Cirrus down in Texas

I guess I’ll just go ahead and say it. I had to make this very choice last Sunday afternoon.

It’s crazy how a runway in sight is still a temptation with decent fields around you…

Had an engine seize with a client and we did end up taking the field, but not before making an effort to reach a runway. We were about 3 miles short where we ended up. Didn’t bend anything, but it could’ve been worse.

View attachment 110172
Damn! Thanks for sharing and glad everything is okay!
 
Pictures from the scene show the chute deployed but not really opened.
 
I guess I’ll just go ahead and say it. I had to make this very choice last Sunday afternoon.

It’s crazy how a runway in sight is still a temptation with decent fields around you…

Had an engine seize with a client and we did end up taking the field, but not before making an effort to reach a runway. We were about 3 miles short where we ended up. Didn’t bend anything, but it could’ve been worse.

View attachment 110172

Well done!!!
 
I guess I’ll just go ahead and say it. I had to make this very choice last Sunday afternoon.

It’s crazy how a runway in sight is still a temptation with decent fields around you…

Had an engine seize with a client and we did end up taking the field, but not before making an effort to reach a runway. We were about 3 miles short where we ended up. Didn’t bend anything, but it could’ve been worse.

View attachment 110172

I do NOT want to make this thread about me, and RIP to the deceased, but I’m saying that I personally understand that the mindset of making the field with the airplane when you still have partial power, or a sick, but still running engine is a real thing.

Did you gear up or down? What did you do after you landed? Glad everyone is ok.
 
Did you gear up or down? What did you do after you landed? Glad everyone is ok.
Like I said, this thread is about the Cirrus, I was just commenting on the mindset. I’ll probably post a better writeup later. The good news is that two of the people on board the Cirrus appear to have survived, so hopefully we'll get a better idea of what went wrong eventually.
 
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Like I said, this thread is about the Cirrus, I was just commenting on the mindset. I’ll probably post a better writeup later. The good news is that two of the people on board the Cirrus appear to have survived, so hopefully we'll get a better idea of what went wrong eventually.
Classy response to not make this tragedy about you.
 
@Flying Keys any chance you could work that weather magic you did in the other thread ???

Here are a few things that might help you visualize the situation.
3D Views:
1) Looking NE
N420SS 3D View.JPG
The blue ball is where the AP Altitude hold was turned off. LNAV mode continued being active until a slight level off, leading to the red ball, where the AP was completely turned off:

2 )Looking fairly down the runway to the north-northwest
N420SS 3D View Alt.JPG

3) Profile view, looking west:
N420SS Profile.JPG

4) Closer profile of the short final
N420SS Profile Close.JPG

5) Planview of the flight path with 2100 Radar Mosiac (2055 and 2105 Mosaics did not provide much additional insight - no developments in the immediate vicinity or indications of outflow, etc).
N420SS 2D with radar overlay.JPG

6) Closer-in planview without radar
N420SS 2D close.JPG

I'm aware this was a visual approach, but for reference I added FLICKA, the FAF for the LOC 17R approach, pegged to the minimum altitude of 1800 MSL

As noted above, there was a slight level-off prior to the AP turning off, at which point, they entered a pretty steep descent and a slight right turn just before the ADS-B trail ended.

That's about all I have - the only armchair analysis I can add is that I don't think weather was a factor as the returns were pretty far away and there were too many other a/c in the pattern to not notice windshear.
 
Here are a few things that might help you visualize the situation.
3D Views:
1) Looking NE
View attachment 110273
The blue ball is where the AP Altitude hold was turned off. LNAV mode continued being active until a slight level off, leading to the red ball, where the AP was completely turned off:

2 )Looking fairly down the runway to the north-northwest
View attachment 110272

3) Profile view, looking west:
View attachment 110274

4) Closer profile of the short final
View attachment 110276

5) Planview of the flight path with 2100 Radar Mosiac (2055 and 2105 Mosaics did not provide much additional insight - no developments in the immediate vicinity or indications of outflow, etc).
View attachment 110271

6) Closer-in planview without radar
View attachment 110270

I'm aware this was a visual approach, but for reference I added FLICKA, the FAF for the LOC 17R approach, pegged to the minimum altitude of 1800 MSL

As noted above, there was a slight level-off prior to the AP turning off, at which point, they entered a pretty steep descent and a slight right turn just before the ADS-B trail ended.

That's about all I have - the only armchair analysis I can add is that I don't think weather was a factor as the returns were pretty far away and there were too many other a/c in the pattern to not notice windshear.


That's cool graphic. @scottd on another forum had a Nexrad Level II sequence for KGHX showing an outflow boundary and collapsing cell over the approach corridor for this airport. He said that the data we see removes the outflow stuff because it doesn't have precip in it. The more I learn about this weather stuff, the less I realize I know.

