Knowing where you are...

denverpilot

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A friend e-mailed this one to me. I haven't bothered to hunt it on the web... True or not, it's a good yarn. And reminds me of good old Stapleton...

-----

The Payoff
Dedicated to Frank Crismon
(1903-1990)
by Capt. G. C. Kehmeier
(United Airlines, Ret.)

“I ought to make you buy a ticket to ride this airline!" The chief pilot's words were scalding. I had just transferred from San Francisco to Denver. Frank Crismon, my new boss, was giving me a route check between Denver and Salt Lake City.

"Any man who flies for me will know this route," he continued. "'Fourteen thousand feet will clear Kings Peak' is not adequate. You had better know that Kings Peak is exactly 13,498 feet high. Bitter Creek is not 'about 7,000 feet.' It is exactly 7,185 feet, and the identifying code for the beacon is dash dot dash."
"I'm putting you on probation for one month, and then I'll ride with you again. If you want to work for me, you had better start studying!"

Wow! He wasn't kidding! For a month, I pored over sectional charts, auto road maps, Jeppesen approach charts, and topographic quadrangle maps. I learned the elevation and code
for every airway beacon between the West Coast and Chicago. I learned the frequencies, runway lengths, and approach procedures for every airport. From city road maps, I plotted the streets that would funnel me to the various runways at each city.

A month later he was on my trip.

"What is the length of the north-south runway at Milford?" "Fifty-one fifty."

"How high is Antelope Island?"

"Sixty-seven hundred feet."

"If your radio fails on an Ogden-Salt Lake approach, what should you do?"

"Make a right turn to 290 degrees and climb to 13,000 feet."

"What is the elevation of the Upper Red Butte beacon?" "Seventy-three hundred."

"How high is the Laramie Field?"

"Seventy-two fifty."

This lasted for the three hours from Denver to Salt Lake City.

"I'm going to turn you loose on your own. Remember what you have learned. I don't want to ever have to scrape you off some hillside with a book on your lap!"

Twenty years later, I was the Captain on a Boeing 720 from San Francisco to Chicago. We were cruising in the cold, clear air at 37,000 feet.

South of Grand Junction a deep low-pressure area fed moist air upslope into Denver, causing snow, low ceilings, and restricted visibility. The forecast for Chicago's O'Hare Field was 200 feet and one-half mile, barely minimums.

Over the Utah-Colorado border, the backbone of the continent showed white in the noonday sun. I switched on the intercom and gave the passengers the word.

"We are over Grand Junction at the confluence of the Gunnison and Colorado Rivers. On our right and a little ahead is the Switzerland of America--the rugged San Juan Mountains. In 14 minutes we will cross the Continental Divide west of Denver. We will
arrive O'Hare at 3:30 Chicago time."

Over Glenwood Springs, the generator overheat light came on.

"Number 2 won't stay on the bus," the engineer advised.

He placed the essential power selector to number 3. The power failure light went out for a couple of seconds and then came on again, glowing ominously.

"Smoke is coming out of the main power shield," the engineer yelled.

"Hand me the goggles."

The engineer reached behind the observer's seat, unzipped a small container, and handed the copilot and me each a pair of ski goggles. The smoke was getting thick.

I slipped the oxygen mask that is stored above the left side of the pilot's seat over my nose and mouth. By pressing a button on the control wheel, I could talk to the copilot and the
engineer through the battery-powered intercom. By flipping a switch, either of us could talk to the passengers.

"Emergency descent!" I closed the thrust levers. The engines that had been purring quietly like a giant vacuum cleaner since San Francisco spooled down to a quiet rumble. I established a turn to the left and pulled the speed brake lever to extend the flight spoilers.

"Gear down. Advise passengers to fasten seat belts and no smoking."

I held the nose forward, and the mountains along the Continental Divide came up rapidly. The smoke was thinning.

"Bring cabin altitude to 14,000 feet," I ordered.

At 14,000 feet over Fraser, we leveled and retracted the gear and speed brakes. The engineer opened the ram air switch and the smoke disappeared. We removed our goggles and masks.

Fuel is vital to the life of a big jet, and electricity is almost as vital. The artificial horizon and
other electronic instruments, with which I navigated and made approaches through the clouds, were now so much tin and brass. All I had left was the altimeter, the airspeed, and the magnetic compass--simple instruments that guided airplanes 35 years earlier.

