Cirrus down near Aspen

The pilot did exactly what Cirrus tells pilots to do when a potential emergency arises...pull the red handle. He did and they are alive today. If they were in, say, a Mooney the outcome may have been very different and a rather different discussion would be taking place on POA.
As far as poking fun at Cirrus pilots, I currently ride a Harley-Davidson and get a lot of ribbing from metric riders, even though I've gone over a 100,000 miles without a breakdown. When I rode metrics we used to poke fun at Harleys (in the '70s) as they actually were a 1/2 ton of roadable crap. So the poking fun will never end and it's rather amusing to see how products like Harley and Cirrus are marketed. Harley has spent the last two decades marketing to 50 yo bearded, big bellied men and now the supply of those is running out so they are shifting to different bikes that appeal to younger riders to save the company. Interesting to see if they can pull it off.
 
Maybe I’m stupid, but I would not want to pull the chute over the Rockies.

Yeah, me three. So many other options seem much more attractive than pulling the chute in this scenario. Wonder if he tried any of them.

Obviously, the concern is loss of control in IMC, but with all of the other resources, backup AI, moving map, GPS ground speed, vectors from ATC, etc. you ought to be able to make a 180 back to lower terrain and/or VMC.

C.
 
Maybe I’m stupid, but I would not want to pull the chute over the Rockies.
Not stupid.. and it's a sobering proposition. These guys were lucky to have landed somewhere not totally remote. Had they not pulled the chute, would they be alive? Maybe.. maybe not.. given how often small planes crash, the average aviator doesn't seem to be as skilled as we like to think. Go to the NTSB database, search by fatal.. and you'll find plenty 200 fatals since May of 2018, in the US alone, in single engine piston.. of which, incidentally, only 3 were Cirrus

Randomly clicking on just a handful from the list.. these all sound like pretty ridiculous, and at least for the first two, very preventable accidents. No, the chute would not have saved the first 2, and probably not the 3rd one either, depending on the root cause

-4 people dead, C182, sounds like they hit an antennae
https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/R...tID=20200112X30726&AKey=1&RType=HTML&IType=FA

-2 people dead, M20C, departure stall?
https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/R...tID=20191231X83852&AKey=1&RType=HTML&IType=FA

-1 person dead, M20C, some kind of CFIT.. scud running? Engine failure?
https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/R...tID=20191213X42028&AKey=1&RType=HTML&IType=FA

^my point is, we're not as good as we think we are.. the dude in the C182 was an ATP. Mistakes happen, and more tools in the bag are better than less

I suspect if the parachute had not been used, we would be speculating why this pilot flew into the side of a mountain instead.
Yes! And we wouldn't know it was because of a panel going "haywire" .. we would just assume he lost it in IMC, and make the (in)appropriate judgements of flying single engine piston in the winter in the mountains.. at least from this we can learn a little

So many other options seem much more attractive than pulling the chute in this scenario
In and out of IMC.. with instruments you don't trust, right after departure when you're still lower than the mountains.. 30 second longer he'd have been in the mountain. I am not sure how many he *actually* had for other options. Ofcourse he can fly it partial panel.. but, how often do people train that, maybe during a BFR or IPC..? we all think it's easy but I've seen 2,000 hr people really FUBAR partial panel approaches under the hood. There's no guarantee his standby gauges worked either, if it was a frozen pitot (or static, remember static also impacts airspeed) his standby was probably bogus as well.. it's not a death sentence, but it's a huge and unexpected increase in workload

Obviously, the concern is loss of control in IMC, but with all of the other resources, backup AI, moving map, GPS ground speed, vectors from ATC, etc. you ought to be able to make a 180 back to lower terrain and/or VMC.
Sounds like his immediate indication was a degrading airspeed and subsequent stall indication.. this may force the AP into an envelope protection mode and command a nose down pitch, so naturally he likely had AP off and hand flew it for a short while.. and now he has to start troubleshooting, while flying the plane and navigating.. to then ultimately having to fly an approach back into the airport in and out of the clouds with unreliable airspeed and possible other instruments. GPS ground speed is okay, but a 10-20 knot wind aloft can make that data rather suspect, and potentially useless. Certainly do-able, and we were all trained to fly partial panel. The chute was not his only option, but I gather it was the best option at the time

Flying over "the middle of nowhere" and mountains (CO, Sierra Nevada, etc.) I've often shuddered at the though of "chute"ing in. I guess it's like abandoning ship in a storm in high sea, the prospect sucks, but if death is likely otherwise, might as well take your chances
 
I have never wanted to pull a chute.........