It would be cool to see your location data on that image.
 
1. How high were they when engine quit? 1800ft?
2. Distance from closest runway at that point?

Assuming a glide ratio of 8.8:1 (from the SR22 manual) at 1800 feet and if flown properly, they would make it from 2.99 miles out.

Any excess speed over best glide, you should also point the nose up right away until you reach it, so as to gain some extra distance. You can even use the wind in your favor and land with a tailwind if it gets you to the runway.
 
1. How high were they when engine quit? 1800ft?
2. Distance from closest runway at that point?

Assuming a glide ratio of 8.8:1 (from the SR22 manual) at 1800 feet and if flown properly, they would make it from 2.99 miles out.

Any excess speed over best glide, you should also point the nose up right away until you reach it, so as to gain some extra distance. You can even use the wind in your favor and land with a tailwind if it gets you to the runway.
That glide is clean, with flaps they fly like a rock. Apparently this guy was (is?) an experienced pilot with a factory pilot on board. I'm really starting to think they drew the unlucky card.
 
1. How high were they when engine quit? 1800ft?
2. Distance from closest runway at that point?

Assuming a glide ratio of 8.8:1 (from the SR22 manual) at 1800 feet and if flown properly, they would make it from 2.99 miles out.

Any excess speed over best glide, you should also point the nose up right away until you reach it, so as to gain some extra distance. You can even use the wind in your favor and land with a tailwind if it gets you to the runway.

Q1 and Q2 was discussed earlier in the thread.
 
That's cool graphic. @scottd on another forum had a Nexrad Level II sequence for KGHX showing an outflow boundary and collapsing cell over the approach corridor for this airport. He said that the data we see removes the outflow stuff because it doesn't have precip in it. The more I learn about this weather stuff, the less I realize I know.

It would be cool to see your location data on that image.

I’d like to see that. I have the raw level II data, but no way to open it. However, I looked at the base echoes and velocities from a different commercial site and there is no evidence of outflow at that location at that time. The storms to the north didn't collapse for over an hour after the accident; a relatively weak outflow reached KDWH at about 2313Z. At that point the wind did shift to northerly, as you would expect.

KDWH 012153Z 23007KT 10SM CLR 32/24 A2990 RMK AO2 LTG DSNT NW-NE SLP121 T03220239
KDWH 012253Z 18003KT 10SM CLR 31/23 A2990 RMK AO2 LTG DSNT NW-NE SLP123 T03110228
KDWH 012353Z 02004KT 10SM SCT040 SCT050 28/22 A2992 RMK AO2 LTG DSNT NW SLP130 T02830222 10356 20283 53009

There was additional outflow from a collapsing storm just southeast of Downtown Houston, but that was mitigated by the outflow from the north and never reached the field.

Not sure what you're looking for as far as location data. I downloaded the kml of the flight path from Flightradar 24 and imported it into Google Earth. The radar data were overlaid in GE using geographic references on the respective basemaps. The point-by-point analyses were mine. Quick and dirty, but I stand behind it.
 
Something changed in the 10 seconds prior to AP disconnect. The descent rate and groundspeed both started falling. Then after the AP went off, the descent rate increased dramatically without a big increase in groundspeed.

EDIT: Actually, it looks like it was simply leveling off at the target autopilot altitude of 960ft. Makes you wonder if it just got slow as the altitude was being captured, then went into a steep, but slow descent when they kicked it off.
 
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They were well above the nominal 3° glidepath provided by the PAPI until just after the AP disconnect (when they quickly went below it). The level-off between 4 and 5 nm from the PAPI units brought them almost 250' above GP at both the 4nm and 3nm distances, respectively. At 2nm, they were still almost 200' above GP, that's when a second level-off occurred (presumably an altitude capture of 960'), just before the AP was disconnected.

This is not to presume any airmanship or mechanical errors, just bringing to light some facts for our situational awareness.

EDIT: To put this in perspective, at 4nm from the PAPI, when they began the descent, they would have had to fly a 3.75° glidepath to make the touchdown zone. At 2NM, after the second level-off and AP disconnect, they were still needing to fly the same glidepath.
 
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Hopefully no stall regime; I believe that all Cirrus aircraft have "envelope protection" as that's part of Garmin's system.
This is an odd one, though we later find that most "odd" crashes really do have mundane causes.
 
Something changed in the 10 seconds prior to AP disconnect. The descent rate and groundspeed both started falling. Then after the AP went off, the descent rate increased dramatically without a big increase in groundspeed.

EDIT: Actually, it looks like it was simply leveling off at the target autopilot altitude of 960ft. Makes you wonder if it just got slow as the altitude was being captured, then went into a steep, but slow descent when they kicked it off.
With the steep descent with ap coming off makes me wonder about a runaway trim at a really bad time ??
 
