Cloud Nine's New Plane

Yep. I'm mostly ok with being more cavalier when VFR, but it's a whole other kettle of fish when shooting an approach. My practice is to be stabilized when cleared for and fly an approach at 170 kias, throw the first notch of flaps and gear out at GS intercept or the FAF which will slow me to 140kias and that is the configuration until landing is assured when the rest of the flaps can come in. Hate criticizing him, but I simply don't understand why Pascal didn't ask for a vector to get things set up correctly. I get the icing concern, but he seemed to be anything but stabilized and a vector would've added but a few minutes.

If I get to flight idle on a real approach I've done screwed the pooch. It's time to go missed and try again.

Agreed. VFR vs. IFR is a big difference.

My thought is Pascal was also far behind the airplane for multiple reasons, far enough behind it that he didn't see that he needed a delay vector or the like.

There was a pretty long discussion thread on the MU-2 forum about how to correctly shoot approaches and what speed it should be done at. But, the profiles in the SFAR and within the AFM state pretty clearly that they recommend 125 KIAS or so and then slow to Vref (which is 1.3 Vs for 20 degree flaps and 1.5 vs for 40 - flaps 20 and flaps 40 landings are both approved normal procedures) once landing assured/runway in sight. Some people shoot faster, some people think you should be shooting slower.

On the MU-2, there are several reasons why one might not want to do flaps 40 landings as a normal procedure, and from what I've read, I think my procedure is going to be flaps 20 for normal landings and flaps 40 for short field. But I'm also not planning on doing short fields until I get comfortable with the plane. Mitsubishi publishes landing charts for flaps 20 and flaps 40. Because of the change to flaps 40 having Vref at 1.5 Vs instead of 1.3, the landing distances end up about the same. But with flaps 20, you have much better options if you lose an engine on the approach. Additionally, the jack screws for the fowler flaps end up wearing out faster if you do routine flaps 40 landings, whereas the lower forces when flaps 20 is used will help longevity. One of the jack screws on this plane had to be replaced, and the pilot who'd been flying it before that happened did flaps 40 every time. Makes sense to me for making flaps 20 the standard.
 
Surprising they haven't "beefed up" or redesigned the jack screw if that's a longevity problem using flaps 40 a lot.
 
Last edited:
Not judging how well your procedure may work, but respectfully, what you described does not sound like a stabalzied approach.

Not sure what's the norm on the Conquest (or the published procedures), but I can tell you on the piston Twin Cessnas, that's the norm and it works much better. If you have full flaps out at 1,000 ft on an approach, you're going to be coming down using a lot of power and your OEI options will get much tougher. The extra drag that comes out when you hit full flaps upon seeing the runway is much easier to deal with.

I know on jets having the engines partly spooled during the approach is considered a good thing to reduce lag associated for a go-around. But in that situation, the OEI performance is also sufficient to allow for single engine go-arounds in that configuration.
 
Surprising they haven't "beefed up" or redesign the jack screw if that's a longevity problem using flaps 40 a lot.

I'm not sure how much of a problem it ends up being. I suspect this jack screw was also original to the plane, which has 5700 TT on it. So it could be an over exaggeration to call it a problem. But, it does apparently add stress. Not to a level that causes failures or unsafe conditions (which would result in some redesign or AD), but perhaps enough that it redcues service life to some degree.

For me, the OEI aspects are the big ones. The plane is able to do single engine missed approaches at flaps 20 pretty easily, but not at flaps 40.
 

Big split flaps with lots of drag, very high Vmc(over 135kias) if the authofeather doesn't work, and the huge props that are giant speed brakes. The configuration change isn't a big deal as it doesn't perceptibly change pitch. Just adds drag.

Its how I do all my landings regardless of conditions and is also how I practice it in the sim at TruFlight. I'm going there next week and will report back their thoughts although that is how we did it last year also.

I'm open to criticism and discussion on these points.
 
Big split flaps with lots of drag, very high Vmc(over 135kias) if the authofeather doesn't work, and the huge props that are giant speed brakes. The configuration change isn't a big deal as it doesn't perceptibly change pitch. Just adds drag.

Its how I do all my landings regardless of conditions and is also how I practice it in the sim at TruFlight. I'm going there next week and will report back their thoughts although that is how we did it last year also.