This is not directly about the Cirrus itself, but the trend to MFD’s. I have flown for over 50 years


The MFD freezes, you lose too many pieces of information that are vital to safe flight.

In my many years of flying, I have had gyro horizon unusable 3 times that come to mind.

Directional gyro went spinning or stopped turning with turns 2 times.

Turn and bank, never failed.

Air speed indicator, one time.

Altimeter, one time, delayed indication of altitude change, both up and down, errors about 800 feet max, ATC gave me a block altitude and we were fine.

Vertical speed indicator, same event as altimeter, same errors.

Compass, never.


Note that the only time that I had 2 failures at once, there was water in the static air lines, bubbling as I climbed or descended. Otherwise, I always had a backup instrument when a device quit working.

Some will say that I had no backup for the airspeed, but by matching rate of climb to RPM, I knew my approximate airspeed, and in the approach to land, familiar sounds kept me comfortable that my speed was right.


The horizon gets drunk? Use the T&B for turn stability for needed turns, and VSI for stable altitude changes.

DG quits? Time turns, and use the compass to find direction when not turning, then turn some more till you have what you need.

Altimeter/ROC loses static air? Fly someplace with an airport radar and VFR conditions, get radar vectors down to visual conditions. If you, as I do, keep the plane trimmed all the time, a slight increase of RPM will assure that you do not descend while flying to the airport. If necessary, circle up till at an altitude above the chart MSA.


In more than 50 years of flying, the standard 6 pack has never left me without all the information to continue safely in Instrument conditions, and land at the airport of my choice.

It severely bothers me when people think they have all the instruments they need, and one piece of the set fails, and they have inadequate information to safely fly their plane. That is too much information provided by one device.

Additionally, they should not all be electric. I have had 2 alternator failures that lasted longer than the battery, landed without radios. Getting down from 9 or 10,000 feet, then to a suitable airport takes time.
 
"The pilot did exactly what Cirrus said to do". yes, Cirrus is selling planes, and every survivor is most likely to use the insurance money for a new Cirrus, the previous one just saved them.
 
So...if the chute pull was a result of inadequate flight planning or training, how much does the luxury of a parachute pull impact the rest of us in terms of increased insurance premiums??
 
Not stupid.. and it's a sobering proposition. These guys were lucky to have landed somewhere not totally remote. Had they not pulled the chute, would they be alive? Maybe.. maybe not.. given how often small planes crash, the average aviator doesn't seem to be as skilled as we like to think. Go to the NTSB database, search by fatal.. and you'll find plenty 200 fatals since May of 2018, in the US alone, in single engine piston.. of which, incidentally, only 3 were Cirrus

Randomly clicking on just a handful from the list.. these all sound like pretty ridiculous, and at least for the first two, very preventable accidents. No, the chute would not have saved the first 2, and probably not the 3rd one either, depending on the root cause

-4 people dead, C182, sounds like they hit an antennae
https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/R...tID=20200112X30726&AKey=1&RType=HTML&IType=FA

-2 people dead, M20C, departure stall?
https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/R...tID=20191231X83852&AKey=1&RType=HTML&IType=FA

-1 person dead, M20C, some kind of CFIT.. scud running? Engine failure?
https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/R...tID=20191213X42028&AKey=1&RType=HTML&IType=FA

^my point is, we're not as good as we think we are.. the dude in the C182 was an ATP. Mistakes happen, and more tools in the bag are better than less


