more consistent with sparse witness information so far.
That's certainly consistent with a typical "180" back to the runway. Once you complete the 180 you've got another big turn in the opposite direction to come close to the runway itself. (That's one other reason the proving to yourself that a 180 degree turn uses only xxx feet of altitude is a completely useless metric when used to determine a safe "turn-back" altitude, yet I see people use it frequently.)
 
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