"Advise passengers we are making a Denver stop."

"The last Denver weather was 300 feet with visibility one-half mile in heavy snow. Wind was northeast at 15 knots with gusts to 20," the copilot volunteered.

"I know. I heard it."

The clouds merged against the mountains above Golden. Boulder was in the clear. To the northeast, the stratus clouds were thick like the wool on the back of a Rambouillet buck
before shearing.

I dropped the nose and we moved over the red sandstone buildings of the University of Colorado. We headed southeast and picked up the Denver-Boulder
turnpike.

"We will fly the turnpike to the Broomfield turnoff, then east on Broomfield Road to Colorado Boulevard, then south to 26th Avenue, then east to Runway 8."

The copilot, a San Francisco reserve, gave me a doubtful look. One doesn't scud-run to the end of the runway under a 300-foot ceiling in a big jet.

Coming south on Colorado Boulevard, we were down to 100 feet above the highway. Lose it and I would have to pull up into the clouds and fly the gauges when I had no gauges. Hang onto it and I would get into Stapleton Field. I picked up the golf course and started a turn to the left.

"Gear down and 30 degrees."

The copilot moved a lever with a little wheel on it. He placed the flap lever in the 30-degree slot. I shoved the thrust levers forward.

"Don't let me get less than 150 knots. I'm outside."

I counted the avenues as they slid underneath...30th, 29th, and 28th. I remembered that there was neither a 31st nor a 27th. I picked up 26th.

The snow was slanting out of the northeast. The poplar trees and power lines showed starkly through the storm. With electrical power gone, we had no windshield heat. Fortunately,
the snow was not sticking.

"Let me know when you see a school on your side and hack my time at five-second intervals from the east side of the school yard."

Ten seconds.

"There it is. The yard is full of kids. Starting time now!"

Good boy. Smiley faced Holly.

From the east side of the school yard, I counted Kearney, then Krameria,
Leydon,Locust. Remember the double lane for Monaco Parkway. Then Magnolia, Niagara, Newport. Time the speed at 130 knots. Only eight blocks to the end of the runway. Oneida, Olive, Pontiac, Poplar. From Quebec to Syracuse, the cross streets disappear; figure eight seconds. Keep 26th Avenue under the right side of the nose.

"Full flaps."

Dead ahead, glowing dimly in the swirling snow, were the three green lights marking the east end of Runway 8.

We crossed 20 feet above the center green light and touched down in a crab to the left. I aligned the nose to the runway with the right rudder, dropped the nose wheel, popped the speed brakes, and brought in reverse thrust.

It took us 10 minutes to find the terminal in the swirling whiteout. We saw the dim, flashing red light atop the building indicating the field was closed to all traffic.

A mechanic materialized out of the snow carrying two wands. He waved me into the gate. I set the parking brake.

"We have ground power," the engineer advised.

"Cut the engines."

The bagpipe skirl of sound spiraled down to silence.

"My hat is off to you, skipper. I don't know how you ever found this
airport."

"I used to fly for an ornery old chief pilot who made me learn the route," I replied as I hung up my headset and scratched the top of my head where it
itched.

Frank Crismon passed away at
his home in Denver on 25 Jan 1990.

Editor's note:
Professionalism, readiness, and knowledge can never be replaced by all the electronic gadgets in the world. Whether you drive a truck or a C-17, nothing beats knowing your capabilities and those of your machine, and knowing where you are at all times. It's hard to come up with options if you don't know what's going on.




Sent from my iPad using Tapatalk
 
Is Boulder too short for that plane?
 
Is Boulder too short for that plane?
Boulder's too short for almost everything. Plus the approach from the west is practically a crash dive over the mountains. 4100 ft long.
 
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Obviously SWA doesn't have crust old check airmen like the one in the story! (See Branson story)
 
I'm not at all impressed with the story. The pilot was a cowboy and reckless. There HAD to be better options than scud running in a 727 with pax.

Also, he blew off his crew and tried to be a hero. It worked this time but eventually he's the guy that kills people.
 
I'm not at all impressed with the story. The pilot was a cowboy and reckless. There HAD to be better options than scud running in a 727 with pax.