Yes! And we wouldn't know it was because of a panel going "haywire" .. we would just assume he lost it in IMC, and make the (in)appropriate judgements of flying single engine piston in the winter in the mountains.. at least from this we can learn a little


In and out of IMC.. with instruments you don't trust, right after departure when you're still lower than the mountains.. 30 second longer he'd have been in the mountain. I am not sure how many he *actually* had for other options. Ofcourse he can fly it partial panel.. but, how often do people train that, maybe during a BFR or IPC..? we all think it's easy but I've seen 2,000 hr people really FUBAR partial panel approaches under the hood. There's no guarantee his standby gauges worked either, if it was a frozen pitot (or static, remember static also impacts airspeed) his standby was probably bogus as well.. it's not a death sentence, but it's a huge and unexpected increase in workload


Sounds like his immediate indication was a degrading airspeed and subsequent stall indication.. this may force the AP into an envelope protection mode and command a nose down pitch, so naturally he likely had AP off and hand flew it for a short while.. and now he has to start troubleshooting, while flying the plane and navigating.. to then ultimately having to fly an approach back into the airport in and out of the clouds with unreliable airspeed and possible other instruments. GPS ground speed is okay, but a 10-20 knot wind aloft can make that data rather suspect, and potentially useless. Certainly do-able, and we were all trained to fly partial panel. The chute was not his only option, but I gather it was the best option at the time

Flying over "the middle of nowhere" and mountains (CO, Sierra Nevada, etc.) I've often shuddered at the though of "chute"ing in. I guess it's like abandoning ship in a storm in high sea, the prospect sucks, but if death is likely otherwise, might as well take your chances


Yup, good post.

My view:


This guy may or may not have been doing the right things up until the pull, but when he pulled he did the right thing. At the end of the day it sounds like this couple would have died without the chute.

All the guys talking about skill and giving up on skill, that stuff is all baloney. He ended up at the end of his skill set for this particular incident and pulled. Someone with out the chute at the end of their skill set, things rapidly compounding and going wrong, basically are left with a hope and a prayer. Their chances of making it are pretty low.

I think Denver pilot nailed it with the SA part of the flight planning. You really need to have a plan for flying out of airports like this and you need to execute that plan. It should involve flying an ODP or SID and sticking to it OR not flying until it is severe VMC. When things go south you need to stick to the plan until an alternate plan can be executed. A lost ASI should not be an issue for a Cirrus, but it can certainly cause a lot of extraneous distractions, most of which can be dealt with by pressing the little AP disconnect button on the stick and holding it down.

But non of us are perfect and stuff happens.

I fly a Cirrus. I do not give the chute any thought when planning and executing a flight other than a preflight brief as when and what altitudes I will pull on departure. That's it, I don't say "well I can take this chance because I have a chute". No sane person does that. The plane I fly has envelope protection, traffic and TAWS. The traffic system gets some work because I fly in some congested airspace, the TAWS and envelope protection NEVER go off. My promise to myself is if these systems start going off in flight with any type of small regularity, I will call my instructor, fess up and figure out how to fix it. I haven't had to do that yet.


I just did a currency check, which was signed off as a BFR, the flight portion involved slow flight, stalls, steep turns, short field work, engine out simulation, no flap landings among other things. The SR 22 is a docile well handling airplane. The review was fun. As far as the chute goes we were flying into Bedford, over Lowell MA, a small city, about 2,000 feet AGL and my engine "failed". I slowed to best glide, went through the engine out flow, engine was "dead". What are you going to do. No airports around, over a dense urban area. The answer was to glide over what looked like a large cemetery area and pull. No other reasonable alternative was there, just a bunch of bad options if you didn't have a chute that you would have to pick. Luckily the engine came back to "life".

Landing the 22 with no flaps at night was an interesting experience for me. With no flaps you fly 90 knots over the fence. Touching down at near 100 mph at night was wild. Good stuff.
 
Reading my posts on this old thread I want to clarify my position. I stand by my statement that I would not want to pull the chute in the Rockies. However, in this particular situation, I would have anyway. I still wouldn’t have wanted to have to.

