pilots had been reporting instability and issues with the airplane
I've seen one incident reported (each pilot filed a separate report on the same incident). It involved an unexpected pitch-down when the autopilot was engaged. That would be unrelated to MCAS as MCAS only operates when the autopilot is disengaged and MCAS don't not operate the elevator, only the stabilizer trim. The A/P problem could have been a failure in the autopilot system or the crew could have had the vertical mode misprogrammed when they engaged the A/P. We've also seen the pilots' reports but not what the result of their maintenance write up which would have told us what problems, if any, were found.
The other report was a pilot who was complaining about what Boeing's differences training included. He didn't report any occurrence with the airplane.
Some here seem to be jumping to blaming the pilots.
No final reports or conclusions have been issued for either of the two accidents. We (still) know very little about the Ethiopian accident but we have quite a bit of information on the Lion Air accident.
What we know about Lion Air.
1. The accident airplane had AoA related issues on its last FIVE flights yet the airline continued to dispatch it.
2. On the flight immediately prior to the accident flight the aircraft experienced a stabilizer runaway due to an unschedule activation of the MCAS system due to invalid AoA data being fed to the air-data and flight control computers.
3. On that flight the operating crew were unable to handle the problem until their jumpseater pointed out the runaway stabilizer and reminded (?) them of the runaway stabilizer procedure.
4. Once the electric trim was disabled, the Captain elected to continue their two-hour flight with the electric trim disabled, no stall warning system (because the stick shaker continued to activate from liftoff until touchdown), and no autopilot system (because the electric trim was disabled). That type of decision would likely result in certificate action in the US and, I presume, most other countries.
5. The maintenance write-up that has been released for that flight did not mention that the stick shaker was activating for the entire flight.
6. The airline dispatched the airplane again for what turned out to be the accident flight.
7. On the accident flight the Captain was successfully flying the airplane after takeoff (with the stick shaker activating from liftoff). He had 21 MCAS activations and used the electric trim to return the aircraft to a trimmed state all 21 times.
8. The First Officer was trying to find the applicable procedure (runaway stabilizer) in the QRH but wasn't able to find it. The Captain transferred control to the F/O so that we could look for the procedure.
9. The F/O received 5 MCAS activations. He stopped the first 4 activations but failed to continue to re-trim the airplane back to a trimmed condition each time as had the Captain. The 5th activation was not stopped and it brought the stab trim to the full nose-down position which resulted in the loss of control.
That's what we know at this point. Some of those things may be revised or expanded in the final report but, from what we know now, what blame do you think the airline and crew should receive?
The media, and almost everyone else, has assumed that the Ethiopian accident was the result of another unscheduled MCAS activation. Tomorrow will mark two weeks since the accident yet that simple fact has not been confirmed nor ruled out.
French subject matter experts have had the Ethiopian DFDR for about a week. Protocol says that the French can not release any of the information that they recover from the recorder. Their action would be to forward that data back to the investigating agency (the Ethiopian equivalent of the NTSB) and then they would control the release of the information. It should be pretty easy to either rule in, or rule out, an unscheduled MCAS activation as the trimming patter it produces is distinctive. Why hasn't that information been released? I have no idea.
The information that we do have is as follows.
1. MCAS is disabled when the flaps are not retracted and/or when the autopilot is engaged.
2. The departure airport elevation is 7,657'.
3. The unofficial Flightstats data (from ADS-B) indicate that the airplane reached a maximum altitude of about 8,600' and that their rate-of-climb excursions started well before that. The 8,600' reading was at the end of the available data.
4. The 737 is not authorized to takeoff with flaps up. Authorized takeoff configurations are Flaps 1, 5, 10, 15, and 25. Due to the high elevation of the airport, their likely takeoff flap setting was either Flaps 1 or Flaps 5.
5. The acceleration and clean-up schedule for a 737, using an NADP-2 departure, would be to climb to 800' AFL (8,467'), lower the nose to accelerate, then retract the flaps as each flap maneuvering speed is reached. With slower acceleration due to altitude, it's unlikely that they would have started to retract the flaps until somewhat above the 8,600'. (An NADP-1 departure wouldn't have them accelerating and cleaning up until 3,000' AFL/10,657' MSL).
Given this information, how could MCAS have activated on this flight? Lacking data, I can only speculate.
1. Flaps misset for takeoff?
2. Flaps retracted early?
3. Flightstats data wrong?
4. MCAS didn't activate and the problem was something else?
We won't know until the DFDR data and analysis is released. Why hasn't that been released yet?
So, given this, are you still convinced that both accidents were caused by the same problem or do you think we should withhold judgement pending data that shows a second unscheduled MCAS activation?
The US got a lot of criticism for not immediately grounding the MAX as many other countries did. Canada and the US did not ground the MAX until the Ethiopian jackscrew was found in a nose-down position similar to the Lion Air jackscrew. That was the first hard data suggesting that the proximate cause of both accidents was a loss of control due to an excessive nose-down trim and it was that link that justified the grounding.
We know how the Lion Air jackscrew ended up in the full nose-down position. We don't yet know why the Ethiopian jackscrew ended up in a similar position. The DFDR and CVR data will tell us. Considering that a fleet of over 300 airplanes are grounded pending this information, why hasn't anything been released? I don't know.
So, who's blaming the crew without information?