Also, he blew off his crew and tried to be a hero. It worked this time but eventually he's the guy that kills people.

and yet .... nobody died. ...

I can only surmise that this was written before Jeff-uh-Metro opened in 1960.
 
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I'm not at all impressed with the story. The pilot was a cowboy and reckless. There HAD to be better options than scud running in a 727 with pax.

Also, he blew off his crew and tried to be a hero. It worked this time but eventually he's the guy that kills people.

Just what I was thinking. Didn't declare an emergency, didn't use all the resources at his disposal, assuming it happened which I doubt. Difficult to believe that wouldn't make the news hard. Passengers might've noticed.
 
I'm not at all impressed with the story. The pilot was a cowboy and reckless. There HAD to be better options than scud running in a 727 with pax.

Also, he blew off his crew and tried to be a hero. It worked this time but eventually he's the guy that kills people.

The story is pure B.S.
 
The story is pure B.S.

Nope. I'd believe it. Those old guys were used to tight situations with few options and sometimes had to do some unorthodox things to save the airplane and its occupants. What else could this guy have done? Keep flying until something else blew up?

These days they just crash because they don't realize that the airplane has stopped flying itself.

Dan
 
Just what I was thinking. Didn't declare an emergency, didn't use all the resources at his disposal, assuming it happened which I doubt. Difficult to believe that wouldn't make the news hard. Passengers might've noticed.

GEN Fail = NORDO and NAV fail maybe? I don't know what other options they would have had to get to a better field...sectional and clock-chart-ground, assuming the weather allowed it?

Pretty spectacular, if true. Fortunately, they didn't have to worry about cell towers.
 
http://coloradoaviationhistoricalsociety.org/bio_popup.asp?id=106
This pioneer airman (Frank Crimson) flew every aircraft type used by United Airlines, from Boeing 40-Bs to Boeing 720s, without mishaps or accidents.
No mention of this event in his bio.

But he sounds like a pretty good guy. FWIW I did not see anything in the NTSB files about this event either. I am skeptical it actually occurred and perhaps is an apocryphal story dedicate to a guy who a lot of people respected. There are lessons in these stories even if they are not true. Those lessons can be applied without thinking the story as gospel.
 
I'm not at all impressed with the story. The pilot was a cowboy and reckless. There HAD to be better options than scud running in a 727 with pax.

Also, he blew off his crew and tried to be a hero. It worked this time but eventually he's the guy that kills people.
Nailed it, Captain. He killed 43:
"The training record of this captain indlcated a pattern of below average judgment, as well as a tendency to deviate from standard operating procedures and practices. Indeed, lt is significant that in this case the history not only reflects an apparent indifference toward adhering to acceptable procedures and tolerances in general, but specifically during the landing or ILS approach phases of flight."​
Salt Lake City B-727 crash November 11, 1965.

dtuuri
 
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http://coloradoaviationhistoricalsociety.org/bio_popup.asp?id=106

No mention of this event in his bio.

But he sounds like a pretty good guy. FWIW I did not see anything in the NTSB files about this event either. I am skeptical it actually occurred and perhaps is an apocryphal story dedicate to a guy who a lot of people respected. There are lessons in these stories even if they are not true. Those lessons can be applied without thinking the story as gospel.
Frank Crimson didn't author the OP's piece--he was who it was dedicated to.

dtuuri
 
Nailed it, Captain. He killed 44:
"The training record of this captain indlcated a pattern of below average judgment, as well as a tendency to deviate from standard operating procedures and practices. Indeed, lt is significant that in this case the history not only reflects an apparent indifference toward adhering to acceptable procedures and tolerances in general, but specifically during the landing or ILS approach phases of flight."​
Salt Lake City B-727 crash November 11, 1965.

dtuuri

Seems Kehmier was really proud of being able to do stupid things.

There's a bio about Crismon at http://coloradoaviationhistoricalsociety.org/bio_popup.asp?id=106 with the very interesting comment " During his tenure, there were no accidents involving an instrument procedure or terrain. " referring to the United airlines flights in the rocky mountain region. Guess he retired before Kehmier got into more trouble.