Something changed in the 10 seconds prior to AP disconnect. The descent rate and groundspeed both started falling. Then after the AP went off, the descent rate increased dramatically without a big increase in groundspeed.

EDIT: Actually, it looks like it was simply leveling off at the target autopilot altitude of 960ft. Makes you wonder if it just got slow as the altitude was being captured, then went into a steep, but slow descent when they kicked it off.
How was it determined when the AP was disconnected?
 
Clearly shows an outflow boundary pivoting through the eastern part of the approach corridor with a collapsing cell on the western side. No way to know for sure if this was responsible for this accident. The velocity data I examined didn't have any kind of classic microburst signature. As I've said for the last 20+ years folks...beware of the benign...that supercell thunderstorm is not the one that is going to bite you. The "collective we" have been using the wrong approach to teach pilots about convection. The one that is currently taught will lead pilots down the primrose path to end up as an NTSB statistic. I did a presentation at SUN 'n FUN and AirVenture that discussed this a bit.

View attachment 110353


Completely disagree in this case. There was no outflow at or near the field at the time of the final approach. Everything was fairly good (even higher than normal glidepath) until they clicked off the autopilot. The outflow you show would have not produced that result unless the final approach occurred an hour after it did.
 
Completely disagree in this case. There was no outflow at or near the field at the time of the final approach. Everything was fairly good (even higher than normal glidepath) until they clicked off the autopilot. The outflow you show would have not produced that result unless the final approach occurred an hour after it did.

It would be cool to add the flight path to Scott's animation. If you had an event strong enough to cause the aircraft to fall out of the sky the AP would disconnect on it's own.
 
It would be cool to add the flight path to Scott's animation. If you had an event strong enough to cause the aircraft to fall out of the sky the AP would disconnect on it's own.

You’re flying away from the proposed shear. In this case, you’d get increasing performance.
 
Sure, you have every right to disagree, but this kind of environment is conducive for low-level wind shear. Wasn't long ago I experienced a similar event on short final into Denver with the same look and feel of the level II NEXRAD data. It also caused two other aircraft to go around on the same visual approach. I've looked at hundreds of cases over the last 30+ years and given the distance from the radar site, the outflow boundary that was closer to the surface along with the collapsing cell is more likely than not to have produced some interesting conditions on final approach. Of course all of this depends on the accuracy of the data we have available which in some expert witness work I have done, the position on Flightaware (or other apps) isn't all that accurate compared to the radar data dump from the ASR-11 or ASR-9 which have a refresh rate of 4.6 seconds.

Looking at the ADS-B track, there is no reason to suspect shear.

Looking at the METAR, there is no reason to suspect shear at that time.

Looking at the radar, there is reason to suspect shear an hour after the accident, when the outflow did indeed pass and shift the wind to the north, as indicated by the last METAR I posted above.

How many other planes were in the pattern? Did any of them indicate shear enough to knock an airplane high on approach out of the sky? Was it coincidence that it was slowing the descent to capture the preselected AP altitude and as soon as the AP kicked off, it began a steady descent to the ground?
 
It would be cool to add the flight path to Scott's animation. If you had an event strong enough to cause the aircraft to fall out of the sky the AP would disconnect on it's own.

Also, you’d only get about three radar frames with the aircraft in it. The outflow from the collapsing northern storm did not reach the field for another hour.
 
View attachment 110174
What struck me though was that another minute and a half of the engine limping and it might have been in a place where the options were a lot less pretty - way more trees - and the temptation to stretch the glide would have been that much stronger. One of my takeaways is that with a very sick engine you might be better off staying over fields or intentionally making a precautionary landing before it gets worse rather than continuing over a less friendly area.

I once saw a video where an old military pilot said an engine out was actually better than a partial power or intermittent power, there is no way I can find it now but it might have been on AOPA...

The one think that was drilled into me during training was best glide give you max distance. you will not go a farther distance by stretching the guild.
 
Looks like Scott pulled the animation.
I once saw a video where an old military pilot said an engine out was actually better than a partial power or intermittent power, there is no way I can find it now but it might have been on AOPA...

The one think that was drilled into me during training was best glide give you max distance. you will not go a farther distance by stretching the guild.

I think with a partial engine failure you don't give up altitude. If you can't maintain altitude then you had better plan finding a place to put it down gently.
 
Nope. I didn't believe it either, but I've seen ASDB traces that showed AP function.

Depends on the autopilot. Some show the mode selected on ADS B, but they are the exception rather than the norm, at least right now.
 
I think with a partial engine failure you don't give up altitude. If you can't maintain altitude then you had better plan finding a place to put it down gently.
Agreed. If you think you have a GOOD landing option underneath you, you're probably more likely to save the plane, and possibly the engine, if you can do it while you have choice.
 
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