Realizing that he was approaching rising terrain without airspeed indication or visual reference to the ground, the pilot decided to activate the Cirrus Airframe Parachute System (CAPS)
 
Whether the pilot and/or pilot-rated passenger opened the alternate static source following the loss of airspeed information could not be determined.

I don’t understand why they couldn’t just ask them before publishing this.
 
I don’t understand why they couldn’t just ask them before publishing this.
Maybe the position of the alternate static source didn’t match what they said they did.

what I find interesting is that there was no mention of an altimeter problem, but alternate static might have been a solution.
 
what I find interesting is that there was no mention of an altimeter problem, but alternate static might have been a solution.

yeah everything about this sounds like the Pitot portion of the system froze, not the Static lines. Eg overwhelmed the Pitot heat, or otherwise melted and water entered the pitot port and then froze in the lines???

Not anything to this severity, but I’ve had a mismatch of Altitude indications in IMC in cruise, and it can be really disorienting in IMC where you are supposed to “trust your instruments” but also getting a bunch of mismatched data and alarms that something is broken.
Luckily I was in level cruise, on autopilot, and well well above any possible terrain, so was able to clear up the error after a few minutes.
 
Would someone more familiar with this whole thread mind sharing:

1.) Were they in IMC?
2.) If not, was it night time?
3.) If not, why not a turn back or was there more instruments out?
 
Would someone more familiar with this whole thread mind sharing:

1.) Were they in IMC?
2.) If not, was it night time?
3.) If not, why not a turn back or was there more instruments out?
According to the report (you did read it, right?) late afternoon, not IMC. The instruments were flakey, pilot turned back but then the instruments appeared correct so he continued on original trip.

I don't fly a Cirrus but any one problem with the airplane, and I'm back on the ground ASAP. My very first pax after getting my license was a close friend (also a pastor). After the trip, the comment was "god forbid anything happens, but now I know how you want to die". Baloney! I intend to die of very old age, in my sleep and NOT in an airplane!
 
Not anything to this severity, but I’ve had a mismatch of Altitude indications in IMC in cruise, and it can be really disorienting in IMC where you are supposed to “trust your instruments” but also getting a bunch of mismatched data and alarms that something is broken.
Luckily I was in level cruise, on autopilot, and well well above any possible terrain, so was able to clear up the error after a few minutes.
Honestly, I see nothing in the final report that would warrant a competent instrument pilot pulling the chute.

Unfortunately the Instrument Flying Handbook (and therefore probably many, if not most, instructors) give short shrift to instrument malfunctions. Like @geezer , I’ve had several flight instrument malfunctions in flight, including in IMC conditions. The failed instrument(s) seemed immediately obvious to me, and other than changing my scan to ignore the failed instrument(s), the solution was simple, and the outcome was good.

I think when we decide it’s necessary to “choose between” control/performance and primary/supporting when flying instruments, we start reducing the tools available. The problem is compounded by only doing just enough partial panel training to be just proficient enough to pass the checkride.
 
According to the report (you did read it, right?) late afternoon, not IMC. The instruments were flakey, pilot turned back but then the instruments appeared correct so he continued on original trip.

I don't fly a Cirrus but any one problem with the airplane, and I'm back on the ground ASAP. My very first pax after getting my license was a close friend (also a pastor). After the trip, the comment was "god forbid anything happens, but now I know how you want to die". Baloney! I intend to die of very old age, in my sleep and NOT in an airplane!
I didn't have time to read it when I posted thus asking for a few quick facts. I did read it just now. Seems he was in day time IMC and approaching rising terrain:

