Do you train your departure plan?

denverpilot

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DenverPilot
Fascinating graphic. Plenty of constant emphasis in primary flight training on the base to final turn and stall/spin awareness, but not nearly enough in planning departures and knowing exactly where you are going when the engine quits on initial climb out, IMHO.

I posted a thank you to the CFI who pounded doing the TOLD numbers into my head and always asked, "where are you going to go when the engine quits?" and made me brief it out loud before pushing the throttle up for takeoff.

Sometimes there aren't good options but it's better to KNOW there aren't any, and how high one needs to be to make the cliche'd "impossible turn". Are you going in that field to the left, or are you doing an air return to the departure runway? Can you even make it? Did you look on Google Earth to find the most open place to go and that has the "softest" stuff to hit?

It certainly looks to me like we need a new training emphasis. What do you think? How were you trained?

ea838d7464e94cd5c22f951280d2822d.jpg
 
I was trained to brief engine outs right after takeoff.

On upwind, things like

. At OAK, land on 33 or in bay mud. Land on remainder of 28 if possible (it's long)
. At PAO, land in bay mud, between substation and transmission lines (they are not connected)
. At RHV, land on Capitol Expressway or in Cunningham Lake (not good options at that airport). If high enough to return, use the parallel runway.
 
I didn't get much emphasis on departure planning until I did my ME training and departure briefing became a huge emphasis. I carried that over onto SE departures as well.
 
In airplane training, departure engine failures were treated as "reaction" rather than planning.

In glider training, we trained landing sites and return altitudes and plans.
 
I trained to always know what your options are.
 
Not much emphasis either, except find a spot ahead and hit it. In the desert that's easy enough since it's sparsely populated.

For reference:

Takeoff
41 accidents - 12%

Initial Climb
127 accidents - 38%

Crosswind
4 accidents - 1%

Downwind
15 accidents - 4%

Base
23 accidents - 7%

Final
30 accidents - 9%

VFR/IFR Approach
55 accidents - 16%

Missed Approach/Go Around
44 accidents - 13%

or in descending order:

(38%) Initial Climb
(16%) VFR/IFR Approach
(13%) Missed Approach/Go Around
(12%) Takeoff
(9%) Final
(7%) Base
(4%) Downwind
(1%) Crosswind
 
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I didn't get much emphasis on departure planning until I did my ME training and departure briefing became a huge emphasis. I carried that over onto SE departures as well.



In airplane training, departure engine failures were treated as "reaction" rather than planning.



In glider training, we trained landing sites and return altitudes and plans.


I've also seen both of these mentioned before. I think somewhere we are doing private non-Commercial single engine pilots a disservice not emphasizing this sooner / somewhere along the line.

Haven't done the ME myself, but I recognize the sailplane one. We didn't even start the first tow the first day without briefing it. It was years into my SE flying before an instructor really pounded takeoff planning into my head.

Sure there was lip-service. Maybe even the "where are you going to go" phrase when there was a convenient landing location for the CFI to point at during departure, but never an emphasis on saying it out loud that a particular airport just had completely crappy options and internalizing that if the engine quits here at this particular airport not to try anything stupid to return -- and just hit that bad thing, right over there, and yeah... It's going to hurt.

Now I'll be the first to admit maybe in the overload of PP training now over 20 years ago, that the CFI tried harder than I remember. But about 15 years into flying SE non-commercially another CFI recognized my complacency and kicked my ass over it until I got "uncomplacent". Ha.
 
Or to add a little clarity... These two together make up 50% of how you will probably die...


(38%) Initial Climb
(12%) Takeoff

These are a significant training emphasis...

(16%) VFR/IFR Approach
(13%) Missed Approach/Go Around

(And of course they don't break out -- ha, see what I did there? -- IFR/IMC approaches in this stat.)

And these two we have whole multiple page threads here on whether or not you can skid or slip during the base to final turn and how everyone is "going to die!!!"...

(9%) Final
(7%) Base

And these are off the chart so low they're almost statistically insignificant...

(4%) Downwind
(1%) Crosswind


And we had a multi page thread on overhead breaks and have had multi page threads on midfield pattern entry.

We are (like lots of things in human endeavors), not focused on the stuff that will ACTUALLY kill us.

IMHO. :)
 
I've also seen both of these mentioned before. I think somewhere we are doing private non-Commercial single engine pilots a disservice not emphasizing this sooner / somewhere along the line.

You are 100% correct. There is no emphasis on the LOTOT (loss of thrust on takeoff) scenario in the SEL PTS, and consequently many schools/CFIs don't focus on an area that isn't directly testable.
 