I'm open to criticism and discussion on these points.
We have chatted before and I have truly admired how you are open to constructive criticism and looking at things differently.

I also respect that you are using logic to determine your procedures.

I still disagree, but that’s fine.

Remember though, if I’m reading your post correctly, VMC us at full power. Also auto feather is never a guarantee, so imo that shouldn’t factor in.
 
It's listed as a factor, but it's not in their definition. That's all I was saying. Read it and interpret it how you want.
 
Due to the late deployment of full flaps as I described?

I think the approach went wrong when he decided to arrest his descent for a few minutes to save fuel (this was gleaned from the CVR). This delay snowballed.

When the aircraft was less than five miles from the IAF, it was at 6,800' ASL, descending at 2,500 FPM and 245 knots, and the pilot rated passenger stated they expected touchdown in three minutes.
 
I think the approach went wrong when he decided to arrest his descent for a few minutes to save fuel (this was gleaned from the CVR). This delay snowballed.

When the aircraft was less than five miles from the IAF, it was at 6,800' ASL, descending at 2,500 FPM and 245 knots, and the pilot rated passenger stated they expected touchdown in three minutes.

It can be done in these planes. VFR into a known environment with a very attentive pilot. Shooting an approach to minimums? Not recommended.

@SixPapaCharlie filmed a ride in my plane at Gaston’s with a profile somewhat like what got Pascal in trouble. I was configured for landing, but way high with too much energy, however I had enough power out that I could’ve gotten slow with a few moments of inattention. Iirc, we were at 17,500 ft less than 10 minutes before this landing.

@flyingcheesehead can chime in.

 
I think the approach went wrong when he decided to arrest his descent for a few minutes to save fuel (this was gleaned from the CVR). This delay snowballed.

When the aircraft was less than five miles from the IAF, it was at 6,800' ASL, descending at 2,500 FPM and 245 knots, and the pilot rated passenger stated they expected touchdown in three minutes.

As JT said, it's doable. Even in the 414, doing 3,000 FPM down is very doable, and that's without putting the power to idle. In VFR with a pilot who knows what he or she is doing.

Going into Bravo airports on VFR days, that sort of profile is essentially expected from the piston birds to keep from holding up the airliners. Now, if you're not comfortable doing it then you shouldn't, but "maximum forward speed as long as practical" is a common phrase heard. One can always say "unable". As those who've been right seat (or in some cases left seat) with me at the controls can tell you, it's quite doable and can be executed nicely. But, it requires familiarity with the plane and paying very close attention to what you're doing. I can point to half a dozen people on here who've seen an executed brick approach. @ja_user can tell you about going into John Wayne airport in the 414 in December. Because of their noise abatement profile, we were at something around 5,500 AGL on base, still made the numbers.

Once you add in IMC to the mix, it changes things completely.

I think that propeller driven multi-engine aircraft also tend to be different than piston singles or jets when it comes to appropriate stabilized approach procedures. On the MU-2, if you are flying at 1.3 Vs with flaps 20/40, that'll be <110 kts, which will be a very uncomfortable speed and put you in a bad spot in the event of an engine failure - hence why the profiles are written the way they are.

With the exception of the 310 (which if anything needed more flaps, at least with the 520s), any piston twin I've flown has worked best shooting the approach at less than full flaps and then going to full flaps once landing assured. For me the OEI performance is the big concern. On an Aztec, Navajo, or 414, shooting an approach with full flaps will require a lot of power put in, and if you lose an engine you're going to be descending below glide path and have full power. To JT's point about Vmc being something around 135, that makes 140 a good approach speed in my opinion with partial flaps. If you have to do a single engine go-around (which the Conquest can do), you're going to need to go to a high power setting. More speed makes that easier.

@Kritchlow I do appreciate the compliment on being able to tackle the MU-2 successfully. And you're right - I'm not going to fly it solo until I'm comfortable with it, and I'm going to build up slowly. While I've got over 100 hours of turboprop time, this will be the first turboprop that I'm cut loose in without an instructor. So, I have my plan in place to build up comfort by flying proficiency flights after I complete my required training. I also figure I'll bring a good co-pilot along for all long trips, at least early on. I was doing that in the 414 anyway and liked it.
 