Comment from the Civil Aviation forum about pilots flying after crash with fatalities: "[FONT=ARIAL, Helvetica, Geneva]One case, i.e., Capt. Kehmeir, ex UAL 727 captain - famous accident in SLC in the late 1960s... many casualties... got terminated by UAL, later regained his licence but CPL privileges (no longer ATPL), and was hired as pilot for Denver's Ports-of-Call (CV990), he retired from there as first officer."

And Kehmier wrote a book about his time at Ports of Call. Can't find any reviews on it.




[/FONT]
 
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A captain of an airliner at age 24. Pretty good.

Dan
 
Cool story but is the takeaway here that we should memorize the street grid surrounding the airports we operate out of to cabbie like precision?

Situational awareness is one thing, but this was a little absurd. A better option would have been to go where it was clear. It would not have been such an awesome story if they hadn't found the airport.

But yeah, I'm calling B.S. on it too. At best it's a very embellished version of the facts.
 
Fascinating background. I posted more out of sharing what appeared to be a probably mostly fictitious story for fun. The whole premise seems stretched.
 
A better option would have been to go where it was clear.
I was wondering about that too since the problem happened over Glenwood Springs. I would have thought the obvious choice would have been to go back to Grand Junction where he made the PA. I'm assuming the passengers could see it from cruise altitude. But there's a lot left out as there would be in a story like this. I am suspicious of it too since it isn't dated and no one can find any record of it other than this email which seems to have been posted in many places.
 
Cool story but is the takeaway here that we should memorize the street grid surrounding the airports we operate out of to cabbie like precision?
The takeaway for me is, "How does he keep his sanity after causing a fatal crash?" Does he try to atone for it by remembering when his actions, maybe, saved lives instead? The rest of us are spared from his grief to the extent we've learned from it. Our challenge is to avoid new ways to regret.

dtuuri
 
I was wondering about that too since the problem happened over Glenwood Springs. I would have thought the obvious choice would have been to go back to Grand Junction where he made the PA. I'm assuming the passengers could see it from cruise altitude. But there's a lot left out as there would be in a story like this. I am suspicious of it too since it isn't dated and no one can find any record of it other than this email which seems to have been posted in many places.

In California, due to the mountainous terrain, on most days, one doesn't have to fly very far to find better weather. Is that true in Colorado as well?
 
In California, due to the mountainous terrain, on most days, one doesn't have to fly very far to find better weather. Is that true in Colorado as well?
Sometimes. I was just going by this part of the narrative.

South of Grand Junction a deep low-pressure area fed moist air upslope into Denver, causing snow, low ceilings, and restricted visibility. The forecast for Chicago's O'Hare Field was 200 feet and one-half mile, barely minimums.

Over the Utah-Colorado border, the backbone of the continent showed white in the noonday sun. I switched on the intercom and gave the passengers the word.

"We are over Grand Junction at the confluence of the Gunnison and Colorado Rivers. On our right and a little ahead is the Switzerland of America--the rugged San Juan Mountains. In 14 minutes we will cross the Continental Divide west of Denver.
Upslope along the Front Range where Denver (and Boulder) are located doesn't translate into bad weather on the west side of the Continental Divide. The PA seems to corroborate that. There are times when I have used mountain airports as the legal alternate when the Front Range had upslope but the mountains were clear.
 
I'm not at all impressed with the story. The pilot was a cowboy and reckless. There HAD to be better options than scud running in a 727 with pax.

Also, he blew off his crew and tried to be a hero. It worked this time but eventually he's the guy that kills people.

X1000
 
Twenty years later, I was the Captain on a Boeing 720 from San Francisco to Chicago. We were cruising in the cold, clear air at 37,000 feet.

I'm not at all impressed with the story. The pilot was a cowboy and reckless. There HAD to be better options than scud running in a 727 with pax.

Also, he blew off his crew and tried to be a hero. It worked this time but eventually he's the guy that kills people.
A 720 isn't a 727. It's the precursor the the 707.

I liked the story, regardless of its credibility. It was entertaining.
 
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A 720 isn't a 727. It's the precursor the the 707.

I liked the story, regardless of its credibility. It was entertaining.
The B-707 came first, the B-720 was a shorter version with less range.