That's a dream of an airport you have there in your picture - take a look at KPMP or KHWO. They're enough to make you want a litely loaded twin.
 
I find the missed approach/go around statistic more disturbing than the rest of them...every flight starts with a takeoff and ends with a landing, but in 13,000+ hours, I've done exactly seven missed approaches in real life. The vast majority of my training clients haven't done one in the last year, and probably less than half have done one in the last five years. As for go Arounds, I've probably done 50 or fewer in real life, and I suspect my go around numbers are on the high side for most pilots.

And yet, 13% of fatals near an airport fall into these two categories. Our success rate as a group in these two areas is very small compared to takeoffs and landings, or even approaches.
 
yup....I plan for the worst....and am surprised with the best. :D

Every runway I land....I always scope out the takeoff engine out ditching.
 
I wonder if this is discussed more thoroughly in training depending on what part of the country you are trained in? I learned to fly in the midwest and there really wasn't any emphasis on engine failures on departure other than the "close throttle, land straight ahead" types of discussions. We have it pretty easy around here since many of the airports are just surrounded by farm fields and other flat terrain that provides a lot of options for places to go in the event of an emergency.

The concept of a departure plan wasn't really emphasized until I got to my multiengine training. Oddly enough, all the previous instructors I worked with were either multi instructors or multi pilots too so you would have thought they might have said something about it before then.
 
During my training we flew out of KSLC, so plenty of room to land back on the runway, and lots of open space in front of us. Basically, it was under 5000' land straight ahead, above that turn and land on the field somewhere. Briefed that every time. But, we didn't brief take-off options from other airports, which probably wasn't a good thing for my own learning experience. The airport I fly from now the option is to basically use the preferred northbound takeoff, because there is space to land. If the winds are unfavorable, then it's stick your head between your legs and kiss your butt goodbye brief, because you won't live if the engine quits.
 
I find the missed approach/go around statistic more disturbing than the rest of them...every flight starts with a takeoff and ends with a landing, but in 13,000+ hours, I've done exactly seven missed approaches in real life. The vast majority of my training clients haven't done one in the last year, and probably less than half have done one in the last five years. As for go Arounds, I've probably done 50 or fewer in real life, and I suspect my go around numbers are on the high side for most pilots.



And yet, 13% of fatals near an airport fall into these two categories. Our success rate as a group in these two areas is very small compared to takeoffs and landings, or even approaches.


Can this be handled at least partially by CFIs agreeing that they need to be done on every BFR? Most, but not all, of my BFRs have included one.

Instrument folk will always have to do them, but it'll be a by the numbers thing under the hood. Not the typical "this is too squirrelly, go..." type that usually triggers a VFR one.

I always thought the "there's an elephant on the runway" one not very effective in teaching what you usually need them for, crappy winds.

Only a handful of my VFR go arounds have been for aircraft or things on the runway over 20+ years, but many have been because an approach was going to hell in a bad crosswind or more commonly, things went totally to hell on short final with super gusty conditions.

The stat probably also includes touching down and balked landing scenarios in that number. I think quite a few go around accidents happen in that phase where the aircraft is already rolling on (or bouncing off of) the runway and the pilot is already falling behind or is already a mile behind the airplane.
 
Great points. That is one reason why I really don't like "urban" airports, like Timmerman (KMWC) here in Milwaukee. Your options are extremely limited.
 
I always thought the "there's an elephant on the runway" one not very effective in teaching what you usually need them for, crappy winds.

Only a handful of my VFR go arounds have been for aircraft or things on the runway over 20+ years, but many have been because an approach was going to hell in a bad crosswind or more commonly, things went totally to hell on short final with super gusty conditions.
Another very good point. I think most folks would make the right decision to go-around for a runway fowler, but making the decision to go-around for things like wind shear, unexpected gust...etc can be a lot tougher and that is where airplanes tend to get broken - trying to force it in instead of taking the ego hit and going around.
 
Fascinating graphic. Plenty of constant emphasis in primary flight training on the base to final turn and stall/spin awareness, but not nearly enough in planning departures and knowing exactly where you are going when the engine quits on initial climb out, IMHO.

I posted a thank you to the CFI who pounded doing the TOLD numbers into my head and always asked, "where are you going to go when the engine quits?" and made me brief it out loud before pushing the throttle up for takeoff.

Sometimes there aren't good options but it's better to KNOW there aren't any, and how high one needs to be to make the cliche'd "impossible turn". Are you going in that field to the left, or are you doing an air return to the departure runway? Can you even make it? Did you look on Google Earth to find the most open place to go and that has the "softest" stuff to hit?

