The general public and politicians have formed their opinions on Boeing and the MAX based on news reports by reporters who have little technical understanding of the subject matter on which they are reporting.
according to 25.1309....there needs to be a safety analysis on all safety critical systems.....this would be one and that should be done.
Yes. If they stick to business. But when they start opining about the stabilizer trim and the speed the crew was flying and they get it totally wrong, they have horrible insight.
Wasn't that a 737-7 MAX in MCI? I don't think those have been certified yet. Also don't know if they have MCAS. The 737-10 MAX won't.
That's how 737 doors have always been, back to the -100.. another half baked design feature lol
That's how 737 doors have always been, back to the -100.. another half baked design feature lol
What a machine! I always liked how the old 737 landing lights fold out from the bottom of the flap fairing. Some cool design choices..Yup, I guess short haul planes don't need no stinkin' gear doors.
Here's an old -200
Yup, I guess short haul planes don't need no stinkin' gear doors.
Here's an old -200
Ok, so is the Max being built under the same production certificate (or whatever it is called) or is it totally new? If it is the old one I don’t see an issue. If it is entirely new, then I would think the FAA shares some of the liability for this.
Yes. But when you put any aircraft under such a "microscope" of global analysis I'm surprised more issues haven't been "discovered." In the real world this item would have been dealt with a OEM bulletin or worse case an AD. I wonder how an Airbus A320 NEO would fair under such detailed scrutiny?
Well, in the real world, truth be told, it's not only Boeing. You better add Airbus, Textron, Lockheed, GE, Safran, Northrup, L3, United Technologies, and 100s of other national/international aviation companies to your list as they use the same FAA/Designee oversight system as Boeing. As to compliance, Boeing never stopped producing aircraft so they continue to be in compliance with the current oversight requirements just as all the other aviation manufacturers are. No conspiracy.
Well, in the real world, truth be told, it's not only Boeing. You better add Airbus, Textron, Lockheed, GE, Safran, Northrup, L3, United Technologies, and 100s of other national/international aviation companies to your list as they use the same FAA/Designee oversight system as Boeing. As to compliance, Boeing never stopped producing aircraft so they continue to be in compliance with the current oversight requirements just as all the other aviation manufacturers are. No conspiracy.
My, you are a bit cranky today.
Was a big turning point for me. Initially it was pretty easy to blame poor pilots or a poor pilot training culture.., I was one of them "can't a 'real pilot' just disconnect the elec trim and hand fly if it goes bonkers?" but as we learned more about this it's obvious that the MCAS system was a half thought out, bare bones piece of trash, with just about zero training to the crews on the MAX, and Boeing having, what honestly appears to be, zero regard for a safe well built product. Sure, corporations are designed to save costs and maximize profit, but surely having a plane sitting grounded with lawsuits, a reputation hit, etc., is not a cost free route to take
I don't think it's a point of defending anything as much as it is to find out how the oversight system failed. And while you can cherry-pick certain tid-bits out of the narrative the entire oversight system is much bigger and more complex than a few emails imply or other items publicized in the media. The context where those items fit into the big picture is everything.
There is no option to order only a single AoA vane. All 737s have two AoA vanes just like every other transport jet I've ever flown.
No. The original MCAS version also had an accelerometer input, in addition to the AoA input, as the MCAS was only needed when the aircraft went into "ballistic" mode. The AoA option was for a 3rd AoA as all aircraft have 2 as stated above.
FYI: the air carriers dictate the market not the other way around. The Airbus A320 NEO was serving that market and the MAX was Boeing's response. As to a "cheaper version," if that was the case then there would only be Airbus aircraft flying as everything built by Airbus is always cheaper dollar wise when compared to like aircraft. They make their money on the support side.
Technically yes. However, if it were to say a single AoA vane could lead to a catastrophic failure risk then it would be closer to being correct.
To pick up from the answer above and without getting into the complexity of risk analysis, the pilot's interaction to a system failure is one of the first items addressed in determining it's failure risk. There is actually FAA approve guidance on how the aircrew reacts right down to the length of time it takes to react. If I recall during the original risk assessment of the MCAS it was determined the aircrew would react with the 3 second limit, which along with the rest of the original assessment requirements, kept an MCAS failure below the catastrophic risk and the major risk categories. So there's more than a simple "assumption" if the crew can intervene, it's actually part of the certification guidance. Hence the ongoing regulatory review of cockpit data saturation levels and pilot training to see if the 3 second rule and other guidance is still valid.
Another cherry-picked item. The forces were calculated back when the manual trim system was certified years ago. There was zero requirement to recalculate for MCAS install. In the Ethiopia case, it's my understanding there are other issues involved outside the MCAS involvement.
And if you had to build a web server under an equal level of regulatory oversight it would be interesting to see if that backup would still be there or simply offered as an option especially if your customer picked the price point it would buy at.