I thought it made a good story too and probably had many true elements. The pilot was intimate with the area, being based there and driving the same route to work down Colorado Blvd. United didn't have emergency battery-powered attitude indicators back then and there are references to total electrical failures at the airline in literature that resulted in safe landings. (That changed when a B-727 of theirs went in the ocean departing LAX.) So, it's credible enough to me even though extending the gear twice without electricity seems iffy for a Boeing :dunno:. Before we judge the pilot too harshly we have to ask ourselves, had we come up through the system at the same time, "Would we have done better? Or worse?"

dtuuri
 
Before we judge the pilot too harshly we have to ask ourselves, had we come up through the system at the same time, "Would we have done better? Or worse?"
Despite the fact that I still think the story is a fabrication or highly exaggerated I do think we need to consider the time it happened. The safety culture has come a long way since then. Not only that, people who would brag openly about doing something like this would have met a different reception then as now. Yes I know it's a story about one pilot written by another.
 
Unless I'm missing something huge, it's a story about Gale Kehmeier, written by Gale Kehmeier.
That's not how I interpreted it.

The Payoff
Dedicated to Frank Crismon
(1903-1990)
by Capt. G. C. Kehmeier
(United Airlines, Ret.)
I thought it was about Frank Crismon, written by Gale Kehmeier.
 
That's not how I interpreted it.

I thought it was about Frank Crismon, written by Gale Kehmeier.
Look a bit further:


The Payoff
Dedicated to Frank Crismon
(1903-1990)
by Capt. G. C. Kehmeier
(United Airlines, Ret.)

“I ought to make you buy a ticket to ride this airline!" The chief pilot's words were scalding. I had just transferred from San Francisco to Denver. Frank Crismon, my new boss, was giving me a route check between Denver and Salt Lake City.

dtuuri
 
OK, if that was the case I have less regard for the author (Kehmeier) since he is bragging about something he did himself, not writing about someone else. But as you said, the times were different and we have made progress since then.
 
some interesting hits on google for Kehmeier
Here's an AP article carried by the Miami News. He's referring to three other B-727 accidents within days or months of the Salt Lake City crash when he says, as the lone survivor, he speaks for "four captains". He does have a point about the CAB not making public interviews with copilots that flew with him. We ought to be able to face our accusers.

Also, about witnesses who saw fire before the crash. I wouldn't blow that off as typical witness fallibility. I once flew with a captain who had previously flamed out a Learjet and dead-sticked it into an inland lake. Witnesses said the same thing about his crash--and it was true. The flames were from the engines which were "torching" during his attempts to restart them. Upon ditching, those flames ignited the ruptured fuel tanks. Luckily, for him, the water wasn't deep and he and the copilot walked to shore, avoiding the fire. The B-727 was notorious for middle engine compressor stalls in crosswinds early in the takeoff roll. Seems worth investigating whether a steep flight-idle descent at slow speed followed by full throttle could flame it out.

Bottom line? The PIC is the bottom line. We shouldn't depend on engine thrust, ATC, moving maps or anything else to save us from ourselves.

dtuuri
 
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Here's an AP article carried by the Miami News. He's referring to three other B-727 accidents within days or months of the Salt Lake City crash when he says, as the lone survivor, he speaks for "four captains". He does have a point about the CAB not making public interviews with copilots that flew with him. We ought to be able to face our accusers.

Also, about witnesses who saw fire before the crash. I wouldn't blow that off as typical witness fallibility. I once flew with a captain who had previously flamed out a Learjet and dead-sticked it into an inland lake. Witnesses said the same thing about his crash--and it was true. The flames were from the engines which were "torching" during his attempts to restart them. Upon ditching, those flames ignited the ruptured fuel tanks. Luckily, for him, the water wasn't deep and he and the copilot walked to shore, avoiding the fire. The B-727 was notorious for middle engine compressor stalls in crosswinds early in the takeoff roll. Seems worth investigating whether a steep flight-idle descent at slow speed followed by full throttle could flame it out.

Bottom line? The PIC is the bottom line. We shouldn't depend on engine thrust, ATC, moving maps or anything else to save us from ourselves.

Also from the article was the statement of the CAB report that, "the training record of this captain (Kehmeier) indicated a pattern of below average judgment as well as a tendency to deviate from standard operating procedures and practices." He tries to defend himself by saying if he was that incompetent he should have been grounded by either the FAA or United.