Asthis will be the first turboprop that I'm cut loose in without an instructor. So, I have my plan in place to build up comfort by flying proficiency flights after I complete my required training. I also figure I'll bring a good co-pilot along for all long trips, at least early on. I was doing that in the 414 anyway and liked it.

Would it be financially feasible to have someone very familiar with Moo-Moos or even a Moo-Moo Instructor fly along for a few flights? This is how it's done at the airlines when you transition to another plane, an IP flys a number of hours/landings with you. Works well IMO.
 
Would it be financially feasible to have someone very familiar with Moo-Moos or even a Moo-Moo Instructor fly along for a few flights? This is how it's done at the airlines when you transition to another plane, an IP flys a number of hours/landings with you. Works well IMO.

It is a potential option, and I will have to evaluate. The problem is that I don't have any MU-2 instructors local to me, although there is one other MU-2 based nearby (albeit a long body). The required training is really pretty good for getting you familiar with the plane, and pretty intense. As I said, my intent is to fly the plane every 1-2 weeks after training to gain proficiency and comfort. So if I do that (and the training flights will have real purpose associated with them, not just going out and burning fuel), then we'll see how I feel about needing an MU-2 specific guru along vs. another pilot who can be useful.

Really, just having someone else who can run checklists and work the radios, or give tasks to on an approach is valuable. Although there are certainly some people who make better co-pilots than others in this regard. Fortunately, the aviation community around KC is a very good one and I've got some great candidates to come along as co-pilots who add value in the cockpit.
 
Last edited:
It can be done in these planes. VFR into a known environment with a very attentive pilot. Shooting an approach to minimums? Not recommended.

@SixPapaCharlie filmed a ride in my plane at Gaston’s with a profile somewhat like what got Pascal in trouble. I was configured for landing, but way high with too much energy, however I had enough power out that I could’ve gotten slow with a few moments of inattention. Iirc, we were at 17,500 ft less than 10 minutes before this landing.

@flyingcheesehead can chime in.

I believe my exact words were, "Wow, you're gonna land that?!?" :eek:

Being used to the Mooney, where a 3-degree profile is damn near power off... Well, let's just say that from the point where I said that, I would have had to go around the pattern again in the Mooney, twice!

But, @James_Dean clearly knows the limits of his aircraft and his own skills, and executed an impressive Steinway-esque approach to landing... And turned off the runway one taxiway earlier than I did in the Mooney the previous day too! It was a heckuva fun ride. I may have checked Trade-a-Plane for C425s afterwards...
 
Well, @flyingcheesehead , I don't remember any of those. But I'll believe you. There are probably a few others who've died but didn't have enough of a personal relationship with anyone to make it known.

On the Twin Cessna forum there are a few that come to my mind who've perished in airplanes. One that comes to mind was an NTSB report that was just a terrible idea all around. Another was an inexperienced pilot who just had bad luck of an engine failure on takeoff, and a third was a really good, really experienced pilot that had an in-flight fire and couldn't get on the ground in time.

Sometimes you make your own luck, and some days... your number's just up.
 
Well, @flyingcheesehead , I don't remember any of those. But I'll believe you. There are probably a few others who've died but didn't have enough of a personal relationship with anyone to make it known.

On the Twin Cessna forum there are a few that come to my mind who've perished in airplanes. One that comes to mind was an NTSB report that was just a terrible idea all around. Another was an inexperienced pilot who just had bad luck of an engine failure on takeoff, and a third was a really good, really experienced pilot that had an in-flight fire and couldn't get on the ground in time.

Sometimes you make your own luck, and some days... your number's just up.

Yup. I went back and edited my post with links to the PoA threads and NTSB reports. At least the first one happened before you joined, but it was steingar who I was suggesting needed his memory checked. ;)

I do think that keeping one's brain engaged with aviation safety, be it through forums, type clubs, magazines, or reading NTSB reports, is definitely beneficial to one's longevity.

We've also lost a few here to natural causes - Ben Haas, RotaryWingBob, and one whose name *and* handle I've forgotten from Florida.

Now, I haven't met any of the above in person, so it appears that as long as you've met me, you're immortal! Glad you're safe, @Ted DuPuis. ;)
 
  • Like
Reactions: Ted
James and Ted, thanks for your comments. You guys know better than I.