"The pilot began the takeoff roll on runway 33 about 1520. Shortly after takeoff, the indicated airspeed decreased from normal climb speed to less than 20 knots. Immediately thereafter, the primary flight display (PFD) completely lost airspeed indication and displayed red X's. At the same time, the backup airspeed indicator became unreliable. The pilot decided to return to the airport, and as he maneuvered the airplane, the airspeed indicator became operational again. After confirming the airplane’s speed, the pilot began to retract the flaps, activated his flight plan on the avionics, and engaged the autopilot. Shortly thereafter, the airplane entered instrument meteorological conditions, the airspeed indicator once again failed, and the autopilot disengaged. Realizing that he was approaching rising terrain without airspeed indication or visual reference to the ground, the pilot decided to activate the Cirrus Airframe Parachute System (CAPS). Upon activation of the CAPS, the passenger immediately notified air traffic control via the airplane radio and requested assistance. After more than 5 hours, a rescue crew arrived on foot. The pilot and passenger safely exited the airplane through their respective cabin doors without further incident or injuries."

...that is piling up quite a few nasties! Even with a GPS moving map still working (assumed by me) yuck with no altimeter and not totally sure of altitude remaining above the rising terrain. I think he did the right thing.
 
I didn't have time to read it when I posted thus asking for a few quick facts. I did read it just now. Seems he was in day time IMC and approaching rising terrain:

"The pilot began the takeoff roll on runway 33 about 1520. Shortly after takeoff, the indicated airspeed decreased from normal climb speed to less than 20 knots. Immediately thereafter, the primary flight display (PFD) completely lost airspeed indication and displayed red X's. At the same time, the backup airspeed indicator became unreliable. The pilot decided to return to the airport, and as he maneuvered the airplane, the airspeed indicator became operational again. After confirming the airplane’s speed, the pilot began to retract the flaps, activated his flight plan on the avionics, and engaged the autopilot. Shortly thereafter, the airplane entered instrument meteorological conditions, the airspeed indicator once again failed, and the autopilot disengaged. Realizing that he was approaching rising terrain without airspeed indication or visual reference to the ground, the pilot decided to activate the Cirrus Airframe Parachute System (CAPS). Upon activation of the CAPS, the passenger immediately notified air traffic control via the airplane radio and requested assistance. After more than 5 hours, a rescue crew arrived on foot. The pilot and passenger safely exited the airplane through their respective cabin doors without further incident or injuries."

...that is piling up quite a few nasties! Even with a GPS moving map still working (assumed by me) yuck with no altimeter and not totally sure of altitude remaining above the rising terrain. I think he did the right thing.
I’m not seeing any indication that he actually lost his altimeter.
 
The perspective + has a GPS gagl?? function that gives you the height you are above ground level. While not an altimeter, it would certainly be useful should your altimeter fail. This airplane most likely had this feature.
 
I didn't have time to read it when I posted thus asking for a few quick facts. I did read it just now. Seems he was in day time IMC and approaching rising terrain:

"The pilot began the takeoff roll on runway 33 about 1520. Shortly after takeoff, the indicated airspeed decreased from normal climb speed to less than 20 knots. Immediately thereafter, the primary flight display (PFD) completely lost airspeed indication and displayed red X's. At the same time, the backup airspeed indicator became unreliable. The pilot decided to return to the airport, and as he maneuvered the airplane, the airspeed indicator became operational again. After confirming the airplane’s speed, the pilot began to retract the flaps, activated his flight plan on the avionics, and engaged the autopilot. Shortly thereafter, the airplane entered instrument meteorological conditions, the airspeed indicator once again failed, and the autopilot disengaged. Realizing that he was approaching rising terrain without airspeed indication or visual reference to the ground, the pilot decided to activate the Cirrus Airframe Parachute System (CAPS). Upon activation of the CAPS, the passenger immediately notified air traffic control via the airplane radio and requested assistance. After more than 5 hours, a rescue crew arrived on foot. The pilot and passenger safely exited the airplane through their respective cabin doors without further incident or injuries."

...that is piling up quite a few nasties! Even with a GPS moving map still working (assumed by me) yuck with no altimeter and not totally sure of altitude remaining above the rising terrain. I think he did the right thing.
ack…I didn’t finish read it completely, missed the IMC. Those of us who live here avoid IMC in the hills.
 