It certainly looks to me like we need a new training emphasis. What do you think? How were you trained?

ea838d7464e94cd5c22f951280d2822d.jpg

I'm always training on departures.

#1 Thought - Where am I going to do if this doesn't go well?

#2 Remind myself needed immediate memorized emergency actions like:

A "boost pump - ON" if fuel pressure drops. C205 accident proved that one with a sliver of metal that jammed the engine driven fuel injection pump on takeoff, everyone died.

B Any electric trim / autopilot circuit breakers I should know about?

#3 Where is the fire extinguisher in this thing?
 
Fascinating graphic. Plenty of constant emphasis in primary flight training on the base to final turn and stall/spin awareness, but not nearly enough in planning departures and knowing exactly where you are going when the engine quits on initial climb out, IMHO.

I posted a thank you to the CFI who pounded doing the TOLD numbers into my head and always asked, "where are you going to go when the engine quits?" and made me brief it out loud before pushing the throttle up for takeoff.

Sometimes there aren't good options but it's better to KNOW there aren't any, and how high one needs to be to make the cliche'd "impossible turn". Are you going in that field to the left, or are you doing an air return to the departure runway? Can you even make it? Did you look on Google Earth to find the most open place to go and that has the "softest" stuff to hit?

It certainly looks to me like we need a new training emphasis. What do you think? How were you trained?

ea838d7464e94cd5c22f951280d2822d.jpg

Can't agree with you more on "It certainly looks to me like we need a new training emphasis. What do you think?" I've done a number of "rental checkouts" in recent years. Often at airports that are new to me. I am the one that usually has to initiate the "loss of engine on departure brief" Only once has the CFI initiated it. This happens on BFR's and recurrent training also.
 
Timely posting. The CFI and I used this to discuss "when the takeoff goes bad" and "missed approaches".

Nate's post reminded me to do what he does, brief out loud what you will do should you loose power on the roll or initial ascent.

To make sure missed approaches go smoothly, Ron Levy beat the following into my head (keep in mind this was a C182P)

Decision made to go missed happens
Power Up
Pitch Up
Flaps Up (wing and cowl)

[Take a deep breath]
5-T's
Execute the published procedure

Add to both, there's no macho in any of this. As soon as you don't like what you're experiencing, execute the correct procedure to get you out of it.
 
I don't think I'd do it in that order.

Some missed approaches have an immediate climbing turn because of terrain, and a 182 will climb just fine with 10-20 flaps. In the 172 I instrument-train in, I don't put in any flaps until I can see the runway. It's one less configuration to manage on an approach.

In my own missed approaches, pitch and power happen at the same time, since the approach speed is already above Vy (this is quite different from a VFR go-around). And the first step of the missed approach procedure happens immediately. Usually, that's a straight ahead climb, but occasionally it isn't.

See http://155.178.201.160/d-tpp/1508/00805L2.PDF for an example. You don't want to go further north than you have to, due to terrain. Especially if the wind is pushing you in from the south (and that's REAL common at that airport) and you're timing the MAP.
 
Nate's post reminded me to do what he does, brief out loud what you will do should you loose power on the roll or initial ascent.


I will just toss out here that I let this slip quite a bit at airports I know or even flying with folks who do know the airport well. Not a good habit to let myself fall into as a trap, but no superhuman here. It's easy to let it slide.

But I do believe the CFI who taught me to do it when he said, "There's a reason professional flight crews always do this."

Complacency sucks. But the graphic was a wake up call to get back in the habit. 50% of fatalities is huge.

One of the downsides of non-pro aviation is that there's no sim ride every six months that's being graded to "force" you to do anything. There's a BFR but you can go right back to whatever bad habits you like after you kick the CFI out of the airplane. Haha.

That's not always a good thing. But then again, that's why I can't carry people for hire and the pros can...
 
I don't think I'd do it in that order.

Some missed approaches have an immediate climbing turn because of terrain, and a 182 will climb just fine with 10-20 flaps. In the 172 I instrument-train in, I don't put in any flaps until I can see the runway. It's one less configuration to manage on an approach.

In my own missed approaches, pitch and power happen at the same time, since the approach speed is already above Vy (this is quite different from a VFR go-around). And the first step of the missed approach procedure happens immediately. Usually, that's a straight ahead climb, but occasionally it isn't.

See http://155.178.201.160/d-tpp/1508/00805L2.PDF for an example. You don't want to go further north than you have to, due to terrain. Especially if the wind is pushing you in from the south (and that's REAL common at that airport) and you're timing the MAP.