My twin turboprop time consists of a single five hour round trip in a Commander 30 years ago. I couldn't even keep it on the taxiway center line.

The details of the approach read like too high, too fast to me, but perhaps the speed decay and LOC happened so quickly it was unnoticed for just those critical seconds.

I certainly don't wish to disparage the pilot. By all accounts he was skilled and displayed good judgement in his flying.
 
Last edited:
James and Ted, thanks for your comments. You guys know better than I.

My twin turboprop time consists of a single five hour round trip in a Commander 30 years ago. I couldn't even keep it on the taxiway center line.

The details of the approach read like too high, too fast to me, but perhaps the speed decay and LOC happened so quickly it was unnoticed for just those critical seconds.

I certainly don't wish to disparage the pilot. By all accounts he was skilled and displayed good judgement in his flying.

To be fair, my point was that he might've gotten used to a habit of thinking "this plane can slow down and go down so well, I can be fast and high and recover" - something that in VMC is less of a deal, but can be a big deal in IMC, especially with everything else going on. Because things happened so fast, I think he was also behind the airplane, and probably couldn't see what a bad spot was in.

With that said, I think it would be fair to say that this was a case of bad judgement on several levels. So we're not in disagreement. He arguably shouldn't have made the flight in the first place, he should have started down sooner, he should've realized on the descent that he needed to descend quicker, he should've realized when both way high and way fast at the IAF (and FAF) that was an issue and he should try again. He arguably was intending to bust minimums with reported ceilings ~300 ft below mins on the approach.

Ultimately the LOC happened when he shoved both power levers in quickly when realizing he was 4 kts above stall speed, probably when the stick shaker kicked in. That happened very quickly, and at that low of an altitude was unrecoverable. One thing that those on the MU-2 forum said regarding that aspect was that you have enough power that you never need to shove it in rapidly, and that's a very bad idea for exactly the reason Pascal discovered in the moments before his death. You can still arrest the speed loss with a smooth application of power and a slight nose down.
 
I hadn't followed this particular accident until the last couple of posts.

Canada TSB has an animation:

 
I hadn't followed this particular accident until the last couple of posts.

Canada TSB has an animation:

First part... why did the pilot do that?? Why didn’t he pull the throttles back??
Second part... why did the airplane do that? Why did it roll? Ice?
 
First part... why did the pilot do that?? Why didn’t he pull the throttles back??
Second part... why did the airplane do that? Why did it roll? Ice?

According to the full report, he realized he was at 99 KIAS (stall speed 94 for the configuration) and then shoved the power levers forward to prevent from stalling. When he did that at such a low speed, the plane's tendency is to bank to the right. That plane has left hand rotation propellers, hence the right roll tendency. According to the MU-2 folks it's documented that you should never apply a lot of power quickly at low speeds for exactly that reason. My understanding is the spoilers tend to give you less authority vs. ailerons anyway, especially at low speeds.

Ice was a speculation after the crash happened, but I didn't see anything indicating that icing was believed to be a significant factor in the report.
 
Trash 80! :rockon:

I wrote my first commercial software on a Trash 80 model 1. We had a full house system. Dual floppies, expansion interface, 64KB of RAM and the Percom disk doubler. I wrote an accounting system and an electrical estimating system on TRS-80. I also wrote an energy calculation program that generated reports for heat pump sales people to use.

John

A broadband radio transmitter masquerading as a computer. Those things put out a ton of RF. They were removed from the market by 1 October 1983 because they couldn't be made to meet the FCC's new (at the time) limits from radiated and power line conducted emissions (47 CFR Part 15).
 
According to the full report, he realized he was at 99 KIAS (stall speed 94 for the configuration) and then shoved the power levers forward to prevent from stalling. When he did that at such a low speed, the plane's tendency is to bank to the right. That plane has left hand rotation propellers, hence the right roll tendency. According to the MU-2 folks it's documented that you should never apply a lot of power quickly at low speeds for exactly that reason. My understanding is the spoilers tend to give you less authority vs. ailerons anyway, especially at low speeds.

Ice was a speculation after the crash happened, but I didn't see anything indicating that icing was believed to be a significant factor in the report.
Thanks... I figured ther would be a logical explanation. The more you know about your airplane, the better off you’ll be...
 