Now I see this statement has been posted before in the thread. Regardless of the cause of the accident at Salt Lake, he had previously been found to have a pattern of below average judgment even considering the standards of the time.
 
He tries to defend himself by saying if he was that incompetent he should have been grounded by either the FAA or United.
I think he was trying to blame the engines for not responding and United and the FAA for making him the fall guy instead. Time and again they each gave him stamps of approval. How many route checks, type rating rides and six month proficiency checks did he have to take over twenty years? A whole lot that's how many. I have read the CAB report's citations of training records and interviews with FAA examiners and come away thinking that's not much considering it's probably all they could find.

Regardless of the cause of the accident at Salt Lake, he had previously been found to have a pattern of below average judgment even considering the standards of the time.
Unless you can dig up what those interviews with his copilots contained, all I have to go by is this insight by another of his peers back in 2003:

"I can't fail to mention Gale Kehmeier, who flew west in September. I was not close to him, and only flew with him a very few times, but I admired the fact that he didn't settle for the Status Quo, and was always searching for a way to make flying more efficient. I feel that his forced early "retirement” was unjust. What happened to him at SLC could have happened to any of us--I had a similar incident happen in a DC-8 at about the same time, the difference being that I had a couple of thousand feet to get the engines spooled up (the last of which finally responded as we crossed the run-way threshhold)."​
Yes, he screwed the pooch. But hindsight is 20/20 and apparently nobody thought that what they had seen him do, or heard what he supposedly had done, was so dangerous that they made sure it stopped. That is, except for just one FAA POI--Rodney Stich, author of The Unfriendly Skies.

The self-promoting Stich claims he wrote up Kehmeier for the very thing that caused the accident, a high sink rate approach, just a few months before. But if you read what Stich says he actually wrote in that report, "I made a brief reference to the enroute check in my flight logbook: 'Enroute check, G. Kehmeier. High descent rate, hard landing,'" you can hardly see any urgency in his words. If what he saw was so serious, why was his critique so brief? Isn't a hard landing, by definition, caused by a high sink rate? Let he without sin cast the first stone.

The ultimate cause, IMO, is treading too close to the precipice with other peoples' lives at stake. I don't think we're immune to that disease even 50 years later.

dtuuri
 
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Unless you can dig up what those interviews with his copilots contained, all I have to go by is
There's a lot more to go by than that, the accident report for one, where they interviewed the first officer, second officer the flight attendants and several survivors.

Here is the whole CAB report. I can't cut and paste portions of it because it is a PDF of an old typewritten document.

http://lessonslearned.faa.gov/United227/CABreportUAL227SLC-727.pdf

Does all of this have anything to do with the original story posted? I don't know. I'm a little surprised that there is no mention of the incident in the accident report if it happened prior to it.
 
Does all of this have anything to do with the original story posted?
I think so. In both cases the captain thought he was doing something good. One time it worked out like he planned, one time things went tragically wrong. Smoke in the cockpit, even if it clears with ram air and depressurization, can put a lot of pressure on you to get on the ground ASAP. Think ValueJet in the Everglades or NASCAR's twin Cessna. BTDT myself in a Citation.

The SLC crash was set up by a desire to save the company money and the passenger's time. It wasn't the first time he used that technique, but might have been the first time he discovered how slow the engines can spool up sometimes.

I'm not making excuses for him though. I'm only trying to say that the more things change the more they stay the same. Today's pilots will find new ways to become victims of their overconfidence. Might not be by descending too steeply and too low on final, but they'll find a way.

Here's a link to a newspaper article covering his testimony in front of the CAB. It opens on the second page, but you can drag over to the left side for the beginning.

dtuuri
 
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I think so. In both cases the captain thought he was doing something good.
I remain suspicious of the original story since there doesn't seem to be another record of it. Maybe the event really happened but not in quite the dramatic way in which it was told. Some people find stories like this entertaining and some don't.

The SLC crash definitely happened and people can either believe what the captain said or what the CAB concluded.

I think that times have changed as far as what is considered acceptable regarding safety. CRM didn't even exist then. But I agree with you that people are subject to the same impulses as they were in the 1960s even though I think there are fewer cowboys out there.
 
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