Power, pitch, and flaps are about 5 seconds max...there's more cushion than that built into the TERPS, especially for things like timed approaches.

Missed approaches are, by nature, an aerodynamically destabilizing event. Add to that the fact that most pilots seem to be unprepared for them when they happen, and a "rolling pull" for an immediate turn on the missed could really mess you up. You want to have a procedure that you've trained enough so that it comes immediately and accurately to mind and can be completed in a consistent sequence in a timely manner.

While no procedure is perfect, the procedure that Ron taught Mike works well and is consistent with industry standard and the basic "aviate, navigate, communicate" concept.
 
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This is very recent.

As if on cue, this recording of the Essex County (KCDW) fatal crash shows up in my FB feed.

http://archive-server.liveatc.net/kcdw/KCDW-Aug-15-2015-1330Z.mp3

Aircraft to listen for is 63TV starting at 25:49. Recording ends with the call from the tower to Ops notifying them of a crash.

5 minutes, 54 seconds, from initial taxi call to the crash.

I'm just going off of other's commentary (including one of his personal friends) who say there aren't many options at this airport.

In the pilot's own words, he's unable to maintain power.

Speculation: Other folks have noticed the time from taxi to takeoff is too short and a proper run up may not have been done. Unconfirmed but passing it along as part of this conversation. At an airport without options, would you risk no run-up or a rolling run-up?

Also speculative: Folks in the other thread are saying locals believe he attempted the "impossible turn". Unconfirmed, I know not his altitude at power loss nor his skill level or prep for such an occurrence. He still sounds fairly confident while making the emergency call and the "unable to maintain power" call. It doesn't sound like he "froze" or didn't continue to fly the airplane, but he does sound pretty calm if there really isn't anyplace to go at this airport. Just my opinion, not intended as mean or harmful to those he left behind.

Just seemed too perfect to fall into my feed with this conversation going on.
 
I think the most potentially dangerous thing that has happened to me yet occurred on the takeoff roll during taining, when for some reason the cowling clasps had not been fastened properly. The cowling opened when we were about 20 feet in the air. As a student, I had been reading the pre-takeoff brief in the checklist religiously every sing time. The first thing on the emergency check list is if runaway remains land and stay within 30 degrees of centerline. I had read that so many times at that point, that I just did it, and everything was fine.

After that, I am damn sure to check the cowling better, and that did make me more aware of problems occurring in takeoff.
 
This is very recent.

As if on cue, this recording of the Essex County (KCDW) fatal crash shows up in my FB feed.

http://archive-server.liveatc.net/kcdw/KCDW-Aug-15-2015-1330Z.mp3

Aircraft to listen for is 63TV starting at 25:49. Recording ends with the call from the tower to Ops notifying them of a crash.

5 minutes, 54 seconds, from initial taxi call to the crash.

I'm just going off of other's commentary (including one of his personal friends) who say there aren't many options at this airport.

In the pilot's own words, he's unable to maintain power.

Speculation: Other folks have noticed the time from taxi to takeoff is too short and a proper run up may not have been done. Unconfirmed but passing it along as part of this conversation. At an airport without options, would you risk no run-up or a rolling run-up?

Also speculative: Folks in the other thread are saying locals believe he attempted the "impossible turn". Unconfirmed, I know not his altitude at power loss nor his skill level or prep for such an occurrence. He still sounds fairly confident while making the emergency call and the "unable to maintain power" call. It doesn't sound like he "froze" or didn't continue to fly the airplane, but he does sound pretty calm if there really isn't anyplace to go at this airport. Just my opinion, not intended as mean or harmful to those he left behind.

Just seemed too perfect to fall into my feed with this conversation going on.

Unfamiliar with the airport but it seems like he had enough time to complete a runup if the plane was already set up for departure before requesting to taxi. These are tough recordings to listen to but may keep another pilot safe if they get in a similar situation. I lost power once at 100 ft AGL +/- and it is nothing like your CFI pulling power on a BFR @ 2000ft and making you land.

There was about a minute between takeoff and the engine out call which may have been close to 800-1000 ft or whatever altitude they felt comfortable turning back at.
 
There was about a minute between takeoff and the engine out call which may have been close to 800-1000 ft or whatever altitude they felt comfortable turning back at.
That is what seems a little odd. He was cleared for a left downwind departure. He would have already turned cross-wind if not turning downwind when he made that call.
 
Given the number of times my pre takeoff brief has been "I'm going to aim between those trees and probably die" I am hardly surprised that departure fatalities outnumber others. if the mill quits in the pattern you should have options if you're doing everything correctly. On takeoff, often not so much.
 
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