A broadband radio transmitter masquerading as a computer. Those things put out a ton of RF. They were removed from the market by 1 October 1983 because they couldn't be made to meet the FCC's new (at the time) limits from radiated and power line conducted emissions (47 CFR Part 15).
I believe it! That thing had more exposed cables than a wiring closet! Well, maybe not that many but a lot!
 
First part... why did the pilot do that?? Why didn’t he pull the throttles back??
Second part... why did the airplane do that? Why did it roll? Ice?
Once someone gets that far behind and buried there is no longer a rhyme or reason as to why they did anything. The death certificate was already signed by that point.

Not much different than the folks that stall a 172 on a clear and a million day and crash. Same fundamental problem.
 
I finally caught up with this thread. I’ve watch more than a couple pilots be too hot and fast on an approach, or even VFR pattern. It is pretty easy to see from the right or the left seat whether things were going to work out or not....

Not bailing on that approach at 1500 high and 100kts fast was just insane. I wouldnt let a student try to salvage that imc a 172, because I’d hate for them to think that they could/should on their own...
 
I finally caught up with this thread. I’ve watch more than a couple pilots be too hot and fast on an approach, or even VFR pattern. It is pretty easy to see from the right or the left seat whether things were going to work out or not....

Not bailing on that approach at 1500 high and 100kts fast was just insane. I wouldnt let a student try to salvage that imc a 172, because I’d hate for them to think that they could/should on their own...

If you were 100 kts fast in a 172 I think you'd have other issues, like exceeding Vne. ;)

That whole crash was sad. It really hit me when it happened - I think largely because I'd talked to Pascal a month or so before he died and he left a wife and 3 kids behind, like I would if I crashed and died.

I'll be doing my best to not crash and die, and that includes not making the mistakes he made.
 
You'll probably find Ted that you'll set you approach power on the Torque gauges. On mine, it's pretty much at 180hp/side and that results in about 120kts for the approach if I recall correctly (it's been 5 months since I flew it).
 
A broadband radio transmitter masquerading as a computer. Those things put out a ton of RF. They were removed from the market by 1 October 1983 because they couldn't be made to meet the FCC's new (at the time) limits from radiated and power line conducted emissions (47 CFR Part 15).
Hey, remember the Trash playing "music" on an AM radio?
 
If you were 100 kts fast in a 172 I think you'd have other issues, like exceeding Vne. ;)

Made me laugh while I’m waiting to see the doc again.

Think I have a sinus infection now or strep or who the hell knows.

But at least it’s not still the flu.
 
  • Like
Reactions: Ted
Appropriate for the MU-2...

 
Better get your memory checked, @steingar. I think we're up to four now: (Names linked to threads, description linked to NTSB report)

1) Vic Steelhammer (trombair) - IFR approach
2) John Lancaster - Approach to an oil rig
3) Dwight B. Van Zanen - Go-around
4) Daniel Bernath - Insufficient VFR brain reserves

Mostly before my time, except DVBZ, who I don't recall at all. Never thought of Bernath as part of our little community. Belonging to any group that includes that guy makes me throw in my mouth a little.
 
Mostly before my time, except DVBZ, who I don't recall at all. Never thought of Bernath as part of our little community. Belonging to any group that includes that guy makes me throw in my mouth a little.
Well, Bernath's name on this list at least needs an asterisk. His first NTSB report was before he signed up here, due to landing his Flight Design CT to check the gas, finding it had 0 gallons in one tank and 3 gallons in the other tank, and taking off again with nowhere near enough fuel to reach his destination, much less adequate VFR day reserves. He sued Flight Design for not warning him that the engine would stop if the plane ran out of gas, then signed up here to defend his lawsuit. That was all before my time. He apparently only ever posted in that one thread, and wasn't seen here again.

So, Bernath was the subject of two NTSB reports but (1) the first one was before he joined here and (2) his only participation here was to argue that the plane that he crashed after running out of fuel was faulty due to insufficient warnings about that happening. (Ironically, based on his responses to other posts in the thread he participated in here, I do not believe that a written warning would have made its way into his cognitive processes.) That deserves an asterisk if we're going to list him among POA members who got into NTSB reports.
 
Back
Top