I live near there. Filing ifr ase to ege is a lot of hassle for no gain. Imc in that area is not something most do in a piston single.
That day it would have been simple, easy, and safe to simply fly down valley around the corner vfr. In the long run it would probably be quicker.
 
I live near there. Filing ifr ase to ege is a lot of hassle for no gain. Imc in that area is not something most do in a piston single.
That day it would have been simple, easy, and safe to simply fly down valley around the corner vfr. In the long run it would probably be quicker.
Probably even easier to drive ( about an hour )
 
Might be a good idea to remain VFR if you encounter a problem with the instruments, even if things return to normal. Weather was 9OVC and 3-SN. Not great for a tight circuit but maybe doable.

The report talks about an alternate static. Perhaps worth an attempt even if only the airspeed was seen doing unusual things. Perhaps it was more than airspeed doing unusual things prior to losing the PFD, but only the airspeed was noticed. Can't hurt to try alternate static.
 
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You must drive a lot faster than I do!

An IFR flight ase to ege will be more time, obviously more hazard, than VFR.
Um…my bad, drive is somewhere between 1.5 and 2 hours depending on weather, traffic, speed traps…
 
That’s why the airplane comes with a chute. Pull the chute ,walk away,worry about replacing the airplane later.
 
That’s why the airplane comes with a chute. Pull the chute ,walk away,worry about replacing the airplane later.

Seems to me that perhaps making good decisions and skills in the cockpit might be a better choice. The pilot made poor decisions and put himself in an uncomfortable spot. It’s my belief that pulling the chute was not the last resort, but the first thought.
Just because you don’t die when hitting the ground, that doesn’t mean you will survive. A night or two in the snow can kill you nice and slow. Lots of wrecks in that area, many died before being found.
 
Yup, good post.

My view:




I just did a currency check, which was signed off as a BFR, the flight portion involved slow flight, stalls, steep turns, short field work, engine out simulation, no flap landings among other things. The SR 22 is a docile well handling airplane. The review was fun. As far as the chute goes we were flying into Bedford, over Lowell MA, a small city, about 2,000 feet AGL and my engine "failed". I slowed to best glide, went through the engine out flow, engine was "dead". What are you going to do. No airports around, over a dense urban area. The answer was to glide over what looked like a large cemetery area and pull. No other reasonable alternative was there, just a bunch of bad options if you didn't have a chute that you would have to pick. Luckily the engine came back to "life".

Landing the 22 with no flaps at night was an interesting experience for me. With no flaps you fly 90 knots over the fence. Touching down at near 100 mph at night was wild. Good stuff.

here is my big issue with TAA aircraft and cirrus. because of the redundancy and extent of the equipment in the aircraft it seems some of the general IFR skills seem to go by the way side. from your post, it sounds like you had a good, but general BFR. But the big thing I don't see is advanced system failure training. It seems to me that the pilots that fly TAA aircraft do not get the kind of system training and failure training they really need. the more advance the aircraft, the more advanced the training needs to be. I get it, the cost of training in a cirrus is expensive and the idea of training for a 1 in a million chance may seem like wasted money.

I find no fault in this pilots choice to pull, it probably saved his and his wives life, but I do have a problem with cirrus touting "saves". this accident screams, why did a pilot have to pull when one, or possibly two systems, failed in a aircraft that has multiply redundant systems. this screams lack of system knowledge and training in those systems. From what I have seen, a lot of system failure is glossed over in training in TAA aircraft with the idea of. "all these things and backups will never fail, so here is the overview." TAA aircraft require even more in depth training in systems and system failures because of the complexities of the systems and backups.
pulling over mountains is not a given, as it was pointed out, had the chute not snagged trees, they could have been killed as the plane slid down the slope. once you pull, you are along for the ride and where you land could be even more dangerous then the failure. I really don't like the cirrus idea of pull when anything goes wrong, i think it leads to pilots getting short changed on training.
 
here is my big issue with TAA aircraft and cirrus. because of the redundancy and extent of the equipment in the aircraft it seems some of the general IFR skills seem to go by the way side. from your post, it sounds like you had a good, but general BFR. But the big thing I don't see is advanced system failure training. It seems to me that the pilots that fly TAA aircraft do not get the kind of system training and failure training they really need. the more advance the aircraft, the more advanced the training needs to be. I get it, the cost of training in a cirrus is expensive and the idea of training for a 1 in a million chance may seem like wasted money.

I find no fault in this pilots choice to pull, it probably saved his and his wives life, but I do have a problem with cirrus touting "saves". this accident screams, why did a pilot have to pull when one, or possibly two systems, failed in a aircraft that has multiply redundant systems. this screams lack of system knowledge and training in those systems. From what I have seen, a lot of system failure is glossed over in training in TAA aircraft with the idea of. "all these things and backups will never fail, so here is the overview." TAA aircraft require even more in depth training in systems and system failures because of the complexities of the systems and backups.
pulling over mountains is not a given, as it was pointed out, had the chute not snagged trees, they could have been killed as the plane slid down the slope. once you pull, you are along for the ride and where you land could be even more dangerous then the failure. I really don't like the cirrus idea of pull when anything goes wrong, i think it leads to pilots getting short changed on training.

That post was from February. I take recurrent training every 6 months. So I recently completed another session that I had signed off as an IPC. This included reviewing of the Cirrus systems, approaches, unusual attitudes, ground and debrief. There were also a couple system failures included. I logged about 2.5 hobbs and the session took over 4 hours. More than half of the flying was hand flown, the rest was coupled. Both are important to practice. You are correct, the number of possible failures in a TAA aircraft increase almost exponentially over a 6 pack, but to be fair, at least with Cirrus, just about every critical system is redundant and/or backed up. The other thing about a TAA aircraft is that proficiency at dealing with the avionics is perishable, you need to use the systems to keep the muscle memory. Part of my regimen is to practice flying on the backup instruments only on the simulator. I've been flying about 150 hours a year right now, I have personal minimums per the Cirrus program and do many more approaches than are required to stay current per the FAA rules.

My own personal opinion is that many pilots look at the IFR rating and want to get it done as quickly as possible, with the least cost and expense. Some think it's a badge of honor to get the rating in with the minimum time and training required. And I don't fault them for it. Some people are naturally aces and this stuff comes easily. Some like me, have to work at it. When I started with my CFII (CSIP) he asked me what my goals were for this rating. I told him I wanted to be comfortable taking off, flying in and landing in IMC conditions. I didn't care how long it took, I did take longer than normal (at least in my mind), but I had an instructor that took me out in pretty much all the conditions I would run into alone. More than half my training and approaches were in IMC. My long X country featured most 3 approaches in IMC, night IMC, snow and ice. I could not have had this experience in a compressed learning environment. My instructor as also great in teaching me how to deal with ATC, the most important lesson being I am PIC of my mission, I don't begin an approach before I am ready regardless of what ATC wants.

I wasn't in the cockpit for this pull, so I can't speak to what happened. But I have talked to many pilots who have some apprehension about flying on instruments. I tell them invariably to find a CFII, fess up, then go out and beat it to death until you are no longer uncomfortable. Some take the advice, some don't.

Cirrus does not tell you to pull when anything goes wrong. There are situations where you have precious seconds to successfully pull. Those involve low level engine outs and loss of control situations. Cirrus advocates pulling immediately in those situations. But honestly, to get to that point, things probably haven't been going well for a while leading up to it. In my mind, the safest conclusion to flight is a competent pilot landing on a runway surface. For instance, in an engine out situation within easy reach of a runway, the safest thing for a competent pilot to do is to land on the runway. But if there is any doubt, the pilot should pull. A loss of control in IMC?? Best bet is probably to pull. An unusual attitude? I'm comfortable recovering those, but the bigger issue is why did you end up there? That may be a pull situation. If an emergency happens, but you are able to fly along and troubleshoot? That's not a pull situation, although the option is always there.

There is no quick answer to this stuff. The best answer is practice and proficiency. That is with any aircraft.
 
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